TOWARDS REGAINING
STABILITY AND DIGNITY
IN THE CRADLE OF EUROPE
prepared by the
CORUM RESEARCH GROUP
POB 2580 1211 Geneva 2 - swissbit@solami.com
........
in cooperation with the
GOOD
OFFICES GROUP OF EUROPEAN LAWMAKERS
.....
and the INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE
FOR EUROPEAN
SECURITY AND COOPERATION
.....
.....
initially on the occasion of the
FOURTH SYMPOSIUM OF THE FORUM FOUNDATION -
Crans,
1993
.....
last update: June 21, 2006 (on the Internet at:
http://www.solami.com/93-29.html)
June 12-14, 1991 - CONFOEDERATIO
EUROPAE, Assises
June 30, 1991 - An
Appeal for Help
July 3, 1991 - Memo
2: The Humanitarian Law Basis for Neutralized Zones
October 30, 1991 - Memo
5: DUBROVNIK, the 1st European Commenwealth Town
September 3, 1992 - PROTECTION
OF MINORITIES
October 25, 1992 - L'AIDE
HUMANITAIRE SERT-ELLE A DEFENDRE LES PEUPLES?
July 2, 1993 - Memo
7: UN Trusteeship Plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina
July 29, 1993 - DECLARATION
AGAINST GENOCIDE
September 7, 1993 - International
Minority Protection Guarantees in ex-Yugoslavia
September 7, 1993 - Legal
Facts and Considerations
December 1993 - Draft UN General
Assembly Resolutions (ex-Yugoslavia,
Way
Out)
January 5, 1994 - GOGEL
to: The Hon. Datuk Dominic PUTHUCHEARY, ISIS Malaysia
January 27, 1994 - GOGEL
to: HRH The Sultan of Brunei
February 7, 1994 - AGENDA
FOR ALBANESE ACTIONS
April 5, 1994 - From
Broken Promises to Real Minority Protection in former Yugoslavia
July 14, 1994 - Mediation
Plan
August 26, 1994 -
ACTION PLAN FOR EX-YUGOSLAVIA
March 6, 1995 - Towards
a Europe-Linked Referendum in ex-Yugoslavia
March 22, 1995 - Beyond
Responsibility, Co-Responsibility and Guilt on former Yugoslavia
July 17, 1995 - Will
Great Power Complicity Undo the UN as With the League of Nations?
August 30, 1995 - Minorities
Then, Now and Hence
July 18, 1996 - Memo
9: Keeping the Balkan Peace Process on the Rails
May 2, 1999 - ELEMENTS
OF A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON KOSOVO
May 2, 1999 - Treaty
of Saint Germain-en-Laye: signatories, conference observers
May 10, 1999 - The
Saint Germain-en-Laye Treaty - a Pathway for Kosovo?
June 7, 1999 - Kosovo
with or without Metohija?
This map was originally attached to
the manuscript which was published under the title "From
Broken Promises to real Minority Protection in former Yugoslavia" (UN document
E/CN.4/1994/NGO/54).
It
outlines then-conceivable mutually agreeable UN trusteeship functions in
various parts of former Yugoslavia. It remains to be seen whether
these and similar ideas reflect more than mutually missed opportunities,
and what, if anything, they can contribute towards a viable resolution
of the current conflicts in that area.
(click here for a high-resolution 117 KB version
of this map: depending on your equipment, it may take several minutes to
print; for individual formatting, download it first from: http://www.solami.com/yugo2.gif)
EDITOR'S NOTE (9 March 1999)
Item 1: Skanderbeg - the Albanians' national hero - doesn't seem to have any particular bearing on the current Kosovo conflict. Yet, he is widely credited with having blocked Turkey's onslaught on Europe for some 25 crucial years. Namely after the Serbs who, under King Lazar, in 1389 and precisely in Kosovo, though defeated, had succeded at least to slow the Islamic thrust into the heart of Europe. Thus both the Serbs and the Albanians (many of whom were of Serbian descent) had rendered an invaluable service to Europe as a whole. All this is recognized and venerated not only by nostalgic Serbs, but by other European Christians with a memory. As in these and other cases, a better, unbiased knowledge of our common past might bring to light much needed common ground. And go a long way to inspire the negotiators - currently meeting at Rambouillet - to achieve a dignified, practical and lasting solution to a conflict in Europe's currently most pressing trouble spot.
Item 2: Be they Albanians, Macedonians, Serbs, Tzigans or whatever, the inhabitants of Kosovo are not known for their particular depedency on computers. And yet, on the international scene, they are all in the front row to draw substantial benefit from a problem other societies are increasingly nervous about, i.e. the year 2000 computer bug (Y2K). This is so, because if they manage to prolong the cease-fire in Kosovo into the next year, they have a chance to work out by themselves well-founded and lasting solutions meeting above all their own and not foreign interests. For by that time, the chancelleries of all OECD countries can be expected to be overly busy with other - and not least their own - problems.
Item 3: Our mandate of June 1991 solicited our "good offices ... towards a peaceful, early and lasting resolution of the crisis" of Yugoslavia which then started to unravel at the seams. It hadn't occurred to us that the results of our efforts could one day become helpful in the search for a viable solution of the Kosovo conflict. Until the negotiators at Rambouillet seemed to be dead-locked in their search for common ground. And it suddenly appeared that what, over the past seven years, we have assembled in our ivory tower just might help to do the trick - i.e. when looked upon with the help of the Internet.
Not convinced? Then look for yourself on these pages and
elsewhere and start clicking whenever it itches you! And if you
need further details or explanations, or if you can contribute from your
own stock of data, experiences and insights, or care to make critical comments
or suggestions, please feel free to contact us (CORUM,
box 2580, 1211 Geneva 2), preferably
by e-mail (swissbit@solami.com.com).
.....
......
Man-made, man-maintained and dangerously growing simmering conflict and humanitarian disaster zones in former Yugoslavia increasingly - and at immeasurable costs in various forms - threaten the interests of peace, stability and respect for human rights in all of Europe. In these circumstances, a radically new approach is called for in order to effectively influence the course of events there. That is, if genuine peace is to be given a chance, and those called upon to bring it about will not only remember but heed the lesson from Chamberlin's costly for self-deluding and indeed very short-lived "peace for our time".
Inspired by both modern European developments and all-too-long forgotten, yet decisive historical elements, given a chance the peoples concerned might opt for a joint European option. For all the peoples who lived on the territory of former Yugoslavia, this could involve, e.g., an early joint, one-voice-only but full membership in the European family of nations, be that the European Union as it currently evolves on its worn-out peculiar tracks, or the European Confederation or Commenwealth for which Presidents Havel and Mitterrand laid the foundations in Prague already in 1991.
Special arrangements, including eventually redrawn international borders, might thus be worked out particularly for some past, present and future hot spots of that part of Europe. In every such case, a new minority is created. Each minority - whether reframed, displaced or newly resettled - carries with it the seeds of future conflicts, as many still unresolved minority cases resulting from the First World War show, e.g. the Baltics, Greece, Iraq, Palestine, Romania, Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia, etc. One of the cardinal lessons to be drawn from these and other still festering conflicts is that each uprooted or otherwise destabilized minority must not only be given adequate paper guarantees in the form of international minority protection rights. Also indispensable are effective means, notably adequate representation, to promptly notify and seek redress against rights abuses with the help of those guaranteeing these international rights.
In any case, for many decades, the
constituant
peoples of former Yugoslavia have enjoyed one of the most elaborate,
generally respected and thus beneficially working national minority
rights legislation. Fiddling with that delicate structure
did not really benefit anybody when, in the power vacuum left to the successors
of the in many ways irreplacable President Tito, the minorities
question surfaced again. Not least from the point of view of
regional
stability in the longer run, it could be important now to devise a
generally stabilizing solution to the Balkan minorities question.
Currently, it is the Kosovo situation which, in this sense, offers
an opportunity to look beyond the immediate problems. And here once
more, we find an opportunity to look beneath the national minorities legislation
of former Yugoslavia, where we discover a body of
amazingly fashionable
minority rights which, although of an international nature,
most everybody seems either to want to ignore or simply to have
forgotten. We are talking, of course, about the Treaty
of St-Germain-en-Laye of 1919 which gave birth to the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, i.e. former Yugoslavia, and the corresponding
minority
protection instruments of the League of Nations.
In his memorable Sorbonne address of October 1992
by Sadruddin Aga Khan, the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
had this to say on this matter:
box 2580 1211 Geneva 2
fax: (4122)7335979
J.A.KELLER, Secretary
July 3,1991
H.E. Stipe MESIC,
President S.F.R.Y.
3811-636775
General Veljko Kadijevic,
Defense Minister
3811-636775
General Blagoje Adzic
3811-636775
H.E. Ante Markovic,
President,
Federal
Executive Council
3811-636775
Dr.Miran
Mejak, President,
Chamber
of Republics and Provinces
3811-131775, 3861-343696
President, Federal
Parliament
3811-145627
H.E. Lojze Peterle,
Slovene Prime Minister
3861-219401
Slovene Parliament
3861-219940
H.E. Dr. Draegutin
Celenovic, Croatian Prime Minister
3841-432041
Croation Parliament
3841-278483
It appears to have escaped the attention of the parties to the conflict that article 15 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (2) offers a secure political way out of the present situation. For it provides not only the legal basis for the prompt establishment of neutralized zones for the protection of civilians (3), if need be even on an unilateral basis (4) and eventually covering the territories of the Slovenian and the Croatian Republics. But it would also bring the full weight of these key conventions on the law of war to bear on all those on the military command or execution level who would violate any such duly created neutralized zones. For they would thus automatically subject themselves to persecution anywhere in the world for crimes against humanity.
Notes
(1)
See our Memorandum of yesterday and our letter of July 1, 1991 ...
(2)"Any
Party to the conflict may, either direct or through a neutral State or
some humanitarian organization, propose to the adverse Party to establish,
in the regions where fighting is taking place, neutralized zones intended
to shelter from the effects of war the following persons, without distinction:
(a) wounded and sick combatants or non-combatants; (b) civilian
persons who take no part in hostilities, and who, while they reside in
the zones, perform no work of a military character. When the Parties
concerned have agreed upon the geographical position, administration, food
supply and supervision of the proposed neutralized zone, a written agreement
shall be concluded and signed by the representatives of the Parties to
the conflict. The agreement shall fix the beginning and the duration
of the neutralization of the zone."
For related material see
notably: "Hospital Localities and Safety Zones", ICRC, Geneva
1952, p.42ss; SANDOZ, Ives, "Localités et Zones sous Protection
Spéciale", in: "Quatre études de droit
international humanitaire", Institut Henry Dunant, Geneva 1985, p.41ss.
(3)
Art.15 requires all parties to a given conflict to cease forthwith all
military operations against and within such neutralized zone.
(4)
Though art.15 provides for an agreement among the "Parties concerned" both
the national and the local authorities are seen to be in a position to
validly declare certain areas, eventually extending over the entire territories
of conflict, to be neutralized zones in the sense of art. 15 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention - provided they unreservedly accept the conditions associated
with this status. This view is supported by the recognized practice
of open towns which are also declared unilaterally, which serve
similar aims and which, in practice, had similar effects.
box 2580 1211 Geneva 2
fax: (4122)7335979
J.A.KELLER, Secretary
October 30, 1991
H.E. Stipe Mesic,
President S.F.R.Y.
3811-636775
Generals Veljko Kadijevic
(Defense Minister), Blagoje Adzic
3811-658573
H.E. Ante Markovic,
President, Federal Executive Council
3811-637185
Dr.Miran
Mejak, President, Chamber of Republics and Provinces
3861-343696
H.E. Franjo Tudjman,
President of Croatia
3841-444532
H.E. Slobodan Milosevic,
President of Serbia
3811-684679
H.E. Milan Kucan,
President of Slovenia
3861-213357
Members, Executive
Committee of: Bosnia and Herzegovina (3871-653592),
Croatia (3841-278483),
Macedonia (3891-220859), Montenegro (3881-52246),
Serbia (3811-682850,
-646456), Slovenia (3861-219401, -219940, -213357)
We appreciate the manifest restraint of
the armed forces and their leaders notably with regard to DUBROVNIK and
invite all parties to the conflict to consider the following idea and,
in the event, to seek on their own channels the necessary approval from
European capitals for this plan to be executed:
1. The
Free Citizens of Dubrovnik, through their elected representatives, declare
their town to be the First Town of the European Commonwealth (consisting
of all countries associated with the Council of Europe). As
such they enjoy the right to non-discriminatory national treatment with
regard to travel, commerce, exercise of profession and settlement, i.e.
those rights traditionally accorded to citizens of one European country
in another, on a reciprocal basis.
2. Each
citizen of any Republic/Province of Yugoslavia, upon application, is entitled
to become a Free Citizen of Dubrovnik - and thus a Citizen of the European
Commonwealth - if through his/her action (or inaction) he/she has contributed
to the preservation of Dubrovnik as what it is: an invaluable and irreplaceable
part of the European cultural heritage.
3. Until
the countries associated with the Council of Europe have agreed to
recognize Dubrovnik in the above sense, all parties to the conflict treat
Dubrovnik and similarly endangered civilian centers as Open Towns, as Neutralized
Zones (article 15 of the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949). Accordingly, the
armed forces in these zones, assured of safe passage, shall be evacuated
forthwith in step with the withdrawal of the opposing armed forces inside
and outside these protected zones.
Note
(1)
See our letter and Memoranda of July 1, 2,
3, 7[, 9] and October 6, 1991, responding to
an appeal of June 30 from the President
of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the S.F.R.Y., Dr.Miran
Mejak, soliciting
Economic and Social Council
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities
Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 18
...
...
2. The 1950 study's much-quoted general conclusion seems to be at the heart of a widely shared, important misunderstanding. It concerns the continued validity of the minority protection clauses contained notably in those international agreements and declarations made between the First and the Second World Wars in favour of peoples not affected by the peace treaties which ended the latter. They can be seen to be of direct relevance to the victims of the infamous ethnic cleansing and relocation campaigns which have been conducted under the direction of the Presidents of the former Yugoslavia and of Iraq, respectively. We are referring to the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina and about Iraq's so-called "un-Iraqi" Assyrians, Kurds, Turkomans and Shiites.
3. Received wisdom holds that the wide-ranging formal protection enjoyed by these peoples under the League of Nations minority protection system has not survived the dissolution of the League in 1946. Yet, the 1950 study of the United Nations [Secretariat] ... suggests otherwise in its lesser-known but no less relevant case-by-case section. Concerning Yugoslavia, the protection regime laid down by the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 is thus said to be gone only "as regards the minorities which assisted Yugoslavia's enemies" (p. 65). Accordingly, the League of Nations' individual-oriented protection and redress system may be activated in the actual case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, should its authorities or other imaginative diplomats or concerned citizens be interested. And in the equally current case of Iraq, the authors of the United Nations study on page 51, expressed the view that the dissolution of the League of Nations did not annul but merely "suspended" Iraq's all-important and even constitutive Iraqi Declaration of 30 May 1932 with its wide-ranging minority protection and other "obligations of international concern".
4. In fact, this so-called suspension of solemnly undertaken obligations in favour of minorities has been less a matter of international law than it has been an ill-founded, opportunistic practice. For the United Nations General Assembly, on 12 February 1946, unanimously adopted the resolutions proposed by its League of Nations Committee. Its resolution 24 (I), section I, paragraph 1 specifies that:
"The General Assembly reserves the right to decide, after due examination, not to assume any particular function or power, and to determine which organ of the United Nations or which specialized agency brought into relationship with the United Nations should exercise each particular function or power assumed."
5. Iraq, of course, was never relieved of its 1932 obligations; Iraq's territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty are thus subject to review by the United Nations General Assembly. Accordingly, the Sub-Commission may find it useful to look more closely at the substance of these readily and individually invokable obligations. Concretely, it may want to consider ways and means for the peoples concerned to obtain prompt and effective application of these conveniently forgotten yet valid national and international guarantees. The suggestion of human rights monitors, made by the Special Rapporteur on Iraq (E/CN.4/1992/31; S/24386), might be developed further for registering both related human rights violations and the individuals who took part in same - for later prosecution. The beneficiaries of former League of Nations guarantees might be helped by special representatives communicating directly with the Security Council for it to take prompt and adequate corrective measures.
6. The text
of the 1932 Declaration of the Kingdomn of
Iraq follows [see also: www.solami.com/a3a.htm#DECLARATION
¦ .../UNGA.htm ¦
.../salve.htm]:
...
GE.92-13969/0899K (E)
Editor's Note
Paragraph 5 of the above UN document - available
in English, French and Spanish - is followed by an annex, consisting of
a verbatim reproduction of Iraq's 1932 Declaration
(except for its unrelated articles 3, 7, 8, 11 an 12, whereas the
related League of Nations text - as reproduced on this site at: www.solami.com/a3a.htm
- contains all articles).
...........
2. The Governments
of the United States and of the allied countries (the Allies) declare their
willingness to support the establishment of a UN Trust Territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and in such other places of former Yugoslavia where that might be indicated.
The Allied Governments are
prepared to support lifting the United Nations and other sanctions and
embargo measures in favor of those former republics of Yugoslavia which
effectively, fully and verifiably cooperate in the implementation of all
related UN Security Council resolutions and international minority protection
guarantees, as provided for in the 1919 Treaty between the Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croates and Slovenes and the United States, the British Empire,
France, Italy and Japan.
Furthermore, if need be,
the Allied Governments, individually or jointly, are determined to enforce
all related rights and obligations, and to prevent further violations of
international obligations with all necessary means, including Allied volontary
forces as well as air and cruise missile strikes against hostile ground
forces and their infrastructures.
3. The UN Trust
Territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina is to provide a reliable and secure political,
economic and administrative framework for and towards the responsible exercise
of its inhabitants' inalienable right to self-determination.
Its structures are to facilitate
the prompt implementation in all of Bosnia-Herzegovina of all related UN
Security Council resolutions, the London Agreement of 1992, the 9 constitutional
principles, the interim agreement of March 25 1993, and other applicable
agreements.
To these effects, all military
units in all of Bosnia-Herzegovina are to be pulled back into their designated
areas. Those remaining in the UN Trust Territory shall be placed
under the command of UN-appointed superior officers subjected to the overall
UN Command. They shall assist the UN peace-keeping forces, the non-governmental
organizations and the humanitarian relief agencies in their tasks to effectively
protect and provide for the population in their designated areas.
And they shall be responsible for disarming and disbanding all irregular
forces and, generally, for cleaning up their own acts, including clearing
mine fields, repairing damaged infrastructures, etc.
Economic and Social Council
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protectionof Minorities
Forty-fifth session
Agenda item 17
The Secretary-General has received the following written statement which is distributed in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1296 (XLIV).
2. Manifestly, Europe's sadly lacking will, and the United Nation's ordinary mechanisms for containing and eventually resolving the real threats to international peace and security have so far failed in the case of former Yugoslavia. The powers that be have thus begun to look at alternative or complementary ways and means to address these vital matters. And, as the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadruddin Aga Khan suggested in his visionary Sorbonne address 2/, those in charge may with benefit draw inspiration also from past minority protection instruments.
3. Russia's call last year for more imaginative use of the UN instruments points in the right direction (it proposed to utilize the UN Trusteeship System for interim measures designed to effectively meet the growing actual and foreseeable needs and challenges in the field of minority protection particularly in parts of the former Soviet Union). Also, the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights recently proposed use of the UN Trusteeship System in order to forestall a repeat of the Bosnian tragedy in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. These and other initiatives have brought back to memory the League of Nations' comprehensive minority protection regime with its international guarantees which, notably in the cases of the Yugoslavia, Iraq and the Baltic States, are seen to have survived the League's dissolution in 1946 3/ (E/CN.4/367; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/NGO/27; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34, para. 112; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/NGO/27). As such, they may now be reactivated promptly by way of the mechanism adopted by the UN General Assembly with its resolution 24 (I) of 12 February 1946.
4. Apartheid and ghettos are both intolerable and sure-failure answers to minority problems anywhere. And particularly in a modern, organically grown multi-ethnic society like Bosnia and Herzegovina, a territorial split-up reflecting militarily imposed ethnic border lines - even a "provisional" one brought about by "international mediation" - might bring to the communities involved neither the intended lasting security nor the hoped-for riches - quite the contrary. For the needs of a modern economy, increasingly and imperatively, are free movement of persons, goods, capital and services. As other countries have already painfully experienced, any constraints on these fundamental freedoms on account of ethnic, linguistic or religious apartheid policies could not fail to translate immediately into further economic stagnation and decline, with corresponding adverse implications for the region's stability and security.
5. The responsible leaders of the family of nations and of countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina may thus want to look for vehicles which provide the peoples concerned with sufficient breathing space and allow them to be brought back from the dark ages to the realities and opportunities of the twentieth century. The Charter of the United Nations is seen to offer such a practical vehicle in that its Trusteeship System (article 75ss), in the hands of imaginative politicians, may be turned into a corresponding time machine
6. By volontarily and temporarily placing the illegally occupied, contested and/or destabilized parts of the internationally recognized territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the United Nations Trusteeship System, its legitimate Government, with the decisive support of far-sighted and principled world leaders, could indeed offer all parties to the conflict a neutral and non-prejudicial - and thus generally acceptable - reconciliation vehicle. Within that frame, they could work out genuine and lasting solutions to their particular minority problems without undue outside interference and pressures. All options provided for by the Charter would thus be safeguarded, and the peoples concerned could develop once again a habit of peaceful, civilized and mutually beneficial conduct.
7. Applied as a political neutralizer, i.e. a United Nations "foam carpet" covering an entire conflict area, and thus as a sort of healinhg cover and novel conflict resolution formula, the United Nations Trusteeship System could at the same time prove its worth as an alternative to "negitiations" under duress. In line with the many United Nations Security Council resolutions on former Yugoslavia, it could provide for upholding the fundamental principles at stake there. Some of these principles have alse been brought into focus by the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities which, in its resolution 1993/42 on Bosnia and Herzegovina, appealed
1/
Mario Bettati, "Un
droit d'ingérence?", Revue Générale de Droit
International Publique,
3, 1991, p.639; Mario Bettati, Bernard
Kouchner
et al. "Le
devoir d'ingérence", Denoel, Paris 1987.
2/
"L'aide
humanitaire sert-elle à défendre les peuples?", delivered
in Paris on October 25, 1992, (Bellerive Foundation Geneva).
3/ Danilo
Türk, "Le droit des minorités en Europe", p.452, in: Henri
Giordan (ed.), "Les minorités en Europe", Editions Kimé,
Paris 1992.
4/
Consisting of some 60 European
parliamentarians, this Group has been involved in the analysis and
development of ideas and documents concerning the Gulf
conflict which might contribute to a lasting solution notably of
some perennial minority protection problems there. Its research branch,
CORUM,
has prepared this paper in cooperation notably with B.Cherlonneix, P.Martin,
E.Querio, F.Ruiz, M.Soleiman, C.Vieira dos Santos, R.Wadlow and P.Wainwright.
It is based on "Towards Regaining Stability and Dignity with the UN
Trusteeship System - Documnents on ex-Yugslavia: the International Minority
Protection Guarantees and Mechanisms to bring them to Fruition", August
1993, Corum, box 2580, 1211 Geneva 2. The editor, J.A.Keller, is
alone responsible for eventual errors and ommissions. He wishes to
express his gratitude for the unfailing assistance and numerous services
provided by the United Nations Office in Geneva, by the director of the
UN
Geneva Library and by the League of Nations archivist and their staff.
5/
In his letter of June 1991 the President
of this upper legislative body of Yugoslavia, Dr.Miran
Mejak, thus solicited
1.
Seeking to balance the increasingly destabilising trans-border solidarity
of the Orthodox Christian
communities (e.g. of what is now Bulgaria, Romania, Russia,
Serbia etc.), the Roman Catholic-dominated
Republic of Ragusa (on the Adriatic Sea; now: Dubrovnic) was among the
first to recognize the United States of America, thus expressing also its
appreciation and lending its support to the American Declaration of Independence
of July 4, 1776. But this was only one of several early links of
U.S. interests in the Balkan and the Mediterranean where, in the 1820ies,
U.S. - like Russian - warships begun to vigorously defend national shipping
interests.
2.
In 1919, the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy
and Japan, as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, concluded with
the Serb-Croat-Slovene State the Treaty of St-Germain-en-Laye of 10 September
1919 (in force since July 16, 1920), which stipulates, notably,
The Principal Allied and Associated Powers, taking into consideration the obligations contracted under the present Treaty by the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, declare that the Serb-Croat-Slovene State is definitely discharged from the obligations undertaken in Article 35 of the Treaty of Berlin of July 13, 1878.
8. On February 12, 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 24 (I) concerning the transfer of functions and powers of the League of Nations to United Nations organs:
11. Bosnia-Herzegovina, on December 31, Croatia on May 11, and Slovenia on March 26, 1992, ratified, without reservations, the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Additional Protocols.
12. On May 22,
1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia became Members of the UN.
As such, the first two may seek effective protection for their constituent
multi-ethnic communities by initiating steps to establish interim UN Trust
Territories over illegally occupied, contested or destabilized parts of
their internationally recognized territory. Based on the above international
minority protection guarantees, the UN Charter and, notably, UN Resolution
24 (I) of 1946, other concerned UN Members may also take corresponding
initiatives in favor of the endangered
populations of Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina.
........
box 2580 - 1211 Geneva 2
fax: 4122-7335979
January 5, 1994
It was good to see you again in Geneva and I hasten to accept your kind invitation to the January 22/23 follow-up conference at the Putra World Trade Center in Kuala Lumpur.
In order to effectively overcome or work around some growing problems at the UN and elsewhere, consideration of some novel approaches is called for, including Good Offices by parliamentarians and suitable neutral countries. As we discussed before, a new frame for peace negociations appears to be indispensable. The 1919 Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye avails itself as a prime candidate for providing the formal basis to that end - primarily due to the interesting set of its signatories and their legal successors: Kingdom of Serbs, Croates and Slovenes and the British Empire (thus not only the UK but also Canada and Australia), France, Italy, Japan and the United States. In this connection, too, the Swiss government might play a useful role (e.g. as discrete initiator, go-between and provider of conference facilities).
With this in mind, I recommend you to extend an invitation to The Hon. Ernst Mühlemann, President of the Foreign Relations Commission of the Swiss Parliament (Conseil national), who has just come back from a visit to Bosnia, is a very capable, engaged defender of the principles we are fighting for, and a senior MP with excellent connections in- and outside of Switzerland and even on the religious front (his coordinates are, tel: 4172-632604, -642277, fax: -632610).
As to our own group - and with a view to get serious on the lobbying and infrastructure fronts - I would consider it very useful if you could arrange for an invitation to be also extended to one or more of my trusted colleagues with whom I am working.
I very much look forward to see you in Kuala Lumpur - on the Bosnian and on other matters. Taking this opportunity to send my best wishes for the New Year, I remain, sincerely yours,

enclosure: GA Anti-Genocide resolution (draft 1)
cc: E.Mühlemann, Ermatingen, Stefan Schwarz MdB, Bonn
....
The General Assembly,
PP1 Gravely concerned about the continuing siege of Sarajevo, Mostar and other cities and "safe areas" of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which flies in the face of countless promises, formal commitments, international obligations and United Nations efforts and which, therefore, endanger not only the safety and well-being of the populations concerned, but cast a shadow over the credibility of the United Nations as a reliable and effective instrument of peace and security,
PP2 Noting that the International Court of Justice, with its Order of 8 April 1993 concerning the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 September 1948 in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), inter alia, directed the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to "take all measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide ... whether directed against the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina or against any other national, ethnic, racial or religious group",
PP3 Further noting that the International Court of Justice, in its subsequent Order of 13 September 1993, inter alia, observed that while "all parties to the [1948 Genocide] Convention have thus undertaken 'to prevent and punish' the crime of genocide", the Court was "not satisfied that all that might have been done has been done to prevent commission of the crime of genocide in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina" since the Court handed down its Order of 8 April 1993, and that, according to the Separate Opinion of its Judge ad hoc Elihu Lauterpacht, Security Council resolution 713 (1991) concerning an arms embargo against "Yugoslavia", being contrary to jus cogens, cannot be "valid and binding in its operation against Bosnia-Herzegovina" lest it "make Members of the United Nations accessories to genocide",
PP4 Determined to see to it that the United Nations is not, by default or otherwise, becoming an accessory to genocide and other crimes against humanity, and that its Members shall in no way be hindered "to prevent and punish" acts of genocide in particular,
PP5 Mindful of the political, institutional and other consequences notably of the failure of the League of Nations, in 1936 on the occasion of the aggresson committed against its co-founder Ethiopia, to live up to its own Convenant and principles by promptly, unmistakably and effectively stand up against genocidal practices, barbarisms and other crass violations of international humanitarian law,
PP6 Thus stressing that the prompt and complete implementation of the Orders of the International Court of Justice of 8 April and 13 September 1993, as well as of the fundamental principles adopted by the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia and of the related General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, including those concerning the United Nations Protected Areas in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, is of the utmost importance not only for the security, integrity and stability of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its neighbors, but for the future of the United Nations system as a whole,
PP7 Deeply alarmed by the continuing systematic abuses committed or condoned by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) notably in Kosovo, Sanzak and Vojvodina against Catholics and Muslims as well as against Albanians, Bosnians, Croats, Hungarians and members of other religious and ethnic groups which are covered by international minority protection guarantees written into the still valid Treaty of St-Germain-en-Laye of 10 September 1919, which was signed by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and by the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States (E/CN.4/367),
PP8 Recalling its resolution 1/24 of 12 February 1946 concerning the transfer, from the League of Nations to the United Nations of "Functions and Powers under Treaties, International Conventions, Agreements and other Instruments having a political character", including international minority protection guarantees, such as those granted to the populations covered by the 1919 Treaty of St-Germain-en-Laye (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/NGO/29),
PP9 Supporting the conclusions contained in the commendable report
submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in former Yugoslavia
(E/CN.4/1994/47), as well as in resolution 1993/17 of the United Nations
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
(E/CN.4/1993/45) which, inter alia, calls
- for a strict rejection of "any permanent partition
which results from aggression, intervention and massive violation of human
rights, in particular the abhorrent practice of 'ethnic cleansing'",
- for denying "the validity of any agreement obtained
under extreme duress from the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina for purposes other than a cessation of hostilities ...",
and
- for an interim United Nations Protectorate "to
overcome the present partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina brought about
by aggression and ethnic cleansing", in order "to reintegrate, over a period
of time, the national society of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole",
PP10 Appreciating the proposals made by various governmental and non-governmental organizations on the availability and complementarity of non-military, yet powerful technical, economic, legal and political ways and means for achieving the indispensable objectives thus set out in the case of former Yugoslavia and other trouble spots of the world (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/NGO/29; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/NGO/27; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/NGO/27):
OP1 Requests the International Court of Justice, based on
article 96 of the United Nations Charter and under the Court's accelerated
procedure as laid out in article 103 of the Rules of the Court, to provide
an advisory opinion on
a) whether the Security Council ever intended to and effectively
adapted or otherwise extended its resolution 713 (1991) so as to be validly
applicable with regard to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its
relations with countries others than the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro),
b) whether there exists another Security Council resolution
or any other legal authority superceding or in any way limiting any membership
right the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is entitled to under
the United Nations Charter, including in particular those related to individual
and collective self-defence (article 51), and
c) whether a Security Council embargo remains valid in
international law, under jus cogens or otherwise, if the Security Council
is either unable or unwilling to decide to lift it in the presence of evidence
that maintaining the embargo concerned favors or contributes notably to
genocidal practices or to other crass violations of international humanitarian
law;
OP2 Confirms the right of all United Nations Member States, in cooperation with the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to use all necessary means to uphold and restore the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, unity and viability of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
OP3 Invites the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to promptly reconsider its decision not to renew the mandate of the CSCE monitoring missions for Kosovo, Sanzak and Vojvodina also in light of its overriding obligations under the Treaty of St-Germain-en-Laye of 10 September 1919 particularly with regard to the international minority protection guarantees thus disregarded;
OP4 Calls on the Signatory States of the Treaty of St-Germain-en-Laye of 10 September 1919, and on their successors, to convene a conference on the effective application of the international minority protection guarantees involved, with full participation of Special Representatives nominated by the populations concerned, in order to arrive at non-prejudicial and generally agreeable interim solutions paving the way for a just, principled and lasting peace in both the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the other parts of former Yugoslavia;
OP5 Requests the Secretary-General to submit, within 90 days, a report, drawing on all available governmental and non-governmental resources, on the opportunities and conditions for developing existing and new institutional and legal instruments - e.g. safe areas, humanitarian corridors, United Nations Protectorates, United Nations Trusteeships, Human Rights Monitors, internatrional minority protection guarantees and Special Representatives for populations covered by such international guarantees - into practical vehicles for containing, defusing and eventually resolving the succession, minority and other problems of former Yugoslavia and of other actual and future trouble spots of the world.
The General Assembly,
PP1 Noting that the International Court of Justice, with its Order of 8 April 1993 concerning the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 September 1948 in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), inter alia, directed the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to "take all measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide ... whether directed against the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina or against any other national, ethnic, racial or religious group",
PP2 Further noting that the International Court of Justice, in its subsequent Order of 13 September 1993, inter alia, observed that while "all parties to the [1948 Genocide] Convention have thus undertaken 'to prevent and punish' the crime of genocide", the Court was "not satisfied that all that might have been done has been done to prevent commission of the crime of genocide in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina" since the Court handed down its Order of 8 April 1993, and that, according to the Separate Opinion of its Judge ad hoc Elihu Lauterpacht, Security Council resolution 713 (1991) concerning an arms embargo against "Yugoslavia", being contrary to jus cogens, cannot be "valid and binding in its operation against Bosnia-Herzegovina" lest it "make Members of the United Nations accessories to genocide",
PP3 Determined to see to it that the United Nations is not, by default or otherwise, becoming an accessory to genocide and other crimes against humanity, and that its Members shall in no way be hindered "to prevent and punish" acts of genocide in particular:
OP1 Requests the International Court of Justice, based on
article 96 of the United Nations Charter and under the Court's accelerated
procedure as laid out in article 103 of the Rules of the Court, to provide
an advisory opinion on
a) whether the Security Council ever intended to and effectively
adapted or otherwise extended its resolution 713 (1991) so as to be validly
applicable with regard to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its
relations with countries others than the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro),
b) whether there exists another Security Council resolution
or any other legal authority superceding or in any way limiting any membership
right the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is entitled to under
the United Nations Charter, including in particular those related to individual
and collective self-defence (article 51), and
c) whether a Security Council embargo remains valid in
international law, under jus cogens or otherwise, if the Security Council
is either unable or unwilling to decide to lift it in the presence of evidence
that maintaining the embargo concerned favors or contributes notably to
genocidal practices or to other crass violations of international humanitarian
law;
OP2 Invites the International Court of Justice to receive, take into consideration and incorporate into the proceedings such amicus curiae briefs on matters before the Court which originate either from co-sponsors of related General Assembly resolutions or from such third governmental ot non-governmental parties which have been requested to provide good offices by one or more of the parties to the matter at issue.
The General Assembly,
PP1 Gravely concerned about the continuing siege of Sarajevo, Mostar and other cities and "safe areas" of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina which flies in the face of countless promises, formal commitments, international obligations and United Nations efforts and which, therefore, endanger not only the safety and well-being of the populations concerned, but cast a shadow over the credibility of the United Nations as a reliable and effective instrument of peace and security,
PP2 Mindful of the political, institutional and other consequences notably of the failure of the League of Nations - e.g. in 1936 on the occasion of the aggression committed against its co-founder Ethiopia - to live up to its own Convenant and principles by promptly, unmistakably and effectively stand up against genocidal practices, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other crass violations of international humanitarian law,
PP3 Thus stressing that the prompt and complete implementation of the Orders of the International Court of Justice of 8 April and 13 September 1993, of the fundamental principles adopted by the 1992 London Conference on Former Yugoslavia, and of the related General Assembly and Security Council resolutions - a.o. on the Protected Areas in the territories of the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia - is of the utmost importance not only for the security, integrity and stability of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its neighbors, but for the future of the United Nations System as a whole,
PP4 Deeply alarmed by the abuses committed notably in Kosovo, Sanzak and Vojvodina against Catholics and Muslims, but also, in other parts of former Yugoslavia, against Albanians, Bosnians, Croats, Hungarians and Serbs as well as against members of other religious, ethnic or national groups which are covered by international minority protection guarantees contained in the still valid Treaty of St-Germain-en-Laye of 10 September 1919, which was signed by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and by the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States (E/CN.4/367),
PP5 Recalling its resolution 1/24 of 12 February 1946 concerning the transfer, from the League of Nations to the United Nations of "Functions and Powers under Treaties, International Conventions, Agreements and other Instruments having a political character", including international minority protection guarantees, such as those granted to the populations covered by the 1919 Treaty of St-Germain-en-Laye (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/NGO/29),
PP6 Supporting the conclusions contained in the commendable report
submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in former Yugoslavia
(E/CN.4/1994/47), as well as in resolution 1993/17 of the United Nations
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
(E/CN.4/1993/45) which, inter alia, calls for
- a strict rejection of "any permanent partition
which results from aggression, intervention and massive violation of human
rights, in particular the abhorrent practice of 'ethnic cleansing'",
- denying "the validity of any agreement obtained
under extreme duress from the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina for purposes other than a cessation of hostilities ...",
and
- an interim UN Protectorate "to overcome the
present partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina brought about by aggression and
ethnic cleansing", in order "to reintegrate, over a period of time,
the national society of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole",
PP7 Appreciating the proposals made by various governmental and non-governmental organizations on the availability and complementarity of non-military, yet powerful technical, economic, legal and political ways and means for achieving the indispensable objectives thus set out in the case of former Yugoslavia and other trouble spots of the world (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/NGO/29; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/NGO/27; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/NGO/27):
OP1 Confirms the right of all United Nations Member States, in cooperation with the governments concerned, to use all necessary means to uphold and restore the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, unity and viability of the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), with due consideration for the well-being of their populations and the effective protection of their ethnic, national and religious minorities;
OP2 Invites the governments of the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to adhere to their overriding obligations under the Treaty of St-Germain-en-Laye of 10 September 1919 particularly with regard to the international minority protection guarantees thus specified, and to provide for the nomination of related Special Representatives, for the admission of monitoring missions and for other suitable safaguarding measures;
OP3 Calls on the Signatory States of the Treaty of St-Germain-en-Laye of 10 September 1919, and on their successors, to convene a conference on the effective application of the international minority protection guarantees involved, with full participation of Special Representatives nominated by the populations concerned, in order to arrive at non-prejudicial and ge-nerally agreeable interim solutions paving the way for a just, principled and lasting peace in all parts of former Yugoslavia;
OP4 Requests the Secretary-General to submit within 90 days an
inventory of existing and new humanitarian instruments - e.g. safe areas,
humanitarian corridors, United Nations Protectorates, United Nations Trusteeships,
Human Rights Monitors, internatrional minority protection guarantees and
Special Representatives for populations covered by such international guarantees
- and, drawing on all available governmental and non-governmental resources,
thus to identify the opportunities and conditions for developing these
instruments into practical vehicles for containing, defusing and eventually
resolving the succession, minority and other problems of former Yugoslavia
and of other actual and future trouble spots of the world.
....
box 2580 - CH-1211 Geneva 2
- Switzerland
fax: 4122-7335979
January 27, 1994
HRH The Sultan of Brunei
c/o Brunei Mission to the UN in Geneva
fax: 022-7381013
follow-up to International Conference of Parliamentarians on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kulala Lumpur
Your Royal Highness,
It gave me great pleasure to find two Brunei Delegates attending this memorable lawmaker conference and I trust the results of our labours will both please and encourage Your Royal Highness to continue supporting the cause of the Bosnian people not only on traditional pathways but also through the efforts deployed by imaginative non-governmental organizations. Unfortunately, I missed the opportunity to seek to arrange a personal visit, e.g., through your particularly helpful Delegate Judin; in the event, I'll be glad to come back to the area or meet you elsewhere at the earliest date of mutual convenience.
With their unanimously approved Declaration of January 23, 1994, the some 50 lawmakers from over 30 countries have broken new grounds by going beyond mere calls for governmental and UN actions. Not content with the ever-more-real prospect of eventually being called upon to take up the white flag, they have taken stock of the real and often unpublicized fundamentals of the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia. They have come to recognize their special responsibilities in the face of persistent official bunglings. And they have grown aware of promising options for salvatory actions which they may now pursue individually or collectively - e.g. on the occasion of the Paris conference of the Interparliamentary Union in March - with the assistance of visionary sponsors and suitable NGOs, incl. our fully mandated but inadequately funded Good Offices Group.
With the aim of a just, principled and secure peace in all of former Yugoslavia being generally accepted and ethnic apartheit being seen as both contrary to human dignity and unworkable in a modern society, this elusive aim appears to be inattainable without prior establishment of a natural balance of forces, i.e. without discriminatory external constraints and with reliable minority protection guarantees in place. To these effects, the UN arms embargo must go, for its application against Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia is now also recognized as being manifestly without legal foundation. The regular armed forces of the parties to the conflict, being subject to the Geneva Conventions, should be induced to clean up their own acts and to rein in the marauding militias in their zones of influence.
And the increasingly problematic substitute for imaginativeand competent diplomacy should be scrapped, i.e. the anti-people economic sanctions should be lifted. On this triple basis, a viable interim solution - e.g. in the form of a UN Trusteeship or Protectorate covering the contested areas - may be agreeable to all parties to the conflict, perhaps even before the war will grow beyond control. And parliamentarians from many countries may significantly contribute to - or even provide for - suitable negotiation frames, e.g. based on the 1919 Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye which entails still valid international minority protection guarantees for the peoples now at loggerheads in ex-Yugoslavia.
With this in mind, the enclosed Declaration of Kuala Lumpur was drawn
up; for reasons of imperative confidentiality, it does not reflect the
full extent of the Delegates' determination to pursue all promising avenues
for promptly and effectively breaking up the conspiracy which lies behind
the legally non-existant but effectively practiced UN arms embargo against
Bosnia (see memo "political measures"). Taking this opportunity to reassure
You Royal Highness of my highest considerations, I remain, sincerely yours,
J.A.Keller, Secretary
GOOD OFFICES GROUP OF EUROPEAN LAWMAKERS
encl: Declaration of Kuala Lumpur; press clippings
to: Foreign Ministry, Tirana
from: GOGEL
7 February 1994
AIMS: Strengthening Albania's security, economic and diplomatic
position and perspectives through imaginative and determined development
and application of its own readily available means, notably in the field
of diplomacy.
.....
- UN membership (notably Albanian Mission to the UN in Geneva), UN General Assembly.
- Right to membership in the Council of Europe and EFTA.
- Diplomatic relations notably with France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, U.K. and the United States.
- Trade-related treaties and arrangements concluded before World War II - albeit mostly forgotten - apparently are non-abrogated, immediately revivable and adaptable, eg. with Italy: 1/20/1924, LNTS 44 1926 360; Switzerland: 6/10/1929, LNTS 104 1930 146; UK: 6/10/1925, LNTS 43 1926 82; US: 6/23/1922, USTS 5 1925 9.
- Albanians abroad may be organized into an effective lobby for Albanian economic and political interests - if they retain not only an emotional but a real stake in Albania's future with simple but concrete and practical effects. In this sense, strengthening their citizenship rights and other legal and civil links to Albania may involve their right to participate in national referenda and elections, a full representation in national legislative bodies, the right to transfer their citizenship to their husbands, wives and children, and the right to promptly obtain an Albanian passport independent of whether they possess a further nationality and regardless of their status in their host countries (which is potentially of crucial importance in the case of Albanian holders of expired Yugoslav passports). Moreover, a dense network of capable and dynamic Honorary Consuls may be set up to serve Albanians, visitors and investors from abroad. Particularly helpful foreigners may be made honorary citizens. And suitable foreign investors, under certain conditions, may also become entitled to an Albanian passport.
- Geographic position Macedonia's interests for a highway link to the Adria provides leverage for safeguarding the interests of Albanians residing in Macedonia. Albania is the natural territorial link between Greece and other members of the European Union. Particularly Greek economic interests may thus bring about fundamental improvements in Greek-Albanian relations through efforts to realize Panalba, a strategic Pan Adriatic Highway running through Albania. Turkey's interests to eventually link up with Panalba through Bulgaria offer incentives for related external financings. And the essentially EU-financed construction of Panalba could provide a strong macro-economic skeleton for the creation and organic development of related private enterprises throughout Albania (joint-ventures with suitable Italian construction companies are indicated as they may thus also reduce their unemployment and excess capacity problems and bring to bear their considerable political weight in Rome and Brussels in favor of Albania).
The United States - with a historic link to the region: Republic of Ragusa was among the first to recognize U.S. over 200 years ago - can be expected to have long-term interests for a strategic foothold on continental Europe which is independent of Greece and NATO. Notably through the Albanian voters in the U.S. and by way of U.S. Senators and Congressmen now seeking to help the Clinton Administration with a principled and successful Yugoslavia policy involving no U.S. ground troops, this backdrop makes the United States a natural key ally for whatever diplomatic initiative Albania may undertake within or without the United Nations.
- Diplomatic privileges may be crucial
tools for effectively and promptly carrying out the diplomatic footwork
and networking which is indispensable if the proposed
WAYOUT resolution on former Yugoslavia and other such resolutions are
to find a majority of yes votes in the UN General Assembly. All prerogatives
of a sovereign state, including its power to join forces with parliamentarians
and specialists from other countries, may legitimately be considered for
possible application in this exceptionally difficult situation. Moreover,
the particularly exposed Representatives of Albanians abroad, e.g. its
elected officials of Kosovo, could greatly benefit in their work from Albania's
diplomatic facilities, such as diplomatic passports which, according to
international law and current practice, could readily be made available
to them.
....
- National sovereignty Albania is not only a member of the United Nations but was also a member of the League of Nations. As such Albania has the treaty-based right "to bring to the attention of the Council [which is yet to be designated by the UN General Assembly by way of a corresponding resolution of its own] any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these [international minority protection guarantees and] obligations, and ... the Council may thereupon take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances." (article 11). For UN General Assembly resolution 24 (I) of 12 February 1946 provides for the transfer from the League of Nations to the United Nations of "Functions and Powers under Treaties, International Conventions, Agreements and other Instruments having a political character", including international minority protection guarantees, such as those granted to the populations covered by the Treaty of St-Germain-en-Laye of 10 September 1919. Signed by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as well as by the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States (LN I.B. Minorities 1927. B.2 59), this still valid treaty (E/CN.4/367) covers also the Albanians residing in Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzogovina and Croatia. As shown in the UN documents E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/NGO/27 and E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/NGO/27, similar clauses in other League of Nations-related treaties can be invoked, e.g., by Russia concerning its minorities living in the Baltics and in other now-independent parts of the former Soviet Union - hence Russia's interest for this readily accessible, re-animatable and adaptable instrument to address minority, succession and similar problems anywhere.
Albania is thus in an exceptionally favorable and challenging position to take corresponding political and diplomatic initiatives for generally unlocking this unused diplomatic potential for resolving minority and other conflicts, e.g. by way of fine-tuning and tabling the proposed WAYOUT UN General Assembly resolution on former Yugoslavia. This new approach is understood to be of interest to and acceptable for all parties to the conflict in former Yugoslavia. In the event, such a well-prepared corresponding Albanian initiative is thus likely to draw the support of key states, such as France, Germany, Russia and the United States, thus turning it into a key vehicle for effectively containing and eventually resolving this dangerous conflict on the Balkan.
- Parliamentary support The some 50 lawmakers
from 33 countries who, at the invitation of their Malaysian colleagues
and with the support of the Malaysian Government, attended on January 22-23
1994 in Kuala Lumpur the International Conference of Parliamentarians on
Bosnia-Herzegovina called in particular for the prompt reconsideration
of the "illegal arms
embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina" and "for a new international
conference to replace the ongoing mediations and talks" on former Yugoslavia,
thus strengthening the similar calls adopted a few days earlier by the
European Parliament. In March in Paris, the Interparliamentary Union
will hold its annual conference; it is expected to endorse and further
strengthen these and related calls, and may in fact give - and initiate
for the respective home fronts - decisive support for the proposed
WAYOUT resolution.
.....
The key to success for any eventual Albanian initiative at the United Nations is seen to reside essentially in the substantial strengthening of the Albanian Mission to the UN in Geneva in particular. This calls for an adequately funded infrastructure to be created and manned without delay by reliable and competent personnel. To these effects, the Good Offices Group of European Lawmakers is offering to immediately avail its services on a pro bono mandate basis. It would thus seek to raise among its friends and sponsors the necessary some US$ 200'000 for an initial period of 9 months covering rent of an office ... equipment, communications, travel expenses and fees of the collaborators mutually agreed upon. The latter may include suitable members of the Albanian Diaspora - from Kosovo, the United States, etc. - as well as non-Albanian specialists with the necessary background ... In light of the persistent harrassments of the Albanian populations of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, etc., the following objectives of this Diplomatic Advisory Group are seen to cover vital interests of Albania. They are fully compatible with the original mandate on the Yugoslav conflict, entrusted in 1991 to the Good Offices Group of European Lawmakers by the Presidency of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces of former Yugoslavia (reproduced in: E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/NGO/29, fn 5). The Advisory Group's mandate is thus suggested to be: