BSI/FBC Saga: Not Exactly Reassuring
by Iconoclast
swissbit@solami.com
11 February 2004 (draft)
(of those invited to comment and, in the event, to report
errors and ommissions
- including BSI,
Generali
- only Prof. Hans Schmid, Dr. Tito Tettamanti responded so far;
their observations are reflected in the below-reproduced
draft)
Some clients have sued Banca della Svizzera Italiana (BSI) for damages. Others raise the specter of fraud, even of backhanded interventions by foreign powers. In the event of a negative outcome of related proceedings, some observers see not only this bank at risk, but the Swiss financial market place as a whole to suffer. Not surprisingly, the BSI has persistently denied all charges, defending its positions even aggressively. Yet, at least one former Swiss lawmaker is not happy with some of his former federal colleagues. Because they seem either unwilling or unable to address in a proper and timely fashion what he considers to constitute serious shortcomings in both the internal and the external controls of this internationally active Swiss bank. And because not more sheepish, ill-considered and back-firing bending to foreign pressures and market-strangulating rules, but rather more encouragement and enforcement of time-tested market principles, banking practices and prompt identification and resolution of banking deficiencies are needed in order to effectively protect the consumers and the financial market.
The Lugano-based bank faces damage claims exceeding 800 million dollars. Experts point to avoidable risks entailed in dragged-out proceedings and expect particularly the Federal Banking Commission FBC to intervene.
Is the management of Banca della Svizzera Italiana acting in line with Switzerland's obliging banking traditions? Is BSI a reliable and safe partner for both its clients and its shareholders? Does the Federal Banking Commission correctly carry out its task of controlling the activity of BSI? And is the Swiss taxpayer thus spared the burden of civil responsibility for damages made even bigger by a deficient official banking surveillance?
Unfortunately, as by-standers, we cannot at present answer affirmatively to any one of these questions. We only see signs that the BSI finds itself at the center of a growing controversy. Mismanagement, neglect of fiduciary duties and abuse of confidence are some of the charges which damaged clients have levelled against this venerable Ticinese bank - over the past years and mostly out of the public eye. The respective court cases evolve in the protective shadow of what has all the hallmarks of conveniently and artificially drawn-out civil proceedings. In Geneva, the investigating judge Christine Junod has been looking, since 1999, at the still unexplained and hugely damaging "disappearance" of assets which were placed in BSI custody before 1991. And she is still pondering whether to bring criminal charges against some by-now former BSI officials. Yet, for reasons of state, she may never do that. For the "disappeared" assets include super-sensitive computer tapes on high-resolution airial mapping and geological surveys based on technologies which proved their value in recent wars.
Still, the Federal Banking Commission continues to let the public believe everything to be in line with the law, strictly speaking. Regardless of long-standing claims to the contrary of which it has been informed at least since 1998. And regardless of recent bad experiences with colorblind faith in formalistic approaches which charaterize the surveillance practices underlying the Arthur Andersen, ENRON, Parmalat, Worldcom, and similar cases. Thus, not only could the taxpayer be called upon to foot some of the damage bills, but some of the damage claims are so high that BSI, in the event, may not survive without massive support from its shareholders.
According to documents at hand, BSI is currently fighting off damage claims totalling over one billion Swiss francs in at least five civil proceedings. The open proceedings are in Lugano, Geneva, Nassau (Bahamas), Montevideo (Uruguay) and in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). The Federal Banking Commission and, more recently, even the Federal Council have again been alerted to these cases. Referring to the BSI cases in particular, a federal lawmaker, Nationalrat Jean Spielmann, broke the story with his parliamentary intervention 03.1085 of 19 June 2003 on the adequacy of Swiss banking surveillance. Specifically, Spielmann has raised the following questions:
"1. Is it true that Banca della Svizzera Italiana (BSI) has breached its statutory duty of being run by an irreproachable management, for several years and without being discovered as such, as evidenced in several court proceedings?"Spielmann refers to various cases involving allegedly unsavory BSI officials or practices which caused clients and the Swiss banking community to sustain damages. The so-called Pizza Connection of the eighties is a case in point. As the Wall Street Journal reported in a stunning series on the Mafia, the then-U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani had assembled evidence of the BSI branches in Nassau and Mendrisio to have been involved for years in a huge money-laundering scheme operated by the Sicilian Mafia ("Organization Men: How Banks Often Help the Mafia Turn Ill-Gotten Profits Into 'Legitimate' Holdings", Roger Cohen, WSJ, 15 February 1985). In another case of dubious banking practices - this one brought to light by the Italian Mani Puliti, i.e. "Clean Hand Judges" - numbered BSI accounts were used for illicit payments to Italian political parties, according to the confessions of a manager of the Montedison group. In all of this, and except for responses to foreign pressures, the Federal Banking Commission is not seen to have paid attention or made a dent on these and other damage-prone practices for which Banca della Svizzera Italiana in particular has gained notoriety. Not surprisingly then, the Federal Council answered on 10 September 2003 with a straight face:
"1. The Federal Council and the FBC have no knowledge of cases where a court has found the Banca della Svizzera Italiana to have violated its obligation to conduct its affairs in an irreproachable manner. The FBC is informed that the bank has been engaged for years in civil litigations involving a person residing in the Canton of Geneva, as well as firms controlled by that person."Involving formal reporting requirements, Spielmann's second question narrowed the FBC's options for wiggling itself out of a tight spot on formalities:
"2. Is it true that BSI has changed hands several times without, in its official statements, having divulged self-incurred liabilities amounting to several hundred million Swiss francs, and that – similar to the case of dormant accounts dating from the time of the 2nd world war – BSI has pursued a practice of geriatric problem-solving, rather than a prompt and extra-judicial damage settlement corresponding to the reputation of the Swiss financial market?"In the seventies, the Swiss financier Tito Tettamanti and Fidinam bought a controlling stake in BSI. On that and later occasions of ownership changes, some observers had voiced concerns about allegedly "polished accounts." By way of other Swiss banks, i.e. Unigestion of Geneva and the Swiss Banking Corporation SBS, control of BSI finally went back into Italian hands, Trieste Assicurazioni Generali, when the Federal Competition Commission forced its sale as a condition for its approval of the 1998 SBS/UBS mega merger. According to UBS shareholders opposed to that merger, the true valuation of BSI was kept secret even upon challenges at the merger shareholder meetings. Thus, neither its old nor its new owners were given the legally required information that BSI, at that time already, had long-running court cases pending which exposed the bank to litigation risks exceeding US$ 500 mio. Later, Antoine Bernheim, a spokesman for the new owner Generali, confirmed that during the negotiations for its acquisition of BSI, no consideration was given to the need to provide for current litigation risks on that scale. And the Federal Banking Commission, for reasons of its own, is understood to have been kept in the dark as well during all related hand changes it was required by law to examine and approve. Thus caught flat-footed, the FBC, tellingly, even managed to get its nominal superior to sign on the dotted line the following evasive see-nothing, hear-nothing, smell-nothing answer to its inquiring lawmaker:
"2. Neither the Federal Council nor the Federal Banking Commission is aware of cases where BSI unduly failed to mention 'self-incurred liabilities' in the reports it submitted on the occasion of ownership changes. It is neither the duty of the FBC, nor is it part of its competences, to prescribe to the institutions under its control how to resolve civil litigations."Thus, we come to what may be the core of Spielmann's outstanding charges:
"3. Is it true that in the BSI case, too the Federal Banking Commission has begun licence examinations and corrective measures not on the basis of examination of documents in its possession, but only after several years of neglect of serious indications of wrongdoings, and under the pressure of advanced civil and criminal court procedures in Switzerland and abroad as well as under the threat of U.S. Patriot Act sanctions?"To which the Swiss Government - nota bene on the background of public concerns accentuated by the ENRON, Parmalat and other cases - answered with a deafening silence. Firstly, on what's really going on at the FBC. And secondly, on the implications of BSI's belated scrambling which is understood to currently take place in Lugano, Geneva, Bahamas, Tanzania, Brazil and elsewhere:
"3. The FBC fulfills its mandate according to the law and in line with its best knowledge and a clear conscience. Receiving complaints from clients of individual institutes constitutes a part of its work. The FBC examines such complaints with an eye on violations of surveillance rules and regulations. In the case at hand, no facts have been establised which fall into the purview of banking surveillance. Moreover, reference is to be made to the FBC's official secrecy obligations."
Iconoclast Comments
As the law and the available
documents suggest, the Federal Banking Commission has or should indeed
have been aware of such generally harmful practices which Spielmann rightly
denounced as geriatric problem-solving.
Having for years observed at close range, and having been formally alerted
to what's going on at BSI, there can indeed be no escaping or hiding from
the question: Why did the FBC not intervene so far more effectively?
Is it because the cases which have come to light are considered to be too
small (involving "only" already damage-weakened clients)? Or, on
the contrary, because some of these BSI cases forebode even bigger problems
ahead, similar to the proverbial tip of the iceberg? Have foreign
regulatory authorities, notably the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
not - yet - shown an interest in the matter? The cases of the Nazi
gold, those of the dormant accounts from the Second World War period, those
evolving under the heading of apartheid claims, those involving
what's called "politically exposed persons", and others are symptomatic
- and not encouraging at that. They seem to suggest that currently
the Federal Banking Commission's strength lies less in its independence
from foreign influences (www.solami.com/swissbanks.htm#STAMM),
less in its foresight, and less in its sensitivities to and perception
of macro-political & economic realities, aberrations and opportunities
(.../swift.htm ¦ .../hedge.htm).
And this at the very moment when the global economic and political environment
visibly degenerates into non-productive, self-rightuous and increasinly
parasitic bureaucratic jungles, where the increasingly over-bearing,
paralyzing and harmful compliance mode becomes the
Leitmotiv
of formally sovereign nations and citizens (.../oecdmandate.htm).
When
entrepreneurship, courage and self-responsibility,
when
imagination,
heeding of time-tested principles and liberated citizens are
more then ever called for (.../costbenefit.htm).
And when, instead of hiding behind formalistic excuses for overlooking
malpractices, the Federal Banking Commission could and should be in the
vanguard of cleaning houses where and when necessary (.../swissbanks.htm#54th).
Moreover, there is work to be done for giving back to our bankers the conditions
to protect and serve the homo oeconomicus from all over the world
with competence, reliability and trustworthiness (.../salt.htm).
Instead of pushing them - under whatever fashionable pretext - to become
agents even of foreign fiscal authorities. Which, in the end, merely
amounts to fooling ourselves and others with unhelpful, wasteful and even
counter-productive activism, i.e. something even worse than E.F.Schumacher's
proverbial
"rearranging of the desk chairs on the Titanic."