REPORT FROM IRON MOUNTAIN - On the Possibility and Desirability of Peace
LEONARD C. LEWIN (edit.), Dial Press, New York 1967  (190 KB)

On the Economic Implications of the Proposed Nonproliferation Treaty
H. Anton Keller, Heinz Bolliger, Peter B. Kalff, Revue de Droit International, de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques (The International Law Review - Sottile)  No.1, 1968, p.26-73 www.solami.com/NPT68.htm  (226 KB); Deutsche Teilübersetzung: Rechtsfolgen des Atomsperrvertrages für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, B. Boerner, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Energierecht, Universität Köln, Bd.22, Köln 1968

DECLARATION by the Representative of Switzerland, Prof.Dr.Rudolf Bindschedler, to the Non-Nuclear Weapons States Conference, Geneva, 10 Sep 1968
    AIDE-MEMOIRE, EPD, Bern, 17 Nov 1987;  AIDE-MEMOIRE, EPD, Bern, 9 May 1988;
    On Security Guarantees for Non-Nuclear Weapons States, EPD, Bern, 23 Aug 1968

The Nonproliferation Treaty in Light of Nuclear Energy Developments
H. Anton Keller, Paul Bähr, Peter B. Kalff, Revue de Droit International, de Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques (The International Law Review - Sottile)  No.3, 1975, p.201-240 www.solami.com/NPT75.htm (175 KB) ¦ .../NPT75.doc  (1.32 MB)
London Club (Nuclear Suppliers Group) - NPT complement or substitute?, 11/1975 ¦ INFCIRC/254
Will Tomorrow's Terrorist Have an Atomic Bomb?, NYT, Nuclear Control Institute, 21 June 1981
 

2002 extract from the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs site:

Background

The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely.  A total of 188 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance.

To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.

The provisions of the Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, envisage a review of the operation of the Treaty every five years, a provision which was reaffirmed by the States parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) met at the United Nations in New York from 24 April to 19 May 2000. The Conference was the first to be convened following the Treaty's indefinite extension at the 1995 Conference*. States parties examined the implementation of the Treaty's provisions since 1995, taking into account the decisions adopted at the 1995 Conference on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on the strengthening of the review process for the Treaty.  States Parties also examined the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference.

10 Jun 08   Threatening Iran, NYT, editorial
25 Apr 08   Government Releases Images of Syrian Reactor, NYT, David E. Sanger, video
8 Dec 07   Search for Iran's Nuclear Arms Program Turned Up Unexpected Conclusion, WP, Peter Baker et al.
29 Nov 07   Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal Vexed Nixon, NYT, David Stout
20 Nov 07   Radiation Detectors for Border Delayed Again, Washington Post, Robert O'Harrow, comments
14 Oct 07   Analysts Find Israel Struck a Nuclear Project Inside Syria, NYT, David E. Sanger et al.
13 Aug 07   Upkeep Of Security Devices A Burden, Washington Post, Mary Beth Sheridan
1 Aug 07   Radiological terrorism: Seize the Cesium, NYT, Peter D. Zimmerman et al., Op-Ed Contributors
20 Jul 07   Radiation Detector Program Delayed, WP, Robert O'Harrow Jr., comment
14 Jul 07   Government Accountability Office tries to build a dirty bomb, WP, editorial
20.Jun 07   Junge Zürcher Forscher auf der Spur von Atom-Terroristen, NZZ, ami
10 Jun 07   MI6 probes UK link to nuclear trade with Iran, Observer, Mark Townsend
1 Jun 07   Radioactivity Sensors for Russia, NYT, C. J. CHIVERS
8 May 07   U.S. Debates Deterrence for Nuclear Terrorism, NYT, DAVID E. SANGER & THOM SHANKER
8 May 07   Answering Al Qaeda, NYT, CLARK KENT ERVIN
7 May 07   Effort to Repair Nuclear Treaty Gets Snagged Over Agenda, NYT, NuclearNo.com, Reuters
19 Apr 07   MIDDLE EAST NUCLEAR-WEAPON FREE ZONE: A SERIOUS START?, TP, Rene Wadlow
11 Apr 07   Obituary on Paul Leventhal, Anton Keller
15 Feb 07   Not Supporting Our Troops: Armor vs Top Gun Priorities, NYT, Editorial
4 Feb 07   The Peace Paradox, NYT MAGAZINE, David A. Bell, Reconsideration
4 Feb 07   Whose War Powers?, NYT MAGAZINE, Noah Feldman, The Way We Live Now
27 Jan 07   Sanktionen: Zwischen Diplomatie und Militärgewalt, nzz.ch, Kommentar
25 Jan 07   Smuggler’s Plot Highlights Fear Over Uranium, NYT, Lawrence Scott Sheets et al.
8 Jan 07   Pakistan, India to finalize agreement of avoidance nuclear accidents, IRNA
8 Jan 07   If Israel had nukes, would it use them against Iran?, Jerusalem Post, Yaakov Katz, reader comments
8 Jan 07   You'd better hold us Israelis back, 'before we do something crazy ...', Irish Independent, Eric Silver
8 Jan 07   Out-of-the-box thinking is called for!, Iconoclast
8 Jan 07   Israel denies nuclear strike plan, The Times, David Sharrock
8 Jan 07   Military strike is only way to stop Iran, says top Israeli strategist, The Independent, Eric Silver
8.Jan 07   Ein brisanter Trainingsbericht, Berliner Zeitung, Roland Heine, Kommentar
8.Jan 07   Israel will Iran atomar angreifen, Berliner Zeitung, AFP
8 Jan 07   Israel planning nuclear strike, second UK paper claims, Turkish Daily News
8 Jan 07   Pakistan, India to finalize agreement of avoidance nuclear accidents, Irna
7 Jan 07   Revealed: Israel plans nuclear strike on Iran - Focus: Mission Iran, Sunday Times, Uzi Mahnaimi

Hassan M. Fattah, Arab Nations Plan to Start Joint Nuclear Energy Program, NYT, December 11, 2006
Blood, Toil, Tears and Nukes, NYT, Editorial, December 8, 2006
Eric Lipton, U.S. to Expand Cargo Scans to Detect Nuclear Material, NYT, December 8, 2006
Walter Pincus, New Nuclear Weapons Program To Continue, WP, December 2, 2006
William J. Broad, U.S. Analysts Had Flagged Atomic Data on Web Site, NYT, November 4, 2006
David E. Sanger, N. Korea Reports 1st Nuclear Arms Test, NYT, October 9, 2006
Nuclear weapons are a very bad idea in a region cursed by instability, The Daily Star, Editorial, 24 Aug 06
David E. Sanger, "U.S. and Russia Will Police Nuclear Terrorists", NYT, July 15, 2006
Victor Khudoleev, "Nuclear Forces Of New Quality", Defense and Security/Krasnaya Zvezda, July 12, 2006
Yevegeny Tkachenko, Fissile Materials Storage Unit In Ural to Guarantee N-Security, Itar-Tass, July 11, 2006
Paul Leventhal, "On the 25th Anniversary Of the Nuclear Control Institute", NCI, June 21, 2006
André Gsponer, "Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons: Military effectiveness and collateral effects", ISRI, May 23, 2006
Philip Wainwright, Harvard & other impulses for unlocking the U.S./Iran nuclear gridlock, ICESC, May 16, 2006
Anton Keller, "Keine Guten Dienste zum Atomsperrvertrags-Fiasco? Zur Rechtsgrundlage für ein obligatorisches Referendum", 5.Mai 2006
"Aggravating a bad situation", The Jordan Times, April 27, 2006
David E. Sanger et al., "Iran Is Described as Defiant on 2nd Nuclear Program", NYT, April 25, 2006
Max M. Kampelman, "Bombs Away", NYT, April 24, 2006
Selig S. Harrison, "How to Regulate Nuclear Weapons", Washington Post, April 23, 2006
James Gordon Prather, "Nuking bunkers", WorldNetDaily.com, April 22, 2006
Joseph Farah, "Osama alive, well, armed with nukes", WorldNetDaily, April 21, 2006
Chris Floyd, "Mad Love", Moscow Times, Global Eye, April 21, 2006
Seymour M. Hersh, "THE IRAN PLANS", The New Yorker, April 17, 2006 (4/8/06)
William M. Arkin, "The Pentagon Preps for Iran", WP, April 16, 2006
Paul Leventhal, "Has Iran Crossed the Line?", PBS' News Hour, April 11, 2006
Peter Baker et al., "U.S. Is Studying Military Strike Options on Iran", WP, April 9, 2006
Abbas Maleki et al., "Harvard Researchers Propose Plan to Resolve Iranian Nuclear Crisis", STPP, March 2006
Stephen M. Osborn, Nuclear Bunker Buster Bombs againt Iran, Global Research, March 14, 2006
Robert Kagan, "the nonproliferation 'regime' may now be collapsing", WP, March 12, 2006
Anton Keller, NPT-conform peaceful nuclear activities under Russian sovereignty - in Iran, Mar 2, 2006
Barry R. Posen, "We Can Live With a Nuclear Iran", NYT, Feb 27, 2006
George Perkovich, "U.S.-India Draft Nuclear Agreement Ill-Considered, but Goal of Accommodation with India a Good One", CFR (Bernard Gwertzman),  Feb 24, 2006
Iran: Which Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse? (summary), International Crisis Group, Feb 23, 2006
Elisabeth Bumiller, U.S. Urges India to Split Civilian-Military Nuclear Plants, NYT, Feb 23, 2006
Lionel Beehner, "Israel’s Nuclear Program and Middle East Peace", CFR, Feb 10, 2006
Anton Keller, "Iranian NPT rights & obligations in perspective",memo to UN, Jan 31, 2006
David E. Sanger et al., "Bush and China Endorse Russia's Nuclear Plan for Iran", NYT, Jan 27, 2006
Paul Kerry, "Iran and the NPT - Fairness and Reality", tpmcafe.com, Jan 26, 2006
Joachim Gruber, "European Judas - Germany's Proliferation of WMD Technology", Acamedia, 2006
Mathew L. Wald, "Widespread Radioactivity Monitoring Is Confirmed", NYT, Dec 24, 2005
Spencer Hsu et al., "U.S. Monitored Muslim Sites Across Nation for Radiation", WP, Dec 24, 2005
Alok Jha, "Scientists call for plans to change asteroid's path - Developing technology could take decades", Guardian, Dec 7, 2005
LawrenceScheinman, "New U.S.-India Agreement Undercuts U.S. Allegiance to Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons", CFR (Bernard Gwertzman),  Nov 3, 2005
Joseph Cirincione, "Lessons Lost", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov/Dec 2005.
ICONOCLAST, "More Light & Less Flat-Earth Missionaries!", Sep 25, 2005
Mark Landler, IAEA to Report Iran to UN Security Council for Treaty Violations, NYT, Sep 25, 2005
Walter Pincus, "Pentagon Revises Nuclear Strike Plan - Strategy Includes Preemptive Use Against Banned Weapons", WP Sep 11, 2005, www.solami.com/wppreemptivenukes.htm
William C. Potter, "India and the New Look of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy", Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 25 Aug 2005
Gary Milhollin, "Don't Underestimate the Mullahs", NYT, 23 Aug 2005, .../nytnuciran.htm
Rose Gottemoeller, "The Process in Place", NYT, 23 Aug 2005, .../nytnuckorea.htm
Joby Warrick, "Soviet Germ Factories Pose New Threat - Once Mined for Pathogens in Bioweapons Program. Labs Lack Security", WP, Aug 20, 2005
George Perkovich et al., "Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security", carnegieendowment.org, March 2005
Joseph Cirincione, "Iran and Israel's Nuclear Weapons", the Globalist, March 11, 2005
RetoWollenmann, "Zwischen Atomwaffe und Atomsperrvertrag - Die Schweiz auf dem Weg von der nuklearen Option zum Nonproliferationsvertrag (1958–1969)", Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung Nr. 75, Hrsg.: Andreas Wenger Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik der ETH Zürich, November 2004 (html Version)
Cameron Brown, "Israel AND the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe", MERIA, Sep 2004
David E. Sanger et al., "South Koreans Say Secret Work Refined Uranium", NYT, 3 Sep 2004
Dafna Linzer et al., "S. Korea Acknowledges Secret Nuclear Experiments - IAEA Announces Probe of Activities", WP, 3 Sep 2004, .../wpkorea.htm
Bhaskar Dasgupta, "The Chasm between the Haves and Have-Not's",piquancy, 28 April 2005
Thomas Graham Jr., "Avoiding the Tipping Point", armscontrol.org, July 2004
Kurt M. Campbell, et al., editors, "The Nuclear Tipping Point - Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices", Brookings, 2004
Nicholas D.Kristof, "A Nuclear 9/11", NYT, 10 March 2004, .../nyt911.htm
Joby Warrick et al., "Probe of Libya Finds Nuclear Black Market", WP, 24Jan 2004
"Plugging Nuclear Leaks", editorial, NYT, 4 Jan 2004, .../nytplugging.htm
David E. Sanger et al., "From Rogue Nuclear Programs, Web of Trails Leads to Pakistan", NYT, 4 Jan 2004, .../nytproliferation.htm
Robert Einhorn and Jon Wolfsthal, "Heading Off an Iranian Nuclear Weapons Capability", Center for Strategic & International Studies project, 2004-
Joe Vialls, Baghdad Nuke Marks Bali Anniversary, 18 Oct 2003
Ibrahim al-Marashi, "How Iraq conceals and obtains its Weapons of Mass Destruction", MERIA , March 2003 .../meriaconceal.htm, meria@mail.biu.ac.il
JulianBorger, "US plan for new nuclear arsenal - Secret talks may lead to breaking treaties", Guardian, 12 Feb 2003, .../TGmininukes.htm
Walter Pincus, "CIA Head Predicts Nuclear Race", WP, 12 Feb 2003, .../wpnpt.htm
Daniil Kobyakov and Nicolas Florquin, "'Dirty Bomb' Threat Awakens Dormant Disarmament Conference", Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002
J. Schefer, "Forty Years of Neutron Diffraction in Switzerland", SNN, Dec 2002
Emily B. Landau, "Egypt's Nuclear Dilemma", Strategic Assessment, vol.5, no.3, Nov.2002, JCSS  Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, .../Egypt.htm
Franz A. Blankart, "EUROPA HELVETICA", .../BLANKART.htm, 22 Oct 2002
Anton Keller, "Against some Holy Grail Mantras", .../holygrail.htm, 21 Sep 2002
Paul M. Cole, "Nuclear Weapon Decisionmaking in Sweden 1945–1972", April 1996
Jürg Stüssi-Lauterburg, "Historischer Abriss zur Frage einer Schweizer Nuklearbewaffnung" (664 KB)
    "Aperçu historique d'un armement nucléaire pour la Suisse" (642 KB)
    "La questione dell'armamento nucleare della Svizzera, compendio storico" (846 KB)
    "Historical Outline on the Question of Swiss Nuclear Armament" (42 KB), 31 Dec 1995
Dominique Brunner, "Bleibende Wirkung der nuklearen Abschreckung", NZZ, 12.Mai 1995
Anton Keller, "ON THE IDEAL NATION", .../nations.htm, 11 Jun 1991
U.S. to Build Atomic Reactor for World Conference at Geneva, AEC, 23 March 1955

(reproduced in: Atoms for Peace Manual, a compilation of official materials on international cooperation for peaceful uses of atomic energy, U.S. Senate, Document 55, June 21 1955, Washington)

    The exhibit woud enable visiting scientists and technicians to observe a reactor which provides excellent facilities for a variety of cross-section measurements, experiments with neutrons and gamma rays, including shielding studies and production of radioisotopes. Qualified scientists and technicians will be allowed to operate the machine, using the controls to start, maintain and stop a nuclear chain reaction within the reactor. During these experiments, known as criticality tests, the familiar blue glow of the irradiated fuel elements will be visible in the water.
    The reactor will be of the "swimming pool" type successfully operated at the AEC's Oak Ridge National Laboratory for several years. Research reactors of this type are now being constructed at the Pennsylvania State and Michigan Universities. The name comes from the fact that the reactor is immensed in a pool of water which affords an effective safety shield against radiation.

    The project, for the Geneva Conference will be carried out by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, which is operated for the AEC by the Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Company, and will be under the general supervision of Dr.George L. Weil, Technical Director of the U.S. participation in the Geneva Conference.
    The fuel will be fuel grade uranium enriched in isotope 335 to about 20 percent. About 5 kilograms of U-235 will be required. The reactor will be tested at Oak Ridge and then dismantled and shipped to Geneva. The reactor and its fuel would be at all times under the control and custody of the AEC. It will be housed in a temporary prefabricated metal building dedigned especially to enable the delegates and visitors at Geneva to see the reactor in operation.
    The "swmming pool" feature will be a tank 10 feet in diameter and 20 feet deep, in which the entire reactor is immersed. Specially purified water is used for the shielding. Health and safety control will be built into the reactor. A small platform will be built on top of the reactor, from which a lecturer can direct demonstrations and explain the operation of the machine. The housing structure will be designed to accommodate a constant flow of visitors observing the operation of the reactor.
    The swimming pool reactor, which is estimated to cost about $350,000, will be part of the technical exhibit being planned by the U.S. at Geneva.

    Note to desks: Four pictures of the present Swimming Pool Reactor at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory are available at 30 East 42nd Street (Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation).

Question Relating to Measures to Safeguard Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Security Council,

Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of States to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thereby to undertake not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States,

1.    Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter;

2.    Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear- weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

3.    Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

(adopted at the 1433rd session by 10 against zero votes, with 5 abstentions (Algeria, Brasil, France, India and Pakistan)

312     La résolution no 255 du Conseil de sécurité
    Le 19 juin 1968, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a adopté une résolution (S/Res/255) (cf. annexe 2) qui contient une déclaration de garantie contre les meances ou les agressions atomiques de la part des puissances dotées d'armes nucléaires à rencontre d'Etats qui n'en sont pas dotés. Des déclarations semblables des Etats-Unis, de l'URSS et de la Grande-Bretagne avaient précédé cette résolution (17 juin 1968).
    Juridiquement, les Etats mentionnés n'assument pas d'autres obligations que celles que la Charte de l'ONU leur imposait déjà en leur qualité de membres du Conseil de sécurité; en effet, les déclarations de garantie et la résolution se réfèrent chaque fois à ces obligations préexistantes. Ainsi, tout le caractère problématique des sanctions de l'ONU - blocage du Conseil de sécurité par un veto - subsiste.
    Cette interprétation a également été soulignée à plusieurs reprises au cours des délibérations du Sénat américain. La résolution porte néanmoins un effet juridique dans la mesure où elle restreint la latitude politique des trois puissances dotées d'armes nucléaires. En effet, celles-ci sont tenues, le cas échéant, d'agir immédiatement en se conformant aux obligations que leur impose la Charte de l'ONU, alors qu'elles peuvent, en d'autres circonstances, le faire selon leur libre appréciation. Cela ne change toutefois rien au résultat final.
    En ce qui concerne la sécurité des Etats non dotés d'armes nucléaires, on se référa encore au point 12 du préambule, relatif aux dispositions correspondantes de la Charte des Nations Unies. Il ressort de ces dispositions que l'usage de la force entre les parties au traité peut être considérée comme rupture du traité. Cette disposition ne contient cependant pas de garantie contre de tels actes.

23 août 1968 Garanties de sécurité      (English translation)

    "On sait que la question a fait l’objet de longues discussions tant à la Conférence du Désarmement qu’à l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies et que les craintes émises n’ont pas été dissipées par la résolution adoptée le 19 juin dernier par le Conseil de Sécurité.
    L’arme atomique est d’une nature telle que les garanties juridiques sont de peu de poids lorsque son emploi est en jeu. C’est plutôt de la difficile théorie de l’équilibre de la terreur que les petits pays doivent attendre en période d’armement nucléaire leur précaire sécurité. La garantie de soutien donnée à une future victime du chantage nucléaire ne vaut guère plus que ce que l’intérêt et le souci de maintenir le status quo peuvent dicter en cas de besoin aux puissances atomiques. ...
    Un engagement de renoncer à l’emploi de l’arme atomique contre les Etats non dotés d’armes nucléaires serait un geste positif de la part des grandes puissances, que nous devons chercher à obtenir. Il est peu probable, cependant, qu’il ne soit pas assorti d’une réserve pour le cas de légitime défense, réserve déjà exprimé dans la résolution du Conseil de Sécurité; il serait par conséquent de peu de valeur, puisque dans le système de la Charte, c’est à chaque Etat qu’il appartient de décider des conditions de la légitime défense, aussi longtemps que le Conseil de Sécurité n’a pas pris position. Un engagement de ne pas riposter au moyen d’armes nucléaires à une attaque conventionnelle lancée par un Etat non doté d’armes nucléaires ne correspondrait d’ailleurs pas à l’état présent du droit international. Il n’est pas sûr qu’il soit dans l’intérêt de la paix. ..."

23 Aug 1968      Guarantees of safety

    "It is known that the question was the objet of long discussions so much with the general Conference of Disarmament as at the Assembly of the United Nations and that fears emitted then have not been dissipated by the adopted resolution of last 19 June by the Security Council.
    Atomic weapons are of such a nature that legal guarantees are of little weight when their employment is concerned.  In a period of nuclear armement, it is rather the difficult theory of the balance of terror that small countries may rely on for their precarious safety. The guarantee of support given to a future victim of the nuclear blackmail is hardly worth more than whatever may be dictated by the interest and concern atomic powers may have for maintaining the status. ...
    A commitment to give up the use of nuclear weapons against States not equipped with nuclear weapons would be a positive gesture on behalf of the great powers, which we must seek to obtain. It is not very probable, however, that such a commitment will not be matched by a reserve in the case of self-defence, which reserve is already expressed in the Council Resolution on Safety; it would be consequently of little value for a long time, since in the system of the Charter, it is up to each State to decide conditions of the self-defence, as long as the Security Council will not have taken a position. A commitment not to counteract with nuclear weapons when a conventional attack is launched by a State not equipped with nuclear weapons would not at present correspond to the international law. Also, it is not sure that such a commitment would be in the interest of peace."

    Neutron scattering has a long tradition within Switzerland, which has the world strongest “per capita” national user community [1]. What is the reason? For this we have to go back to the early days of neutron sources in our country. In 1953, a project to build the Swiss research reactor DIORIT, started in 1952 by a private consortium of 171 Swiss companies headed by Brown Bovery (BBC), Sulzer and Escher Wyss, was presented to the Swiss government. Construction was completed three years later by the Reaktor AG. The DIORIT reactor went critical on August 26, 1960. The delay in starting operation was due to a second research reactor (SAPHIR), which was acquired in parallel: This was on the initiative of Max Petitpierre, the Swiss Federal Council of Foreign Affairs, who was also President of Switzerland at the time. The reactor SAPHIR (Figure 1) was sold by the US government for only 770’000 Swiss francs, at the occasion of the exhibition Atoms for Peace held in 1955 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. It was named SAPHIR because of the blue Cerenkov radiation in the reactor pool.
    Three goals were pursued with these new research instruments: Reactor development, training of reactor personnel and condensed matter research. The Institute for Reactor Research of the ETH Zurich, headed by Professor Walter Hälg, was therefore divided into two parts: Reactor technology located in Zurich and the division Education & Research (Ausbildung & Forschung, Delegation AF) located in Würenlingen. In 1960, the Reaktor AG was transformed into the government owned Eidgenössische Institut für Reaktorforschung (EIR).
Peter Fischer started his career at the ETH Zurich, where he made his Masters thesis on the properties of tin telluride, under the supervision of Professor Georg Busch. In summer 1961, he joined the Delegation AF in Würenlingen as a thesis student (Figure 2), together with Georg Maier. This PhD thesis on spinels MgAl2O4 was on an initiative of Professor Fritz Laves, who was looking for a method to distinguish Al and Mg, as this was problematic with X-rays [2].
    With his collaborators, he installed a spectrometer equipped with a mechanical 1:2 drive for simultaneous change of ? and 2? which was based on an optical spectrometer built by the company Toepfer; the instrument was on loan from the university of Basel. It was tested at the reactor SAPHIR. Peter Fischer started to investigate the magnetic properties of MnBi in collaboration with his Norwegian teacher and friend, A.F. Andresen [3], who unfortunately died in 1991 in a car accident. The instrumentation used at the DIORIT is shown in Figure 3. He was supervisor of many future neutron scatterers such as Willi Bührer (†1997), Professor Albert Furrer, Karel Tichy, Heinz Heer and Werner von Wartburg and myself.
    One thing crystallized out of all this work very quickly: Condensed matter physics will be his interest, therefore powder diffraction his method of choice to investigate new materials. This is obvious as neutrons are very valuable for investigations of bulk properties as well as of magnetism. Instrumentation and computing programs were not so well developed in those days. Peter Fischer therefore got very interested in developing new instrumentation. He was always one step ahead and particularly made sure he had the latest software installed on the newest computers. This way, he became one of the first using consequently the (new) Rietveld profile refinement method, and thereby contributed significantly to its development. Therefore it is not surprising that the single detector powder diffractometer punching data onto paper tape was just to slow for him!
    He pushed for the introduction of linear position sensitive detectors. As a result, the DMC spectrometer at the reactor SAPHIR was put into operation in mid 1984, financed by grants from the Swiss Science Foundation, EIR, ETH Zurich and the universities of Berne and Geneva (Figure 4, [4]). Instead of a single counter, 400 wires were now covering an 80° range in 2?. Also single crystal instruments had his interest, as for example his second instrument at SAPHIR, the P2AX (Figure 5). The younger generation may just remember this instrument from the data format containing its name in the file extension (*.2ax), which still exists.
    Peter Fischer was also always in the front line of new science: Hydrogen storage in metals [5], today used in many rechargeable batteries, as well as high temperature superconductors. As an example of the hydrogen storage materials, I just want to mention the magnesium based Cs3MgD5 containing MgD42– anions as well as D– (bonded to Cs only), investigated on the HRPT at SINQ (Figure 6, [6]). In high temperature superconductors, Peter Fischer associated structural changes with superconductivity, soon after Bednorz and Müller found the effect. Together with Professor Klaus Yvon, he discovered a structural phase transition in the first high-Tc material, (La,Sr)CuO4, soon after superconductivity was reported in this material (Figure 7, [7]), and he was among the first to determine the correct structure of the YBa2Cu3O7 (Y123). But probably the most important work he did was with Emanuel Kaldis and Alan W. Hewat on the characterization of the YBa2Cu4O8 (Y124) and Y2Ba4Cu7O15 (Y247, [8]) compound, and the study of the effect of pressure on the Tc in Y124 and Y123. This work confirmed the idea of Bob Cava and collaborators, that Tc was controlled by a charge transfer from socalled “charge reservoir” layers, and that the effect of pressure was due to the different compressibility of the superconducting and of the charge reservoir layers. We also should not forget his important work with his Russian colleagues on the effect of Ca substitution for Y, which changes the charge balance and therefore Tc of these materials [9] and related work with Professor Vitali Trounov. Finally, Peter worked on the magnetic structure of high-temperature superconducting materials in which Y was replaced by magnetic rare earths.
    It is therefore not surprising, that Peter Fischer immediately saw the new possibilities for the Swiss neutron community when the idea of building a spallation neutron source at the proton accelerator at SIN in Villigen appeared. Of course, the “banana” detector from SAPHIR had to grow! 1600 wires are now covering 160° [10] at the new powder diffractometer HRPT at SINQ (Figure 8). This development from the French company CERCA with major inputs from PSI scientists and engineers (EIR and SIN merged 1988 to form PSI) was strongly pushed by Peter Fischer and went into final operation before his retirement despite facing many problems (as most pioneering work does).
    Another field of interest for Peter Fischer was magnetism. He always pushed (mostly successfully) to be equipped with the latest cryostats such as for example the 7 mK dilution refrigerator (Figure 9), used to study the magnetic structure of DyBa2Cu4O8 [11] and many other materials. He probably holds the world record concerning the ratio of successful to failed experiments in a dilution cryostat. Of course, also the “old” DMC was moving over the river, now to be installed at a super-mirror guide for cold neutrons.
    The work of Peter Fischer is contained in almost 400 publications. He advised many young scientists in their Masters as well as PhD thesis work, three of them alone to be finished within this year. We thank him here on the occasion of his retirement for all his input given to science, to our group and to his colleagues worldwide. However, despite being retired, Peter Fischer will definitely not be absent from physics. We are grateful to have such an experienced “consultant” behind us.
    Peter Fischer was always a member of ETH Zurich, whereas his research facilities changed it’s ownerships and names quite frequently. He officially left our institute at the end of October for his retirement. Our best wishes to him and his wife Hedi for their future. You always can reach him at peter.fischer@psi.ch or at his private address, Waldweg 14, CH-5242 Lupfig.
    Peter, I would like to thank you on behalf of our laboratory, but also personally, for all you have done!

Peter Fischer LNS ETHZ&PSI
Figure 1: Loading the parts of SAPHIR for it’s journey to the Geneva exhibition “Atoms for peace” (1955).
Figure 2: Delegation AF (1962) in the chemistry building (today OFLC) at Würenlingen (from the left: Prof. Walter Hälg, Hans Ripfel, Peter Fischer, Georg Maier, Frans Brandt, Ferrrucio Ferroni [Natrium loop]).
Figure 3: Instrumentation installed at the reactor Diorit in Würenlingen.
Figure 4: Double Axis Multicounter Diffractometer (DMC) at the reactor SAPHIR. [4]. The instrument is now installed on a cold guide at SINQ.
Figure 5: The experimental hall at the reactor SAPHIR. In the foreground the MARC spectrometer, in the center the P2AX, and in the back the single crystal and the single counter powder diffractometers.
Figure 6: Hydrogen localisation in Cs3MgD5. Multi phase powder diffraction investigation at HRPT/SINQ, ?=1.886Å. The additional phases are traces of CsD & MgO.
Figure 7: Structural phase transition in La1.85Sr.15CuO4 at 150K [7].
Figure 8: High-resolution powder diffractometer HRPT at the spallation neutron source SINQ in Villigen.
Figure 9: The Oxford dilution refrigerator at the reactor Saphir mounted on DMC.

[1]     Neutron Beams and Synchrotron Radiation Sources, OECD Megascience Forum (OECD, Paris, 1994) p. 89
[2]     P. Fischer, Neutronenbeugungsuntersuchungen der Strukturen von MgAl2O4- und ZnAl2O4-Spinellen, in Abhängigkeit der Vorgeschichte. Z. Kristallographie 124, 275-302 (1967)
[3]     A.F. Andresen, P. Fischer, W. Hälg and E. Stoll, A neutron diffraction study of the magnetic properties of MnBi, ZAMP 15, 655 (1964)
[4]     W. Hälg, H. Heer, J. Schefer, P. Fischer, B. Bron, A. Isacson and M. Koch, DMC, ein neues Neutronen-Pulverdiffraktometer mit Multidetektor am Reaktor Saphir, Helvetica Physica Acta, 57, 741 (1984)
[5]     K. Yvon and P. Fischer, Crystal and Magnetic Structures of Ternary Metal Hydrides: a Comprehensive Review. Topics in Appl. Phys. 63; Hydrogen in Intermetallic Compounds I Electronic, Thermodynamic, and Crystallographic Properties, Preparation; ed. L. Schlapbach, Springer, pp 87-138 (1988).
[6]     B. Bertheville, P. Fischer and K. Yvon, Synthesis and Cyrstal Structures of Cs2MgD4 and Cs3MgD5, J. Alloys and Comp. 302, L12-L16 (2000)
[7]     M. Francois, E. Walker, Y.L, Jorda, K. Yvon and P. Fischer, Structural phase transition at 150 K in the high-temperature superconductor La1.85 Sr0.15 CuO4 Solid State Commun. 63, 35-40 (1987)
[8]     A.W. Hewat, P. Fischer, E. Kaldis, J. Karpinski, S. Rusiecki and E. Jilek, High resolution neutron powder diffraction investigation of temperature and pressure effects on the structure of the high-Tc superconductor Y2Ba4Cu7O15 Physica C: Superconductivity 167, 579-590 (1990)
[9]     G. Böttger, I. Mangelschots, E. Kaldis, P. Fischer, Ch. Krüger and F. Fauth, The influence of Ca doping on the crystal structure and superconductivity of orthorhombic YBa2Cu3O7-? J. Physics: Condensed Matter 8, 8889-8905 (1989)
[10]     P. Fischer, G. Frey, M. Koch, M. Könnecke, V. Pomjakushin, J. Schefer, R. Thut, N. Schlumpf, R. Bürge, U. Greuter, S. Bondt and E. Berruyer, High-resolution powder diffractometer HRPT for thermal neutrons at SINQ, Physica B 276-278, 146-147 (2000)
[11]     B. Roessli, P. Fischer, M. Zolliker, P. Allenspach, J. Mesot, U. Staub, A. Furrer, E. Kaldis, B. Bucher, J. Karpinski, E. Jilek and H. Mutka Crystal-field splitting and temperature dependence of two-dimensional antiferromagetism in the high-Tc compound DyBa2Cu4O8, Z. Phys. B 91, 149-153 (1993)

"I was responsible for the bombing at the US Consulate [which killed or injured no one] and I'm proud of it, but most of the people were killed by an Israeli micronuke that was targeted at the Sari Club at the same moment. You know, to make Islam look bad." Amrozi , Convicted Indonesian ‘Mass Murderer’
           At exactly 1300 hours on 12 October 2003, all was quiet around the Baghdad Hotel in Iraq. American troops and a few Iraqi taxis prowled the streets, while inside the hotel itself CIA agents sprawled in air-conditioned luxury, casually discussing who to murder next. Two thousand miles away to the south east, in Bali, Indonesia, it was exactly 1800 hours, and dusk was rapidly falling across the tropical island. Hundreds of mourners started to light thousands of Australian taxpayer-funded candles to commemorate the first anniversary of the Bali Bombing, and Australian Prime Minister John Howard stood ready to address the assembled throng.
            Little Johnny Howard started telling mourners about the evil “Muslim Terrorists” who had devastated Kuta Beach exactly one year before with a home-made potassium chloride detergent bomb, killing an [official] total of 202 civilians, though the real figure was far higher, and included those who died days or weeks after the event from ultraviolet flash burns and plutonium poisoning. Forget about “Muslim Terrorists”, because the only countries on earth with stealth plutonium critical weapons were, and remain, America and Israel.
            Less than one minute after Little Johnny opened his mouth to speak, in fact at precisely 1300:56 hours Iraqi time, there was an awesome screech as another fission monster from hell went critical, this time in an underground sewer located less than 250 feet away from the Baghdad Hotel, home to America’s premier spooks, and to several of New York’s “Iraq Provisional Council” toadies. Blissfully unaware of this perfectly synchronized event, Little Johnny’s voice droned on and on in Bali.
            Back in Baghdad the fireball from the latest fission monster from hell expanded and then burst out into the street above, burning at a staggering 300,000 degrees centigrade and vaporizing all material within 30 feet of its lethal blast vector. The fireball spontaneously ignited six nearby buildings and sprayed the Baghdad Hotel with more than a ton of lethal radioactive particles. Someone somewhere was telling the CIA “right back at you”, on the first anniversary of its own bombing of Kuta Beach in Bali on 12 October 2002.
            Naturally you were not told about this landmark event by members of the corporate media, who suppressed any chance of panic among American troops in Iraq by telling everyone who would listen that a “car bomber charged the hotel gates”, or some such equally predictable and pathetic rubbish. Spontaneously igniting buildings and vaporized cars were left out of the story completely. In fact, some western reporters may not have actually known what happened, because all have been fed the same ridiculous lie that surface car bombs dig craters. Rest assured that surface car bombs can’t and never will be able to dig craters.
            Unwilling to believe that either the Mossad or CIA would be willing to blow up their own assets to celebrate the first anniversary of the Bali bombing, I waited impatiently for the results of a discreet Geiger counter sweep of the immediate area. Unlike Bali, the Geiger counter in Baghdad recorded a reasonably high level of gamma radiation, meaning that the micro nuke used for the attack was of an older type which incorporated a uranium 238 neutron reflector. Several countries including Britain, France, Russia and China have substantial stocks of these weapons, which are normally kept under very tight control by the respective national authorities.
            Apart from a handful of British weapons stolen from their classified buried locations in East Germany decades ago, the only known “suitcase” micros on the loose are Russian. Back in September 1997, former Spetsnaz [Russian Special Forces] commander General Alexander Lebed admitted to “losing” between 84 and 100 of these weapons, and frightened the west by stating casually on television ``Can you imagine what would happen morally, psychologically, if this weapon is detonated in a big city? ... About 50-70,000 people, up to 100,000 people would be killed.''
            As usual, the colorful Alexander Lebed was playing with his audience, because he knew very well at the time that most of the “lost” Russian suitcase nuclear weapons were rated at 0.01 kilotons [10 tons equivalent TNT], with only 12 of the total packing the 1.0 kiloton [1,000 tons equivalent TNT] blast he was describing.  It would be nice to confirm this personally with General Alexander Lebed, but sadly he is no longer with us.
            On 28 April 2002 General Lebed was flying to the opening of a new ski line in the Yermakov district of Siberia when his helicopter crashed. Though he survived the crash, the hospital in Abakan pronounced Lebed dead at 1300 hours.

General Alexander Lebed
           Quite apart from deliberately marking the first anniversary of the Bali bombing, it seems entirely possible that those in control of this series of micro nuclear weapons are intent on using them for “area denial”, in other words to prevent the Americans from using certain specific sections or areas of Iraq. Translated to the prestigious Baghdad Hotel in the heart of the city, this makes perfect sense. Though ninety-nine percent of American troops would be unable to distinguish between a conventional 10 ton explosive blast and a critical nuclear 10 ton blast, the Central Intelligence Agency would know the difference in a flash.
            It is a fact of life that CIA personnel are so far up themselves they feel entitled to five-star accommodation wherever they travel, including Iraq. Army tents without air conditioning or showers would be out of the question for these self-appointed “super spooks”, as would any accommodation contaminated by even a tiny trace of gamma radiation. Perhaps this is the main point of the exercise. First get rid of the American spooks, and the American troops will eventually follow them home.

    WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 - The F.B.I. and the Energy Department have conducted thousands of searches for radioactive materials at private sites around the country in the last three years, government officials confirmed on Friday.
    The existence of the search program was disclosed on Thursday by U.S. News & World Report, on its Web site. Since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, government agencies have disclosed that they have installed radiation-detection equipment at ports, subway stations and other public locations, but extensive surreptitious monitoring of private property has not been publicly known.
    The federal government has given thousands of radiation alarms, worn like cellphones on the belt, to police and fire departments in major cities.  A spokesman for the Justice Department, Brian Roehrkasse, confirmed that law enforcement personnel were conducting "passive operations in publicly accessible areas to detect the presence of radiological materials, in a manner that protects U.S. constitutional rights."
    U.S. News, citing people it did not name, said many of the sites that federal agents had monitored were mosques or the homes or businesses of Muslims, and the report set off a dispute between a Muslim group here and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
    The group, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, said in a statement: "This disturbing revelation, coupled with recent reports of domestic surveillance without warrant, could lead to the perception that we are no longer a nation ruled by law, but instead one in which fear trumps constitutional rights. All Americans should be concerned about the apparent trend toward a two-tiered system of justice, with full rights for most citizens, and another diminished set of rights for Muslims."
    But John Miller, an assistant director of the F.B.I., said in a statement that his agency "does not target any group based on ethnicity, political or religious belief." "When intelligence information suggests a threat to public safety, particularly involving weapons of mass destruction," the statement said, "investigators will go where the intelligence information takes them."  Mr. Miller said the bureau was "disappointed at the conclusions" reached by the Muslim group. He added that F.B.I. agents would work through the holiday weekend to catch whoever set off a bomb on Tuesday that damaged the door of a mosque near Cincinnati.
    According to a federal official who would not allow his name to be used, the investigators have visited hundreds of sites in Washington, New York, Chicago, Detroit, Las Vegas and Seattle on multiple occasions, as well other locations for high-profile events like the Super Bowl. The surveillance was conducted outdoors, and no warrants were needed or sought, the official said, speaking on anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss classified programs. "If you can go drive a car into the parking lot near the shopping mall, we can go there," he said. "It's nothing intrusive. We're not searching into a particular building, just sniffing the air in the area."
    Federal officials have expressed anxiety about two radiological threats. One is a "dirty bomb," a conventional explosive that would spread a radioactive material. Such an attack would be unlikely to kill anyone with radiation, but it could contaminate streets, buildings or other public places. The materials that would be used are highly radioactive and might be detected from some distance, experts say.
    The other threat is that someone would try to detonate a nuclear bomb. Bomb fuel, either enriched uranium or plutonium, is much harder to detect, because its radiation signature is weak, physicists say. But it is also much harder to obtain.  At least some of the surveillance was by the Nuclear Emergency Support Team, part of the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration, which leads the American effort to secure nuclear materials around the world.

    Clandestine FBI and Energy Department teams have monitored private property in the United States for signs of radiation without warrants, U.S. officials said yesterday. Officials said the monitoring, which intensified after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, did not require warrants or court orders because it took place from publicly accessible areas or from parking lots or driveways leading to private facilities, which the FBI believes do not carry privacy protections.
    According to a report yesterday by U.S. News & World Report, government teams were sent to more than 100 Muslim sites in the Washington area, including mosques, homes, businesses and warehouses, plus similar sites in Chicago, Detroit, Las Vegas, New York and Seattle.
    The magazine, citing unnamed sources who knew about the secret program, said investigators sometimes went onto property under surveillance without a warrant, and some participants were threatened with firing after questioning the legality of the activity. At its peak, three vehicles monitored 120 sites a day in and around Washington, nearly all of them Muslim targets identified by the FBI, the report said. The magazine said checks were made daily for about 10 months starting in 2002 and resumed during high threat periods.
    Justice Department spokesman Brian Roehrkasse said the FBI does not target any group based on ethnicity, political or religious belief. "When intelligence information suggests that there may be a threat to public safety, particularly involving weapons of mass destruction, FBI investigators will go wherever the intelligence information takes them, acting within the framework of the law," he said.
    Department spokesman John Nowacki said the government "is concerned with the growing body of reporting that al Qaeda has an intention to obtain and use chemical or radiological materials in an attack against Americans, and with this in mind, the FBI, as part of an interagency team, conducts passive operation in publicly accessible areas to determine the presence of nuclear materials in the area, in a manner that protects U.S. constitutional rights."
    The Supreme Court ruled 5 to 4 in 2001 that warrants are required for police to use devices that search through walls for criminal activity, striking down the use of a heat sensor that led to marijuana charges against an Oregon man. "The message they are sending through these kinds of actions is that being Muslim is sufficient evidence to warrant scrutiny," said Ibrahim Hooper, spokesman for the Council on American-Islamic Relations.
    Imam Johari Abdul-Malik, director of outreach for Al Hijrah Islamic Center in Falls Church, called the surveillance another example of unwarranted activity -- "both unwarranted from the standpoint of spying on Muslims who are only trying to observe their rituals and unwarranted in terms of not having proper judicial review." "I don't understand what good this sort of surveillance is doing," said Mukit Hossain, trustee of the All Dulles Area Muslims Society in Sterling. "What we are doing is harassing the immigrants and citizens and we haven't found one that is a terrorist." He said this kind of surveillance fuels "anti-Muslim feelings in America and a public relations problem for America in Muslim countries."

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is going to get another airing in May of this year. People have started making noises about it already, but it’s going to be quite predictable. A whole load of documents will be produced prior to the Review Conference; the pacifists and left leaning folks will demonstrate vociferously; North Korea and Iran will be hauled over the coals for daring to want nuclear weapons; Israel will maintain a discreet silence; India will bellow about unfair treatment; Pakistan will squirm about the AQ Khan proliferation network; USA will tie themselves in knots trying to navigate some extremely contradictory policy shoals; France will be petulant; UK will be diplomatically active; Russia will be lost as usual; the conference will end with some high sounding declaration and that will be it. Frankly, if you ask me, it’s a complete crock and the treaty should be torn up. Useless piece of paper. Why? Read on, McDuff.
    I have spoken before in this space about the NPT with reference to Iran. It would be conducive to repeat what I concluded for Iran back in 2003. “Iran will have its nuclear weapons, if not today then tomorrow. As I mentioned, there is no downside to Iran and only an upside, which makes it very difficult to convince Iran to give up its nuclear weapons programme. It cannot be threatened, cannot be bribed, and certainly cannot be forced. The neighbourhood is tough and to expect Iran to resign its nuclear aspirations is rather too naïve. All that the world should do now is to try to address the structure around nuclear power states. As we have seen with the press reports about Saudi Arabia wanting Pakistani Nuclear weapons, it’s a mutual deterrence issue. The nuclear genie is out of the bottle and no amount of swearing and shouting will cause it to go back in again. "Welcome (premature, mind you) to the nuclear club, Iran."
    Let me cut to the chase; I recommend that the NPT be hung, drawn, quartered and dropped neatly into the rubbish bin. While it was useful for many years during the cold war, it has proven to be spectacularly ineffective indeed in the last decade. So what’s the big deal about the NPT? To summarise the NPT, five defined nuclear powers, namely USA, UK, France, China and Russia, promise not to transfer nuclear weapons; not to help others acquire them; and to pursue nuclear disarmament. The non-nuclear weapon states promise not to get nuclear weapons; accept safeguards from the International Atomic Energy Agency and in return for that, they get civilian nuclear energy help. It entered into force in 1970 and a huge number of countries ratified it. So far so good! Right now, we have Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, and India who possess both the nuclear weapons and the delivery vehicles. While Pakistan and India have tested weapons, thereby removing all doubt, North Korea has publicly claimed to have nukes, while Israel is strongly suspected to have nuclear weapons although this has not been officially confirmed. To top it all, North Korea withdrew from the NPT. What is the end-result? If the objective was to stop nuclear proliferation, then it failed miserably. We have the examples of the above countries to prove it. If the objective was to reduce and stop nuclear disarmament – then that has failed miserably as well.
    The nuclear weapon states absolutely do not desire to do anything, which will reduce or remove their nuclear weapons capability. For example, it is the nuclear weapons capability, which gives France and Russia its extra influence in the world. The USA and USSR are busy upgrading their arsenals – the USA is thinking about upgrading its major warhead designs (heavy discussions have been heard lately about spending more than $2 billion on a routine 10-year overhaul to extend the life of the aging warheads, such as the W-76) while the USSR is working on better delivery systems; USA has refused to ratify the CTBT and so on and so forth. On the other hand, for a country to achieve nuclear weapons, they only have to start spraying money around in corrupt or crazy countries such as Pakistan and North Korea respectively, and they will get all what they need. We have seen and heard how Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have attempted to gain this knowledge. So frankly, the NPT has been proven to be well and truly stuffed.

    If so, what is the alternative? This requires going back to the drawing board. The main reason why nuclear weapons were dreaded, as opposed to say battle tanks or cruise missiles, is their sheer destructive power. In other words, the sheer potential to virtually wipe out the entire earth many times over is what got people terrified. The anti-nuclear campaign was in full flow starting from the late 50’s and gained quite a head of steam, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the foot on the accelerator was taken off. In addition, with the passage of time, nuclear weapons have lost their terror, as none had actually been used since WWII. The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction kept usage of nuclear weapons down to zero. It is a mutual suicide weapon indeed, but recently, given impact of terror attacks, fear has become generic. Gone are the days that massive rallies would take place about removal of nuclear weapons, but now, people are more driven by what a few pathologically disturbed idiot terrorists could do, rather than what a whole structure which owns and manages nuclear weapons can. In other words, what I feel is that the worry is more about individuals rather than states. Given that most of the states are heading towards democracy and responsible government, the worry is about these individuals, terrorists and the few failed or terrorist harbouring states.
    Given this background, what can one do? What one can do is to give up this NPT business and concentrate on homing into addressing the “root causes”. Namely, protection of civilians from warfare, going after the terrorists and sorting out failed or threatening states. The ICC needs to be bedded down, a real anti-terrorist treaty should be embedded, and finally the recently proposed UN reforms should be taken a step further to allow international intervention. The Geneva Conventions should be given more teeth and should be further incorporated into national law. Put it in another way, just like the UN and European Human Rights Conventions are now incorporated into British Law, similarly the Geneva Conventions with some improvements should be incorporated into various national laws. At the very least, no country, which does not have these conventions and treaties as part of their own legal system, should be allowed to be part of the UN Security Council. This will provide the necessary teeth for the prevention of wholesale massacres and genocide of civilians. If anybody wishes to pop off a nuke, they should know the penalties for this.
    Secondly, the ICC is a very good measure, but needs to be improved. This column is not the place to go into those, but the big guys should again be part of ICC otherwise it does not make sense. Some improvements need to be made to get countries like USA, India, and China etc. to sign up and some of their objections are pretty valid. It is vital to address genocide, massacres, and other crimes against humanity globally. I can understand and appreciate the objections which the USA has made and those need to be addressed as well, in case that any tin pot dictator or rocket scientist gets hold of nuclear weapons or goes about selling them, he will be hauled over hot coals.
    Thirdly, within the ICC or some other framework, a real anti-terrorist treaty has to be bedded down. No faffing around! Anybody who is going after civilians for political, social or religious purposes outside the national and international laws is a terrorist. Interpol needs to be strengthened, extradition treaties implanted into the treaty – this rats nest of bilateral treaties has to go – perhaps the Interpol can get a structure like that of the WTO. Intelligence sharing, targeted eradication, information sharing, good databases, better passports and security, good border controls etc. etc. will stop or at least make it very difficult for terrorists to go about getting hold of nuclear technology. The IAEA is a good idea and need to be given further teeth and bigger scope to handle chemical and biological weapons as well.
    The final part is to look at the UN reforms more critically and aggressively. In particular, some sort of international consensus mechanisms should be drawn up, so that failed or failing states can be looked at much earlier and if required with much more force than currently. In addition, we also should not be forced to be in a position that situations like Rwanda happen again, while some UNSC members are not sure. Again, this column isn't the place to go deeper into the UN reform proposals, but it definitely has to be made more concrete and more rigorous. Failed states and freely available nuclear weapons technology are not a good combination. At end of the day, the objective is to be realistic about all this. Nuclear technology is out there. We might as well as bring the states into the structure rather than persist in a structure, which fails in its basic objectives. Ralph Waldo Emerson warned of this saying: ‘Man is a shrewd inventor, and is ever taking the hint of a new machine from his own structure, adapting some secret of his own anatomy in iron, wood, and leather, to some required function in the work of the world. But it is found that the machine unmans the user. What he gains in making cloth, he loses in general power.”
    All this to be taken with a grain of salt!

    Lawrence Scheinman, a prominent expert in arms control policy, says the Bush administration's sudden agreement in principle to provide nuclear technology to India even though India has never joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has nuclear arms, "rubs up against the longstanding policy that we have had on nuclear proliferation." In short, that policy holds that the United States should not aid the nuclear efforts, civilian or otherwise, of nations not in conformity with the non-proliferation regime.
    Although the agreement was announced in principle on July 18, there is not yet a formal accord awaiting congressional action. Scheinman says President Bush will "have a tough time" getting it through Congress unless there is considerable consultation and flexibility. The agreement to help out India's civil nuclear program comes at a time when the United States is trying to pressure Iran, which is a signatory to the NPT, not to go further in their ostensible civilian nuclear program.
    Using the term used by the administration to describe the Iraqi coalition, Scheinman says the "United States administration does not have great confidence in multilateral institutions as a way to get things done and prefers to act on the basis of a consensus of 'the willing.'"
    Scheinman, the distinguished professor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, was formerly assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Clinton administration. He was interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor for cfr.org, on November 3, 2005.

The others are Pakistan and Israel?
    Yes, Pakistan and Israel are the other two. In comparing India and Iran, however, while India had never undertaken any obligations with respect to nonproliferation, Iran is a party to the NPT and made a commitment to nonproliferation, to safeguards, and to provide all the appropriate information to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. Iran was found to be delinquent in providing information to the IAEA for a period of somewhere between fifteen and eighteen years about what it was doing, what it was proposing, what it was producing, and the like.

So, Iran has to be looked upon as a state that had a set of legally binding obligations with which it failed to comply.
    India is a state that never made the commitment in the first place to the NPT. And it is now regarded by the US administration as an important potential strategic partner as it looks to the years ahead with respect to East Asia and to the broader international system. It's also important to remember that before the agreement that was reached on July 18th between India and the United States, there had been ongoing discussion on strategic relations between the two countries. I think about a month before this agreement was reached between India and the United States, an agreement on Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership was concluded that called for improved relations in economic, technological, and military cooperation fields. It was the July statement that brought in the civil nuclear cooperation factor that rubs up against the longstanding policy that we have had on nuclear proliferation.

Can you tell us what that policy is?
    The policy is that we will not cooperate with any state that does not accept full scope safeguards on all of its civil nuclear activities. This is inscribed in our 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act that amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. We do not say that a state has to be an NPT party, to qualify for cooperation—it could for example be a party to a nuclear-weapon free zone treaty—but it must accept that it will have only civil nuclear activity and that nuclear activity will be under comprehensive international safeguards.

And those safeguards mean what? The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)?
    IAEA safeguards to verify that the state is in compliance with its undertaking not to produce anything nuclear but for civil purposes. In addition, we had taken the lead in creating the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in the aftermath of the 1974 India “peaceful” nuclear test and for years we had been trying to get all of the nuclear suppliers to agree that they would not cooperate with any country that did not accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards on all of their nuclear activities.
    It was not until 1992 that the NSG agreed as an entity that that's the way that they would proceed in the future. And now the United States comes along and says, "Well, we think our legislation with respect to nonproliferation and safeguards needs to be adjusted because there are new geo-strategic considerations that we are trying to deal with and that we'll also have to get our NSG partners to agree to alter a policy commitment that we took in 1992 after twenty years of U.S. efforts."

So, did this come as sort of a bolt from nowhere to the Congress?
    I think it did. I don't think anybody anticipated that the administration was going to suddenly turn around and say, "Well, our national legislation, our national policy, and our international undertakings need to be changed because we have a new situation that we are confronting, a modernizing China, in terms of its nuclear weapons, a growing assertiveness of China in the East Asia region and India, a democratic country that has not joined the NPT, but that could serve as an important partner in trying to maintain stability in that region of the world."

Now, explain to me one thing: We know India has had a series of nuclear tests, including most recently in 1998. There are now five nuclear-weapon states that are acknowledged—the United States, Britain, Russia, France, and China.
    Yes, the NPT acknowledged five nuclear-weapon states.

Why can't India be a nuclear-weapon state since it obviously has nuclear weapons?
    Because, under the terms of the NPT the only states that can be recognized as nuclear weapon states for the purposes of the treaty are those that tested before January 1, 1967—that was the definition agreed to by the states that negotiated the NPT. India did not conduct a test until 1974, so in order for them to become a nuclear weapon state the treaty would have to be fundamentally amended. Amendment is extremely difficult, and if you opened up that treaty to amend it to accommodate India then you would effectively be opening the treaty up to amendment for other reasons. Everybody would want to assert their view on what they felt was deficient in the NPT and should be corrected. One of those things would be Article Six of the NPT. Most of the countries in the world would like to see Article Six, the commitment of the nuclear-weapon states to disarm being fulfilled on a more rapid and comprehensive basis than they think we're doing. So they would say that if you want to amend the treaty to allow India to become a party to the treaty as a nuclear-weapon state, then we want you to accept a time-bound framework for getting rid of all of your nuclear weapons. And that is something we don't want to open ourselves up to.

Now, the Bush administration's policy on nonproliferation until now has been what?
    The administration asserts that it is strongly in favor of promoting nuclear nonproliferation. But it's been less convinced that the best way to do this is through arms control arrangements or through multilateral institutions and agreements and prefers what has been called by [Council President] Richard Haass  “multilateralism a la carte,” which is what you see in the so-called Proliferations Security Initiative and initiatives that the United States has pushed with its G-8 [Group of Eight] partners with respect to dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons material becoming available to non-state actors and terrorist groups.  In other words, the United States administration does not have great confidence in multilateral institutions as a way to get things done and prefers to act on the basis of a consensus of “the willing.”

So you're taking that expression from Iraq?
    Yes

So how did the policy on India evolve?
    Our former Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill was pushing very hard, and others in the administration were pressing to reassess our relationship with India. They were saying that it's unfortunate that here you have the largest democracy in the world, with whom we share many common values, which is being dealt with differently than almost everybody else and we need in the present international political/security environment is a closer and better and stronger relationship with India. Most people would agree, I among them, that it's important for the United States to forge a stronger and deeper set of relations with India. We do have a lot in common.
    The question is whether, in doing so, we should sacrifice another value that we have, which is the value of sustaining a credible nuclear nonproliferation regime. So I think what you're seeing here is basically a problem of how do you strengthen relationships with India, but not at the expense of another important relationship, which is the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

How would this agreement in July violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty?
    What is involved here, essentially, is that under the existing law that we mentioned a few minutes ago under our national legislation and under our international undertakings in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the NSG, there is not supposed to be any cooperation in the nuclear field with countries that don't accept comprehensive safeguards on all their nuclear activities. That means that they are to have civil programs, that they forego the pursuit or acquisition of nuclear weapons or explosive devices, and that that civil program can be verified.
    By entering into this agreement, we're saying that, well, even though you are a self-declared nuclear weapon state, even though you are running a nuclear weapons program, we are prepared to enter into some kind of a relationship with you where we can have cooperation in the civil nuclear sector. Then the question becomes, what does the United States get for what it's apparently prepared to give, and what is it that India is giving to the United States and the international community in exchange for what it receives in the way of nuclear cooperation?
    There has been a whole list of things that has been indicated in the record. India has agreed that it would maintain a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and that it would work for the conclusion of a fissile material cutoff convention, and that it would strengthen its nuclear export control system. These are things that are very much part of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The problem for many of us is that yes, these are good things but they're already in place, that is to say these are policies and practices currently being pursued by the Indian government, so the question is, what else is India going to do?
    One of the other things that they are committing themselves to do is not to transfer any sensitive nuclear technology to states that don't already have them. That's very consistent with U.S. thinking as well. You may recall the president's statement in February of 2004 that called for no further transfer of enrichment or reprocessing technologies to states that don't already have fully operational capability in that field; in other words, to create a new barrier to any other countries entering into the business of enrichment and reprocessing, which of course is focused very much on the Iranian situation. India is saying, “Yes, yes, we'll go along with that as well.” In fact, if you look back at the history, India has never, to our knowledge, transferred these sensitive nuclear technologies. But then you get to something else. India has several reactors that are under international safeguards because they were provided to India by suppliers on that condition, for example the Tarapur reactors.

That's provided by the United States.
    Yes. The others are the Rajasthan reactors that were provided by Canada. The rest of the reactors that are in India are not under any kind of surveillance, monitoring, or controls. They have said in this agreement with the United States that they would separate their military and civilian nuclear facilities and place their civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards and that they would also adhere to the additional protocols and safeguards (PDF) that the board of governors had approved in 1997 and to which we have already signed up but have not yet implemented.
    The problem here is that  it's the sovereign right of India to make the decision as to what is civil, what is military, and they could say they have about eight reactors that are not under safeguards that they could declare to be civil facilities but they won't do that for all of them because they have taken the position, as far as I understand it, that they, unlike the United States or the former Soviet Union, have not stockpiled large quantities of fissile nuclear material that could be used weapons purposes and require flexibility to respond to changing circumstances. They have a minimum deterrence policy and posture and they only produce as much nuclear material for those weapons as they need and that's a changing, shifting requirement. So the question would be, are they prepared to declare all of their nuclear facilities other than the specifically dedicated facilities weapons program to be civil, to place it under international safeguards in perpetuity so that they could never withdraw a facility from safeguards and apply its capability for a weapons program, or are they not?
    This is going to be a very, very big problem in terms of how things go forward and why many of us have been urging the Congress, which has to get into this whole business of approving an agreement for cooperation and approving the conditions for export policies to be carried out, to insist on a  very rigorous set of conditions to be applied, including a very broad declaration of facilities to be strictly for civil purposes. Congress has to get into this in terms of changing our law; and we as a country have to get into this in terms of getting an agreement in terms of all our partners in the NSG. There are now forty-five countries involved in the suppliers group. It operates on the basis of consensus, which means that everybody has got to agree that yes, we will change the rules of the game and we'll do it en masse and we'll not have one country walk away and say, “I'm going to do what I please,” after having worked so hard to get an agreement that we would all work according to the same set of rules.

Is there any likelihood that Congress will say no?
    I don't think that Congress will say no. I think what Congress will do is to determine the conditions under which they would be prepared to approve an agreement for cooperation with India . What is necessary is that the administration places before the Congress a draft agreement for cooperation. This applies to any cooperative agreement that we have and it sits before Congress, I think, for a total of ninety days and the Congress has to act on it. If the Congress doesn't like what they see in terms of the particulars in that agreement for cooperation, they can say, “Well, we're prepared to accept this if you do A and B.” One of the ideas is that the Indian government should agree to a voluntary moratorium on any further production of fissile material for weapons purpose, while a fissile material cutoff treaty (that they agree to pursue with the US and others) is being negotiated.
    The Indians have already been approached on this, as far as I understand it, and they said absolutely not. The reason they said “no” was the reason I gave earlier, that they say they don't stockpile fissile material for weapons, but produce it as needed. If there were a sudden change in terms of need and they were locked into a no-production fissile material for weapons, they would not be able to address their changing security environment.

Are the Iranians saying the United States is being very hypocritical? Are other countries saying that?
    Yes. I think that from the Iranian point of view, they sit there and say, "Wait a minute, here is a country that doesn't subscribe to the NPT and is free to go out as a consequence—legally free to go out—and develop nuclear weapons, which it's been doing, and you're about to do business with them, which is fine. On the other hand here we are a party to the NPT, we have accepted full scope safeguards, we have adopted the additional protocol and applied it even before our legislature has ratified it, and you're telling us we don't have the right to complete the nuclear fuel cycle? Wait a minute, how is it that the Indians can be rewarded for their staying outside the treaty and still get all the cooperation that a party inside the treaty would normally get and you're telling us that we shouldn't be enriching nuclear material, we should not be reprocessing nuclear material and that we're bad guys and we should be treated accordingly."
    So it does make it very difficult and the Iranians are very clever. From their point of view, the United States is promoting a policy of differentiation in the treatment of India that has always stayed outside of the NPT. How do other countries like South Africa, the Ukraine, Brazil that gave up nuclear weapons programs and stayed within the treaty, how do they react to this? These countries have to be thinking, "Wait a second, we gave up these rights and we committed ourselves to a legally binding commitment, and in order to get cooperation, now you're going to go ahead and offer cooperation to a country that said it's not going to subscribe to any of these things?"

I assume Pakistan will be knocking on our door, too.
    They already are. There are reports that the Pakistanis would like to build a number of power reactors and you bring up a good point. If the United States is successful in getting an agreement to go forward with this arrangement with India, the Chinese, who have already said that they have what we would call “grandfathered agreements” with Pakistan will be in there in full force to transfer more technology and to cooperate more. Other countries will be looking at Pakistan and say, “Maybe we can do some business there as well.”
    Now, that business would be under safeguards and under conditions that a country cannot produce material for weapons purposes. One thing that I forgot to add, is that if we get into the business of nuclear cooperation and the transfer of nuclear material for civil reactors to India, to the extent that we're making those transfers, we are relieving them of the need to produce their own material for their civil programs domestically and the workload that would have gone into producing that civil nuclear material could, in theory, be dedicated to producing nuclear material for weapons purposes. So, in a sense, we would be assisting them in their proliferation.

Why did the United States feel it necessary to do all of this? Why couldn't it just have a strategic agreement against terrorism and stuff like that?
    Good question. Why couldn't we have a wholesome strategic agreement between ourselves and India that didn't get into the issue of civil nuclear cooperation? I think that the answer to that is that the Indians wanted to have an agreement that gave them legitimacy, the recognition by the world's leading power that they are a legitimate state in conducting their nuclear activities and that opens the door for them to be considered one of the inside crowd, as opposed to being on the outside. I think the answer to this is very much a question of India's self-image and its image in the world and its concern that it be acknowledged for what it is, which is a nuclear-weapon state, even though it's not one that is a weapon-state by the definition of the NPT.

Does President Bush have enough political clout to push this through, you think?
    I think he'll have a tough time. I am aware of the fact that Congress on both sides of the aisle, Senate and House sides have indicated to the Administration that they expect not to be presented with a fait accompli, take it or leave it kind of agreement for cooperation, but rather to keep a close consultation with the Congress on this. I think that if the administration chose to just try to barrel it through, it wouldn't make it. But, if they chose to do it on the basis on temperate negotiation and consultation and working and ironing out the wrinkles and the differences with the Congress that they might be able to get something.

    George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a leading expert on India’s nuclear program, applauds the U.S. goal of trying to reach an accommodation with India over its nuclear program. But he says the details in the draft accord, now being worked on in advance of President Bush’s arrival in India next week, were “very under-cooked and not well-considered.”
    “The idea of changing the rules to make some accommodation with India was correct,” says Perkovich. “But this particular approach was ill-considered, in essence giving India, or attempting to give India, everything, and to throw out in essence all the rules in return for too little from India. And the reason that you want more from India is to be able to send a signal to the rest of the world that ‘Yes, nonproliferation matters also, and we’re not throwing out the distinctions that have been made between countries that have nuclear weapons and countries that don’t.’”

What were the problems?
    The original proposal was unusually vague, and it left open some really fundamental questions. For example, the administration in July 2005 said that this deal would augment our nuclear nonproliferation objectives. It said the main way this would happen is that for the first time India would designate certain nuclear facilities as civilian, and put those under safeguards by the [UN nuclear watchdog, the] International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. Many of those facilities aren’t under such safeguards now.
    What the administration didn’t nail down was how long would the safeguards be accepted or agreed to by India. In other words, all of the world, except for the five recognized nuclear weapon states, have safeguards forever on a facility.