INDEX    abstract ¦ introduction ¦ security considerations ¦ NPT obligations ¦ NPT obligations applying to nuclear-weapon states (NWS) only ¦ NPT obligations applying to non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) only ¦ NPT obligations applying to all parties to this treaty ¦ implications of NPT obligations ¦ non-peaceful uses of nuclear material by NPT-NNWS ¦ definitions ¦ avenues for preventing non-governmental diversions ¦ economic considerations ¦ nuclear macro-explosions ¦ Plowshare projects ¦ nuclear micro-explosions ¦ programs and adverse experiences with the IAEA and other ¦ development trends and possible consequences on other nuclear energy programs ¦ micro-explosions vs. conventional breeder reactor concepts ¦ input/output indices of integrated mirco-explosion breeder reactor system ¦ profile of EURODIF and URENCO programs ¦ NPT constraints on NNWS regarding micro-explosion system developments ¦ official positions on nuclear micro-explosion systems vs. NPT ¦ in defence of expanded safeguards measures ¦ conclusions
 

TO THE UNBORNS' HEALTH AND WEALTH,
        TO THE MILLIONS' UNIMPEDED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS
        IN REAL SAFETY FROM NUCLEAR THREATS AND ANNIHILATION, AND
    TO THE WISDOM AND COURAGE OF THE DOZENS
    INFLUENCING THE COURSE OF EVENTS
    IN THE ABOVE DIRECTION – OR AWAY FROM IT.
                                                    H.A.K.

ABSTRACT

An analysis of the first five years of operation of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) leads the authors to conclude that — q.e.e — the treaty has failed to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives capabilities and, due to its exclusive backward focus, is even providing incentives to explore the apparently feasible pure-fusion nuclear explosives road. Yet — and again q.e.e. — with regard to economic implications, the NPT has proven a nuisance and an unnecessary obstacle in many cases and, in some respects, poses a clear threat of growing dimensions. The vantage point for these conclusions is that of observers actively involved in nuclear micro- and macro-explosives development, respectively application planning.

The obligations undertaken by the parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty and their collateral, the IAEA NPT safeguards, are analysed with regard to their apparent and possible security, political and economic implications. The lack of measures verifying the fulfilment of some key undertakings and the possibility formally accorded NPT Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to import, produce, stock-pile and use — explicitly for non-peaceful purposes — any quantity even of bomb-grade fissionable material outside all IAEA or other international safeguards, is seen to cast serious doubts on the relevancy of these elaborate safeguards. Furthermore, the IAEA NPT safeguards' almost exclusive attention to governmental diversions is seen to cause a dangerous neglect of the possibly much more real dangers arising from eventual non-governmental diversions of nuclear material. A promising avenue to effectively cope with this latter problem is identified in the form of intergrated nuclear energy systems eventually entailing no transportation and storage of special fissionable material. Related development opportunities are outlined and concentrated research efforts in that direction are recommended.

Besides references to some unfortunate developments concerning the development and eventual availability of the peaceful nuclear macro-explosions technology, the authors present some preliminary economic data on the inertial confinement, or micro-explosion fusion reactor concept as possibly affected by the NPT, too. This novel reactor type avails itself for development of an extremely safe breeder system. With such a plant, conventional nuclear power plants of some three times its own installed power could be run symbiotically and totally independent of enrichment facilities. For such a 1000 MWe breeder is calculated to annually produce some 2000 kg U-233 or plutonium with an input of some 1000 kg lithium and deuterium each and some 2000 kg thorium or natural uranium.

These significant developments — and ecologically even more favorable offshots of it (e.g. boron-hydrogen reactors and Plowshare explosives) — are seen to be jeopardized by the NPT for reason of its unwitting failure to distinguish between nuclear macro- and micro-explosion systems and due to its focus on fissionable material. An authoritative interpretation promptly and totally exempting nuclear micro-explosion systems from the NPT is thus called for.

Some apparent structural, methodological and other deficiencies associated with present international efforts to promote and safeguard the peaceful development of nuclear energy are discussed and possible remedies proposed.
 
 

1 — The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), in order to prevent «diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices», entails specific obligations to that and similar effects for either Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS), Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS) or both. Fulfilment of these obligations is taken for granted and subject to no direct control in the case of NWS, whereas in the case of NPT-NNWS, adherance to their respective sovereign undertakings is subject to verification by way of «safeguards». The International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna (IAEA) has been charged with, and has assumed the responsibility of verifying the fulfilment of some — but not all — of these NPT-NNWS obligations by way of safeguards agreements based in its Blue Book Model (INFCIRC/153). This gives rise to both security and economic questions of apparently growing significance. Moreover, the terms «nuclear weapons» and «other nuclear explosive devices» are nowhere defined in either the treaty itself, its historical elements or its supplementary documents.

2 — In particular, absence of a reference to scale — i.e. excluding nuclear micro-explosions — has become a source of growing anxiety in some industrial circles due to recent research results and experiments in the field of advanced peaceful nuclear energy developments and applications. Also, the not-so-academic question — entailing again both economic and security implications — of: «Does the NPT cover non-fission-induced fusion explosives?» has gained additional weight due to recent developments.

3 — The traditional tools of treaty interpretation by themselves are not seen to suffice to eventually permit the arrival of widely-accepted and reliable answers to what in essence appear to be political questions in the first place and which, therefore, might be addressed most effectively on the occasion of the forthcoming NPT Review Conference and on other suitable levels between the interested governments.

4 — Man being what he is, there can hardly be raised a serious objection to effective measures against diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from safeguarded uses to the clandestine manufacture of explosive devices or for purposes unknown — or, for that matter, against effectively safeguarding the use

of, and nuclear material as such. Indeed, the growing role ¹ of and development trends ² in nuclear energy, as well as apparent trends in political interplays ³, seem to indicate the application of the most effective nuclear material safeguards, science and technology afford, on a world-wide, standardized basis properly reflecting development progresses in all related fields.

5 — The presently proposed IAEA safeguards ⁴ seem to constitute both a step in the above direction — and, hélas, a likely obstacle on that very road. The former, because of a) their impressive apparent acceptability to both industry and governments of NPT-NNWS and b) their built-in adaptability to some related developments. The latter, because of a) their minuscule chances — if not their outright failure — to eventually be applied to all nuclear activities — at least in NPT-NNWS — and to all peaceful nuclear activities in all NPT-NWS, b) their failure to provide for the verification of the fulfilment of every and all obligations undertaken by NPT states, c) their exclusive reliance on the control of fissionable material and related equipment, d) their reliance — apparently out of political necessity — on verification of each NNWS' or group of NNWS' individual and more or less effective nuclear safeguards measures and e) their sub-
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    1}     Spinard, B. I., «A Projection of Nuclear Power and its Associated Industry», in : Nuclear Proliferation Problems (Jasani, ed.), SIPRI, Almquist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1974, p. 21-40.
    ²     Ibidem; see also: OECD, «Energy Perspectives to 1985», Paris, 1975;
    Bülow, H., et al., «Entwicklungstendenzen der für die Energienachfrage Relevanten Strukturelemente von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft», PROGNOS, Basel, 1975;
    Browa, H., et al., «Energiemodell Industrie», PROGNOS, Basel, 1972;
    Bogensberger, H., et al., «Die Bedeutung der Kernenergie für die Deckung des Weltenergiebedarfs», KFK-1995, Karlsruhe, 1974;
    Hill, J., «Future Trends in Nuclear Power Generation», Philos. Trans. R. Soc, Ser. A, May 1974, v. 276 (1261), p. 587-601;
    «World Nuclear Power: Status, Trends and Markets», NP-19776, Interdevelopment. Inc., Arlington, 1973;
    Grenon, M., «Ce monde affamé d'énergie», Laffont, Paris, 1973;
    «Laser Fusion Feasibility Project», University of Rochester, Rochester, 1974, p. 13.
    ³     The present face of world politics — reflecting, of course, social, economic and political gradients and tensions within and between states — is poked with incidents of terrorism of various natures and degrees. With these gardients and tensions — key sources for aspirations to changes — still growing, national and international terrorism is likely to stay with us and become an ugly, everyday affair of increasing sophistication — like, e.g., the Vietnam war was, or rather still is. Sooner or later, it is likely to penetrate the diplomatic world, either as target or vehicle. Nuclear material, under such circumstances, is seen as an instrument
of unparalleled effectiveness and commensurate attractiveness for both governmental and non-governmental terrorism — the latter, conceivably, serving occasionally as camouflage for the former.
    ⁴     IAEA, «The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection, with die Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons» (generally referred to as «Blue Book»), INFC1RC/153, Vienna 1971.

6 — Disturbing as the last point most certainly is — is likely to remain so, and may even prove disastrous before long —, another fact deserves serious attention for reason of its security and political implications. Reference is made here to the NPT's unbalanced approach to safeguards, whereby the simple signature of the NWS is taken as a guarantee that their respective commitments will be honored, while the signature of the NNWS must be complemented by safeguards measures intended to verify compliance with their obligations under the NPT ⁶.

7 — In our NPT analysis of 1968 ⁷, we pointed out that in attempting to bar NNWS from the fission road to a nuclear weapon capability, the NPT inadvertently, yet inevitably would seem to give impetus to the pursuit of the only remaining road thus left open to that end, namely the pure-fusion road. In 1969 ⁸, we identified a likely vehicle for use on that road, namely the fusion device triggered by an argon bomb-pumped dye laser. Since then, various developments observed seem to have unhappily confirmed our earlier assessment. Moreover, the worldwide growth of the role assigned to nuclear energy and the correspondingly growing availability of weapon-quality fissile material is seen to facilitate what is obliquely referred to as «non-governmental diversion» — a proliferation road which the NPT's authors have left for the states to care about.
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    ⁵     For a discussion of the feasibility to produce crude nuclear bombs and radiation weapons (reflecting related USAEC studies), see: McPhee, J., «The Curve of Binding Energy», Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 1974; Taylor, T., et al, «Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards», Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass., 1974.
        For an excellent discussion of the background of eventual non-governmental diversions of special fissionable material, see: Willrich, M., «Nongovernmental Nuclear Weapon Proliferation», in: Nuclear Proliferation Problems, op. cit., p.168-186.
    ⁶   ENDC/PV. 362, § 17; see also: Imai, R., «The Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Japanese Attitude Three Years After Signing», in: Nuclear Proliferation Problems, op. cit., p. 247, 252.
    ⁷     Keller, H. A., et al., «On the Economic Implications of the Proposed Nonproliferation Treaty», International Law Review (Sottile), N° 1, Geneva 1968 (...[www.solami.com/NPT68.htm ¦ .../NPT.htm]); see also: Young, E., «The Control of Proliferation: The 1968 Treaty in Hindsight and Forecast», ISS Adelphi Papers Nr. 56, London, 1969; Young, E., «A Farewell to Arms Control?», Penguin Books ISBN 014 02.1593 X, London, 1972; Boerner, B., «Rechtsfolgen des Atomsperrvertrages für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland», Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Energierecht, Universität Köln, Bd. 22, Köln, 1968;  Jasani, B., (ed.), «Nuclear Proliferation Problems, SIPRI, Stockholm, 1974, passim.
    ⁸     «Non-Fission-Induced Nuclear Fusions - Recent Developments and Perspectives», Colloquium Report, Doublekay-6970, Basel, 1969.

8 — To what extent, under such circumstances, the NPT — and its IAEA safeguards — can reasonably be expected to prevent or slow the proliferation of governmental fission explosives capabilities beyond the effectiveness of the already operational factors will be discussed below on the background of the present IAEA NPT safeguards model, safeguards measures indicated by political reality and corresponding reactor development indications and opportunities. Indeed, the recent Indian example does not bode well to nuclear security policies resting on the present NPT and may indeed turn out to be an unexpectedly constructive and decisive element in the eventual development and implementation of a more effective and balanced approach to an increasingly pressing world problem.

9 — The NPT's perhaps inevitably assymetric design implies an assumption that the NPT-NWS's related commitments — in the view of NPT-NWS — are relatively marginal, or that, for them, circumstances are and will remain such, that non-compliance with these obligations would necessarily be against their own best interests and thus out of the question or sufficiently improbable. And while the latter view may very well indeed be correct — without, however, being necessarily recognized as such and reflected in the related actions or inactions eventually taken by the responsible authorities —, it would be rather difficult to see how the former proposition could reasonably be sustained by and after detailed analysis of these numerous commitments. It may thus be well to take a closer look at these NPT obligations.

10 — The obligations falling under this heading are contained in NPT

Article I:
«Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices». THE NPT vs. NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS     207

11 — The obligations falling under this heading are contained in NPT

Article II:
«Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices».

Article III.1:
«Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere».

Article III.4:
«Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiations of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-days period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations».

12 — The obligations falling under this heading are devided into those issuing from the NPT preamble — with no legally binding character — and into those — with legally binding character — issuing from NP

Article III.2:
«Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide:
    (a) source or special fissionable material, or
    (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material,
to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be
subject to the safeguards required by this Article».

Article IV.1:
confirms the «inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty» — and thus, by implication, their corresponding obligation to abstain from any interference in, and perhaps even to facilitate the execution of this right by such a state — «to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty».

Article IV.2:
«All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world».

THE NPT vs. NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS     209

Article V:
«Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements».

Article VI:
«Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control».

13 — Good or bad, for better or for worse, the NPT has become a fact of life and indeed of singular importance in international relations. The security and economic implications of inadequate or direct non-compliance by NPT-NWS with their obligations thus undertaken have acquired a commensurate importance the more so, as some of the security and economic benefits entailed in the NPT for NNWS can, under this treaty, no longer be developed by NNWS themselves, but must be sought from the NWS ⁹. An expansion of the IAEA NPT safeguards to the effect
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    ⁹     These include:
        1. Deterrence against governmental nuclear blackmail, and actual nuclear attacks. See die related UN Security Council Resolution S/Res/255.
        2. Provision of nuclear explosion services for peaceful ends. See: §§ 28-37.

of actively monitoring the adherence of all parties to the obligations undertaken by them under this treaty would thus seem highly desirable ¹⁰.

14 — Whether such an expansion is now or at all politically feasible is, of course, an all-together different ball game. Indeed, the IAEA NPT safeguards model does not provide for verification of compliance with any obligations undertaken by NPT-NNWS, other than those defined in Art. III.l of the NPT, thus leaving essentially unchecked those entailed in Art. III.2, as well as others ¹¹. Granted, technical and/or financial considerations may
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    ¹⁰ A further set of arguments in favor of strengthening the IAEA NPT safeguards — leaving aside the not-so-convincing-ones of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, made last fall — is offered by: Prawitz, J., «Arguments for Extended NPT Safeguards», in Nuclear Proliferation Problems, op. cit., p. 158-167.
      Of course, the NPT’s all too-evident failure to prevent the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the apparent lack of real progress in nuclear disarmament — as provided for in Art. VI — would not by themselves speak against this treaty or its provisions. For it could not realistically be expected to significantly alter the political climate between the NPT-NWS — a climate which has not been, and is not likely to become conducive to that effect if nuclear lambs essentially contend themselves with the unparalleled abdication of their right to become nuclear tigers and leave the rest to the merci of those nuclear tigers which have pressed for this abdication. Accordingly, it is doubtful that real progress in the desired direction of nuclear disarmament will, eventually, issue from any conceivable changes of, additions to, or supplementary instruments of the present NPT which might be tabled at the forthcoming NPT Review Conference, or later. And as conditions do not seem to be ripe yet for the dialectic process to take place fully by way of the previously proposed «third forces scenario» — providing for the pooling of respective resources by NNWS in particular — appreciable effects in the above direction are conceivable only if the obligations entailed in Art. VI — applying to both NWS and NNWS — will finally be taken seriously — at least by the NNWS themselves — and will be developed by them into a system of genuine leverage against the NPT-NWS's respective apparent complacency and indifference (see also: §§ 67-69). Various views of States in the above direction are compiled in: GOV/COM. 22/6, p. 18-21.
    ¹¹    The IAEA Safeguards Conference of 1970 was provided with a IAEA working paper (GOV/COM. 22.3, § 12) wherein the following reasoning was developed:

«The agreement to be concluded by 'each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty’ is that described in Article III.l of the Treaty. This requires only that safeguards be applied on nuclear material with a view to preventing diversion while the material is in a special nuclear activity ‘within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere’. It is not required, therefore, that the agreements referred to should cover the obligations set forth in Article III.2 of NPT which relate to materials that will leave the State. It is to be noted, moreover, that the obligations contained in Aurticle III.2 fall equally upon nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and are related to equipment and to other special materials as well as to nuclear material».

also have indicated this solution without apparent loss of effectiveness. However, the authors' present concern is neither the technically attainable vs. the actually attained level of perfection of the safeguards system, its financial and/or political acceptability, nor, for that matter, its effectiveness in attaining the stated objective of IAEA NPT safeguards ¹². For these perhaps highly efficient, economic instruments — made and implemented by renowned experts and highly motivated and competent international public servants — serve an objective the relevancy of which may no longer be beyond doubt — if indeed it ever was.

15 — With the IAEA NPT safeguards systems, the question arises anew: Why bother at all with safeguards exclusively directed against governmental diversions? For, under the NPT, any NNWS is eligible to receive any quantity even of bomb-grade nuclear material from any willing supplier, is permitted to stockpile this material and — all without control, under the ominous «non-peaceful» exemption clause of Art. III.2 — may even be permitted to produce nuclear explosive parts, or
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(Continuation of preceding page.)

    1.    Does this mean that the exporting State will have the right — or even the obligation — to verify compliance of the receiver State with some or all of the applicable obligations entailed in the NPT?
    2.    What consequences does this entail for  a) the exporting firm, b) the exporting State, c) the importing State, d) the importing firm, e) third States having an interest that these obligations are fulfilled and their fulfilment be verified to their satisfaction?
    3.    What might happen, if the exporting State — for whatever reason — refuses to take the responsibility for «verifying the fulfilment» of some or all of the NPT obligations undertaken by an importing NNWS?
    4.    How can an exporting NPT State discharge its obligations under Article III.2, if it is requested by — and is prepared to supply material and/or equipment falling under this Article to — a) a NNWS, b) a NPT-NNWS?
    5.    Does the NPT provide the right to signatory States interested in reliable verification of the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by a NPT-NNWS, in the partial or total absence of such IAEA verifications, to intervene in the affairs of NPT-NNWS?
    6.    Can and should the IAEA's role in implementing the NPT safeguards be curtailed by way of interpretation alone, e.g. without parallel amendments of the NPT?

at least non-explosive radiation weapons ¹³. The reason for this astonishing fact is a simple reservation in Art. III.2 of the NPT, providing that the prohibition to supply NNWS nuclear material and equipment outside the required safeguards applies only to nuclear material and equipment intended for peaceful purposes!

16 — The Swiss Government considers the NPT to cover non-fission-induced nuclear weapons ¹⁴. By the same token, the United States Government has formally stated:

«The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted»¹⁵.

«The NPT prohibits ... transferring complete nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient ...» ¹⁶.

    «In the course of their work, the consultants found it necessary to make a number of assumptions concerning the application of safeguards under the NPT as follows: (...)
    (c) The safeguards system will be applied under the NPT in most non-nuclear-weapon States, where all nuclear material will be subject to safeguards; ...».

Safeguards Conference, on June 15, 1970, raised the following questions formally ²⁴:

20 — If then, as it appears to be the case, this mile-wide loop-hole cannot be closed for whatever mix of reasons, it would not seem to hurt the nonproliferation cause to admit so much — quite the contrary. In fact it would permit to concentrate our scarce resources for attacking and eventually neutralizing the much more real dangers arising from eventual non-governmental diversions of special fissionable material.

21 — Transport and storage of special fissionable material are seen to provide the two most significant opportunities for non-govern-
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    ²⁴     GOV/COM/OR. 2, § 56 (translated from: «Declaration de la Delegation Suisse», DPF, Berne, 1970, p. 8).

mental diversions. And if the change of focus from governmental to non-governmental diversion safeguards would indicate a radically new approach to safeguards from the point of view of those eventually entrusted with the related tasks, the parameters «transport» and «storage» may by themselves lead the thinking away from conventional safeguards concepts the more they are allowed to dominate this thinking. And dominate they must if non-governmental diversions are seriously going to be sought to be prevented by all available means. Which leads to the theoretically ideal solution of a contained nuclear energy system entailing zero transport and storage of special fissionable material.

22 — What are the opportunities, what the limits — from the scientific and the technological point of view — for such a system? The main input, of course, would still be natural uranium or thorium, but that, by itself, could hardly serve for terror, blackmail or even weapon production purposes. This source material would then have to be converted to nuclear fuel on site, fully automatically, preferably in a continuous fashion requiring no storage for the fuel and, ideally, spent fuel would be processed fully on site, too. The nuclear fuel thus produced would be used exclusively at the nuclear power plant thus served, with thermal and electrical energy being the system's only significant output.

23 — This theorical model depends, for its realization, primarily on the commercial availability of source material conversion systems (SMCS), the installation and operation of which will result in economically and/or politically acceptable fuel costs. Possible SMCS candidates are seen primarily in the following systems ²⁵:

tive conversion systems. With the possible exceptions of the ultra-centrifuge and the jet-nozzle systems — none of these SMCS is likely to become commercially available before some ten years, even assuming sufficient r&d funds to be available. Nevertheless, a concentrated effort to fully explore this novel nuclear avenue appears to be indicated by, and is recommended because of the inherently high safety against non-governmental diversions of special fissionable material uniquely provided by the INES system.

25 — The importance of an international treaty in terms of its security, political and/or economic significance tends to equip it and its provisions with a commensurate momentum of their own, governed primarily by related developments and the laws of political expediency. Thus, provisions of initially secondary importance may suddenly be discovered to avail themselves for meeting a need which may not have been foreseen and whose satisfaction with a given treaty instrument may consequently not reflect the original intentions and objectives of its signatories, and may in fact run counter both the treaty's proclaimed objectives and the legitimate interests of those having subscribed to it.

26 — A situation of this nature seems now in the making. The NPT provides for verification of the obligations undertaken by its signatories, a.o., by way of international controls of their peaceful nuclear facilities and the involved fissionable material in particular. At the time of its development the NPT's reference to «other nuclear explosive devices» was generally considered to be directed at excavation-type peaceful applications of nuclear explosives, generally described as Plowshare programs²⁷.
    Another nuclear explosion aspect of potentially far broader interest and economic significance has been outlined in a theoretical way in our 1968 study and in the meantime has acquired concrete form. In Article IV, the NPT specifies :

«Nothing in this Treaty shall he interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty».

27 — The reservation that the related rights for peaceful nuclear activities are limited by the obligations undertaken under Articles I and II may turn out to be — economically and politically — a highly damaging one to NNWS. As such it may be inadmissible inasmuch as it may jeopardize both the development and early availability of «soft» Plowshare devices, as well as of some advanced nuclear reactors involving laser, electron or other high-energy beams and entailing no comparable ecological loads. For neither eventually feasible non-fission-induced boron/hydrogen explosives, nor the concept to compress minute quantities of fission and/or fusion material with such beams to the effect of technically contained nuclear micro-explosions, can be denied to involve a «nuclear explosive device».

28 — On the subject of peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, the NPT has served to focus world-wide attention on a highly promising new technology for economic large-scale excavations — even though, primarily for ecological reasons, it has, for the moment, moved out of focus in the very country of its birth, the United States ²⁸. Air blast and seismic effects aside, radioactivity releases on any level — in the view of a growingly ecology-minded public — have become, and are likely to remain the key obstacle to the early large-scale application of the presently still «hard» Plowshare technology anywhere in the western world.

29 — The Soviet Union is known to have placed itself in the forefront of this technology's development and is reported to have actually commenced the execution of one of its key Plowshare projects, namely the link of, and partial diversion of the Arctic-bound Pechora River to, respectively with the Kama River — eventually leading into the Caspian Sea — by way of an over 100 km long, nuclearly excavated canal 29. No positive assurance has been obtained that the radioactivity problem known to be associated with nuclear surface excavations has been solved there — under which circumstances a basic requirement would be met for Plowshare to qualify as a soft, i.e. an ecology-oriented or even ecologically safe technology.

30 — Individual ecological reservations notwithstanding, numerous Plowshare projets of equally vast economic significance for the areas directly involved and beyond have indeed been conceived of, as is evidenced in the following indicative list of possible application sites for corresponding water resources management within and beyond the involved drainage basins.
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    28}     AP, «U.S. to End Atoms-for-Peace Tests», International Herald Tribune, 3/5/71.
    ²⁹     Kirejev, V. W., et al., «Excavation by Grouped Nuclear Explosions in Alluvial Rocks», IAEA-TC-I-4/14, Vienna, 1975.

31 — In light of these significant opportunities for applications of the eventually available soft Plowshare technology, it seemed proper to seek every possible guarantee that under the NPT these services would actually become available under adequate international mechanisms providing them on a non-discriminatory, equitable basis with due consideration of all relevant factors ³⁰. In exchange for the abdication of their sovereign rights to develop the peaceful nuclear explosion technology for economic development of their natural resources, the NNWS were thus given assurances in Article V to the effect that:

«... potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development».

32 —

Plowshare Project              Rivers or Seas involved              Main Purposes            States Involved

Amambia	Parana	oroys, hp, n	Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina
Fartura	Rio Iguaca,	ri, hp	Brazil,
	Rio Uruguay.		Argentina, Uruguay
3. ASIA (excl.	USSR for lack of data)
Karkheh	Karkheh, Karun River	ri, fr, n, c	Iran
Nadia	Ganges	fr, n	India, Bangladesh
Deogarh	Son River Mahanadi River	ri, hp	India
Kra Canal	Andaman Sea,	navigation	Thailand,
	Gulf of Siam		Burma
Tsuyung	Yangtze-Kiang,	ri, fr, hp, n,	c China,
	Red River		North Vietnam
Wan' Kiang	Hwang Ho	oroys, hp, n	China

Abbreviations:
navigation           sea-level navigation
hp                      hydro-power development
c                        local climate changes through alteration of hydrological cycles
oroys                  off-river over-year storage
n                        river navigation development
ri                        integration of drainage basins of rivers involved
fr                        flood control, flood relief

33 — Yet, in its ratification message to Congress, the United States Senate — unopposed by the US Government, which is bound by such directives — stated :

equally unchallenged unilateral decision by the U.S. Congress to practically stop — apparently for economy reasons — the further development of the peaceful nuclear excavation technology, or for that matter, of the NRC's recent unilateral and, formally and initially, infinite suspension — apparently for review purposes — of all exports of enriched uranium ³².

34 — Numerous countries have expressed interest in the early and equitable availability of the Plowshare technology. The above-mentioned unilateral actions seem to have limited — for the time being — the sources of the promised «potential benefits» to just one, the Soviet Union. Moreover, the ominous bilateral arrangements allowed under NPT Article V, are seen even less to provide for adequate consideration and protection of the related interests of countries eventually affected by the execution and/or operation of such far-reaching Plowshare projects.

35 — On the technical and ecological side it is to be noted that at present only one technology is known to eventually entail, for all practical purposes, neither primary nor secondary radioactivity. Yet, that very technology — if and when mastered — is also understood to require no special fissionable material but
____________
    ³²     In this context, a decision handed down by a US Court of Appeals appears to put all related US obligations under the NPT into an alarming perspective, even though the decision in question has no evident link to nuclear energy matters. As quoted and commented on by Detlev VAGTS of the Harvard Law School (in: Breaking the UN Embargo on Rhodesian Trade: Its Significance for Mining Interests, WWP & I, p. 42-44), the court said:
    «We think that there can be no blinking the purpose and effect of the Byrd Amendment. It was to detach this country from the UN boycott of Rhodesia in blatant disregard of our treaty undertakings. The legislative record shows that no member of Congress voting on the measure was under any doubt about what was involved then; and no amount of statutory interpretation now can make the Byrd Amendment other than what it was as presented to Congress, namely a measure which would make — and was intended to make — the United States a certain treaty violator.
    Under our constitutional scheme, Congress can denounce treaties if it sees fit to do so, and there is nothing the other branches of government can do about it ...».
    VAGTS thus comments (authors’ additions in brackets):

«It is not clear how often the combination of causes will arise for another version of this drama... However, other countries may assume the role of outcast (or special, perhaps secret US friend, as the case may be) as world politics shift. If that happens, we know that the United States will participate in the boycott (of some Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, e.g. concerning peaceful nuclear explosion services, and/or delivery of nuclear material, equipment and/or know-how) only up to the point where its own interests seem to be adversely affected, regardless of its treaty commitments».

instead readily available and practically uncontrollable source materials ³³.

36 — Available data suggest that the USSR Plowshare programs have been developed to the level of industrial applications in several fields, particularly water and mineral resources development ³⁴.
This pioneering work is commendable and the Soviet Union deserves credit for both the technology's factual development and its efforts on the international, level to exempt it from all technology-unrelated restraints such as those issuing from efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and proliferation.

37 — Nevertheless, dependency on any one single national source for such economic key services is hardly acceptable or even ideal for those interested in them, and the option to seek to obtain them on either a bilateral or an international basis does not significantly alter this outlook. This unfortunate situation is seen to have further strengthened the respective reservations of several key countries and in fact may be expected to eventually result in experiments similar to and beyond that of India.

38 — The concept to compress fusion pellets to supra-high densities and to ignite them to the effect of technically contained, nuclear micro-explosions by way of specially tailored, ultra-short laser bursts is generally credited to Dr. John H. Nuckolls of the University of California's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (now: LLL, for Lawrence Livermore Laboratory). It dates back to the early sixties, may be viewed as a spin-off of Nuckolls' involvement in nuclear weapons r&d, and its development to-date has most probably benefitted considerably from the LLL's advanced nuclear weapon codes, studies and related know-how ³⁵.
____________
    ³³     Although not presently discussed with regard to this technology's eventual security implications, it goes without saying that the very significant economic and ecological advantages of this technology can be expected to be paralleled by a commensurate security drawback.
    ³⁴     Nordyke, M. D., «A Review of Soviet Data on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions», LLL, UCRL-51414 Rev. 1, TID-4500, UC-35, Livermore, 1974 (reproduced in: Doublekay-7502, op. cit.).
    ³⁵     Hora, H., «Laser Plasmas and Nuclear Energy», Plenum Press, New York, 1975; Emmet, J. L., et al., «Fusion Power by Laser Implosion», Scientific American, New York, June 1974; Boyer, K., «U.S. AEC Laser-Fusion Program», LA-DC-72-1113, LASL, Los Alamos, 1974; Brueckner, K. A., et al., «Laser-Driven Fusion», Rev. Mod. Phys., Vol. 46, N° 2, April 1974;

39 — Even though, significant development efforts on the micro-explosion, or inertial confinement thermonuclear reactor concept have, in earnest, been started only in this decade primarily in the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1971, an American industrial group, KMS Industries, Inc., Ann Arbor, Mich., obtained USAEC permission «to conduct, at its own expense, a research and development program in which it would attempt to achieve controlled thermonuclear reactions that might be applied in a potential fusion power reactor. The work would involve the irradiation of pellets of thermonuclear material by a high-power, short-pulsed laser. The pellets would be heated to thermonuclear temperatures... very rapidly and the thermonuclear energy possibly released on a controlled basis in a reactor».

40 — Efforts by the authors — started in early 1972 — to interest some non-American atomic energy authorities and involved industries in this novel approach to peaceful nuclear energy development and applications have led to some preliminary arrangements. More recently, a company was established in Switzerland which, eventually, might serve as a catalyst for the previously proposed broader and internationally supported venture onto those new horizons. Related programs are known
______________
(Continuation of preceding page.)

Teller, E., «Futurology of High-Intensity Lasers», in: Laser Inter action, (Schwarz + Hora, eds), Vol. 3 A, Plenum Press, New York, 1974, p. 3-10; Charatis, G., et al., «Experimental Study of Laser Driven Compression of Spherical Glass Shells», KMSF-U219, Ann Arbor, 1974; Lubin, M., et al., «Short-Pulse-Laser-Heated Plasma Experiments», Nuclear Fusion, Vol. 13 (6), 1973, p. 829-838; Booth, L. A., «Central Station Power Generation by Laser-Driven Fusion», LA-4858-MS, Vol I, 1972; McCann, T. E., et al., «Neutron Production in Electron Beam Targets», APS meeting, Albuquerque, June 1972; Winterberg, F., «Production of Dense Thermonuclear Plasmas by Intense Ion Beams», Plasma Physics, Vol. 17, 1974, p. 69-77; Yonas, G., et al., «Electron Beam Focusing and Application to Pulsed Fusion», Nucl. Fusion, Vol. 14, 1974, p. 731-740.
    For an analysis of the NPT-related issues and the opportunities evolving from the nuclear micro-explosion development, see: Keller, H. A., et al., «A Documentation and Interpretation on Laser- and Electron Beam-Induced Fusion Energy», DoubIekay-7251, Basel, 1972; also, by the same author: «A Case for Pioneering Actions on Nuclear Micro-Explosion Systems», Life Report IV, Doublekay-7351, Basel, 1973.
    Papers reflecting related programs outside the United States are indicatively listed in footnote 36.
    The apparently horrendous financial and economy implications of the projected investments in conventional nuclear energy programs, and the savings eventually attainable by way of the micro-explosion reactor systems, deserve and are planned to be analysed in detail separately.

to have been commenced, a.o., in Britain, France, Canada, Australia, Japan, Israel and Switzerland ³⁶.

41 — A corresponding key invention — covering hybrid pellets — was made by an AEC-independent United States scientist in Switzerland under contract with the author in August 1972 ³⁷.
____________
    ³⁶     The Swiss Federal Institute for Reactor Research, EIR in Würenlingen, a.o., is conducting numerical and other studies on various aspects of hybrid micro-explosion systems using fissionable and fusionable material.

    Indications of Micro-Explosion Works Conducted Outside the United States:
«The Institutes which reported definitely on fusion neutrons from laser produced plasmas are:
Lebedev-Institute (Group of Basov-Kxyukov) (USSR)
Limeil Laboratories CEA (France)
Laser Energetics Lab., University of Rochester (USA)
Sandia Laboratories (USA)
Osaka University (Japan)
Max Planck-Institute, Garching (FRG)
Lebedev-Institute (Group of Basov-Sklizkov) (USSR)
Lawrence Livermore Labs (USA)
Los Alamos Scientific Labs (USA)
Naval Research Labs (USA)
Lebedev-Institute (Group of Prokhorov-Pashinin) (USSR)
KMS-Fusion Industries (USA)
Academy of Science, Peking (China)
Polish Academy of Science (Poland)
... The Soreq Nuclear Institute (Israel), the Australian State University and the Battelle Institute, Golombus, Ohio (USA) are very advanced in producing neutrons».
Excerpt from: Laser Interaction, (Schwarz + Hora, eds.), Vol. 3 B, Plenum Press, New York, 1974, p. 799-800.
    Indicative scientific publications are seen to be:
Basov, N. G., et al., «Investigation of Plasma Parameters at the Spherical Heating of the Isolated Solid Target by High-Power Laser Radiation», Lebedev Physical Institute, Moscow, in: Laser Interaction, op. cit., Vol. 3/B, New York, 1974;
Hora, H., «Coupling of Laser Radiation into Plasma by Dynamic Absorption Causing Super-Efficient Compression*), Atomkernenergie, Vol. 24-3, 1974, p. 187-192;
Hughes, J. L., «Laser-CTR Developments in Australia», Australian National University, Canberra, in: Laser Interaction, op. cit., Vol. 3 B, New York, 1974, p. 755-773;
Yamanaka, C, et al., «Thermonuclear Fusion Plasma Heated by Lasers», Institute of Laser Engineering, Osaka, in: Laser Interaction, op. cit., Vol. 3 B, New York, 1974, p. 629-665;
Spalding, L, «Some Reactor Implications of Laser Fusion», UKAEA, Culham Laboratory, Abingdon, in: Laser Interaction, op. cit., Vol. 3/B, New York, 1974, p. 775-797;
Floux, F., et al., «X-Ray Emission from Laser Created Plasmas», Phys. Lett., A. Vol. 45 (6), 1973, p. 483-484;
Weil, S. (ed.), «Selected Bibliography on Plasma Production by Lasers», Israel AEC, Tel Aviv, 1973;
Hohla, K., «The Iodine Laser, A High Power Gas Laser», Institute for Plasma Physics, Munich, in: Laser Interaction, op. cit., Vol. 3 A, New York, 1974, p. 133-146;
Decoste, R., et al., «Linear and Nonlinear Heating of a Cold Dense Plasma by Pulsed CO2 Laser Radiation», Report 73-895-01, Institut de Recherche de l’Hydro-Québec, Varennes, 1973;
Seifritz, W., et al., «Laser Induced Thermonuclear Micro-Explosion Using Fissionable Triggers», ANS Philadelphia paper, EIR, Würenlingen, 1974.
³⁷ Winterberg, F., «Micro-Fission Explosions and Controlled Release of Thermo-nuclear Energy», Nature, Vol. 241, Feb. 16, 1973, p. 449-450.

Attempts to safeguard its prompt availability for investigation and eventual development by way of the IAEA journal Nuclear Fusion were accompanied by the following developments:

The inventor was issued a secrecy order by the AEC (which reportedly obtained a copy of the manuscript by way of the IAEA referee) and the US Mission in Vienna intervened promptly at the IAEA with the result that the IAEA refused to publish the paper on the ground that it contains «restricted data» ³⁸.

Three Soviet scientists jointly published an intriguingly similar-looking English-version paper as an original work (containing a possible duplication of a calculation error contained in the manuscript submitted to Nuclear Fusion) with priority claims in apparent conflict with those of the inventor ³⁹.

43 — Since 1972 a dislocation in fusion r&d priorities away from magnetic to inertial confinement can be observed and recent de-classifications in the laser-fusion field by the AEC can be expected to advance this process still further. The total US expenditures on fusion r&d in 1974 reached about 100 mio $, almost half of which went into micro-explosion programs.
^{______________
    38}     The key details of this case have been presented and analysed in Doublekay-7351,. op. cit., p. viii-x, 3/4.
    ³⁹     Askarjan, G. A., et al., «Application of Super-High Compression of Matter by Reactive Ablation Pressure for Production of Microcritical Mass of Fisser, Production of Super-Strong Magnetic Field and Acceleration of Charged Particles», Lebedev, Preprint N° 109, Moscow, 1973.
    The footnote of this preprint reads: «This paper reproduces a Lebedev Physical Institute Report of July, 1972, which was sent to JETP-Letters August, 1972 (published with delaying in Vol. 17 NIO, May 20, 1973)».
    ⁴⁰     The Swiss Government sought to obtain an explanation of the circumstances of this matter from the IAEA but reportedly has received less than satisfactory answers to-date. As the legitimate interests of a wider audience seem thus to have been jeopardized, a more productive inquiry aimed at forestalling other such happenings might be called for by an interested party: The related key provision of the IAEA Statute is seen to be Article VII.F. See also: GOV/COM. 22/6, p. 27-29.

A US Congressman recently introduced a bill for the accelerated development of micro-explosion fusion systems on a scale paralleling the Manhattan project of the early fourties ⁴¹. Recent data strongly suggest hybrid micro-explosion systems (using both fissionable and fusionable material for obtaining higher gain factors ⁴² and/or for high-efficiency breeding of U-233 or plutonim in the blanket zone) to offer substantial economic advantages. Most significant, in the case of the eventual boron-hydrogen reaction ⁴³, this particular hybrid system would entail almost no radioactive wastes.

44 — All these programs and activities have already led to expectations significantly altering the nuclear energy supply outlook for as early as the second half of the eighties and beyond in that they hold the promise and possibility to essentially by-pass the presently planned uranium enrichment facilities. As explained below, this seems to be feasible and economically indicated under conditions fully meeting the overall electricity demand and the fuel requirements of the fission power plants then in operation.

45 — The plutonium inventory in a 1000 MWe fast breeder reactor is about 2500 kg, representing a capital investment of some 25 mio $ at present prices. The presently developed liquid metal breeder reactor (LMFBR) is calculated on this scale to produce some 100 kg plutonium (or the more valuable U-233, depending on the feed input) per year, compared to some 250 kg for a corresponding gas-cooled breeder reactor (GCFBR) which, however, seems to trail the LMFBR significantly with regard to their development levels.

46 — In contrast to this, a micro-explosion breeder reactor — trailing, of course, both LMFBR and GCFBR in development levels — will require a thorium or natural uranium inventory of some 150 t
____________
    ⁴¹     US Congressman Richard T. Hanna, «The Fusion Energy Act», H.R. 17538, Congressional Record, 93rd G, Vol. 120, N° 167, Washington, 12/3/74.
    ⁴²     In die case of pure-fusion micro-explosion systems, the gain factor is calculated to be about 200, whereas in the case of hybrid pellets using both fissionable and fusionable material levels of 1400 and more may be obtained even with smaller reactors units.
    ⁴³     Weaver, T. A., et al., «Exotic CTR Fuels for Direct Conversion-Utilizing Fusion Reactors», UCID-16230, Livermore, 1973; Hora, H., «First Possible Exotherm Hydrogen-Boron₁₁-Reactions by Laser Compression with the Nonlinear Force», extracts published in Laser Focus, 4, 1975; Hora, H., «Increased Nuclear Energy Yields from the Fast Implosion of Cold Shells Driven by Nonlinear Laser-Plasma Interactions», Institut für Experimentalphysik, Chr. Albrechts-Universität, Kiel, 1975.
    ⁴⁴     Private communications to the author. See also:
Seifritz, W., et al., «Uranium and Thorium Shells Serving as Tampers of DT-Fuel Pellets for the Electron Beam Induced Fusion Approach», joint EIR/Nuclear Ltd. paper to be presented at June ANS meeting in New Orleans.

(representing some 4 mio $ at present prices), but no special fissionable material such as plutonium or U-233 for inventory purposes — hence the system's unique, inherent safety against an accidental or sabotage blow-up. The financial savings entailed in this inventory feature are not likely to be lost to other design features either. Moreover — and economically most significant — a 1000 MWe micro-explosion breeder reactor is conservatively calculated to be capable of producing annually, ceteris paribus, over 2700 kg gross ⁴⁵ and over 2000 kg net U-233 or plutonium. Besides, enough tritium for on-site production of the DT fusion pellets required is thereby obtained as well — all of which in forms and ways surpassing present and presently anticipated safety and environmental load standards.

48 —

A INVENTORY             Quantity     Present Market Value
Thorium,                  150 t        4 mio $
    or Natural Uranium    150 t                 2.5 mio $

B ANNUAL INPUT
Lithium                  1000 kg            20 000 $
Deuterium,              <1000 kg           >80 000 $
Thorium,                >2000 kg     >50 000 $
    or Natural Uranium  >2000 kg                >31 000 $

C ANNUAL OUTPUT
U-233,                  >2000 kg     >32 mio $
    or Plutonium        >2000 kg                >20 mio $

Electricity (75% load, 15 mills/KWh)
Breeder Unit 1000 MWe    5900 GWh          88.5 mio $
Conventional Reactor Units
totalling 3000 MWe,
using only fuel supplied
from Breeder Unit     >17 700 GWh         >267 mio $
Total System Output   >23 600 GWh         >354 mio $
___________
    ⁴⁵     The figures presented are based on LIDSKY's 0.3955 capture rate (rate of D-T reaction neutrons captured in thorium) as quoted in: Leonard, T. A., Review of Fusion-Fission Concepts, Nuclear Technology, Vol. 20, December, 1973. Allowance of a 50% reduction effect is made for reactions characteristical of structure of and material used in pellet, reactor chamber and blanket zone.

48 — In combination with an on-site reprocessing plant and equipped with the indicated fuel flow controls, such an integrated breeder unit — in addition to its own fusion pellet-driven 3000 MWth or 1000 MWe installed power — would be capable of supplying the fuel for some three conventional 1000 MWe, e.g. high-temperature gas-cooled (HTGR) nuclear power stations running all at the same power level.

49 — The annual in- and output indices for an integrated 1000 MWe or 3000 MWth micro-explosion breeder reactor system work out as given in Table II. Although not readily comparable with present-generation reactor fuels supplied by enrichment facilities, the market value of U-233 and plutonium is seen to fairly reflect the capital costs of the development, construction and operation of the enrichment facilities. Table III gives the main indices of the URENCO and the EURODIF programs as reported in the published literature.

50 —

                                                 EURODIF  URENCO
Separative work capacity
  of main plants (in t/y)                        9 000   10 000

kg U-235 contained in fuel produced if
  plant were set up and run at full capacity
  for fuel with following enrichment
    2%                                          68 400   76 000
    3%                                          60 300   67 000
    4%                                          56 300   62 500
    5%                                          53 100   59 000
    90 % (the reference plants are not
    known to be laid out for such fuels)        46 800   52 000
Required installed electric power (MW)           3 000      250
Estimated plant costs at 1975 prices (mio $)     3 000    2 400
Estimated begin of commercial operations          1979&nb