The present amicus curiæ addresses legal, fairness and political questions concerning artworks covered by the Settlement Agreement which, on 26 January 1999, under the guidance of the Presiding Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, was made and entered into by and between the Settling Defendents (Credit Suisse and UBS) and the Settling Plaintiffs (represented by Michael D. Hausfeld, Robert A. Swift and Melvyn I. Weiss and, for the Settlement Classes, theWorld Jewish Restitution Organization).  It seeks to assist the legal owners of stolen and looted art thus covered to trace and, in the event, to obtain the early return of their property.
    By shedding light on some legal mechanisms, particularities and roles of involved banks, as well as on some features of the international art market, the significance of the artworks falling under this Settlement takes shape.  Taking further into consideration
(a)  the resulting disproportion between the total Settlement amount - US$ 1.25 billion - and the estimated current market value of the artworks involved - US$ ~3-23 billion,
(b)  the Settlement's failure to provide for either inventorizing related artworks or notifying the persons concerned, and
(c)  the universally applicable principles of fairness, comity and the preponderance of international treaties over private agreements,
it is understood that this Settlement was not intended and - at least with regard to international obligations incurred by Switzerland and other countries - cannot have the effect of legally curtailing or even preventing claimants, either individually or jointly, to institute proceedings against whoever may be concerned, not excluding any of the releasees defined in the Settlement.  It is for the Court to make this clear.
    This is the more so as several billion dollars worth of artworks looted by the Nazi Regime are understood to be now kept in Baghdad.  After having been entrusted for safekeeping to some Swiss fiduciaries, originally deposited mainly in some bank vaults in Zurich, later deposited in the "caves of Alibaba" of Switzerland's Customs Free Zones, then shipped to Kuwait where, in 1990, Iraq's invading forces took possession.
    Otherwise, and in as much as this Settlement would immunize Swiss institutions against future claims for the return of looted art, even Saddam Hussein might find himself to be a de facto releasee, directly - and perversely so - benefitting from this multi-purpose amnesty of some undelicate Swiss "fiduciaries" and their hidden friends.

Assets means any and all objects of value including but not limited to personal, commercial, real, tangible, and intangible property, including, without limitation, cash, securities, gems, gold, and other precious metals, jewelry, documents, artworks, equipment, and intellectual property.

Looted Assets means Assets actually belonging in whole or in part to Victims or Targets of Nazi Persecution that were actually or allegedly stolen, expropriated, Aryanized, confiscated, or that were otherwise wrongfully taken by, at the request of, or under the auspices of, the Nazi Regime.

the UN Secretary General is "to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact." (1)

3.    Under the title "From the deposit box to the vegetable garden" (2),Jörg Boller presented an account of his personal war-time experiences on the matter of safekeeping in Switzerland of valuables, including artworks, by Holocaust and other victims of the Nazi Regime.  Boller pointed out that upon taking power, the Nazi Regime agressively sought to repatriate as much as possible all movable assets held abroad.  These comprehensive efforts found formal expression notably in the "Law on the confiscation of property belonging to the enemies of the German people and the German government" of 14 July 1933 and in the "Law on the sell-out of the German economy" of 12 June 1933.  These laws were directed against all German companies and residents - be they Nazis, Jews or not.  All of which encouraged many concerned persons to develop a nest-egg abroad, with neighboring Switzerland traditionally availing itself for politically safe cash and art deposits.

4.    According to Boller - a specialist and consultant in Swiss banking matters -

the agressive, and in some cases border-transcending German repatriation practice "explains why Germans wishing to leave, many of them Jewish, refrained from opening bank accounts in Switzerland in their own name.  Mr. E.Witzig, then director of the Swiss Credit Bank branch in Kreuzlingen [just across Switzerland's Northern border with Germany], always warned foreigners not to use their own name."  Mostly, "Swiss individuals served as mandatories for their German friends.  When that was not possible, lawyers, notaries and/or fiduciaries or even bank employees became account holders and used their proper names.   ... only very few disconcerted Germans opened accounts in their own name, and ... most existing accounts or deposits were assigned to a third party after 1932 or 1933.  ... Even if Holocaust survivors have an account number, the connection to the beneficial owner cannot be established for lack of proof since most of the time the banks did not know his or her identity.  While there were those Swiss who thought helping friends in need was just the thing to do, there were also professional investment advisors offering assistance for less altruistic reasons.  In general, their motivation was sheer greediness.  Therefore, it must be presumed that most of the vanished personal deposits of Holocaust victims are in these hands. ... These 'fiduciaries' were good at covering their tracks."

6.    The bank accounts opened by concerned foreigners prior to the Second World War often were linked with the rent of safety boxes providing for the safe deposit of valuables, like documents, jewelry, paintings, etc.  Estimates of the current market value of paintings which, prior and during WWII, were deposited by foreigners in Swiss banks, Custom Free Zones, art dealerships and private collections range from some 3 to over 20 billion dollars (4).   In many cases, some of these paintings were found to be copies or forgeries.  Many of them were brought into Switzerland in lieu of cash, be it as real or pretended-to-be "family pieces", objects for financial or barter transactions or - as in the case of the collection of Hermann Göring - for paying military equipment  (5).

7.    With so many unknowns on the paintings' origin, real ownership and pédigré, with so psychology-charged a raw material, and with an uncertain political environment here and there, the evolving post-war Swiss, European and international art markets could not but reflect these characteristics and uncertitudes in distinct ways.  Market opacity, art experts with conflicting interests, mutual back-scratching, lack of transparency, protectionism, etc. contributed not only to sky-rocketing prices but also to massive art scandals(6).

8.    Also, the more others sectors of civilian and economic life have undergone changes favoring the hands of the state (7), the more artworks have become preferred market vehicles, with Switzerland still strengthening its position as a traditionally favored deposit and market place.  This has been true not only for its banks but also because of its exterritorial Free Zones (8).  They are particularly attractive for long-term safe-keeping of real values which are expected to better preserve the fruits of legitimate business, including tax avoidance as the center pillar of free enterprise and a market economy(9).

9.    All this has contributed to a massive turnover and change-of-hands in the international art market since WWII.  Most of the suspect or easily traceable artworks have disappeared from Europe if not from the international art market, with experts pointing to the United States, Japan, the Middle East and South America as the regions with probably the most important private and public collections of looted art (10).  As a result, most artworks looted from Nazi victims are seen to have little chance of being traceable and recoverable any time soon - at least not on ordinary paths and with ordinary means (11).

10.    In contrast, and as pointed out above, the UN Secretary-General's comprehensive and final Report - if and when adequately - made pursuant to SCR 687, is presently seen to offer some real hope of providing detailed and concrete indications for a significant number of significant art works which - whether originally looted or regularly acquired - were transferred in 1990 to Baghdad after they had found their way from WWII deposits in Switzerland to Kuwait.   In this situation, both the Settlement and SCR 687 acquire particular significance.  Of course, the former, private agreement may not formally stand in the way of the proper, public execution, application and implementation of the latter.  However, in practice, there may occur significant obstacles facilitated and carried out by stone-walling Iraq-controlled Swiss firms capable of hiding behind the Settlement.  And, perhaps even more importantly, significant opportunities may be missed which could flow from a correspondingly interpreted and applied Settlement and which could consist of effectively encouraging the Iraqi leadership to cooperate with the UN Secretary General on the matter of SCR 687 (para 15) in mutually beneficial ways.

11.    With the free flow of things - i.e. if the Settlement is not correspondingly limited in its ramifications through either removal of the word "artworks" or authentic interpretations - the Settlement is likely to produce effects which are seen to be harmful to the victims of Nazi art lootings.  And even the public law SCR 687 might not be as helpful as it could be - and has undoutedly been intended to be.  For in their eventual efforts to assist claimants to recover artworks looted under the Nazi Regime and now under the control of Saddam Hussein, U.S. judges could find themselves constrained and frustrated by language and implications of an inadequately considered and nonadapted Settlement.
 

NOTES

(+)    The amicus curiæ of the Swiss Investors Protection Association of 19 November 1999 concerns possible conflicts of interests, Interhandel, IG Farben; on the Internet it is available at: www.solami.com/UBSac.htm

(1)    on the Internet at: www.un.org/depts/oip/scrs/scr687.htm

(2)    BILANZ, February 1997 (translation: courtesy of JML, Zurich)

(3)    Until 1981, the UBS imposed on each client wishing to open an account the following rules as a sine qua non condition (it being understood that an identical or similar standard text, with essentially similar ramifications, was already in force during and before WWII; bold emphasis added by this writer):

        "The entire contractual relationship between the client and the Union Bank of Switzerland shall be governed by the Bank's General Conditions as from time to time in effect.  Certain kinds of transactions are subject in addition to the special regulations issued by the Bank, in particular the deposit of securities and other valuables for safe custody (custodianship), savings books and savings accounts, desposit books and deposit accounts, check books, safe deposit boxes and night depositories.
        Whenever one or more attorneys are appointed, the authority conferred on them enters into force at once with the right of substitution until revoked in writing addressed to the Bank.  The attorneys are empowered to exercise all rights which the principal himself could exercise; they are, for instance, also authorized to pledge or sell securities on deposit, either for the account of the principal or a third party or even for their own account.  It is expressly stipulated that this power of attorney shall not expire at the death or incapacity of the principal, but shall remain valid until the Bank has received written revocation.
        Any damage resulting from reliance by the Bank upon any false, forged, altered or otherwise legally insufficient instructions, documentation or other legitimation shall be borne by the customer, unless the Bank is guilty of gross negligence.
        All aspects of the relationship between client and Bank shall be governed exclusively by Swiss law.  Place of performance of all obligations of both parties, as well as the exclusive jurisdiction of lawsuits and any other kinds of legal proceedings, shall be                      , excepting only that the Bank may sue the client in any competent court at the domicile of the client or any other court having jurisdiction."

(4)    Estimates provided by private sources.  For further leads, see: Thomas Buomberger, "Raubkunst - Kunstraub, die Schweiz und der Handel mit gestohlenen Kulturgütern zur Zeit des Zweiten Weltkrieges", Orell Füssli Verlag, Zürich 1998.  In 2001, Switzerland's final Bergier Report (interim report of December 1999 on the Internet at: www.admin.ch ) is expected to provide further, yet still far less than conclusive clues about foreign art deposits in Switzerland prior and during WWII.  Research efforts covering Europe in particular are understood to be under way by the European Commission on Looted Art, London (t: +44171-4873401, f: +44171-4874211, e-mail: 106771.731@compuserve.com ), while research efforts covering the United States in particular are understood to be under way by the Holocaust Art Recovery Project HARP (Marc Masurovsky, on the Internet at: www.lostart.org ).

(5)   "OBSERVATIONS concerning the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the World Jewish Congress et al. and the Swiss Bankers Association signed May 2 1996 in New York", 25 May 1996 (on the Internet at: www.solami.com/a73.htm#Oerlikon-Bührle )

(6)    whereby it deserves to be mentioned that the latter have had their epicenters mostly abroad - even though Switzerland has probably the world's highest per capita rate of art deposits, galeries, appraisers, money-lenders, experts, etc.

(7)    By way of criminalizing ever more the activities and omissions of citizens and by charging them ever more readily with the burden of proof of innocence.

(8)    Yes - and contrary to cash and other deposits made at Swiss banks - art deposits in the new-old wealth sanctuary, i.e. the extraterritorial Custom Free Zones of Zurich and Geneva in particular, have been outside the reach of Swiss prosecutors.  This is seen to be no coincidence but the Swiss lawmakers' slow but carefully considered response to foreign economic aggressions which, in several cases, have been favored by either negligent or zealous Swiss officials following private agendas.  Of course this is only a partial remedy, as it does not prevent future cases of unjustified blockages of assets on the flimsiest of charges pressed on Swiss judges by foreign colleagues.  Indeed, knowing that only criminal charges will lead anywhere, Swiss legal assistance continues to be abused, notably by routinely - and often falsely - invoked foreign drug and other criminal charges.  Thereby, many a Swiss judge can be hoodwinked into circumventing the asset protection and wealth privacy rules written into Swiss law.  Particularly if a competent foreign authority is ready to risk the goodwill of its Swiss counterpart, e.g. by lending a hand in order to effectuate what even on its home turf would clearly amount to an illegal fiscal fishing expedition.  In this sense, the existence, the past and present attractiveness and the growing use of Switzerland's Custom Free Zones is also a reaction to conditions abroad.  And the mere fact that criminals may also take advantage of these and other legal Swiss institutions cannot, in a genuinely free society, serve to deprive the law-abiding citizens of their freedoms and advantages.

(9) Responsible citizens of a free enterprise society worth its name are characterized by such activities as avoiding tolls and taxes by chosing different routes and more cost-effective production centers, cash transactions, etc. (Anton Keller, "European Taxmen Plot an Orwellian Scheme", Wall Street Journal Europe, 9 May 1986, on the Internet at: www.solami.com/Orwell.htm#Taxmen Plot ).  Yet, endlessly income-hungry tax authorities in many OECD countries are already well on their way to successfully undercut, even criminalize these very pillars of the market economy.  Already, both tax avoidance and cash changes are no longer considered normal but have been made suspect and now are already criminalized world-wide, e.g. under the term "money-laundering".  With those still daring to fight these aberrations easily paintable asfighting motherhood.
    Real value assets like artworks are thus worldwide in growing demand for mainly economic reasons, e.g. as a hedge against devaluations if not as investments for long-term appreciation.  This trend is accentuated the more as the productive economy and its moorings are seen to be losing out to new mass phenomena.  Indeed, the economic globalisation process and associated developments are feeding incertainties and unease in many quarters also with regard to what are felt to be the increasingly fragile paper monies.

(10)   OBSERVATIONS, op.cit.  (on the Internet at: www.solami.com/a73.htm#stolen Jewish art)

(11)    These include the various national and international, non-governmental and governmental efforts as reflected in the amicus curiæ which Anne Weber, in her capacity as Chair of the European Commission on Looted Art, introduced at the "fairness hearing" of the Court in Brooklyn on 29 November 1999.
 
 

Anton Keller, Secretary

17 December 1999

      The Honorable Edward Korman, President
      U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
      225 Cadman Plaza East
      Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201 718-2602470 f78
 

Amicus Curiæ  re: artworks (Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation)

Your Honor,

     In the above matter, we take pleasure submitting for your benevolent consideration an amicus curiæ developed on the background of our related insights.

     We have never been associated with or mandated by any of the parties to the Settlement Agreement of 26 January 1999, and we have no mandate either from any of the parties involved in the matter of artworks.  However, we have been involved in good offices efforts related to the Kuwait/Iraq conflict, and we understand the subject of artworks, as covered by the Settlement, to be linked to the UN Security Council Resolution 687 which, in para 15, explicitly provides for „the return of all Kuwaiti property sized by Iraq“ (including artworks).  Moreover, the Security Council is expected to provide shortly for a renewed effort to identify and repatriate Kuwaiti persons and property still held by Iraq, with the artworks involved estimated to be valued over US$ 5 billion and originating in part from looted art deposits made in Switzerland prior and during the Second World War.  In this light we consider it appropriate to draw the Court’s attention to possible adverse effects of the Settlement, as it stands, on the related art inventory and recovery efforts, and to offer our services to the Court for corresponding improvements.

     We trust this to be helpful and look forward to hear from Your Honor at your earliest convenience.

     With Season's Greetings and best regards,

enclosure:

amicus curiæ, 12/17/99

 
 The present amicus curiæ addresses questions - notably on possible conflicts of interests, non-intended and non-desired effects and implications on third party interests, etc. - which have arisen or may arise from the Settlement Agreement which, on 26 January 1999, under the guidance of the Presiding Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, was made and entered into by and between the Settling Defendents (Credit Suisse and UBS AG) and the Settling Plaintiffs (represented by Michael D. Hausfeld, Robert A. Swift and Melvyn I. Weiss and, for the Settlement Classes, the World Jewish Restitution Organization).  It seeks to shed additional light on and thus to help clarify some dates and terms used in this agreement.  As such it may strengthen this agreement and facilitate its prompt implementation in as much as concerned third parties, notably some stakeholders of I.G. Farben i.A. (in liquidation), may thus be able to determine their own related interests and rule out any infringement - be it in fact or in law - on their own rights.

1. The Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Settlement") of 26 January 1999 provides, a.o., the following definitions (bold emphasis added by this writer):

Assets means any and all objects of value including but not limited to personal, commercial, real, tangible, and intangible property, including, without limitation, cash, securities, gems, gold, and other precious metals, jewelry, documents, artworks, equipment, and intellectual property.

Cloaked Assets means Assets wholly or partly owned, controlled by, obtained from, or held for the benefit of, any company incorporated, headquartered, or based in Germany or any other Axis country or other country occupied by any Axis country between 1933 and 1946 or any other entity or individual associated with the Nazi Regime (regardless of where such entity or individual was or is located, incorporated, headquartered, or conducting business), the identity, value or ownership of which was in fact or allegedly disguised by, through, or as the result of any intentional or unintentional act or omission of or otherwise involving any Releasee, including, without limitation, Internationale Industrie und Handelsbeteiligungen A.G. (a.k.a. "Interhandel"), and its predecessors, successors, or affiliates.

Releasees means the Settling Defendants; the Swiss National Bank; Other Swiss Banks; the Swiss Bankers Association; the Swiss Confederation (inluding, without limitation, the Cantons and all other political subdivisions and governmental instrumentalities in Switzerland); all business concerns (whether organized as corporations or otherwise) headquartered, organized, or incorporated in Switzerland as of 3 October 1966, including, without limitation, corporations incorporated in Switzerland that are owned, operated, or controlled directly or indirectly by corporations located outside Switzerland ("the Swiss-based Concerns") and their branches and offices, wherever located; and all affiliates of any Swiss-based Concern (whether organized as corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships or otherwise) wherever headquartered, organized, or incorporated in which the Swiss-based Concern owns or controls directly or indirectly at least 25 percent of any class of voting securities or controls in any manner the election or appointment of a majority of the board of directors, trustees or similar body ("Owned or Controlled Affiliates").  As to each of the foregoing Releasees, the term Releasees also includes, without limitation, each of its predecessors, successors, assigns, officers, directors, employees, agents, attorneys, heirs, executors, administrators, and personal representatives wherever located.  The term Releasees excludes Basler Lebensversicherungs-Gesellschaft, Zürich Lebensversicherungs-Gesellschaft, and Winterthur Lebensversicherungs-Gesellschaft and their subsidiaries in the insurance business, but only to the extent of insurance claims of the type asserted in Cornell, et al. v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., et al., 97 Civ. 2262 (S.D.N.Y.) [*].  The term Releasees also excludes parent companies and other affiliates of Swiss-based Concerns that  (1) before 1945 were headquartered, based, or incorporated in Germany or any other Axis country or other country occupied by an Axis country between 1933 and 1946,  (2) were not Owned or Controlled Affiliates as defined herein, and  (3) disguised the identity, value, or ownership of Cloaked Assets or used Slave Labor.  A company shall not be deemed a Releasee by virtue of being an Owned or Controlled Affiliate if  (1) the company was headquartered, based, or incorporated in Germany or any other Axis country or other country occupied by an Axis country between 1933 and 1946, and  (2) the company's parent was a Swiss-based Concern established for the sole purpose of disguising the identity, value, or ownership of Cloaked Assets.

Slave Labor means work for little or no renumeration actually or allegedly performed by individuals involuntarily at the insistence, direction, or under the auspices of the Nazi Regime.

3.     Also, having systematically bought up a controlling interest in Interhandel, the Kennedy-Schäfer deal of 1963 and its associated cash-flow of some SFR 521 million in favor of UBS almost doubled UBS' worth, making it overnight Switzerland's biggest bank (5).  With regard to its provision for liquidating assets linked to Nazi Germany, this "private" deal can also be seen as an inadvertent late application of the Washington Agreement of 25 May 1946 between the United States and Switzerland (6) - albeit with a symptomatic difference.  While the latter, in its Annex II F, provided for German persons to be explicitly and strictly excluded from participating either directly or indirectly in the liquidation process, the former rested on GAF's public auction in New York on which occasion - with the help of an intermediary, Blyth & Co, and with no constraint whatsoever - I.G. Farben successor BASF finally brought I.G. Farben's American assets back into the family fold.

4.     Headquartered in Frankfurt, Germany, I.G. Farben is understood to have employed slave labor as defined above during the latter part of the Nazi Regime.  Its successors - i.e. I.G. Farben i.A. (in liquidation), BASF, Bayer, Hoechst, etc. – and other German firms are understood to be currently involved in proceedings aimed at settling related claims, with a lump sum offer of DM 6 billion reportedly under consideration by the claimants (7).  Both shareholders and representatives of I.G. Farben i.A. are on the record to have submitted separate claims to UBS AG totalling some DM 4 billion for slave labor compensations (8) and SFR 7 billion for allegedly violated trusteeship functions notably in relation to Interhandel (9).

5.     The past and current shareholdings of the former UBS, Interhandel and the present UBS AG in I.G. Farben and in its successors, respectively, - and vice-versa - are not publicly known; indications are that holdings above the Settlement's 25% threshold - not to speak of effective control - cannot be ruled out (10).  Even if they were below said threshold, explicit mention, in the Settlement, of Interhandel, and inclusion of such terms as affiliates and Slave Labor and such dates as 3 October 1996 (11), on their own is seen to give rise to some questions, such as:

a) How and based on which explanations did the singular name Interhandel find its way into the Settlement?  Have all parties to the Settlement been fully briefed on the background, importance and possible implications of this particular mention, and have they agreed to this mention not only by non-opposition but explicitly?

b) Does the Court or either Settlement party share the official Swiss view – as opposed to that of the U.S. Government -, holding Interhandel not to be a "Swiss-based Concern established for the sole purpose of disguising the identity, value, or ownership of Cloaked Assets", in which case, notably in the event of an Interhandel holding of a minimum of 25% of I.G. Farben shares, I.G. Farben and either of its successors would seem to qualify as Releasees?

c) Why, in the event, is inclusion of the term Slave Labor in the Settlement indispensable for the achievement of the Settlement's objectives, and in no way prejudicial or harmful for the prompt conclusion and implementation of a satisfactory separate agreement on this alien subject?  In other words, and the more so as the non-Holocaust-related claimants are not a party of or represented in the Settlement (12): can it be ruled out that this US$ 1.25 billion settlement has been intended to, can be used for, or will provide effective immunity for UBS AG and/or I.G. Farben and its successors - if not in law but in effect - against much bigger non-Holocaust-related claims which have arisen or may yet arise, notably from the activities prior, during and after the World War II of UBS AG's predecessors - including Interhandel - and/or I.G. Farben?

NOTES

(+)    The amicus curiæ of the Good Offices Group of European Lawmakers of 17 December 1999 concerns notably artworks, the Kuwait/Baghdad connection, and legal elements related to the establishement of Swiss bank accounts and their possible liquidation; on the Internet it is available at: www.solami.com/UBSac.htm.

(1)    Shraga Elam, "Die Schweiz und die Vermögen der I.G. Farben - Die Interhandel-Affäre", 1999 - Zeitschrift für Sozialgeschichte des 20. und 21.Jahrhunderts, Heft 1/98 März 1998, S.61-91 ( .../IGCHEMIE.htm);  Sebastian Speich, "Geheimakte bringt SBG ins Schleudern - Nazi-Vermögen: Bundesrat muss jetzt die brisante Interhandel-Akte öffnen", CASH #4, 24.Januar 1997;  Sebastian Speich, "Wie es zur Interhandel-Affäre kam und wie die SBG durch Übernahme der Firma zur grössten Schweizer Bank wurde",  Shraga Elam, "Wie das Sturzenegger-Bänklein zu 120 Millionen Franken Reingewinn kam", "Verschlungene Pfade zum grossen Geld – Auf welchen Umwegen die Schweizerische Bankgesellschaft an die Gelder der I.G. Farben kam und dadurch zur Nummer 1 unter den Schweizer Grossbanken wurde", "Interhandel: Vertuschen nützt nichts mehr", CASH #10, 7.März 1997, "Eine Leiche im Keller der UBS - Die Eidgenössische Bank, 1945 von der SBG übernommen, spielte eine zentrale Rolle bei den Nazi-Geschäften", CASH #45, 7.November 1997;  Hans Schaffner, "It's Time to Stop Misrepresenting Swiss Wartime Role", International Herald Tribune, 6 April 1998;  Anton Keller, Philip Wainwright, "Who Wants to Sack Heidyland?", Swiss Investors Protection Association, box 2580, 1211 Geneva 2, 1 January 1998 ( .../gold.htm ¦ .../a$UBS.htm ¦ .../UBSindex.htm ).

(2)     "IG-Farben-Konzern  --  bis 1945 grösster deutscher Chemiekonzern und neben der Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG grösster Konzern in der Geschichte des deutschen Imperialismus, der sowohl vor und im ersten als auch im zweiten Weltkrieg entscheidenden Anteil an der Rüstungsproduktion hatte.  Die IG entstand aus einer Reihe von Chemieunternehmungen, deren Hauptprodukt urspr. künstliche Farbstoffe auf Anilinbasis bildeten.  Die Entwicklung begann 1904 mit der Bildung zweier Interessengemeinschaften (IG) ud mündete 1925 in der Fusion der IG-Unternehmungen zur IG-Farbenindustrie AG, dem grössten Konzern der Chemieindustrie kapitalistischer Länder.  Das vielseitige Produktionsprogramm der IG reichte von Teerfarbstoffen über Pharmazeutika, Kunststoffe, synthetische Treibstoffe und Leichtmetalle bis zu Explosiv- und Sprtengstoffen sowie Giftgasen.  Die IG waren von jeher bes. eng mit dem imperialistischen Staat verbunden.  1933/45 nahmen 24 Direktoren der IG 81 führende Positionen im faschistischen Staatsapparat ein.  Der Konzern nahm aktiv an der Ausplünderung der vom Hitlerfaschismus okkupierten Länder teil.  Zahlreiche führende Vertreter der IG machten sich schwerster Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit schuldig.  Ein beträchtlicher Teil des Aktienkapitals wurde von den Gründerfamilien gehalten (Bayer, Brüning, Weinberg u.a.).  Die sog. Entflechtung nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg erfolgte nach einem bereits 1940 von der Konzernleitung beschlossenen Reorganisationsplan.  Die ehemalige IG bildet heute in der BRD eine eng mit den Monopolbanken liierte finanzkapitalistische Gruppe aus drei Konzernen: BASF, Bayer und Hoechst.  Nachdem die Kapitalverflechtung über Gemeinschafts-Unternehmungen Ende der 60er Jahre durch Austausch der Kapitalbeteiligungen weitestgehend aufgegeben wurde, beruht der enge Zusammenhalt der drei Konzerne seither auf abgestimmter Politik hinsichtlich der Produktions-schwerpunkte sowie der inneren und äusseren Expansion.  Die Konzerngruppe der ehemaligen IG ist mit einem Umsatz von rd. 71 Md. DM (1976) und mehr als 500000 Beschäftigten die bedeutendste Monopolgruppe der BRD und die mit Abstand grösste Gruppierung internationaler Konzerne in der kapitalistischen Chemieindustrie.  Rund ein Drittel des Umsatzes (22 Md. DM) stammt aus den ausländischen Produktions-gesellschaften mit rd. 160000 Beschäftigten in über 100 Ländern."
Ökonomisches Lexikon, Verlag Die Wirtschaft, [Ost-]Berlin 1979.

     According to recent press reports, the textile color parts - i.e. I.G. Farben's original core business - of BASF, Bayer and Hoechst are to be merged again soon.   Date-lined 10 November 1999, 15:36, the Swiss news service SDA published the following text (emphasis added):

"bsd057 c4ger ecpi fin

BASF, Bayer und Hoechst wollen Textilfarben-Anbieter bilden

        Ludwigshafen (sda / dpa) Die deutschen Chemie-Konzerne BASF, Bayer und Hoechst wollen ihre Textilfarben-Aktivitäten zum weltweit grössten Anbieter mit einem Jahresumsatz von mehr als zwei Mrd. DM verschmelzen.  Zu diesem Zweck soll das BASF-Textilfarben-Geschäft mit der bereits am Weltmarkt führenden Bayer-Hoechst-Tochter Dystar zusammengelegt werden, wie die BASF am Mittwoch in Ludwigshafen mitteilte.  Die Fusion gehört zu einem Bündel von Massnahmen, mit dem der Chemiekonzern BASF seinen Unternehmensbereich Farben neu ausrichten und dessen Leistungsfähigkeit auf einem hart umkämpften Markt steigern will.

Stellenabbau
        Dazu gehört der geplante Verkauf von Produktion und Vermarktung spezieller Pigmentpräparationen mit weltweit 470 Mitarbeitern und der Abbau von 30 Stellen in in der Pigmentproduktion in Ludwigshafen bis 2002.  Das neue Textilfarbstoff-Unternehmen von BASF, Bayer und Hoechst soll für Produktion, Marketing und Vertrieb zuständig sein und weltweit 4700 Beschäftigte zählen. Dazu gehören auch die weltweit 1500 Beschäftigten der BASF aus diesem Zweig.

Neue Gesellschaft ab April 2000
        Die neue und noch namenlose Gesellschaft, bei der die Konzerne gleichberechtigte Partner sein werden, könne ihre Arbeit zum 1. April 2000 aufnehmen. Die Zustimmung der Aufsichtsgremien und der Kartellbehörden steht noch aus. Nach Angaben der Hoechst AG wollen die Partner ihre Kostensituation im Vergleich zur Konkurrenz aus Asien verbessern. Zudem werde mit dem Zusammenschluss das Produkt- und Technologie- Portfolio gestärkt.  Die BASF wertete die Partnerschaft als «Signal für die weitere notwendige Konsolidierung der europäischen Textilindustrie». Das neue Unternehmen habe die nötige Grösse, um in einem hart umkämpften Markt zu bestehen.
        Die 1995 von Bayer und Hoechst wegen des Wettbewerbs gegründete Dystar (Frankfurt am Main) hatte 1998 mit 3200 Mitarbeitern einen Umsatz von 1,5 Mrd. DM erzielt. Das Unternehmen zählt 23 Töchter, die auf den Geschäftsfeldern Reaktiv-, Dispersions- und Spezialfarbstoffe tätig sind.  Das BASF-Textilfarbengeschäft war 1998 auf einen Umsatz von 860 Mio. DM gekommen.  Schwerpunkte sind Küpen-, Reaktiv-, Dispersions- und Indigofarbstoffe.  Die BASF will ihre Produktionsanlagen in Deutschland und Brasilien einbringen."

"Obwohl die SVS [Schweizerische Verrechnungsstelle] zum Schluss kam, dass diese Firma am im [Washingtoner] Abkommen festgelegten Stichtag bloss zu 17% deutsch beherrscht war und die alliierten Vertreter in der CM [Commission Mixte, Bern] gegen diesen Befund kein Rekursverfahren anstrengten, betrachtete das OAP [Office of Alien Property, Washington] die amerikanischen Beteiligungen der Basler Holdingsgesellschaft [Interhandel] als deutsche Werte.  Die US Feindgutbehörden waren nicht bereit, die General Aniline and Film Corporation, deren Gesamtwert zwischen 60 und 80 Mio. $ ausmachte, freizugeben. ..."

(4)     Res Strehle, Gian Trepp, Barbara Weyermann, "Ganz Oben - 125 Jahre SBG", Limmat-Verlag, Zürich 1987, S.91/2.  Designed - from its biginnings in the late twenties - as I.G.Farben's main conduit of licence payments from abroad (siehe auch: Werner Otto Reichelt, "Das Erbe der IG Farben", Econ), the inherent current value of Interhandel - which was fully absorbed by UBS only in 1996 (5) - is estimated by some observers to be SFR 8-10 billion.

(5)     Sebastian Speich, op.cit., CASH #45;  Dirk Schütz, "Der Fall der UBS - Warum die Schweizerische Bankgesellschaft unterging", Bilanz - Weltwoche-ABC-Verlag, Zürich 1998.  The merger of Interhandel with UBS was completed on 26 September 1996, according to the official files of the Registry of Commerce of Zürich.

(6)     Von Castelmur, op.cit., passim, speziell FN 378; Daniel Frei, "Das Washingtoner Abkommen von 1946 - Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik zwischen dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und dem Kalten Krieg", SZG Nr.19, 1969, S-567-619;  M. Durrer, "Die schweizerisch-amerikanischen Finanzbeziehungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg.  Von der Blockierung der schweizerischen Guthaben in den USA über die 'Safehaven'-Politik zum Washingtoner Abkommen (1941-1946)", Bern 1984.

(7)    Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, "8 Milliarden und Mehr", Petra Pinzler, "Nur ein Spiel um Geld", Die Zeit, 12.November 1999 (www.zeit.de/links/).  To be sure, among the IG Farben successors only IG Farben i.A. - and then only in connexion with its multiple billion dollar claims vis-à-vis UBS - is publicly giving the impression of still taking an interest in this matter without, however, participating in the solidarity fund the German Government and industry is seeking to set up to equal parts for a definite resolution of this long-simmering issue (Roger Cohen, "Stalemate Forces Delay In Nazi Compensation - Dispute Is Over Pay Owed to Slave Laborers", International Herald Tribune, 11 November 1999).  This may have to do with IG Farben's particular background and the "Wollheim-Prozess" which addressed the issue of compensation of concentration camp inmates which IG Farben used as forced labors during the war (Reichelt, op.cit., p.94).

(8)    "IG-Farben-Nachfolger plant Stiftung für Nazi-Opfer", Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 23 February 1999 (according to subsequent reports, a transmission error occurred as the claims are not for SFR 3.6 million but for SFR 3.6 billion).

(9)     In a letter of 28 August 1998, UBS AG formally acknowledged a UBS shareholder's claims he had filed on 1 and 14 August 1998, totalling SFR 7.107 billion, i.e. within the legal 30 day filing period and in line with art. 748 chiffre 1 of the Swiss Code of Ogligations which requires both contested and non-contested claims to be fully provisioned or securised as a precondition for a merger to be completed.

(10)    Related questions are the subject of the special audit of UBS AG which some concerned UBS shareholders have asked the competent Swiss courts to set up in accordance with article 697 lit.b of the Swiss Code of Obligations ( .../697ZH.htm ).

(11)     This is understood to be the first filing date of the class action in the present case.  However, it is also just one week after the final integration of Interhandel into the former UBS (5).

(12)    The fact that both the Washington law firm Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C., according to its circular of August 1999, and the New York law firm Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP, are reportedly in the vanguard of "Slave Labor Lawsuits" is not, in the event, seen to amount to proper representation of Slave Labor claimants in the Settlement proceedings.  Moreover, it is certainly not for this writer to decide whether this double mandate constitutes a conflict of interests, be it on its own or in light of the above-outlined circumstances, effects and possible implications of the Settlement on said slave labor lawsuits.

(*)    The International Herald Tribune (26 November 1999) reported:

"Holocaust Claim is Settled

LOS ANGELES -- In the first settlement of litigation over unpaid Holocaust-era life insurance policies, the Italian insurer Assicurazioni Generali SpA has agreed to pay the descendants of one Nazi victim $1.25 million to resolve a single case, according to people knowledgable about the deal.  Terms of the settlement in the case, Stern v. Generali, were supposed to remain confidential, but an official with the California insurance commissioner's office revealed the sum in the agreement, which was disclosed to a judge in Los Angeles on Tuesday.  Peter Simshauser, a lawyer for Generali, said the deal was in line with the company's policy of trying to resolve Holocaust-era claims but refused to comment on the size of the payment."