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Editor's Introduction  (25 January 1998)

Only future generations of historians can tell whether the private Swiss-based research group CORUM and its complement on the political scene, the Good Offices Group of European Lawmakers, have been more than generators of unfulfilled hopes.  Whether it was all justified, i.e. the attention arosen by their work (e.g. nuclear disarmament negotiators in the Kremlin in 1968 had sought to vilifiy what made the rounds then as the "red poison in green covers"), the probably unintended honor of being branded "diplomatic mercenaries" by some bad-tempered diplomats, and the UN's obliging honor to be formally associated with spies and modern Robin Hoods.  Whether, in retrospect, their often seemingly lost-cause efforts amounted to more than a waste of time and of scarce resources.  And, in the event, to what degree they have in fact served their designed purpose.

To be sure - and in as much as, in those functions, the editor was able to help it and was not undercut from without or from within - the objective has always been to help provide vision and guidance in an era of increasing confusion, to offer discrete, rapid and reliable documentary and intellectual muscle for conflict analysis and non-governmental services, and to avail informal political testing grounds for ideas aimed at avoiding or, as the case may be, obtaining a negotiated settlement of political conflicts of an international nature.

Having been involved in both groups, the editor prefers to let the record speak for itself.  And to concentrate his comments on current and foreseeable headaches and on ideas, elements and pathways which, conceivably, might contribute to avoid - if at all possible and desirable (1) - the currently re-appearing logique de guerre particularly in the Mideastern and the European theatre.

After completion of our ground-breaking research on political and economic implications of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (2) - which was as much vilified in Moscow, Washington and Berne as it was appreciated in Brazilia, Delhi, Paris, Teheran and elsewhere - we had been invited to lend our omni-directional expertise notably in the Teheran hostage crises of 1979/1981 and in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict.  An informal network of lawmakers from numerous countries thus availed itself for corresponding services when Iraq, on 2 August 1990, had invaded Kuwait and prevented thousands of stranded foreign nationals to leave either Iraq or Kuwait.  As director of CORUM and long-time adviser to Swiss and foreign parliamentarians, the editor became directly involved in those hostage-release and related efforts.  In turn, he was personally entrusted with minority protection missions for Northern Iraq and Yugoslavia, with good offices mandates in the constitutional crises in Algeria and the hostage affairs in Kashmir, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Peru, and with the representation of the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation ICESC (non-governmental organization in consultative status with ECOSOC and UNESCO).

Some of these outgrowths have left their traces in statements made by representatives of both governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to various UN bodies - from working groups over the International Court of Justice up to the UN Security Council.  Those most relevant to currently still unresolved issues - Algeria, Baltic minorities, hostage-takings (e.g. in Kashmir), Iraq, Yugoslavia, etc. - find reflection in the present record of communications, with some documents being published also in the official UN collection (UN codes: E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/NGO/27; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/NGO/27; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/NGO/29; E/CN.4/1994/NGO/48; E/CN.4/1994/NGO/54; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/NGO/27; E/CN.4/1995/NGO/47; E/CN.4/1995/NGO/51; E/CN.4/1995/NGO/52).

Covering a wide spectrum in the field some call paradiplomacy, related de-classified communications eventually may form the core and central archive of this netsite (for the time being, the complete index on the Mosul Vilayet subject will be maintained at the web address: http://www.solami.com/mvcindex.htm, while on the subject of ex-Yugoslavia it will be accessible at: http://www.solami.com/93-29.html).  Unavoidably, the subjects thus covered often overlap and with each reader having his own agenda, a generally useful classification may here be found only in a strictly chronological order.  Beyond that, the extensive name and subjects indexes should cover related deficiencies, as may the wonders of the net, e.g. fine-tuned hyperlinks.

The following communications are focussed on the Mosul Vilayet and cover the period of 1990 to 1998.  As in the case of other sections of this site, most of its elements have been selected for their value to shed additional light on its central subjects, i.e. mankind's common roots in monotheism and effective minority protection as universally agreeable vehicles for unlocking the increasingly evident - and dangerous - gridlocks in the Middle East, the Balkans and elsewhere, and for opening pathways towards mutually beneficial New Horizons, not least for Jerusalem.  Of course, the relevancy of these elements is not always apparent to "instant historians", and it will become so to the untrained naked eye only when looked at from a certain time distance and when considering parallel developments which may have no obvious links.  Moreover, even people in highest places - some say those even more so than others - are not always at ease with ideas running against the grain and the party line but who, as history shows abundantly, are often the only truly helpful ones.  Granted, in very tight situations it takes indeed an independent, visionary and bold mind to think and act unswervingly in line with the insights which can be gained from the universally applicable philosophy underlying our logo (i.e. the puzzle of the square with nine stars the solution to which requires you to break out of worn-out tracks by drawing one line beyond the square into the surrounding space and by turning around out there in order to cut across two stars).

Thus, together with these additional explanations, we have now added these further elements.  Sometimes despite the editor's reservations.  The texts originating from third persons have been integrated notably for reasons of comity, balance or fairness.  In so doing, the editor implies neither his agreement with or support of the statements thus made by others, nor does he otherwise engage his responsibility.  His sole objective is to avail this unique communication platform for documents and statements he considers to be useful and to advance the debate - if possible without adding to the confusion and complication of things, and hopefully for helping along certain developments which may benefit from such plugs.

All this being said, and as the rising sound of war drums pierces through the cold winter nights even this far away from its origin, the editor cannot but deplore the - only perhaps inevitable - neglect on all sides of practical, reasonable and dignified pathways out of the current mess in the Middle East and in the very cradle of Europe.  E.g. it appears that the leadership of the Palestinians never seriously considered - or perhaps was not even informed by their subordinates and friends about - some efforts made on their behalf in 1990 and 1992, and advices transmitted to them in 1992, 1993 and 1994:

Similarly, the modern Nebuchadnezzar and other could-be-renewers-of-monotheism bordering ancient and reportedly re-discovered Eden have yet to recognize and constructively bring to bear the unique opportunities available to them.  This goes far beyond single-mindedly exploiting the power vacuum left by alleged world leaders which - with damages beyond their grasp - have managed to cover up their shortcomings while passing off their essentially empty gesticulations as leadership.  It requires profound insight, vision and courage to redirect the ship of state when its course has been found to be faulty.  It may be helped by supporting the voices of reason and clear-sightedness who have already prepared the path to mutually beneficial New Horizons.  And even at this late hour, a corresponding, well-considered and competently executed diplomatic initiative in the true spirit we prefer to read intoPresident Saddam Hussein's recent Hymn on Monotheism might well break the logjam.  It might effectively stop the war drums and provide prompt and effective relief and return to normalcy not only to the victims of the unbearable double-embargo in Northern Iraq, but through them to all residents in all of Iraq.

To this effect, principled men and women of goodwill anywhere are solicited to do all that is in their power.  Of course, even with the best of intentions and the most powerful forces at hand, the reverse side of Victor Hugo's medal still applies: "no force is strong enough to push through an idea whose time has not come!"  Yet, "corriger la fortune" is no French monopoly, and anyway, the test of the pudding lies in its eating.  Indeed, and particularly in a moment like this the lithmus test of real leadership cannot pass he who uses his muscles divorced from his dignity, his moral fibres and his brainpower, he who uses them for selfish purposes while neglecting historic opportunities to help others, and he who in words and deeds doesn't recognize himself as being no more than a channel of and a servant to our all One God.
 

______________________

(1)    From almost all socially, culturally, economically and politically relevant points of view, and in the absence of genuine substitutes for the defining functions of war, peace may be something less than desirable.  This is the seemingly preposterous yet well researched and defended conclusion of the more-than-ever re-readable study commissioned by President John F. Kennedy: Leonard C. Lewin (editor), "IRON MOUNTAIN REPORT - On the Desirability and Feasibility of Peace", Dial Press New York, 1967 (traduction française: "La Paix Condamnée", Calman-Lévy, Paris 1968; deutsche Übersetzung: "Verdammter Friede", Econ, 1968).

(2) A.Keller, H.Bolliger, B.Kalff"On the Economic Implications of the Non-Proliferation Treaty", Revue de Droit International, de Sciences Diplomatiques et Economiques (International Law Review, Sottile), I, 1968:  this research report of 47 pages, bound with a green cover, was also very acidly commented on by Radio Moscow in early 1968) ;  Anton Keller, Paul Bähr, Peter B.Kalff, "The Nonproliferation Treaty in Light of Nuclear Energy Developments", Revue de Droit International, de Sciences Diplomatiques et Economiques, III, 1975.  The editor acknowledges the numerous contributions made to these and related papers by Elizabeth Young and Lord Kennet.
 


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M E M O     to:    H.E. Perez de Cuellar, fax: 212-9634879

8/18/90     from:  A.Keller, MP Adviser, tel+fax: (33)450322842

            re:    Possible Iranian Good Offices for
                   Repatriating Foreigners from Kuwait and Iraq

At the recommendation of Dr.Felix AUER, Member of the Swiss Parliament's Foreign Relations Commission (fax: (41)61-6963357), and H.E. Ambassador Taba TABAI, Iranian Mission (fax: (41)22-7330203), the following idea has been brought to the attention of the CICR, as well as of the British, French, German, Italian and US authorities, for possible consultations and coordinated actions:

1.  The Italian Foreign Ministry listed 5900 EC citizens to be "stranded in Kuwait and Iraq" as of August 7 (3,657 in Kuwait, 2,243 in Iraq; Reuters, WSJ 8/14).  An American source estimated 5000 Americans to be held back in Kuwait, 500 in Iraq.  The Swiss Foreign Ministry listed 53 Swiss citizens to be retained in Kuwait and 52 in Iraq.  The corresponding figures for other foreign nationals were given in a Reuters dispatch (8/14) for Japan (270, resp. 270) and USSR (880, resp. 7830), with an estimated total of about one million foreigners with an uncertain status.

2.  According to the ICRC, the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 (United Nations Treaty Series, vol.75, p.287) was ratified by Iraq on February 14, 1956, and Kuwait acceded to it on September 2, 1967.  As of today, this convention is said to be fully binding on both countries.

  Its article 3 (I) provides for the protection of

  And its article 15 stipulates: 3.  Under present circumstances it appears desirable to consider in particular the options for a prompt evacuation from Kuwait and Iraq of all foreign nationals desiring to leave the area.  One such option might consist of getting Iraq to agree to the establishment of a CICR-administered neutralized zone in Kuwait through and from which the evacuation might then be carried out by way of Iran.

4.  Iranian good offices might be crucial for obtaining such a humanitarian solution which, when realized, will create considerable goodwill in the countries concerned.  E.g. if, as a precondition to settling with Iraq actual bilateral matters, Iran insists that all foreign nationals now held back in either Kuweit or Iraq be provided full CICR protection and be promptly released by CICR air lift to Teheran.

cc: Dr.Auer

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attn: President G.BUSH: due to interrupted public telecom to Baghdad, I requested this morning the Iraqi ambassadors in Geneva, NY, London, Paris, Bonn and Washington to transmit this telex:

M E M O     to:    H.E. President Saddam HUSSEIN, fax: 9641-5374495

8/18/90       from:  A.Keller, MP Adv., tel+fax: (33)450322842

Your Excellency,

Some concerned Iraqi Representatives rightly raised questions on the matter of Swiss neutrality regarding Iraqi actions vis-à-vis Kuwait and the UN's response to them.  Although I am, of course, not speaking for the Swiss Government, it may be helpful to note that Swiss neutrality has always been strict, but that it can and does in fact only exist to the extent that parties to a conflict unreservedly recognize and honor the Geneva Red Cross Conventions and Additional Protocols, i.e. those singular instruments of international law for which Switzerland has not only depositary functions but, as Iraq's continuing use of various ICRC services demonstrates, quite tangible and highly actual responsibilities.

That offers interesting perspectives.  For Swiss trading firms are estimated to have, in recent years, been involved in some 40% of Iraqi import and export trades.  Strict Swiss neutrality in the present conflict - i.e. Swiss  n o n-participation in any commercial sanctions decided by foreign bodies - could thus provide for covering a considerable part of Iraq's export and import needs.  And in as much as Swiss neutrality can be expected to be unreservedly respected by all interested UN Member States, this would not be a mere theoretical but a very practical effective contribution to the resolution of some actual regional problems.

In order to get there, the Swiss Government would have to lift its actual orders constraining commerce involving Iraq and Kuwait. It would have to issue instead a "courrant normal" decree, providing for Swiss firms, protected by the Swiss flag, to legally engage in Iraqi and Kuwaiti commerce - up to the level of previous years.  Naturally, the Swiss Government can  n o t  be expected to even consider any such measure - unless it will be satisfied that the above fundamental neutrality condition is or will be reliably met.

Trusting the forceful statements of the Iraqi's Representatives in Paris and elsewhere, who have repeatedly referred to the standards of international law and who have asserted that Iraq will honor its treaty obligations, I am confident that the Swiss Government will be in a position to exercice its neutrality rights and obligations in the above sense the moment the Geneva Conventions, notably art.3 I,b of the Fourth Convention of 1949 (ratified by Iraq on February 14, 1956) will be unreservedly honored by Iraq.  This could best be demonstrated if Iraq were to turn Kuwait not only into a  f r e e  zone, but promptly agreed to making it a CICR-administered  n e u t r a l i z e d  zone in the sense of art.15 of said Red Cross Convention - through which all foreigners now reportedly held back in either Iraq or Kuwait would be able to return home - securely, directly or by way of Teheran and at once.

I am priviledged to submit to Your Excellency's attention this informal memorandum in response to a suggestion by Dr.Felix AUER, Member of the Swiss Parliament's Foreign Relations Commission (fax: (41)61-6963357).  I am pleased to note the assistance which made this communication possible and which I received from the Iraqi Mission's Counsellor, Dr.Alkadi.  If I can be of any help, please let me know. Respectfully yours,
                                                                                            A.Keller

cc: Dr.Auer, Basel; Dr.Alkadi, Geneva

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J.A.KELLER
Parliamentary Adviser
box 2580 1211 Genève 2
4122-7346011 (ext.3596)
fax: 4122-7338671 & -217970
privat t+fax: 0033-450322842

28 August 1990

re: Proposed Stabilization Steps Beyond Tomorrow

Your Excellency,

This is to present my compliments, to advise you of the reactions to date to my communications of August 15 and 18 (sent to you by fax, copies enclosed) which I developed on my own initiative following our brief meeting of August 10, and to submit some further ideas for confidential consideration and eventual actions.

1.  None of the three memoranda has, as of now, drawn a written response.  Inofficial oral acknowledgements, resp. mostly sceptical, but basically favorable responses have been received from a Senior White House adviser, an aid of the British Foreign Office, the Iranian Ambassador in Geneva, and from Dr.Alkadi of the Iraqi Mission.  The latter, though, in a telephone call of August 20, regretted that I "combined" two "totally unrelated" subjects, i.e. the "retained foreigners" and embargo questions.  Essentially my response was that even unrelated, individually dead-locked problems can be brought to a satisfactory solution if seen and properly handled as mutual catalysts.  He wasn't convinced, insisted - over my objections - that Iraq fully honors to the letter the Fourth Geneva Convention and, as His Master's Voice, generally didn't seem to be accessible to my common sense language.  Nonetheless, Dr.Alkadi assured me that my memo was transmitted to the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Baghdad by way of his Mission and that he will keep me informed of any eventual reply.

2.  Assuming the measures in place and those that might still be taken to provide for the foreigners now retained in Kuwait and Iraq to be released, and eventually to bring about a unilateral military withdrawal from all of Kuwait, I suggest that consideration be given already now to the following plan.  It may be adapted for an early application, following new circumstances, but I recommend to keep it strictly confidential):

Trusting this to be of interest to Your Excellency, I would appreciate to learn Your Excellency's views on these suggestions.  I remain at your disposal for eventually developing these ideas further and for assisting you in any other way you may deem appropriate. Sincerely yours, enclosures: copies of 3 fax memos (8/15+18/1990)

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WINDOWS FOR HELPING KUWAIT'S CAUSE
AT IPU PUNTA DEL ESTE MEETING
CORUM, 1 October 1990









The Interparliamentary Union's Punta del Este meeting of October 15-20, 1990, offers 3 distinct avenues for effectively promoting Kuwait's pressing cause: the membership route, the resolution route, and the good offices route.

Each one of these routes may be chosen independently of others, but every one, to differing degrees, requires fine-tuned and well coordinated support from both the outside and the inside of the IPU (Executive Committee, Council, National Groups, Conference, Secretariat).  This memo seeks to identify the legal, political and operational conditions with a view to attain maximum synergetic impact on the IPU decision-making bodies and - through their eventual actions - on related decision-making processes in concerned IPU Member States, favoring

The Membership Route

In June 1990, the Members of the Kuwaiti Legislature were elected.  Prior to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces, the duly elected National Group formally applied for affiliation with the IPU.  The IPU Executive Committee, at its preparatory meeting of October 12/13, will thus have an opportunity to conclude that the conditions laid down in Article 3 of the IPU Statutes are fulfilled, thus clearing the way for the IPU Council to welcome the Kuwait National Group first thing in its deliberations.  Indeed, the relevant paragraph reads as follows:

Even from a strict, legalistic point of view, there can be no doubt about the fact that Kuwait's National Group was created by the Kuwaiti Legislature meeting all the stipulated requirements.  The fact that force majeur presently - i.e. after the National Group has been created - prevents this Legislature from functioning in Kuwait proper is, at least as far as the IPU is concerned, legally irrelevant.  The related United Nations Security Council resolutions have made the invasion of Kuwait legally void of any contrary consequences.  Moreover, according to recognized principles of international law, Kuwait still physically possesses Kuwaiti diplomatic territory in several parts of the world and its still functioning Legislature is free to exercise its functions on any one of these territories.

Under these circumstances, the Kuwait National Group should be allowed to exercise any and all of its IPU membership rights from the first day in Punta del Este.  Although it now appears to be highly improbable that effective resistance to such a result could be mounted in either the Executive Committee or the Council, a contingency motion, to be introduced - if need be - preferably by a Member of the Executive Committee, should be prepared for including in the Punta del Este agenda an emergency supplementary item under Article 15 of the IPU Statutes.  This item could read as follows:

The Resolution Route

The various supplementary items so far proposed by different National Groups (CONF/84/2-P.2-5) provide mostly for a condemnation of Iraq's agression against Kuwait and aim at strengthening related United Nations Security Council resolutions.  Only Egypt's text goes beyond the surface of actual problems in that it calls for a transformation of the Middle East into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.  It appears indicated to prepare draft resolutions which have a chance of effectively promoting a negotiated, lasting conflict resolution.  One such text may be:

The Good Offices Route

The terms of reference of existing IPU Committees regularly provide for the preparation of "reports and draft resolutions".  These traditional work instruments, naturally, continue to be indispensable for the successful pursuit of the IPU's aim which, as stated in Article 2 of its Statutes, is

     to "work for peace and co-operation among peoples and for the firm establishment of representative institutions."

Yet, in our time of international state terrorism, of dangerously growing social and economic gradients between even neighbouring peoples, lawmakers everywhere may want to query themselves more thoroughly and urgently than ever as to their proper rôle in this upside-down world where they seem to be condemmed to helplessly watch the civilization train which they have been working on to be derailed by madmen in and out of office.

In our time the information saturation is such that - sophisticated communication equipments notwithstanding - effective communication of relevant information is increasingly rare, with most of our leaders being prevented from thinking much beyond the moment.  More and more our leaders are dependent on less and less properly functioning information screeners, giving rise to essentially uncontrollable, orwellian bureaucracies and expertocracies.  Not surprisingly, their rôle of figure heads comes to light in ever more documents which they have signed on the dotted line all right, but which they couldn't possibly have fully read, much less really studied. In these times, it seems appropriate to reassess the basic contracts between the citizens and their state, i.e. between the world's only genuine sovereigns and their representatives on the national and the international level.

In this light, the lawmaker's rôle everywhere cannot responsibly be confined essentially to drafting principles, enacting rules and letting the world take its course, whatever the direction and foreseeable consequences.  As direct representative of citizens - which, it may be repeated, are any state's only real sovereigns - isn't he or she more and more called upon to check whether the state ship's direction and the foreseeable consequences of this or that policy remain in line with the principles enacted?  And couldn't some clear-sighted lawmakers also play a useful rôle for identifying possible conflict exit routes obscured by the propaganda fog, and for obtaining prompt and fair indemnisation of all the foreigners who became innocent victims of ill-considered policies which led to such human tragedies as presently witnessed in the Middle East?

In times past, when leaders of the political executive and the military had driven their societies into ruin and shambles, it used to be for surviving parliamentarians to grab the white flag, pick up the pieces and - in consultation and cooperation with their colleagues from the other side - provide for their fellow-citizens to get out of the quagmire back onto solid ground for rebuilding society. In the actual circumstances, why should lawmakers wait until desaster has struck again?  Why not consider a more active, a collision-preventing rôle?  E.g. by developing among themselves within the IPU the time-honored facility of good offices.  Which would not be simply another paper-producing committee.  Rather, it would be an ad hoc composed fire brigade of particularly competent and suitable lawmakers and outside experts. Leaving official communications to whom they may concern, these mostly few non-involved brainstormers could avail themselves notably of the IPU Secretariat's communication facilities.  Thus, in the shadow of the public limelight, they would take contact with colleagues in conflicting camps.  They would try to digest and turn the relevant information into possibly helpful ideas which, once both sides agreed, could then be left to the official diplomats and administrators to be put into practice.

With the existing committees being all governed by rules based explicitly on Article 22f of the Statutes (they are all designed for traditional committee paper work), the Council may use its statutory powers (Article 22g) to set up a Permanent Special Committee for Good Offices.  To this effect, a Member of the Executive Committee might want to exercise his or her prerogatives (Rule 7.2) and promptly introduce a corresponding supplementary item on the agenda of the Executive Committee, which might read as follows:

CORUM, POB 2580, 1211 Geneva 2
fax: (41)22-7338671
 
 

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J.A.KELLER
Parliamentary Adviser
box 2580 1211 Genève 2
(41)22-7346011 (ext.3596)
fax: (41)22-7338671, 217970
privat t+fax: (33)-450322842 re: KUWAIT - Presently Not Eligible for IPU Membership?

Dear Sir,

At the IPU - despite UN Security Council resolutions, international law, etc. -Iraq has succeeded to get its territorial ambitions, its blatant annexation of Kuwait, effectively honored: being physically driven from its national territory, the Kuwait Legislature is held to meet no longer the IPU Membership requirements, as laid out in article 3 of the IPU Statutes.  The enclosed memo shows why this position, reportedly taken by the IPU Secretariat, is legally untenable.  I thus recommend you to consider ways and means to promptly and effectively address this and related issues, to which effect I have drawn up some concrete measures that might be taken at the IPU meeting in Punta del Este.

In view of recent Gulf developments on the public political front, you may also want to know more about the Islamic or Arab solution that Western leaders, too have now begun to talk about publicly.  One such proposal - developed by Arab businessmen, lawyers and historians familiar with the non-arab cultures and interests - has in fact been circulated, on behalf of Swiss parliamentarians' good offices, among key arab and non-arab leaders since September 4, i.e. prior to the Bush-Gorbachev meeting in Helsinki.  I take pleasure inviting you to study the enclosed outline (which is also available, upon request, in a French translation and in the original Arabic version) in order to see for yourself if such a crisis resolution formula would be compatible with the interests you, as a lawmaker, are concerned about.

I'd appreciate your circulating the enclosed texts to interested colleagues of yours, notably to those planning to participate at the IPU conference in Punta del Este.  Those wishing to associate themselves in an appropriate way with the corresponding efforts might want to consider developing, introducing and getting adopted - be it at the home front and/or at the IPU conference - resolutions such as the one suggested on page two of the enclosed Kuwait memo.

While looking forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience, I shall be glad to attend to your eventual questions and remain, sincerely yours,

J.A.Keller

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(draft A)
No: 33/B/1-307-J1

10 October 1990

The Secretary General
Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva

Dear Sir,

I am pleased to confirm the Kuwait National Council's desire to become a Member of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.  Reflecting corresponding Council decisions, I have, with my letter of July 19, 1990, solicited your benevolent guidance as to the right procedure to be followed.  After the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi troops, you kindly provided the requested information by way of the good offices of the Kuwait Mission in Geneva.  I understand that in the view of some members of the IPU Secretariat the Kuwait delegation to the IPU Conference in Punta del Este would be welcome, but only as part of the public; for statutory reasons, under present conditions, it could not become a Member.  I may thus be permitted to point out the following.

The above-outlined position, if upheld by the IPU's governing bodies, would make the IPU the first and only international organization to honor Iraq's aggression of Kuwait.  In contrast, the UN Security Council resolutions provide for this aggression to be nul and void in international law.  Thus, present circumstances have indeed made it indicated to concentrate more on the substance than on the form, and to accelerate the Kuwait membership application as much as possible.  To this effect I may refer you particularly to the essential elements I outlined to you already in my pre-invasion letter of July 19, i.e. the legal background of the Kuwait National Council, its composition, the fact that it has been sitting since July 9, 1990, and the fact that it has resolved to seek to assume "its role on the regional and international level as a representative institution".

The Council's duly elected President, H.E. Abdul Aziz Fahed Al-Masaeed, its Deputy-President, Mr. Rashid Awad Al-Jwaisri, and its undersigning Secretary General represent the Kuwait National Council ex officio in all parliamentary bodies abroad, unless decided otherwise.  As of now, no contrary decision has been taken, except that for the imminent IPU Conference - due to the Council's extraordinary session in Jeddah which overlaps the IPU Conference - another duly elected Member of the Kuwait National Council and designated Member of the IPU Kuwait National Group, Mr. ........................., will represent the Kuwaiti Legislature at the IPU Conference in Punta del Este.  He will be assisted by special advisers.

Accordingly, I invite you to extend to our delegation the courtesies normally accorded to representatives of other national legislatures.  Should this application for IPU membership in any way fall short of the statutory rigors, I beg you to take into consideration the exceptional circumstances which, for the time being, have affected us physically but not legally.  The considerations thus requested are those which most likely would have prevailed (if they hadn't been codified) if such circumstances would have been foreseen by the authors of the IPU Statutes and the bylaws.  Meanwhile, I wish the IPU further success and you all good health and personal wellbeing.

Yours Sincerely,

Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Askari
Secretary General of
Kuwait National Council
 
 

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(draft B)
No: 33/B/1-307-J1

10 October 1990

The Secretary General
Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva

Dear Sir,

  I have the honor to submit herewith the Kuwait National Council's application for membership in the Interparliamentary Union.  To this effect I may refer you particularly to the essential elements I outlined to you already in my pre-invasion letter of July 19, 1990, i.e.

-  the legal background of the Kuwait National Council and its composition,

-  the fact that it has been sitting since July 9, 1990, and

-  the fact that it has resolved to seek to assume "its role on the regional and international level as a representative institution".

  The Council's duly elected President, H.E. Abdul Aziz Fahed Al-Masaeed, its Deputy-President, Mr. Rashid Awad Al-Jwaisri, and its undersigning Secretary General represent the Kuwait National Council ex officio in all parliamentary bodies abroad, unless decided otherwise.  Due to the actual situation and the Council's extraordinary session in Jeddah - which overlaps the IPU Conference - we hope to receive word - by way of the good offices of the Kuwait Mission in Geneva (fax: 4122-7337848) - of your decision on our membership application in time for some duly elected Members of the Kuwait National Council and Members of the IPU Kuwait National Group to eventually make it to Punta del Este.

  Should this application for IPU membership, in any way, fall short of the statutory rigors, I beg you to take into consideration the exceptional circumstances which, for the time being, have affected us physically but not legally.  The considerations thus requested are those which most likely would have prevailed (if they hadn't been codified) if such circumstances would have been foreseen by the authors of the IPU Statutes and the bylaws.

  I take this opportunity to express our gratitude for your benevolent consideration of our membership application. Meanwhile, I wish the IPU further success and you all good health and personal wellbeing.

Yours Sincerely,

Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Askari
Secretary General of
Kuwait National Council
 
 

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J.A.KELLER
Parliamentary Adviser
box 2580 1211 Genève 2
(41)22-7346011 (ext.3596)
via fax: 022-7330326 private t+fax: (33)50592228

December 21, 1990

re: Good Offices; Safeguarding Archeological Treasures of Iraq

Dear Dr. Alkadi,

Please find enclosed the list of European and other lawmakers through whose good offices the Mecca Confederation plan was brought to the attention of interested colleagues in their respective Parliaments.

Some of the ideas thus developed for a peaceful and lasting resolution of the Gulf conflict appear to have drawn the interest of the Iraqi Government and of others:

As these and other best efforts for a prompt solution of the Gulf conflict may yet fail to obtain the indispensable additional support from the Iraqi leadership, in particular, the dangers involved in increased hostilities for the irreplacable cultural treasures of Iraq have caught my attention.  I, for one, fully appreciate the Iraqi Authorities' concern for effectively safeguarding these treasures.  Like the Dead Sea scrolls, some of them may yet significantly contribute to a better understanding of the real roots of our religions - and thus help to build the solid fundament for more harmonious relations among the People of the Middle East in particular.

Of course, the Government of Iraq may yet want to seek - through prompt ratification - and obtain the special protection provided for in art.16 of the Second Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  But even then there may still remain an inadmissably high risk of destruction to key pieces of mankind's heritage.  To be sure, military planners and politicians in general cannot be expected to let hostages - be they human beings or ancient stones - stand in the way of what they see as their prime mission.  Thus - as was finally and commendably the case with the foreigners previously held back against their will - the Iraqi leadership may recognize its interests to be really served and its responsibilities to be really met only if it strictly adheres to and makes full use of the respective treaties and good offices.

To wit, the United Nations could be asked to provide for the physical safeguarding, in Geneva, of some particularly valuable archeological finds (e.g. ancient library parts) for the duration of enhanced risks - analoguous to the Spanish Government's 1939 use of the League of Nations' safeguarding facilities.  Such a step might not only be of interest in cultural terms, but might also contribute indirectly, yet significantly, to the increasingly pressing search for a peaceful conflict resolution in the above sense.

Trusting this to be helpful, I remain, sincerely yours,

J.A.Keller
 

Annex

PARLIAMENTARIANS CONTACTED CONCERNING THE MECCA CONFEDERATION PLAN

AUSTRALIA                Leo MCLEAY
AUSTRIA                     Rudolf PÖDER
BELGIUM                    Ch. Cornet d'ELZIUS
BULGARIA                  Peter VOUTOV
CANADA                     Joan B.NEIMAN
CYPRUS                      Dr. Vassos LYSSARIDES
CZECHOSLOVAKIA Valtr KOMAREK
DENMARK                  Ivar NOERGAARD
EGYPTE                       Dr.Ibrahim M. KAMEL; Dr.Leila TAKLA
FRANCE                      Yves TAVERNIER
FINLAND                    Ritva LAURILA
GERMANY                  Rita SÜSSMUTH
GREECE                       Athanassios TSALDARIS
GUATEMALA              Marina Molina RUBIO
HUNGARY                   Dr.György Lehel PAPP
ICELAND                     Geir H.HAARDE
IRELAND                     Sean TREACY
ISRAEL                         Dov. SHILANSKI
ITALY                           Claudio VITALONE
JAPAN                          Shintaro ISHIHARA; Yoshio SAKURAUCHI
LUXEMBOURG           Erne HONNICOT-SCHOEPGES
MALTA                        Lawrence GONZI
NETHERLANDS          Jan Kees WIEBENGA
NEW ZEALAND          Kerry BURKE
NICARAGUA               Myriam Arguello MORALES
NORWAY                    Sigurd HOLEMARK
POLAND                     Janusz ONYSZKIEWICZ
PORTUGAL                 Mario J.MONTALVAO MACHADO
SPAIN                          Miguel Angel MARTINEZ
SAN MARINO            Alvaro SELVA
SWEDEN                     Sture ERICSON
SWITZERLAND          Josi MEIER
THAILAND                 Suwit KHUNKITTI
TURKEY                     H.Barlas DOGU
U.A.E.                          Hilal bin Ahmed LOOTAH
UNITED KINGDOM   Michael MARSHALL
UNITED STATES        Terry SANFORD
U.S.S.R.                      Svetlana SAVITSKAYA
VENEZUELA              Jos‚ Rodriguez ITURBE
YOUGOSLAVIA        Miran MEJAK
 
 

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PARLIAMENTARIANS ASSOCIATED WITH AN EFFORT
TO RESOLVE THE GULF CONFLICT PEACEFULLY
(9th up-dated list of 8 February 1991; corr.1)

     On 15 January 1991, CORUM invited some 60 senior lawmakers from 40 mostly European countries to consider co-sponsoring the LAWMAKER'S PLEDGE which has been designed to complement and facilitate the execution of IRAQ's PLEDGE as a pathway for a principled, prompt and peaceful resolution of the Gulf conflict.  These pledges have been developed by CORUM in consultation with representatives of the parties to the conflict.  Due to the extraordinary circumstances the method of negative approval - i.e. approval by non-opposition - was chosen and a first edition of this list was established 23 January of those who had not, until the set deadline, unreservedly objected to being associated with this PLEDGE.  On 23 January, all initial addressees were again informed by fax of the efforts under way, together with an amendment offered by Egypt's Dr. Takla proposing the PLEDGE to be adapted and used for urgently promoting

     To date, some 20 invited lawmakers have expressed reservations on this back-to-back commitment which, while avoiding a formal link, addresses some basic regional issues which would in any case have to be tackled.  Until contrary notification will have been received (fax: 4122-217970) their names will remain deleted from the list of lawmakers who support this PLEDGE either tacitly or explictly: ____________

1.  Since mid-August 1990, some 10 senior Swiss lawmakers have participated in the development and promotion of good offices contributions essentially focused on the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and aimed at a lasting resolution of the Gulf conflict and its root causes. After Iraq will have honored its international obligations concerning Kuwait, they are pledged, if desired, to avail themselves for hosting appropriate meetings in Switzerland, including one concerning the proposed Middle Eastern or Mecca Confederation, and support other initiatives in line with the LAWMAKERS' PLEDGE.
 
 

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