cia prisons (9.11.05, update 1.12.07)

Eingereicht von Banga Boris
Einreichungsdatum 17.06.2005
Eingereicht im Nationalrat
Stand der Beratung Erledigt

Eingereichter Text
Mit an Sicherheit grenzender Wahrscheinlichkeit ist nach heutigem Kenntnisstand davon auszugehen, dass die USA, d. h. die CIA, eventuell das FBI und andere Dienste, zivile Luftfahrzeuge für "renditions" (zur Folterung nach Syrien, Ägypten, Jordanien, Marokko) und für Entführungen von Terrorismusverdächtigen (zumindest drei Fälle in Schweden und Italien bzw. Deutschland) verwendet haben und verwenden. Nach den Genfer Konventionen und nach dem Uno Pakt II über die bürgerlichen und politischen Rechte gilt nicht nur das Non-Refoulement-Prinzip, sondern auch das absolute Folterverbot.
Dabei ist auch unser Land betroffen. Sowohl die dazu verwendete Boeing 737 (Business Jet) als auch eine Gulfstream überflogen nicht nur häufig den schweizerischen Luftraum, sondern landeten auch mehrmals in Genf.
Die Boeing 737 ist registriert unter einer privaten Firma und hat ihre Immatrikulation bereits mehrfach gewechselt. Auch die Gulfstream wechselt laufend ihre Immatrikulation und gilt aktuell als Firmenflugzeug der Firma Sikorsky. Beide Flugzeuge sind nicht "Standard" und weisen keinerlei Beschriftungen auf. Hingegen besitzen sie spezielle Einstiegsleitern (Unabhängigkeit von der Bodenorganisation) und besondere Antennen für Satcom.
1. Hat der Bundesrat Kenntnis von diesen Überflügen und Landungen in der Schweiz und wie hat er reagiert?
2. Ist der Bundesrat bereit, bei verdächtigen Flugzeugen (sie gelten nach der Landung auf dem Abstellplatz als exterritorial) die einzig möglichen Kontrollen (Zoll und Bordbuch) lückenlos durchführen zu lassen?
3. Ist der Bundesrat bereit, die USA in unmissverständlicher Form zur Einhaltung insbesondere der Genfer Konventionen anzuhalten?

Antwort des Bundesrates vom 23.09.2005
1. Der Bundesrat hat von diesen Flügen aus der Presse erfahren. In der Zwischenzeit getroffene Abklärungen haben ergeben, dass die in der Anfrage beschriebenen und in der Presse mit Immatrikulation genannten Flugzeuge am 24. Dezember 2003 sowie am 25. Januar und am 15. April 2004 in Genf gelandet und anschliessend nach Washington weitergeflogen sind. Die Bewegungen im Luftverkehr von und nach der Schweiz können bei Vorliegen konkreter Hinweise auf staatsschutzrelevante Vorgänge vom Dienst für Analyse und Prävention des Eidgenössischen Justiz- und Polizeidepartementes überprüft oder bei Vorliegen von konkreten strafrechtlichen Verdachtsmomenten von den zuständigen Strafverfolgungsbehörden bearbeitet werden, doch handelt es sich dabei nicht um systematische Überprüfungen aller Flugvorgänge. Dies ist auch nicht möglich, weil täglich hunderte von Flügen von und nach der Schweiz zu verzeichnen sind. Für die beiden erwähnten Flüge aus den Jahren 2003 und 2004 lagen zum Zeitpunkt der Landung in der Schweiz keine Verdachtsmomente vor, die eine eingehendere Überprüfung hätten erforderlich erscheinen lassen.
Auch die nachträglichen Abklärungen ergaben keinerlei Hinweise, dass die genannten Flüge in die Schweiz rechtswidrigen Zwecken gedient hätten, namentlich dem unfreiwilligen Transport von Personen durch die Schweiz oder der unfreiwilligen Verbringung von Personen aus der Schweiz.
2. In der Schweiz gelandete ausländische Luftfahrzeuge unterstehen uneingeschränkt dem Schweizer Recht. Sie gelten nicht als exterritorial. Die Zollgesetzgebung regelt abschliessend, welchen Kontrollen in der Schweiz landende und ab der Schweiz abfliegende Luftfahrzeuge unterstehen. Sind solche Kontrollen nach Zollrecht zwingend vorgeschrieben, werden sie entsprechend auch lückenlos durchgeführt. Es handelt sich hierbei beispielsweise um die Kontrolle des Ladungsmanifestes und, soweit Personen gewerbsmässig befördert werden, des Reisendenverzeichnisses. Nach dem Auslad wird das Luftfahrzeug zudem durch einen Zollbeamten besichtigt, wobei ihm auf Verlangen sämtliche Räume, Schränke und Behältnisse zu öffnen sind, die für die Vornahme der Besichtigung erforderlich sind. Bei Verdachtsmomenten haben die Zollbehörden weiter jederzeit die Möglichkeit, Kontrollen durchzuführen. Diese Verdachtsmomente beschränken sich aber in der Regel auf die mögliche Verletzung von Zollvorschriften. Technische Kontrollen an ausländischen Luftfahrzeugen können gemäss den Vorgaben der europäischen Zivilluftfahrtorganisation im Rahmen des Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft durch das Bazl durchgeführt werden. Die Kontrollen hierbei beschränken sich aber auf rein technische Aspekte wie z. B. Pilotenlizenzen, im Cockpit mitzuführende Dokumente, die Sicherheitsausrüstung in Cockpit und Kabine sowie den allgemeinen Zustand des Luftfahrzeuges.
3. Die Schweiz hat mehrmals sowohl auf multilateraler wie auch auf bilateraler Ebene die grundlegende Bedeutung des Folterverbotes als zwingende Bestimmung des Völkerrechtes in Erinnerung gerufen. Weiter haben Bundesrätin Micheline Calmy-Rey und Staatssekretär Ambühl anlässlich ihrer Besuche in Washington im Juni 2005 den amerikanischen Behörden ein Memorandum übergeben, in welchem darauf hingewiesen wird, dass die Überführung von Personen in Länder, in denen sie riskieren, gefoltert zu werden, gegen das Folterverbot und das ebenfalls völkergewohnheitsrechtliche Non-Refoulement-Prinzip verstösst. Nachdem in den Medien entsprechende Berichte erschienen sind, hat das EDA die Botschaft der USA in Bern um Klärung ersucht. Das EDA hat die Daten und die Immatrikulationen der Botschaft übermittelt und festgehalten, dass, sollten sich diese Angaben bestätigen, die Schweiz diese Praxis verurteilen und von den USA die Einstellung dieser Flüge verlangen würde. Der Vertreter der USA teilte mit, er werde die Anfrage weiterleiten und den Behörden in Washington die Bedenken der Schweiz zur Kenntnis bringen. Die Schweiz wird eine offizielle Antwort erhalten.

The CIA has been hiding and interrogating some of its most important al Qaeda captives at a Soviet-era compound in Eastern Europe, according to U.S. and foreign officials familiar with the arrangement.

The secret facility is part of a covert prison system set up by the CIA nearly four years ago that at various times has included sites in eight countries, including Thailand, Afghanistan and several democracies in Eastern Europe, as well as a small center at the Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba, according to current and former intelligence officials and diplomats from three continents.

In Afghanistan, the largest CIA covert prison was code-named the Salt Pit, at center left above. (Space Imaging Middle East)

The hidden global internment network is a central element in the CIA's unconventional war on terrorism. It depends on the cooperation of foreign intelligence services, and on keeping even basic information about the system secret from the public, foreign officials and nearly all members of Congress charged with overseeing the CIA's covert actions.

The existence and locations of the facilities -- referred to as "black sites" in classified White House, CIA, Justice Department and congressional documents -- are known to only a handful of officials in the United States and, usually, only to the president and a few top intelligence officers in each host country.

The CIA and the White House, citing national security concerns and the value of the program, have dissuaded Congress from demanding that the agency answer questions in open testimony about the conditions under which captives are held. Virtually nothing is known about who is kept in the facilities, what interrogation methods are employed with them, or how decisions are made about whether they should be detained or for how long.

While the Defense Department has produced volumes of public reports and testimony about its detention practices and rules after the abuse scandals at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison and at Guantanamo Bay, the CIA has not even acknowledged the existence of its black sites. To do so, say officials familiar with the program, could open the U.S. government to legal challenges, particularly in foreign courts, and increase the risk of political condemnation at home and abroad.

But the revelations of widespread prisoner abuse in Afghanistan and Iraq by the U.S. military -- which operates under published rules and transparent oversight of Congress -- have increased concern among lawmakers, foreign governments and human rights groups about the opaque CIA system. Those concerns escalated last month, when Vice President Cheney and CIA Director Porter J. Goss asked Congress to exempt CIA employees from legislation already endorsed by 90 senators that would bar cruel and degrading treatment of any prisoner in U.S. custody.

Although the CIA will not acknowledge details of its system, intelligence officials defend the agency's approach, arguing that the successful defense of the country requires that the agency be empowered to hold and interrogate suspected terrorists for as long as necessary and without restrictions imposed by the U.S. legal system or even by the military tribunals established for prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay.

The Washington Post is not publishing the names of the Eastern European countries involved in the covert program, at the request of senior U.S. officials. They argued that the disclosure might disrupt counterterrorism efforts in those countries and elsewhere and could make them targets of possible terrorist retaliation.

The secret detention system was conceived in the chaotic and anxious first months after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, when the working assumption was that a second strike was imminent.

Since then, the arrangement has been increasingly debated within the CIA, where considerable concern lingers about the legality, morality and practicality of holding even unrepentant terrorists in such isolation and secrecy, perhaps for the duration of their lives. Mid-level and senior CIA officers began arguing two years ago that the system was unsustainable and diverted the agency from its unique espionage mission.

"We never sat down, as far as I know, and came up with a grand strategy," said one former senior intelligence officer who is familiar with the program but not the location of the prisons. "Everything was very reactive. That's how you get to a situation where you pick people up, send them into a netherworld and don't say, 'What are we going to do with them afterwards?' "

It is illegal for the government to hold prisoners in such isolation in secret prisons in the United States, which is why the CIA placed them overseas, according to several former and current intelligence officials and other U.S. government officials. Legal experts and intelligence officials said that the CIA's internment practices also would be considered illegal under the laws of several host countries, where detainees have rights to have a lawyer or to mount a defense against allegations of wrongdoing.

Host countries have signed the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as has the United States. Yet CIA interrogators in the overseas sites are permitted to use the CIA's approved "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques," some of which are prohibited by the U.N. convention and by U.S. military law. They include tactics such as "waterboarding," in which a prisoner is made to believe he or she is drowning.

Some detainees apprehended by the CIA and transferred to foreign intelligence agencies have alleged after their release that they were tortured, although it is unclear whether CIA personnel played a role in the alleged abuse. Given the secrecy surrounding CIA detentions, such accusations have heightened concerns among foreign governments and human rights groups about CIA detention and interrogation practices.

The contours of the CIA's detention program have emerged in bits and pieces over the past two years. Parliaments in Canada, Italy, France, Sweden and the Netherlands have opened inquiries into alleged CIA operations that secretly captured their citizens or legal residents and transferred them to the agency's prisons.

More than 100 suspected terrorists have been sent by the CIA into the covert system, according to current and former U.S. intelligence officials and foreign sources. This figure, a rough estimate based on information from sources who said their knowledge of the numbers was incomplete, does not include prisoners picked up in Iraq.

About 30 are considered major terrorism suspects and have been held under the highest level of secrecy at black sites financed by the CIA and managed by agency personnel, including those in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, according to current and former intelligence officers and two other U.S. government officials. Two locations in this category -- in Thailand and on the grounds of the military prison at Guantanamo Bay -- were closed in 2003 and 2004, respectively.

A second tier -- which these sources believe includes more than 70 detainees -- is a group considered less important, with less direct involvement in terrorism and having limited intelligence value. These prisoners, some of whom were originally taken to black sites, are delivered to intelligence services in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Afghanistan and other countries, a process sometimes known as "rendition." While the first-tier black sites are run by CIA officers, the jails in these countries are operated by the host nations, with CIA financial assistance and, sometimes, direction.

Morocco, Egypt and Jordan have said that they do not torture detainees, although years of State Department human rights reports accuse all three of chronic prisoner abuse.

The top 30 al Qaeda prisoners exist in complete isolation from the outside world. Kept in dark, sometimes underground cells, they have no recognized legal rights, and no one outside the CIA is allowed to talk with or even see them, or to otherwise verify their well-being, said current and former and U.S. and foreign government and intelligence officials.

Most of the facilities were built and are maintained with congressionally appropriated funds, but the White House has refused to allow the CIA to brief anyone except the House and Senate intelligence committees' chairmen and vice chairmen on the program's generalities.

The Eastern European countries that the CIA has persuaded to hide al Qaeda captives are democracies that have embraced the rule of law and individual rights after decades of Soviet domination. Each has been trying to cleanse its intelligence services of operatives who have worked on behalf of others -- mainly Russia and organized crime.

The idea of holding terrorists outside the U.S. legal system was not under consideration before Sept. 11, 2001, not even for Osama bin Laden, according to former government officials. The plan was to bring bin Laden and his top associates into the U.S. justice system for trial or to send them to foreign countries where they would be tried.

"The issue of detaining and interrogating people was never, ever discussed," said a former senior intelligence officer who worked in the CIA's Counterterrorist Center, or CTC, during that period. "It was against the culture and they believed information was best gleaned by other means."

On the day of the attacks, the CIA already had a list of what it called High-Value Targets from the al Qaeda structure, and as the World Trade Center and Pentagon attack plots were unraveled, more names were added to the list. The question of what to do with these people surfaced quickly.

The CTC's chief of operations argued for creating hit teams of case officers and CIA paramilitaries that would covertly infiltrate countries in the Middle East, Africa and even Europe to assassinate people on the list, one by one.

But many CIA officers believed that the al Qaeda leaders would be worth keeping alive to interrogate about their network and other plots. Some officers worried that the CIA would not be very adept at assassination.

The agency set up prisons under its covert action authority. Under U.S. law, only the president can authorize a covert action, by signing a document called a presidential finding. Findings must not break U.S. law and are reviewed and approved by CIA, Justice Department and White House legal advisers.

Six days after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush signed a sweeping finding that gave the CIA broad authorization to disrupt terrorist activity, including permission to kill, capture and detain members of al Qaeda anywhere in the world.

It could not be determined whether Bush approved a separate finding for the black-sites program, but the consensus among current and former intelligence and other government officials interviewed for this article is that he did not have to.

Rather, they believe that the CIA general counsel's office acted within the parameters of the Sept. 17 finding. The black-site program was approved by a small circle of White House and Justice Department lawyers and officials, according to several former and current U.S. government and intelligence officials.

Among the first steps was to figure out where the CIA could secretly hold the captives. One early idea was to keep them on ships in international waters, but that was discarded for security and logistics reasons.

CIA officers also searched for a setting like Alcatraz Island. They considered the virtually unvisited islands in Lake Kariba in Zambia, which were edged with craggy cliffs and covered in woods. But poor sanitary conditions could easily lead to fatal diseases, they decided, and besides, they wondered, could the Zambians be trusted with such a secret?

Still without a long-term solution, the CIA began sending suspects it captured in the first month or so after Sept. 11 to its longtime partners, the intelligence services of Egypt and Jordan.

A month later, the CIA found itself with hundreds of prisoners who were captured on battlefields in Afghanistan. A short-term solution was improvised. The agency shoved its highest-value prisoners into metal shipping containers set up on a corner of the Bagram Air Base, which was surrounded with a triple perimeter of concertina-wire fencing. Most prisoners were left in the hands of the Northern Alliance, U.S.-supported opposition forces who were fighting the Taliban.

"I remember asking: What are we going to do with these people?" said a senior CIA officer. "I kept saying, where's the help? We've got to bring in some help. We can't be jailers -- our job is to find Osama."

Then came grisly reports, in the winter of 2001, that prisoners kept by allied Afghan generals in cargo containers had died of asphyxiation. The CIA asked Congress for, and was quickly granted, tens of millions of dollars to establish a larger, long-term system in Afghanistan, parts of which would be used for CIA prisoners.

The largest CIA prison in Afghanistan was code-named the Salt Pit. It was also the CIA's substation and was first housed in an old brick factory outside Kabul. In November 2002, an inexperienced CIA case officer allegedly ordered guards to strip naked an uncooperative young detainee, chain him to the concrete floor and leave him there overnight without blankets. He froze to death, according to four U.S. government officials. The CIA officer has not been charged in the death.

The Salt Pit was protected by surveillance cameras and tough Afghan guards, but the road leading to it was not safe to travel and the jail was eventually moved inside Bagram Air Base. It has since been relocated off the base.

By mid-2002, the CIA had worked out secret black-site deals with two countries, including Thailand and one Eastern European nation, current and former officials said. An estimated $100 million was tucked inside the classified annex of the first supplemental Afghanistan appropriation.

Then the CIA captured its first big detainee, in March 28, 2002. Pakistani forces took Abu Zubaida, al Qaeda's operations chief, into custody and the CIA whisked him to the new black site in Thailand, which included underground interrogation cells, said several former and current intelligence officials. Six months later, Sept. 11 planner Ramzi Binalshibh was also captured in Pakistan and flown to Thailand.

But after published reports revealed the existence of the site in June 2003, Thai officials insisted the CIA shut it down, and the two terrorists were moved elsewhere, according to former government officials involved in the matter. Work between the two countries on counterterrorism has been lukewarm ever since.

In late 2002 or early 2003, the CIA brokered deals with other countries to establish black-site prisons. One of these sites -- which sources said they believed to be the CIA's biggest facility now -- became particularly important when the agency realized it would have a growing number of prisoners and a shrinking number of prisons.

Thailand was closed, and sometime in 2004 the CIA decided it had to give up its small site at Guantanamo Bay. The CIA had planned to convert that into a state-of-the-art facility, operated independently of the military. The CIA pulled out when U.S. courts began to exercise greater control over the military detainees, and agency officials feared judges would soon extend the same type of supervision over their detainees.

In hindsight, say some former and current intelligence officials, the CIA's problems were exacerbated by another decision made within the Counterterrorist Center at Langley.

The CIA program's original scope was to hide and interrogate the two dozen or so al Qaeda leaders believed to be directly responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks, or who posed an imminent threat, or had knowledge of the larger al Qaeda network. But as the volume of leads pouring into the CTC from abroad increased, and the capacity of its paramilitary group to seize suspects grew, the CIA began apprehending more people whose intelligence value and links to terrorism were less certain, according to four current and former officials.

The original standard for consigning suspects to the invisible universe was lowered or ignored, they said. "They've got many, many more who don't reach any threshold," one intelligence official said.

Several former and current intelligence officials, as well as several other U.S. government officials with knowledge of the program, express frustration that the White House and the leaders of the intelligence community have not made it a priority to decide whether the secret internment program should continue in its current form, or be replaced by some other approach.

Meanwhile, the debate over the wisdom of the program continues among CIA officers, some of whom also argue that the secrecy surrounding the program is not sustainable. "It's just a horrible burden," said the intelligence official.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 - A classified report issued last year by the Central Intelligence Agency's inspector general warned that interrogation procedures approved by the C.I.A. after the Sept. 11 attacks might violate some provisions of the international Convention Against Torture, current and former intelligence officials say.

The previously undisclosed findings from the report, which was completed in the spring of 2004, reflected deep unease within the C.I.A. about the interrogation procedures, the officials said. A list of 10 techniques authorized early in 2002 for use against terror suspects included one known as waterboarding, and went well beyond those authorized by the military for use on prisoners of war.

The convention, which was drafted by the United Nations, bans torture, which is defined as the infliction of "severe" physical or mental pain or suffering, and prohibits lesser abuses that fall short of torture if they are "cruel, inhuman or degrading." The United States is a signatory, but with some reservations set when it was ratified by the Senate in 1994.

The report, by John L. Helgerson, the C.I.A.'s inspector general, did not conclude that the techniques constituted torture, which is also prohibited under American law, the officials said. But Mr. Helgerson did find, the officials said, that the techniques appeared to constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment under the convention.

The agency said in a written statement in March that "all approved interrogation techniques, both past and present, are lawful and do not constitute torture." It reaffirmed that statement on Tuesday, but would not comment on any classified report issued by Mr. Helgerson. The statement in March did not specifically address techniques that could be labeled cruel, inhuman or degrading, and which are not explicitly prohibited in American law.

The officials who described the report said it discussed particular techniques used by the C.I.A. against particular prisoners, including about three dozen terror suspects being held by the agency in secret locations around the world. They said it referred in particular to the treatment of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is said to have organized the Sept. 11 attacks and who has been detained in a secret location by the C.I.A. since he was captured in March 2003. Mr. Mohammed is among those believed to have been subjected to waterboarding, in which a prisoner is strapped to a board and made to believe that he is drowning.

In his report, Mr. Helgerson also raised concern about whether the use of the techniques could expose agency officers to legal liability, the officials said. They said the report expressed skepticism about the Bush administration view that any ban on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment under the treaty does not apply to C.I.A. interrogations because they take place overseas on people who are not citizens of the United States.

The current and former intelligence officials who described Mr. Helgerson's report include supporters and critics of his findings. None would agree to be identified by name, and none would describe his conclusions in specific detail. They said the report had included 10 recommendations for changes in the agency's handling of terror suspects, but they would not say what those recommendations were.

Porter J. Goss, the C.I.A. director, testified this year that eight of the report's recommendations had been accepted, but did not describe them. The inspector general is an independent official whose auditing role at the agency was established by Congress, but whose reports to the agency's director are not binding.

Some former intelligence officials said the inspector general's findings had been vigorously disputed by the agency's general counsel. To date, the Justice Department has brought charges against only one C.I.A. employee in connection with prisoner abuse, and prosecutors have signaled that they are unlikely to bring charges against C.I.A. officers in several other cases involving the mishandling of prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But the current and former intelligence officials said Mr. Helgerson's report had added to apprehensions within the agency about gray areas in the rules surrounding interrogation procedures.

"The ambiguity in the law must cause nightmares for intelligence officers who are engaged in aggressive interrogations of Al Qaeda suspects and other terrorism suspects," said John Radsan, a former assistant general counsel at the agency who left in 2004. Mr. Radsan, now an associate professor at William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul, would not comment on Mr. Helgerson's report.

Congressional officials said the report had emerged as an unstated backdrop in the debate now under way on Capitol Hill over whether the C.I.A. should be subjected to the same strict rules on interrogation that the military is required to follow. In opposing an amendment sponsored by Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, Mr. Goss and Vice President Dick Cheney have argued that the C.I.A. should be granted an exemption allowing it extra latitude, subject to presidential authorization, in interrogating high-level terrorists abroad who might have knowledge about future attacks.

The issue of the agency's treatment of detainees arose shortly after the attacks of Sept. 11, after C.I.A. officers became involved in interrogating prisoners caught in Afghanistan, and the agency sought legal guidance on how far its employees and contractors could go in interrogating terror suspects, current and former intelligence officials said.

The list of 10 techniques, including feigned drowning, was secretly drawn up in early 2002 by a team that included senior C.I.A. officials who solicited recommendations from foreign governments and from agency psychologists, the officials said. They said officials from the Justice Department and the National Security Council, which is part of the White House, were involved in the process.

Among the few known documents that address interrogation procedures and that have been made public is an August 2002 legal opinion by the Justice Department, which said that interrogation methods just short of those that might cause pain comparable to "organ failure, impairment of bodily function or even death" could be allowable without being considered torture. The administration disavowed that classified legal opinion in the summer of 2004 after it was publicly disclosed.

A new opinion made public in December 2004 and, signed by James B. Comey, then the deputy attorney general, explicitly rejected torture and adopted more restrictive standards to define it. But a cryptic footnote to the new document about the "treatment of detainees" referred to what the officials said were other still-classified opinions. Officials have said that the footnote meant that coercive techniques approved by the Justice Department under the looser interpretation of the torture statutes were still lawful even under the new, more restrictive standards.

It remains unclear whether all 10 of the so-called enhanced procedures approved in early 2002 remain authorized for use by the C.I.A. In an unclassified report this summer, the Senate Intelligence Committee referred briefly to Mr. Helgerson's report and said that the agency had fully put in effect only 5 of his 10 recommendations. But in testimony before Congress in February Mr. Goss said that eight had.

Some former intelligence officials have said the C.I.A. imposed tighter safeguards on its interrogation procedures after the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison came to light in May 2004. That was about the same time Mr. Helgerson completed his report.

The agency issued its earlier statement on the legality of approved interrogation techniques after Mr. Goss, in testimony before Congress on March 17, said that all interrogation techniques used "at this time" were legal but declined, when asked, to make the same broad assertion about practices used over the past few years.

On March 18, Jennifer Millerwise Dyck, the agency's director of public affairs, said that "C.I.A. policies on interrogation have always followed legal guidance from the Department of Justice."

I know this sounds out there, but I can't shake the feeling they're on a mission to saturate Europe with cocaine. One has to only remember the war waged on Nicarauga and all the exposés which followed proving the CIA was running drugs, not to mention supplying the gangs in South Central Los Angeles with crack. Snakes!

When I first read about this, I felt my inner bs meter shoot up when it was said they were making stopovers to transport terrorist suspects to secret interrogation/torture centers in Eastern Europe and even Gitmo. An airport in Porto? The hub is via Lisboa and south, Algarve, so Faro would make sense. Those weren't the airports named. The base at Lajes has been brought into it, The government in power is coughing and sputtering, the left is demanding a major investigation.

Check any CIA factbook and a lot of other sources which all claim Portugal is the gateway for drugs, especially coke from South America, Afghanistan for heroin and Morocco for hashish. A big report came out recently which revealed cocaine use is at an all time high in Spain and Britain, with Portugal right in there. Portuguese publications have run articles about the decline in heroin use and how the drug of choice now is cocaine and, get this, the users in one article were 13 to 15 years old. This country is awash in drugs and now there's a Columbian connection due to the cocaine. Hey, the junkie rate declines, heroin isn't selling that well, but wow, let's give 'em a taste of cocaine. It has to get here somehow and how better to get it here from Colombia but by the CIA?

Back to those planes. I've been told by too many reputable people and have also believed the CIA are the biggest drug lords on the planet. I found an article from Columbia Tribune about how it was very unlikely the secret prisons exist, which was mostly about the flights, but the part I zeroed in on was at the end:
The Portuguese government said it was consulting with the U.S. government after Diario de Noticias reported Friday that 34 planes that landed in Portugal over the past three years were suspected of involvement in secret CIA operations.
Secret? Hmmm. When this first broke it was 3 planes and the year has changed from 2003 to 2005. Another suspicion-raiser were reports of a huge drug bust, the first on the 22nd of November, the others on the 26th or 27th, depending on where it was read. From Xinhuanet:
LISBON, Nov. 22 (Xinhuanet) --Portugal's Judicial Police (PJ) announced on Tuesday that they seized 6.1 tons of cocaine and arrested seven suspects during a raid on Monday.
Though it's a bit different the players seem to be the same. The first bust report stated,
The cocaine came from Colombia. A Colombian and six Frenchmen were arrested in the raid.
. The later bust as reported by UPI;
LISBON, Portugal, Nov. 26 (UPI) -- Portuguese police have seized more than 7 tons of cocaine and arrested six people, including a Frenchman under investigation in Spain for money laundering.
Both included either 5 to 6 Frencmen and one Colombian. If there were really a second record bust in 6 days, that news would have had the headlines screaming 13 Tons and what do you get? News. This hasn't been news as there was no two and two to put together. Why? It doesn't make sense, and I feel more confused than when I first began writing. I can't see this having anything to do with the CIA planes, unless that other report about the Spanish finding 2 tons of coke destined for the Netherlands plays a part. Link. Hmm. The last report of a CIA plane landing there was a week ago according to the Columbian Tribune.

Stop the GD presses. It sure pays to search in many different ways. After finding the plane that landed in the Netherlands was from a CIA front, "Path Corp" I searched that with CIA. I found a blog, xer-files that has me whistling even though I have a mouthful of crackers. Woootwooot. The first entry was about the Path plane. The entry before is what roped and pulled me in:
November 24, 2005 -- LATE NEWS -- The Frequency Monitoring Centre in the Netherlands is now reporting on yet another CIA prisoner aircraft transiting Schipol East Airport in Amsterdam. The plane departed Schipol on November 18, 2005 enroute to Reykjavik, Iceland. The plane, a DeHavilland Dash 8-315B (registration N505LL) flew to Amsterdam from Sabiha Gökçen Airport in Istanbul, Turkey on November 16, 2005. The plane is registered to Path Corporation, a CIA front company. (Path owns three other aircraft: N120JM (Fairchild.SA227-AT), N212CP (Cessna/208B), and N221SG (Gates Learjet Corp 35A). N505LL was photographed at Chandler Airport in Phoenix on May 18, 2005 and has been seen in Afghanistan on CIA covert missions.
Turkey? Afghanistan? Whoa. Where do the drugs come from? Where are they consumed? What is Amsterdam known for? I don't feel quite as ridiculous as when I first began this wondering if the CIA were transporting drugs, not terrorists. I'm going to stand by this hunch, like I would my man. The feeling is that strong. In the meantime, Portugal plays a major role, even if the players are usually another nationality. I don't understand why the borders and the waters aren't more patrolled, unless...oh yes, they're still doing for the CIA what they've done since the revolution 30-some years ago. Whatever is asked.

Just think about it. Iraq is costing more than the US can afford. All wars have been paid for with drug money, so what makes things different now? The CIA has always been the top dog. What makes that different? Not a damn thing. It will always be business as usual and nothing anyone can come up with to prove what I'm sensing is true, will mean a thing. These agencies all play the same game -- there're no separate teams, in spite of what the news, Hollywood or the White House want you to believe.

There you have it. I feel better having written out what's been stuck inside for over a week now. I could be totally wrong or totally right, but will never know. Hell, they could be transporting both -- terrorist suspects and drugs, a most sick and slick operation that only the CIA can get away with. Snakes.

A bitter debate over torture has erupted in Europe. Washington is believed to have used EU countries as transit points for moving terrorism suspects to clandestine locations where they may have been tortured. The Council of Europe and other organizations are now demanding answers -- from the US and European countries who looked the other way.

Dick Marty, a liberal-minded Swiss citizen with a gray beard, glasses and a high forehead, knows what it's like to face a powerful opponent. As a prosecutor, he once successfully prosecuted the Mafia. His current adversary is just as intimidating and perhaps even more secretive than the Mafia. It's the United States Central Intelligence Agency, which, in an effort to back the White House, has responded to the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks by kidnapping terrorism suspects and presumably abusing them in secret prisons. Now the Council of Europe has hired Marty to find out which European countries may have helped the US agents achieve their objectives.

Last Friday, the Swiss prosecutor made it clear that he has no compunctions about picking a fight with the world's sole remaining superpower. A self-confident Marty filed a request with the European Union's satellite center in Torrejón, Spain for satellite photographs from the past three years. He hopes to use the images to determine whether the alleged secret prisons did in fact exist, in countries like Poland and Romania. He also contacted the European aviation authority, Eurocontrol, asking for data on the flight movements of 31 aircraft suspected of having served as CIA shuttles for the transport of prisoners or abducted terrorism suspects.

Marty's mission touches on a hot-button issue -- and it's the first serious attempt to investigate and expose an arbitrary system Washington has allegedly used as one of its most effective weapons in combating terrorism. The US agents have used torture-like methods that many experts believe violate international law to extract statements from suspected members of al-Qaida. Until now, Washington's European allies have consistently looked the other way when it came to this notorious aspect of the worldwide counterterrorism effort.

A regular CIA gulag appears to have been created in recent years, with many prisoners kept in Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and various central Asian nations, places where the CIA was given access to the prisoners at all times. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe, also claims to have seen a suspicious-looking prison camp at Camp Bondsteel, an American base in Kosovo.

But the highest-ranking al-Qaida members are apparently kept moving with a small group of CIA interrogation experts, like an invisible caravan, from one of the so-called black sites to another. Outrage over claims that some of these secret prisons may be located at former military bases in Eastern Europe triggered the Council of Europe's investigation.

Turning a blind eye to human rights violations?
In the past, the Europeans turned a blind eye to the Americans' human rights violations. After all, Islamist terror was considered more dangerous and, more importantly, was being committed by a common enemy. But now European politicians have had enough.

Marty secretly hopes for trans-Atlantic cooperation, and he may well get it. A heated debate has broken out in the United States over whether the West's leading power can resort to torture when it believes its national security is under threat. The Bush administration's draconian methods have met with sharp resistance in the US Senate. US President George W. Bush, for his part, has threatened to veto an amendment that would require the CIA -- like any other US government agency -- to use only methods allowed under international law to extract information from its prisoners. Vice President Dick Cheney's vehement efforts to obstruct the amendment even prompted former CIA Director Stansfield Turner to angrily label Cheney a "vice president for torture."

Another amendment the US Congress recently approved would give the US government 60 days to present a detailed report on the secret CIA prisons, or black sites. Specifically, Congress wants information on both the locations of these sites and all the interrogation methods allegedly used there. In other words, it appears that the US Congress and Swiss prosecutor Marty are both urgently seeking the same information.

The Council of Europe's investigator already submitted a discreet request to the office of Democratic Senator John Kerry, who proposed the amendment, asking for information on the outcome of the report. Meanwhile, however, Marty can at least look forward to receiving informal help. In light of the heated debate over torture in Washington, the prospects of keeping the highly confidential report under wraps are slim.

The White House is increasingly coming under fire, especially in light of the difficulties Bush is having in convincing his fellow Americans that he is, in fact, winning the global war against terrorism. Indeed, every attempt on the part of the administration to suppress the revolt in the Senate against White House-sanctioned interrogation practices has so far failed.

The US does not engage in torture, but rather "unique and innovative" methods of prisoner interrogation, explains CIA Director Porter Goss. But what these methods entail has since become public knowledge. Under the policy, blows to the face and the abdomen are allowed, as is the apparently routine practice of forcing prisoners to stand for 40-hour periods in ice-cold cells while periodically spraying them with cold water. In an especially repugnant practice known as waterboarding, the prisoner is made to believe that he is drowning. "We must never simply fight evil with evil," says Republican Senator John McCain, himself a torture victim during the Vietnam War. "It will kill us."

European governments in the hot seat
The investigations in Europe are also acquiring a new sense of urgency, prompted by an official investigation request filed by the Council of Europe, which arrived in European capitals last Tuesday and has made officials nervous in several member states, including Germany. In a questionnaire accompanying the request, Terry Davis, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, asks for information on the "activities of foreign services" on German soil and demands an investigation into the possible abduction of suspected al-Qaida activists. The request also includes questions about prisoner "transport by air."

The German government will have some explaining to do, especially when it comes to charges that the German authorities turned a blind eye to the Americans having used their military base in Frankfurt am Main, which was just closed in October, Berlin's Schönefeld Airport and the US military base in Ramstein essentially as European transfer stations for their secret prisoner transports.

British journalist Stephen Grey, who claims to have a list of the flight movements of CIA aircraft, says he has discovered 210 suspicious flights in England alone. In January 2003, the Austrian air force even sent up two fighter jets to check on a suspicious Hercules flying under registration number N8183J. An investigation later revealed that the plane had taken off from the Rhine-Main Airbase in Frankfurt and was operated by Tepper Aviation, which is considered a CIA front company.

The German government has long been unofficially aware of such episodes. But it too has no knowledge of what or who was actually being transported on the aircraft. Nevertheless, Berlin has yet to follow the lead of the Danish government, which insisted that the Pentagon discontinue flights in Danish airspace that are "incompatible with international conventions."

The Council of Europe also wants to know how the German government intends to ensure that such activities on the part of "foreign agencies" are monitored in the future -- and "to what extent domestic law provides for a suitable response to such violations of the law," especially when they relate to the "curtailment of liberty by foreign agencies."

In short, the Council of Europe wants to know what European governments intend to do about CIA agents being allowed to fly their prisoners across Europe with impunity. The Germans won't be the only ones with some explaining to do by Feb. 21, the deadline for all member states to return the questionnaire. The truth is that hardly any US ally in Europe has sufficiently met its obligation to comply with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits any form of torture.

In Germany, there is at least one documented case of the CIA abducting Khaled el-Masri, from the southern city of Neu-Ulm. The story of Masri, who was abducted in Macedonia in late 2003 and flown to Afghanistan in January 2004, is one of the first cases to expose the secret CIA program.

Masri, who has had a German passport for the past decade, was interrogated for months in a prison in Afghanistan, where he was likely tortured and, after no evidence was found to incriminate him, was secretly flown back to Europe in late May 2004. The case has drawn the attention of both the German and the Spanish authorities, because the aircraft used to transport Masri, a Boeing 737 with registration number N313P, was owned by a company with ties to the CIA and made a stop on the Spanish island of Mallorca.

The German government must have known about the allegations by no later than June 2004, when Masri's attorney, Manfred Gnjidic wrote to then Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and the Federal Chancellery. The authorities reacted as they often do in embarrassing situations, using behind-the-scenes diplomacy in an attempt to make the problem go away.

At first, agents with Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND), sent a discreet inquiry to their US counterparts with whom they normally enjoy a close working relationship. The reply was succinct: it was a mistake, the kind that happens now and then.

Then, in Feb. 2005, then Interior Minister Otto Schily flew to Washington and met with CIA Director Goss. Schily demanded an explanation and an assurance that the abductions would cease. But this time Schily, otherwise known for his good relationship with the Bush administration, came away more or less empty-handed.

In a similar case, the Italian Justice Ministry has attempted to exert pressure on its own judiciary. Justice Minister Roberto Castelli publicly chastised a Milan public prosecutor who caused trouble for Castelli by filing an extradition request for 22 CIA agents. Prosecutor Armando Spataro said that in February 2003 the US agents kidnapped Imam Abu Omar in broad daylight in Milan, placed him on a Lear jet operated by CIA airline Tepper Aviation, and sent him to Egypt via the US airbase in Ramstein, Germany. If Castelli sends the extradition request to Washington, the move will anger the Bush administration. But if he refuses, he'll irritate many Italians. To avert either outcome, Castelli first plans to meticulously examine the prosecutor's petition for signs of "leftist anti-Americanism."

Two Eastern European countries are coming under even more pressure than Germany or Italy: Poland and Romania, both countries that apparently served as temporary destinations for the CIA's secret al-Qaida transports. Insiders in Washington claim that the two countries also contained secret black sites.

The issue is especially worrisome to the Romanians. If investigator Marty, currently making inquiries in Bucharest, finds evidence of the existence of a secret US prison, the country's planned accession to the EU in 2007 could be in jeopardy. But all other Europeans who, despite not having actively supported the prisoner transports, looked the other way for too long will hardly be able to avoid coming clean. "If it becomes apparent that flying torture chambers are circling over Europe," threatens Martin Schulz, Social Democratic group leader in the European Parliament, "there will be no getting around an official inquiry."

Correction Appended: A correction has been made to this text. Through a translation error, SPIEGEL Online incorrectly stated that Khaled el-Masri was abducted by the CIA in the German city of Neu-Ulm. In fact, he was abducted in Macedonia.

Eingereicht von Teuscher Franziska
Einreichungsdatum 05.12.2005
Eingereicht im Nationalrat
Stand der Beratung Erledigt

Eingereichter Text
1. Hat eine Schweizer Behörde, und wenn ja, welche, über Landung von geheimen CIA-Flugzeugen in der Schweiz Bescheid gewusst?
2. Da die Flüge angeblich geheim sind, wie hat das EDA davon erfahren?
3. Was wird das EDA unternehmen, wenn die USA weiterhin die Auskunft über die Flüge verweigern?

Eingereicht von Teuscher Franziska
Einreichungsdatum 12.12.2005
Eingereicht im Nationalrat
Stand der Beratung Erledigt

Eingereichter Text
1. Wofür hat die Schweiz Geheimdienste, wenn der Bundesrat nicht durch diese, sondern über die Presse von den geheimen CIA-Flügen erfährt?
2. Seit wann weiss der Geheimdienst DAP von diesen Flügen?
3. Zieht der Bundesrat Sanktionen gegen die USA in Betracht, wenn er keine Antwort auf seine Anfrage zu den CIA-Flügen von den USA bekommt?

Eingereicht von Banga Boris
Einreichungsdatum 14.12.2005
Eingereicht im Nationalrat
Stand der Beratung Erledigt

Eingereichter Text
Im Anschluss an meine Anfrage 05.1093 ersuche ich den Bundesrat um die Beantwortung folgender Fragen:
- Sind die drei CIA-Jets mit den Nummern N379 (später N8068V und N44982), N313P (später N4476S) und N85VM (später N227SV) zwischen dem 11. September 2001 bis Ende 2002 in der Schweiz gelandet oder haben sie die Schweiz überflogen? Wenn ja, wann?
- Haben andere in der internationalen Presse als CIA-Flugzeuge enttarnte Maschinen vom September 2001 bis heute Überflüge oder Landungen in der Schweiz getätigt? (Die wichtigsten Registraturen könnten nachgeliefert werden.)
- Hat er von den USA Passagier- und Crewlisten für jeden nachweislichen Überflug und für jede nachweisliche Landung von CIA-Maschinen in der Schweiz verlangt? Wenn nein, ist er bereit, dies zu tun?
- Hat er oder eine andere Behörde überprüft, ob sich zu den Zeitpunkten, an denen die genannten CIA-Flugzeuge auf Schweizer Flughäfen standen, von Italien international gesuchte oder andere CIA-Agenten unter den Gästen von örtlichen Hotels befanden? Wenn nein, ist er bereit, diese Überprüfung machen zu lassen?
- Hat er überprüft, warum sich der von Italien wegen Entführung gesuchte CIA-Agent Robert Sheldon Lady sowie mindestens zwei weitere Kommandomitglieder nach der Entführung des Imams Abu Omar zwei Mal in Zürich aufhielten? Wenn ja, was ergaben diese Überprüfungen? Wenn nein, ist er bereit, dies auf geeignetem Weg zu überprüfen?
- Hat er überprüft, ob eine der beiden Maschinen, mit denen Abu Omar via Ramstein nach Kairo verschleppt wurde, den Schweizer Luftraum benützte? Wenn ja, was ergab diese Überprüfung? Wenn nein, ist er bereit, diese Überprüfung vorzunehmen?

Antwort des Bundesrates vom 10.03.2006
- Gemäss den Ermittlungen flog der Jet mit der Nummer N379P (später N8068V und N44982) zwischen 2001 und 2002 zehnmal über die Schweiz. Der Jet mit der Nummer N313P (später N4476S) durchquerte den Schweizer Luftraum am 24. November 2002 und am 1. Dezember 2002. Der Jet mit der Nummer N85VM (später N227SV) flog am 8. November 2002, am 12. November 2002 und am 22. November 2002 über die Schweiz.
- Neben den in der Interpellation erwähnten Jets haben auch andere Flugzeuge das Schweizer Hoheitsgebiet in der Zeit von September 2001 bis heute überflogen. Zwischen dem 24. Dezember 2003 und dem 25. Januar 2004 gab es vier Landungen in Genf Cointrin. Der Bundesrat verfügt jedoch weder im Falle der obenerwähnten Jets, noch im Falle der übrigen Flugzeuge über Beweise, dass es sich um CIA-Flüge handelte, die für den illegalen Gefangenentransport benutzt worden wären.
- Artikel 3 Buchstabe c des Übereinkommens über die internationale Zivilluftfahrt, dem die Schweiz beigetreten ist, besagt, dass "ein Staatsluftfahrzeug eines Vertragsstaates das Hoheitsgebiet eines anderen Staates nur überfliegen oder dort landen darf, wenn es eine Bewilligung durch besondere Vereinbarung erhalten hat". Gemäss Artikel 5 des Übereinkommens haben alle im Nichtlinienflugverkehr eingesetzten Luftfahrzeuge der Vertragsstaaten das Recht, in das Hoheitsgebiet eines anderen Vertragsstaates einzufliegen, es ohne Landung zu überfliegen und nichtgewerbliche Landungen durchzuführen, ohne vorher eine Genehmigung einholen zu müssen. In allen oben erwähnten Fällen handelte es sich um nichtgewerbliche Flüge. Gemäss Völkerrecht muss die Identität der Passagiere bei solchen Flügen nicht bekannt gegeben werden. In der Praxis wäre eine Überprüfung ihrer Identität kaum möglich. Bis jetzt gibt es keine Beweise für CIA-Operationen auf Schweizer Hoheitsgebiet oder im schweizerischen Luftraum, bei denen die Grundsätze des Völkerrechtes oder des Schweizer Rechtes verletzt worden wären. Trotzdem hat der Bundesrat die amerikanischen Behörden um weitere Informationen zu diesen Landungen in Genf Cointrin gebeten, sobald er davon erfahren hatte, d. h. im Juni 2005.
Die angeblichen Aufenthalte der von Italien wegen Entführung gesuchten CIA-Agenten in Schweizer Hotels sind Gegenstand von Ermittlungen der Bundesanwaltschaft.
Den erfolgten Nachforschungen zufolge soll ein von Aviano gestartetes Flugzeug auf dem Weg nach Ramstein am 17. Februar 2003 über die Schweiz geflogen sein. Ob Abu Omar an Bord war, entzieht sich der Kenntnis des Bundesrates. Die amerikanischen Behörden wurden um Erläuterungen gebeten, und die Bundesanwaltschaft hat Ermittlungen eingeleitet.

Eingereicht von Müller Geri
Einreichungsdatum 15.12.2005
Eingereicht im Nationalrat
Stand der Beratung Im Plenum noch nicht behandelt

Eingereichter Text
Der Bundesrat wird aufgefordert, folgende Massnahmen zu beschliessen:
1. Die USA werden deutlich für ihr völkerrrechtswidriges Verhalten gerügt.
2. Die Administration der USA muss sich vor dem Gerichtshof im Haag verantworten.
3. Die Schweiz stellt per sofort sämtliche polizeiliche und militärische Zusammenarbeit ein und untersagt jeglichen Waffenhandel.
4. Die Schweiz führt eine lückenlose Untersuchung über amerikanische Souveränitätsverletzungen in der Schweiz durch.
5. Die Schweiz untersagt ab sofort jegliche Überflüge und Landungen von Flugzeugen, welche sich nicht den internationalen Normen unterstellen. Sie akzeptiert keine "unbekannten Frachten" mehr.
6. Die Schweiz macht eine USA-unabhängige Analyse über die Sicherheit in der Schweiz und schlägt geeignete Präventionsmassnahmen vor. Diese werden insbesondere mit ihren Nachbarländern abgestimmt.
7. Die Schweiz bemüht sich um Uno-Reformen, welche es ermöglichen, ein Regulativ zu erstellen, das alle Länder möglichst gleichberechtigt behandelt.

Begründung
Die USA geben vor, weltweit der Vorreiter für die Demokratie und Menschenrechte zu sein. In Wirklichkeit mehren sich die Verletzungen des Völkerrechtes und der Menschenrechte. Die Liste ist lang: offene (Iran, Afghanistan) und verdeckte Kriegführung (Venezuela, Kuba) gegen mehrere Länder ohne Uno-Legitimation; Verletzung international festgelegter Menschenrechte (Folter in Guantanamo und anderen Ländern, Folter in von den USA kontrollierten Gefängnissen), Verletzung der Aufsichtspflicht als internationale Truppe z. B. in Kosovo (Vertreibung von Hunderttausenden Roma) zusammen mit anderen vor Ort stationierten Truppen. Die bisherigen Ermittlungen in der CIA-Affäre von Dick Marty untermauern zusätzlich, mit welchen völker- und menschenrechtswidrigen Methoden die USA umgehen. Jedes andere Land würde im vergleichbaren Fall mehrfach gerügt und sanktioniert werden. Die USA kommen mit kritischen Bemerkungen davon ("man müsste Massnahmen prüfen").
Vor diesem Hintergrund muss nun die Schweiz ihre beiden Rollen überprüfen, wie sie gegenüber den USA und der Weltöffentlichkeit auftritt. Zum einen ist sie Depositärstaat der Menschenrechtskonventionen. Damit soll sie nicht bloss Staaten mit Menschenrechtsverletzungen konfrontieren, welche keine Gegenmassnahmen ergreifen können (Kuba z. B.), sondern gemäss den genauen, internationalen Vereinbarungen über Menschenrechtsverletzungen Mass nehmen und alle rügen, welche diese Rechte systematisch verletzen. Zum anderen ist die Schweiz auch ein souveränes Land, welches die Wahl hat, mit wem sie wie kooperieren will. Es steht ihr dabei sehr schlecht an, wenn sie weiterhin mit einem Land Waffenkäufe und -verkäufe betreibt, das gemäss eigenen Angaben Krieg führt. Es ziemt sich nicht, mit einem solchen Land Freihandelsabkommen abzuschliessen.

Stellungnahme des Bundesrates vom 10.03.2006
1. Die Schweiz hat die USA wiederholt auf hoher politischer Ebene auf ihre Verpflichtungen unter dem Völkerrecht und insbesondere unter dem humanitären Völkerrecht hingewiesen. In einem Memorandum, das Staatssekretär Michael Ambühl am 14. Juni 2005 dem US-State Department sowie Bundesrätin Micheline Calmy-Rey am 27. Juni 2005 der US-Aussenministerin Condoleezza Rice übergeben haben, drückte die Schweiz ihre Besorgnis aus über den Status der Häftlinge in Guantanamo sowie die Praxis der sogenannten "Extraordinary renditions" und erinnerte an die Einhaltung der erwähnten völkerrechtlichen Normen. Im Zusammenhang mit den angeblichen CIA-Flügen verlangte das EDA von den USA seit Ende Juli 2005 wiederholt Auskunft. Am 8. Dezember 2005 übermittelte die US-Botschaft im Auftrag des State Departments die Erklärung von Staatssekretärin Condoleezza Rice, wonach "the United States has not transported anyone, and will not transport anyone, to a country when we believe he will be tortured". Am 30. Januar 2006 haben die USA gegenüber der Schweiz erklärt, dass sie den schweizerischen Luftraum oder schweizerische Flughäfen nicht für illegale Gefangenentransporte benutzt haben und die Souveränität der Schweiz auch in Zukunft respektieren werden.
Es liegen den Schweizer Behörden keine Beweise vor, dass der Schweizer Luftraum oder Schweizer Flughäfen von der CIA für illegale Tätigkeiten benutzt wurden (vgl. Punkt 4).
2. Der Internationale Strafgerichtshof in Den Haag ist für die individuelle Strafverfolgung zuständig. Das bedeutet, dass nur Individuen, nicht aber Staaten vorgeladen werden dürfen. Zudem sind die USA nicht Mitglied des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes. Streitigkeiten zwischen Uno-Mitgliedstaaten können vom Internationalen Gerichtshof geregelt werden, dessen Sitz sich ebenfalls in Den Haag befindet. Ein Fall kann aber nur mit Zustimmung der betroffenen Staaten vor den Gerichtshof gebracht werden. Es ist deshalb unmöglich, vor einem der beiden Gerichtshöfe in Den Haag ein Verfahren gegen die USA anzustrengen. Der Bundesrat erachtet ein solches Vorgehen auch nicht als opportun.
3. Bei einer Einstellung der Ein- und Ausfuhr von Kriegsmaterial mit den USA wären sicherheitspolitische Konsequenzen in Rechnung zu stellen. Die USA sind für die Schweiz ein bedeutender Lieferant von Kriegsmaterial und tragen damit wesentlich zu der in Artikel 1 des Kriegsmaterialgesetzes postulierten schweizerischen Versorgungssicherheit bei. Die wirtschaftlichen Nachteile einer Einstellung der Lieferungen von Kriegsmaterial an die USA würden zudem weit über die Rüstungsindustrie hinausreichen.
4. Die Bundesanwaltschaft hat Ermittlungen wegen Verdachtes auf verbotene Handlungen für einen fremden Staat (Art. 271 StGB) eröffnet.
5. Der Überflug über schweizerischem Territorium unterliegt der Respektierung des internationalen Rechtes, der schweizerischen Souveränität und der Rechtsordnung der Schweiz. Die Schweiz und die USA sind Vertragsstaaten des Chicago-Übereinkommens über die internationale Zivilluftfahrt, welches Privatflugzeuge berechtigt, in das Hoheitsgebiet des anderen Vertragsstaates einzufliegen, es zu überfliegen und nichtgewerbliche Landungen durchzuführen, ohne eine Genehmigung einholen zu müssen. Das Bazl beteiligt sich seit dem Jahre 2000 am Safa-Programm (Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft) der Europäischen Zivilluftfahrtkonferenz (ECAC), welches auch polizeiliche und zollrechtliche Kontrollen von gelandeten Flugzeugen zulässt. Diese können allerdings nur bei begründetem Verdacht erfolgen und liegen in der polizeilichen Befugnis der Kantone des entsprechenden Flughafens. Bei den zur Frage stehenden Landungen in der Schweiz lagen keine Verdachtsmomente vor, die damals eine Kontrolle begründet hätten.
Ausländische Militär- und andere ausländische Staatsluftfahrzeuge dürfen nur mit einer vom Bazl erteilten Bewilligung (diplomatic clearance) auf schweizerischem Hoheitsgebiet landen bzw. dieses überfliegen. Die Schweiz hält in den entsprechenden Jahresbewilligungen neu fest, dass die Benutzung des schweizerischen Luftraumes für Flüge, die im Widerspruch zu den Regeln des Völkerrechtes stehen, nicht gestattet ist. Aufgrund der amerikanischen Zusicherungen vom 30. Januar 2006 (vgl. Punkt 1) erneuerte die Schweiz am 31. Januar 2006 die Jahresbewilligung zur Benützung des schweizerischen Luftraumes gemäss geltendem Recht und in voller Einhaltung des Völkerrechtes.
6. Die Schweiz führt Sicherheitsanalysen und die daraus abgeleiteten Präventionsmassnahmen bereits regelmässig durch und stimmt diese im erforderlichen Ausmass international ab.
7. Die Uno beruht gemäss ihrer Charta "auf dem Grundsatz der souveränen Gleichheit aller ihrer Mitglieder". Gleichzeitig überträgt sie insbesondere den ständigen Mitgliedern des Sicherheitsrates besondere Kompetenzen, Pflichten und Aufgaben. Der Bundesrat befürwortet im Rahmen der Uno-Reformen eine Erweiterung des Sicherheitsrates, die eine bessere Vertretung der Entwicklungsländer ermöglicht und nicht nur zum einseitigen Vorteil der Grossstaaten und zum Nachteil der übrigen Länder erfolgt. Zudem setzt sich die Schweiz aktiv für die Erhöhung der Transparenz und die Weiterentwicklung der Arbeitsmethoden des Sicherheitsrates ein, damit sich alle Uno-Mitgliedstaaten in diesem Gremium besser beteiligen können.

Erklärung des Bundesrates vom 10.03.2006
Der Bundesrat beantragt die Ablehnung der Motion.

Mitunterzeichnende Frösch Therese - Garbani Valérie - Graf Maya - Huguenin Marianne - John-Calame Francine - Lang Josef - Leuenberger Ueli - Menétrey-Savary Anne-Catherine - Rechsteiner Rudolf - Recordon Luc - Rossini Stéphane - Roth-Bernasconi Maria - Salvi Pierre - Savary Géraldine - Vanek Pierre - Vischer Daniel - Zisyadis Josef (17)

Très franchement, avez-vous eu entre les mains le fameux fax égyptien intercepté par les services secrets suisses et dont les informations sur l’existence de prisons secrètes de la CIA en Europe de l’Est ont fait l’objet d’une fuite dans la presse?
– Non, j’ai découvert une transcription de ce fax dans la presse dominicale. Mais je n’avais pas vu le fax ni le document classé secret. Selon la procédure fixée dans une ordonnance du Conseil fédéral, trois de mes services avaient reçu une note résumant des informations de ce fax, sans que la source soit mentionnée.
Ces informations ne différaient guère de celles contenues dans un article du Washington Post et dans un rapport de l’organisation Human Rights Watch.
– Le fax ne vous a-t-il donc rien appris?
– La note transmise à mes services n’a rien apporté de fondamentalement neuf, et l’indiscrétion n’a rien changé à notre politique étrangère dans ce domaine: les transferts extrajudiciaires sont contraires au droit international public, les personnes accusées doivent bénéficier d’une protection juridique, et les interrogatoires sous torture sont strictement interdits.
– Vous sortez pourtant d’une semaine où le Conseil fédéral n’a cessé d’être critiqué pour son silence voire sa «servilité» à l’égard des Etats-Unis, les prisons secrètes de la CIA et les soupçons de torture...
– Ces critiques m’étonnent, car la Suisse est intervenue très tôt déjà. Elle fait partie des pays les plus persévérants pour obtenir des informations sur d’éventuels transferts extrajudiciaires de prisonniers. Dès fin juin 2005, j’avais transmis un mémorandum à mon homologue américaine, Mme Condoleezza Rice, exprimant notre position et nos préoccupations à cet égard.
–Quelles réponses avez-vous obtenues jusqu’ici?
– Nous n’avons été traités ni mieux ni moins bien que les autres pays européens. Le 8 décembre dernier,Mme Rice, lors de son passage en Europe, nous a fait transmettre copie de ses déclarations – en substance, les Etats-Unis n’ont pas transporté et ne transporteront quiconque vers un pays pratiquant la torture.
– Allez-vous en rester là, sachant que la présence de prisons secrètes en Europe, la pratique de la torture et le survol de la Suisse d’avions de la CIA avec des prisonniers privés de tout droit se précisent de jour en jour?
– Nous restons persévérants face aux Etats-Unis et nous continuons de leur demander des éclaircissements. Je précise que nos démarches concernent 74 survols de la Suisse et 4 atterrissages d’avions américains dont nous voulons savoir s’ils ont servi à des transferts illégaux de prisonniers. Nous n’avons, en revanche, pas à demander formellement de comptes aux Etats-Unis sur ce qui se serait passé dans les autres pays européens.
– Ces autres pays, dont la Roumanie, sont mentionnés dans le fameux fax. Se sont-ils plaints?
– De manière générale, les pays concernés par ces informations ont réagi avec une certaine amertume. Ils ne sont pas heureux d’être ainsi montrés du doigt. Et maintenant ils nous demandent des preuves. A l’heure actuelle, nous n’en avons pas. Mais nous sommes d’accord de partager les informations en notre possession.
– Et, avec les Etats-Unis, où en sont nos relations: Joseph Deiss a fait savoir cette semaine que les pourparlers en vue d’un accord commercial de libre-échange ne sont nullement perturbés alors que vous avez laissé entendre le contraire?
– La fuite n’améliore pas l’atmosphère, mais il ne faut pas surévaluer son effet. Surtout, le problème posé par d’éventuels transferts extrajudiciaires et l’accord de libre-échange sont deux dossiers distincts.
– Faut-il comprendre que vous ne sacrifierez pas la défense des droits humains sur l’autel de nos intérêts commerciaux?
– La défense des droits humains est un des piliers de notre politique étrangère et participe aussi de la défense de nos intérêts. Nous avons clairement des divergences d’interprétation avec les Etats-Unis sur le fait qu’il ne peut y avoir de trou juridique dans la défense des droits humains en cas de guerre ou dans un autre contexte. Mais ces divergences clairement exprimées n’empêchent pas d’entretenir des relations bilatérales constructives dans les domaines politiques, économiques ou autres.
– Le conseiller aux Etats Dick Marty, qui enquête sur les prisons de la CIA pour le Conseil de l’Europe, se plaint dumanque de collaboration de la Suisse. Allez-vous l’aider?
– Si nos informations intéressent M.Marty, nous lui répondrons bien sûr dans toute la mesure du possible. Nous avons, par ailleurs, reçu une demande d’information du secrétaire général du Conseil de l’Europe, à laquelle nous aurons répondu d’ici à la fin de janvier.

Les services secrets suisses ont tout faux
Maurice Botbol dirige depuis 1980 Intelligence Online, le site le plus pointu sur les services de renseignements. Il ne raconte pas d’exploits à la James Bond; sa spécialité est de donner avant tout le monde le nom du nouveau patron du General Intelligence Department jordanien ou de révéler l’existence de Sprint, un nouveau logiciel d’analyse de renseignements. «A ma connaissance, c’est la première fois qu’un service secret est contraint de reconnaître qu’il est à l’écoute des pays étrangers.
C’est assez invraisemblable, car les espions ne respectent rien,sauf leurs sources», constate Maurice Botbol. En d’autres termes, si les services secrets ont l’habitude d’organiser des fuites, ils s’arrangent pour que la presse ignore tout de la façon dont le document a été obtenu. Il aurait été beaucoup plus judicieux de fournir à SonntagsBlick une copie du fax égyptien original rédigé en arabe. Autre faute impardonnable: les fax diplomatiques sont normalement cryptés.
La Suisse montre qu’elle est capable de casser les codes utilisés par Le Caire. «Or, dans ce métier, il ne faut surtout pas montrer ses muscles. Au contraire, il faut faire croire aux pays étrangers que leurs systèmes de sécurité sont sans faille pour pouvoir les écouter facilement», s’amuse le directeur d’Intelligence Online.
Un membre d’un service secret étranger en poste à Berne se souvient qu’un ministre de la Défense s’était autrefois vanté que son pays pouvait écouter les Iraniens. «Résultat: Téhéran a changé tous ses systèmes de cryptage. L’Iran a utilisé du matériel beaucoup plus sophistiqué, et nous avons mis six ans avant de pouvoir de nouveau déchiffrer leurs messages», raconte l’espion européen. Les services secrets du monde entier seraient donc en train de maudire la Suisse.
Enfin, les spécialistes des services s’étonnent que l’on ait choisi parmi des milliers d’interceptions un fax égyptien.
«Le Caire n’a guère la réputation d’être pointue en matière d’espionnage. Sa principale préoccupation se limite au «flicage» de ses opposants à Londres», ironise un membre des services secrets. Un fax sur les prisons de la CIA émanant du Ministère des affaires étrangères allemand, français ou britannique aurait été autrement plus crédible. Bref, Berne a tout faux dans ce dossier.
Ian Hamel
www.intelligenceonline.fr

A. Gegenstand der Kontrolltätigkeit der Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation
Im Verlaufe des Jahres 2005 haben schweizerische und ausländische Medien sowie Menschenrechtsorganisationen verschiedentlich Behauptungen über mutmassliche Aktivitäten zur Terrorismusbekämpfung der amerikanischen Nachrichtendienste in Europa aufgestellt. Gemäss diesen Quellen hätten mehrere CIA-Flugzeuge das europäische Territorium und/oder den europäischen Luftraum für illegale Gefangenentransporte benutzt. In gewissen europäischen Ländern hätten sich geheime Gefängnisse der CIA befunden oder befänden sich sogar heute noch dort.
Diese Behauptungen führten zu mehreren parlamentarischen Vorstössen (Frage Banga 05.1093, Frage Günter 05.5232 und Fragen Teuscher 05.5244 und 05.5282). Der Bundesrat beantwortete sie am 23. September, am 5. Dezember und am 12. Dezember 2005. Die Beantwortung weiterer parlamentarischer Vorstösse ist noch ausstehend (Motion Müller Geri 05.3842, Motion Zisyadis 05.3819, Interpellation Lang 05.3744, Fragen Banga 05.1181und 05.1182). ...
(Volltext)

The outrage evident in the Council of Europe report on the secret CIA rendition programme emerges from a clash between the methods used by the United States to break up al-Qaeda networks and the sensitivities of human rights mechanisms introduced into post-war Europe and designed not to permit the unhindered use of government power.

The report's author, Swiss Senator Dick Marty, following up his earlier draft findings, identified what he felt was the difference between the responses to terrorism by Europe and the US:

"While the states of the Old World have dealt with these threats primarily by means of existing institutions and legal systems, the United States appears to have made a fundamentally different choice: considering that neither conventional judicial instruments nor those established under the framework of the laws of war could effectively counter the new forms of international terrorism, it decided to develop new legal concepts. "This legal approach is utterly alien to the European tradition and sensibility, and is clearly contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

It is important to stress here that the argument is not about the origins of the human rights mechanisms, the inspiration for which came as much from the US as from Europe. It is about their application today.

The American decision to engage in counterterrorism beyond the reach of national or international law arose from a desire - a need as Washington saw the matter - to avoid the restrictions of the US law and constitution, which protect individual rights. It therefore built not only Guantanamo Bay, but a series of "black sites", or secret prisons around the world. In these black sites, senior al-Qaeda suspects were held and interrogated, sometimes by so-called "enhanced" methods.

For the Bush administration, authority for this came from a congressional resolution passed on 14 September 2001. Under this resolution "the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001... in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons."

Specific authority for the CIA to act as it saw best against al-Qaeda was then given by President Bush in a "presidential finding" on 17 September 2001.

It was therefore perhaps inevitable that one day, there would be a clash between the operational requirements of the CIA and the legal concerns of European human rights organisations, led by the Council of Europe, which administers the European Convention on Human Rights. This clash is but one element of the wider legal struggle that has seen efforts to get rights for the Guantanamo Bay prisoners and pressure on the US to abide by a strict interpretation of the international convention against torture.

The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has stated that her country does not engage in torture or hand over prisoners to those who do.

The most serious charge Mr Marty makes in his report is against Poland and Romania, both of which he all but accuses of having allowed the CIA to run black sites. These suspected secret prisons were in fact exposed by the Washington Post in an article in November 2005. Poland and Romania were not named in that article - the reference was to "several democracies in Eastern Europe" - at the request of the White House, but they were soon revealed. It is believed that the sites were rapidly closed and the prisoners transferred, perhaps to somewhere in North Africa.

Mr Marty has now collated flight data from rendition flights and has pointed a finger of suspicion at both countries, which continue to deny they did anything wrong. In this, he goes beyond his earlier, preliminary report.

Other intriguing circumstantial information has come from Muhammad Bashmila, a former secret prisoner now free in Yemen. In a rare interview with the BBC Newsnight programme, he spoke of being transferred from Afghanistan to a secret prison where it was cold, where the food appeared European and where evening prayers were held at the late hour of 2045. Somewhere in Eastern Europe is suspected.

It is argued, by the British government among others, that the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism is so grave that there has to be a reconsideration of the balance of liberties. Previously, according to this view, the individual had to be protected against governments. But now the individual ability to wage war on societies is so great that individuals have to be restricted.

Mr Marty does not accept this. In his report, he states: "The compilation of so-called "black lists" of individuals and companies suspected of maintaining connections with organisations considered terrorist and the application of the associated sanctions clearly breach every principle of the fundamental right to a fair trial: no specific charges, no right to be heard, no right of appeal, no established procedure for removing one's name from the list."

But he also quotes within his report a defence from Dan Fried, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs: "We are attempting to keep our people safe; we are attempting to fight dangerous terrorist groups who are active and who mean what they say about destroying us. We are trying to do so in a way consistent with our values and our international legal obligations. "Doing all of those things in practice is not easy, partly because - as we've discovered as we've gotten into it - the struggle we are in does not fit neatly either into the criminal legal framework, or neatly into the law of war framework."

Today, The President Released His Updated National Strategy For Combating Terrorism (NSCT), Which Outlines The United States Government Strategy To Protect And Defend American Interests At Home And Abroad From Terrorism. ...

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thanks for the warm welcome. Welcome to the White House. Mr. Vice President, Secretary Rice, Attorney General Gonzales, Ambassador Negroponte, General Hayden, members of the United States Congress, families who lost loved ones in the terrorist attacks on our nation, and my fellow citizens: Thanks for coming.

On the morning of September the 11th, 2001, our nation awoke to a nightmare attack. Nineteen men, armed with box cutters, took control of airplanes and turned them into missiles. They used them to kill nearly 3,000 innocent people. We watched the Twin Towers collapse before our eyes -- and it became instantly clear that we'd entered a new world, and a dangerous new war.

The attacks of September the 11th horrified our nation. And amid the grief came new fears and urgent questions: Who had attacked us? What did they want? And what else were they planning? Americans saw the destruction the terrorists had caused in New York, and Washington, and Pennsylvania, and they wondered if there were other terrorist cells in our midst poised to strike; they wondered if there was a second wave of attacks still to come.

With the Twin Towers and the Pentagon still smoldering, our country on edge, and a stream of intelligence coming in about potential new attacks, my administration faced immediate challenges: We had to respond to the attack on our country. We had to wage an unprecedented war against an enemy unlike any we had fought before. We had to find the terrorists hiding in America and across the world, before they were able to strike our country again. So in the early days and weeks after 9/11, I directed our government's senior national security officials to do everything in their power, within our laws, to prevent another attack.

Nearly five years have passed since these -- those initial days of shock and sadness -- and we are thankful that the terrorists have not succeeded in launching another attack on our soil. This is not for the lack of desire or determination on the part of the enemy. As the recently foiled plot in London shows, the terrorists are still active, and they're still trying to strike America, and they're still trying to kill our people. One reason the terrorists have not succeeded is because of the hard work of thousands of dedicated men and women in our government, who have toiled day and night, along with our allies, to stop the enemy from carrying out their plans. And we are grateful for these hardworking citizens of ours.

Another reason the terrorists have not succeeded is because our government has changed its policies -- and given our military, intelligence, and law enforcement personnel the tools they need to fight this enemy and protect our people and preserve our freedoms.

The terrorists who declared war on America represent no nation, they defend no territory, and they wear no uniform. They do not mass armies on borders, or flotillas of warships on the high seas. They operate in the shadows of society; they send small teams of operatives to infiltrate free nations; they live quietly among their victims; they conspire in secret, and then they strike without warning. In this new war, the most important source of information on where the terrorists are hiding and what they are planning is the terrorists, themselves. Captured terrorists have unique knowledge about how terrorist networks operate. They have knowledge of where their operatives are deployed, and knowledge about what plots are underway. This intelligence -- this is intelligence that cannot be found any other place. And our security depends on getting this kind of information. To win the war on terror, we must be able to detain, question, and, when appropriate, prosecute terrorists captured here in America, and on the battlefields around the world.

After the 9/11 attacks, our coalition launched operations across the world to remove terrorist safe havens, and capture or kill terrorist operatives and leaders. Working with our allies, we've captured and detained thousands of terrorists and enemy fighters in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and other fronts of this war on terror. These enemy -- these are enemy combatants, who were waging war on our nation. We have a right under the laws of war, and we have an obligation to the American people, to detain these enemies and stop them from rejoining the battle.

Most of the enemy combatants we capture are held in Afghanistan or in Iraq, where they're questioned by our military personnel. Many are released after questioning, or turned over to local authorities -- if we determine that they do not pose a continuing threat and no longer have significant intelligence value. Others remain in American custody near the battlefield, to ensure that they don't return to the fight.

In some cases, we determine that individuals we have captured pose a significant threat, or may have intelligence that we and our allies need to have to prevent new attacks. Many are al Qaeda operatives or Taliban fighters trying to conceal their identities, and they withhold information that could save American lives. In these cases, it has been necessary to move these individuals to an environment where they can be held secretly [sic], questioned by experts, and -- when appropriate -- prosecuted for terrorist acts.

Some of these individuals are taken to the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It's important for Americans and others across the world to understand the kind of people held at Guantanamo. These aren't common criminals, or bystanders accidentally swept up on the battlefield -- we have in place a rigorous process to ensure those held at Guantanamo Bay belong at Guantanamo. Those held at Guantanamo include suspected bomb makers, terrorist trainers, recruiters and facilitators, and potential suicide bombers. They are in our custody so they cannot murder our people. One detainee held at Guantanamo told a questioner questioning him -- he said this: "I'll never forget your face. I will kill you, your brothers, your mother, and sisters."

In addition to the terrorists held at Guantanamo, a small number of suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and questioned outside the United States, in a separate program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This group includes individuals believed to be the key architects of the September the 11th attacks, and attacks on the USS Cole, an operative involved in the bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and individuals involved in other attacks that have taken the lives of innocent civilians across the world. These are dangerous men with unparalleled knowledge about terrorist networks and their plans for new attacks. The security of our nation and the lives of our citizens depend on our ability to learn what these terrorists know.

Many specifics of this program, including where these detainees have been held and the details of their confinement, cannot be divulged. Doing so would provide our enemies with information they could use to take retribution against our allies and harm our country. I can say that questioning the detainees in this program has given us information that has saved innocent lives by helping us stop new attacks -- here in the United States and across the world. Today, I'm going to share with you some of the examples provided by our intelligence community of how this program has saved lives; why it remains vital to the security of the United States, and our friends and allies; and why it deserves the support of the United States Congress and the American people.

Within months of September the 11th, 2001, we captured a man known as Abu Zubaydah. We believe that Zubaydah was a senior terrorist leader and a trusted associate of Osama bin Laden. Our intelligence community believes he had run a terrorist camp in Afghanistan where some of the 9/11 hijackers trained, and that he helped smuggle al Qaeda leaders out of Afghanistan after coalition forces arrived to liberate that country. Zubaydah was severely wounded during the firefight that brought him into custody -- and he survived only because of the medical care arranged by the CIA.

After he recovered, Zubaydah was defiant and evasive. He declared his hatred of America. During questioning, he at first disclosed what he thought was nominal information -- and then stopped all cooperation. Well, in fact, the "nominal" information he gave us turned out to be quite important. For example, Zubaydah disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed -- or KSM -- was the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, and used the alias "Muktar." This was a vital piece of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community pursue KSM. Abu Zubaydah also provided information that helped stop a terrorist attack being planned for inside the United States -- an attack about which we had no previous information. Zubaydah told us that al Qaeda operatives were planning to launch an attack in the U.S., and provided physical descriptions of the operatives and information on their general location. Based on the information he provided, the operatives were detained -- one while traveling to the United States.

We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped talking. As his questioning proceeded, it became clear that he had received training on how to resist interrogation. And so the CIA used an alternative set of procedures. These procedures were designed to be safe, to comply with our laws, our Constitution, and our treaty obligations. The Department of Justice reviewed the authorized methods extensively and determined them to be lawful. I cannot describe the specific methods used -- I think you understand why -- if I did, it would help the terrorists learn how to resist questioning, and to keep information from us that we need to prevent new attacks on our country. But I can say the procedures were tough, and they were safe, and lawful, and necessary.

Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures, and soon he began to provide information on key al Qaeda operatives, including information that helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks on September the 11th. For example, Zubaydah identified one of KSM's accomplices in the 9/11 attacks -- a terrorist named Ramzi bin al Shibh. The information Zubaydah provided helped lead to the capture of bin al Shibh. And together these two terrorists provided information that helped in the planning and execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Once in our custody, KSM was questioned by the CIA using these procedures, and he soon provided information that helped us stop another planned attack on the United States. During questioning, KSM told us about another al Qaeda operative he knew was in CIA custody -- a terrorist named Majid Khan. KSM revealed that Khan had been told to deliver $50,000 to individuals working for a suspected terrorist leader named Hambali, the leader of