JUSTICE, PIRATE-STYLE
Carlo
Schmid: "die USA sind im Moment kein
Rechtsstaat nach unserem Standard"
.
A solitary confinement cage
at Iraq's notorious Abu Ghraib prison.
courtesy
by: Good Offices Group of European
Lawmakers, 1211 Geneva 2
research contributed by:
ICRC
Geneva; EDA &
Bundesarchiv Bern; ETH
Zurich;
I.Gerassimova, UN
Library - url: www.solami.com/ciaprisons.htm - related
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NATO
agreement provided for secret CIA prisons to operate in Poland & Romania
European
Parliament Report On CIA Rendition Flights & Secret Prisons
(app. #7, #8)
US
President Admits CIA Prisons Abroad - Financial
Sanctions against "Rogue States"
Council
of Europe inquiry on unlawful detentions & inter-state transfers
in European states
Canadian
Parliament inquiry (vol.
A&R, I,
II)
"Report
of the Events Relating to Maher Arar"
False Flag Interrogations,
U.S. Army Field Manual FM 2-22.3 vs. Prohibition
of Perfidy
Past
US Uses of False Flags ¦ Illegal
Overflights ¦ Statewatch:
on "rendition" ¦ ACLU
European
Civil Liberties Network ¦ Interrogazione
a risposta scritta 4-00852, Atto Senato
El-Masri
v. U.S. ¦ Iconoclast:
Qui
protège
"les intérêts essentiels" de la Suisse?
Anfrage
06.1141 Vereinbar
mit Genfer Konventionen, Schweizer Souveränität und Menschenrechten?
Compatible
with Geneva conventions, Swiss sovereignty and human rights?
Aiuti
all'Est e Convenzioni di Ginevra
Compatible
avec les Conventions de Genève, la souveraineté suisse et
les droits de l'homme?
GPK "Die
Schweiz und ihr Luftraum: Benutzung für aussergerichtliche Gefangenentransporte"
(français)
Motion 05.3842
"Keine Sonderbehandlung für die USA" (texte
français - testo
italiano)
Anfrage 05.1182
"Mutmassliche Rechtsverletzungen durch die CIA"
(texte
français - testo
italiano)
Fragen 05.5244
"Geheime CIA-Flüge", 05.5282
"Sofortige Aufklärung ist notwendig"
Anfrage 05.1093
"Schweizerischer Luftraum und schweizerische Flughäfen.
Missbrauch" (français
- italiano)
BACKGROUNDER
ON EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS and OTHER EXTRAJUDICIAL TRANSFERS
Amnesty International:
United
States - Below the radar: Secret flights to torture and ‘disappearance’
1 Dec 07
Jordan's Spy Agency: Holding Torture Cell for the
CIA, WP, Craig Whitlock
11 Oct 07 One
train can hide another: CIA "rendition"/drug flights?, cannonfire,
Joseph Cannon, comments
11 Oct 07 Supreme
Disgrace, NYT, Editorial
10 Oct 07 Supreme
Court Refuses to Hear Torture Appeal, NYT, LINDA GREENHOUSE
8 oct 07 Bagram,
Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib: Un taxi pour l'enfer, ARTE, Alex Gibney,
video
7 Oct 07 On
Torture and American Values, NYT, Editorial
7 Oct 07 Ex-Bush
Staffers; An Exit Toward Soul-Searching, Washington Post, Peter
Baker
4 Oct 07 Secret
U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, NYT, SCOTT SHANE et
al.
13 Aug 07 The
Black Sites: inside the C.I.A.’s secret interrogation
program,The New Yorker, Jane
Mayer
31 Mar 07 Another
Guantanamo prosectur faces torture evidence, challenges hierarchy,
WSJ, Jess Bravin
31 Mar 07 Detainee
Alleges Abuse in CIA Prison, Washington Post, Josh White and Ann
Scott Tyson
25 Mar 07 The
President’s Prison: George Bush does not want to be rescued, NYT,
editorial
28 Feb 07 New
Light Shed on CIA's 'Black Site' Prisons, Washington Post, Dafna
Linzer, reader comments
21 Dec 06 Congress
must correct its mistaken elimination of habeas corpus,
Washington
Post, editorial
16
Dec 06 Tortured Canadian Still
on U.S. 'Watch List', Washington Post, Doug
Struck
16
Dec 06 Testimony Helps Detail CIA's
Post-9/11 Reach, Washington Post, Craig Whitlock
2006 Ghost
Plane: The Inside Story of the CIA's Secret rendition Programme,
Hurst & Co., Stephen Grey
29 Nov 06 Polish,
Romanian Facilities Cited in European CIA flights report Washington
Post, Craig Whitlock
29 Nov 06 Report
Rejects European Denial of C.I.A. Activity, NYT, Brian Knowlton
28 Nov 06 EU
Report Says Secret Prisons Were Known, AP, Constant Brand
22 Nov 06 How
to defeat the USA: What the Islamists Have Learned,
Weekly Standard, Michael Novak
4 Nov 06 U.S.
Seeks Silence on CIA Prisons, Washington Post, Carol D. Leonnig
and Eric Rich
26 Oct 06 CIA
tried to silence EU on torture flights, The Guardian, Richard Norton-Taylor
26 Oct 06 High-flying
lifestyle of the CIA's rendition men, The Guardian, Richard Norton-Taylor
8 Oct 06 Links
with "Rogue States": US Treasury leans on Western banks, The Observer,
Conal Walsh
7 Oct 06 Italian
prosecutors wrap up CIA kidnap case - criminal charges against up to 38,
Reuters
6 Oct 06 Canada
to formally protest to U.S. over deported man, CNN, Reuters
6 Oct 06 A
Look at U.S. Rendition Policy, CNN
6 Oct 06 Please
read the terrorists' mail first, Washington Post, editorial
5 Oct 06 Innocent
Canadian Citizen Maher Arar's rendition to Syria by way of Swiss airspace?,
Iconoclast
21 sep 06 Washington
invite les banques suisses à couper les liens avec l'Iran,
Le
Temps, Yves Genier
21 Sep 06 Former
terror suspect: 'I was beaten with a cable', CNN
15 Sep 06 Call
for EU states to reveal their involvement with CIA secret prisons,
European Parliament
8 Sep 06 Tell
us where the prisons are, says Europe after Bush's CIA admission,
Scotsman, A Higgins
7 Sep 06 President
Moves 14 Held in Secret to Guantánamo, NYT, Sheryl Gay Stolberg
6/7 Sep 06 Bush
acknowledges CIA prisons exist, IHT, Brian Knowlton
12 July 06 U.S.
Shifts Policy on Geneva Conventions, Washington Post, C. Babington
& M. Abramowitz
6.Juli 06 Der
CIA treu ergeben, FACTS, Martin Stoll
7 June 06 Rendition
and the rights of the individual, BBC News, Paul Reynolds
15
jan 06 «Nous restons persévérants
face aux Etats-Unis», Le Matin, Ludovic Rocchi
28 Nov 05
Could
The CIA Planes In Portugal And Europe Be Running Drugs?, BS
Report, Brenda Stardom
28 Nov 05 CIA
FLIGHTS IN EUROPE - The Hunt for Hercules N8183J, Der Spiegel,
Georg Mascolo et al.
9 Nov 05 Report
Warned C.I.A. on Tactics In Interrogation, NYT, Douglas
Jehl
2 Nov 05 CIA
Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, Washington Post, Dana
Priest
4 Aug 05 Third
military prosecutor says Guantanamo Bay trials rigged, Homeland,
Michael Hampton
1.Jun 04 Carlo
Schmid: "die USA sind im Moment
kein Rechtsstaat nach unserem Standard"
Suspected
CIA terror flights in Europe
Der Spiegel, Nov.28, 2005
05.1093
- Anfrage
Schweizerischer Luftraum, Flughäfen. Missbrauch
Eingereicht von Banga
Boris
Einreichungsdatum 17.06.2005
Eingereicht im Nationalrat
Stand der Beratung Erledigt
Eingereichter Text
Mit an Sicherheit grenzender Wahrscheinlichkeit ist nach heutigem
Kenntnisstand davon auszugehen, dass die USA, d. h. die CIA, eventuell
das FBI und andere Dienste, zivile Luftfahrzeuge für "renditions"
(zur Folterung nach Syrien, Ägypten, Jordanien, Marokko) und für
Entführungen von Terrorismusverdächtigen (zumindest drei Fälle
in Schweden und Italien bzw. Deutschland) verwendet haben und verwenden.
Nach den Genfer Konventionen und nach dem Uno Pakt II über die bürgerlichen
und politischen Rechte gilt nicht nur das Non-Refoulement-Prinzip, sondern
auch das absolute Folterverbot.
Dabei ist auch unser Land betroffen. Sowohl die dazu verwendete Boeing
737 (Business Jet) als auch eine Gulfstream überflogen nicht nur häufig
den schweizerischen Luftraum, sondern landeten auch mehrmals in Genf.
Die Boeing 737 ist registriert unter einer privaten Firma und hat ihre
Immatrikulation bereits mehrfach gewechselt. Auch die Gulfstream wechselt
laufend ihre Immatrikulation und gilt aktuell als Firmenflugzeug der Firma
Sikorsky. Beide Flugzeuge sind nicht "Standard" und weisen keinerlei Beschriftungen
auf. Hingegen besitzen sie spezielle Einstiegsleitern (Unabhängigkeit
von der Bodenorganisation) und besondere Antennen für Satcom.
1. Hat der Bundesrat Kenntnis von diesen Überflügen und Landungen
in der Schweiz und wie hat er reagiert?
2. Ist der Bundesrat bereit, bei verdächtigen Flugzeugen (sie
gelten nach der Landung auf dem Abstellplatz als exterritorial) die einzig
möglichen Kontrollen (Zoll und Bordbuch) lückenlos durchführen
zu lassen?
3. Ist der Bundesrat bereit, die USA in unmissverständlicher Form
zur Einhaltung insbesondere der Genfer Konventionen anzuhalten?
Antwort des Bundesrates vom 23.09.2005
1. Der Bundesrat hat von diesen Flügen aus der Presse erfahren.
In der Zwischenzeit getroffene Abklärungen haben ergeben, dass die
in der Anfrage beschriebenen und in der Presse mit Immatrikulation genannten
Flugzeuge am 24. Dezember 2003 sowie am 25. Januar und am 15. April 2004
in Genf gelandet und anschliessend nach Washington weitergeflogen sind.
Die Bewegungen im Luftverkehr von und nach der Schweiz können bei
Vorliegen konkreter Hinweise auf staatsschutzrelevante Vorgänge vom
Dienst für Analyse und Prävention des Eidgenössischen Justiz-
und Polizeidepartementes überprüft oder bei Vorliegen von konkreten
strafrechtlichen Verdachtsmomenten von den zuständigen Strafverfolgungsbehörden
bearbeitet werden, doch handelt es sich dabei nicht um systematische Überprüfungen
aller Flugvorgänge. Dies ist auch nicht möglich, weil täglich
hunderte von Flügen von und nach der Schweiz zu verzeichnen sind.
Für die beiden erwähnten Flüge aus den Jahren 2003 und 2004
lagen zum Zeitpunkt der Landung in der Schweiz keine Verdachtsmomente vor,
die eine eingehendere Überprüfung hätten erforderlich erscheinen
lassen.
Auch die nachträglichen Abklärungen ergaben keinerlei Hinweise,
dass die genannten Flüge in die Schweiz rechtswidrigen Zwecken gedient
hätten, namentlich dem unfreiwilligen Transport von Personen durch
die Schweiz oder der unfreiwilligen Verbringung von Personen aus der Schweiz.
2. In der Schweiz gelandete ausländische Luftfahrzeuge unterstehen
uneingeschränkt dem Schweizer Recht. Sie gelten nicht als exterritorial.
Die Zollgesetzgebung regelt abschliessend, welchen Kontrollen in der Schweiz
landende und ab der Schweiz abfliegende Luftfahrzeuge unterstehen. Sind
solche Kontrollen nach Zollrecht zwingend vorgeschrieben, werden sie entsprechend
auch lückenlos durchgeführt. Es handelt sich hierbei beispielsweise
um die Kontrolle des Ladungsmanifestes und, soweit Personen gewerbsmässig
befördert werden, des Reisendenverzeichnisses. Nach dem Auslad wird
das Luftfahrzeug zudem durch einen Zollbeamten besichtigt, wobei ihm auf
Verlangen sämtliche Räume, Schränke und Behältnisse
zu öffnen sind, die für die Vornahme der Besichtigung erforderlich
sind. Bei Verdachtsmomenten haben die Zollbehörden weiter jederzeit
die Möglichkeit, Kontrollen durchzuführen. Diese Verdachtsmomente
beschränken sich aber in der Regel auf die mögliche Verletzung
von Zollvorschriften. Technische Kontrollen an ausländischen Luftfahrzeugen
können gemäss den Vorgaben der europäischen Zivilluftfahrtorganisation
im Rahmen des Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft durch das Bazl durchgeführt
werden. Die Kontrollen hierbei beschränken sich aber auf rein technische
Aspekte wie z. B. Pilotenlizenzen, im Cockpit mitzuführende Dokumente,
die Sicherheitsausrüstung in Cockpit und Kabine sowie den allgemeinen
Zustand des Luftfahrzeuges.
3. Die Schweiz hat mehrmals sowohl auf multilateraler wie auch auf
bilateraler Ebene die grundlegende Bedeutung des Folterverbotes als zwingende
Bestimmung des Völkerrechtes in Erinnerung gerufen. Weiter haben Bundesrätin
Micheline Calmy-Rey und Staatssekretär Ambühl anlässlich
ihrer Besuche in Washington im Juni 2005 den amerikanischen Behörden
ein Memorandum übergeben, in welchem darauf hingewiesen wird, dass
die Überführung von Personen in Länder, in denen sie riskieren,
gefoltert zu werden, gegen das Folterverbot und das ebenfalls völkergewohnheitsrechtliche
Non-Refoulement-Prinzip verstösst. Nachdem in den Medien entsprechende
Berichte erschienen sind, hat das EDA die Botschaft der USA in Bern um
Klärung ersucht. Das EDA hat die Daten und die Immatrikulationen der
Botschaft übermittelt und festgehalten, dass, sollten sich diese Angaben
bestätigen, die Schweiz diese Praxis verurteilen und von den USA die
Einstellung dieser Flüge verlangen würde. Der Vertreter der USA
teilte mit, er werde die Anfrage weiterleiten und den Behörden in
Washington die Bedenken der Schweiz zur Kenntnis bringen. Die Schweiz wird
eine offizielle Antwort erhalten.
Washington Post
November 2, 2005
CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons
Debate Is Growing Within Agency About Legality and
Morality
of Overseas System Set Up After 9/11
By Dana Priest
The CIA has been hiding and interrogating some of its most important
al Qaeda captives at a Soviet-era compound in Eastern Europe, according
to U.S. and foreign officials familiar with the arrangement.
The secret facility is part of a covert prison system set up by the
CIA nearly four years ago that at various times has included sites in eight
countries, including Thailand, Afghanistan and several democracies in Eastern
Europe, as well as a small center at the Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba,
according to current and former intelligence officials and diplomats from
three continents.
In
Afghanistan, the largest CIA covert prison was code-named the Salt Pit,
at center left above. (Space Imaging Middle East)
The hidden global internment network is a central element in the CIA's
unconventional war on terrorism. It depends on the cooperation of foreign
intelligence services, and on keeping even basic information about the
system secret from the public, foreign officials and nearly all members
of Congress charged with overseeing the CIA's covert actions.
The existence and locations of the facilities -- referred to as "black
sites" in classified White House, CIA, Justice Department and congressional
documents -- are known to only a handful of officials in the United States
and, usually, only to the president and a few top intelligence officers
in each host country.
The CIA and the White House, citing national security concerns and the
value of the program, have dissuaded Congress from demanding that the agency
answer questions in open testimony about the conditions under which captives
are held. Virtually nothing is known about who is kept in the facilities,
what interrogation methods are employed with them, or how decisions are
made about whether they should be detained or for how long.
While the Defense Department has produced volumes of public reports
and testimony about its detention practices and rules after the abuse scandals
at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison and at Guantanamo Bay, the CIA has not even
acknowledged the existence of its black sites. To do so, say officials
familiar with the program, could open the U.S. government to legal challenges,
particularly in foreign courts, and increase the risk of political condemnation
at home and abroad.
But the revelations of widespread prisoner abuse in Afghanistan and
Iraq by the U.S. military -- which operates under published rules and transparent
oversight of Congress -- have increased concern among lawmakers, foreign
governments and human rights groups about the opaque CIA system. Those
concerns escalated last month, when Vice President Cheney and CIA Director
Porter J. Goss asked Congress to exempt CIA employees from legislation
already endorsed by 90 senators that would bar cruel and degrading treatment
of any prisoner in U.S. custody.
Although the CIA will not acknowledge details of its system, intelligence
officials defend the agency's approach, arguing that the successful defense
of the country requires that the agency be empowered to hold and interrogate
suspected terrorists for as long as necessary and without restrictions
imposed by the U.S. legal system or even by the military tribunals established
for prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay.
The Washington Post is not publishing the names of the Eastern European
countries involved in the covert program, at the request of senior U.S.
officials. They argued that the disclosure might disrupt counterterrorism
efforts in those countries and elsewhere and could make them targets of
possible terrorist retaliation.
The secret detention system was conceived in the chaotic and anxious
first months after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, when the working assumption
was that a second strike was imminent.
Since then, the arrangement has been increasingly debated within the
CIA, where considerable concern lingers about the legality, morality and
practicality of holding even unrepentant terrorists in such isolation and
secrecy, perhaps for the duration of their lives. Mid-level and senior
CIA officers began arguing two years ago that the system was unsustainable
and diverted the agency from its unique espionage mission.
"We never sat down, as far as I know, and came up with a grand strategy,"
said one former senior intelligence officer who is familiar with the program
but not the location of the prisons. "Everything was very reactive. That's
how you get to a situation where you pick people up, send them into a netherworld
and don't say, 'What are we going to do with them afterwards?' "
It is illegal for the government to hold prisoners in such isolation
in secret prisons in the United States, which is why the CIA placed them
overseas, according to several former and current intelligence officials
and other U.S. government officials. Legal experts and intelligence officials
said that the CIA's internment practices also would be considered illegal
under the laws of several host countries, where detainees have rights to
have a lawyer or to mount a defense against allegations of wrongdoing.
Host countries have signed the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as has the United
States. Yet CIA interrogators in the overseas sites are permitted to use
the CIA's approved "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques," some of which are
prohibited by the U.N. convention and by U.S. military law. They include
tactics such as "waterboarding," in which a prisoner is made to believe
he or she is drowning.
Some detainees apprehended by the CIA and transferred to foreign intelligence
agencies have alleged after their release that they were tortured, although
it is unclear whether CIA personnel played a role in the alleged abuse.
Given the secrecy surrounding CIA detentions, such accusations have heightened
concerns among foreign governments and human rights groups about CIA detention
and interrogation practices.
The contours of the CIA's detention program have emerged in bits and
pieces over the past two years. Parliaments in Canada, Italy, France, Sweden
and the Netherlands have opened inquiries into alleged CIA operations that
secretly captured their citizens or legal residents and transferred them
to the agency's prisons.
More than 100 suspected terrorists have been sent by the CIA into the
covert system, according to current and former U.S. intelligence officials
and foreign sources. This figure, a rough estimate based on information
from sources who said their knowledge of the numbers was incomplete, does
not include prisoners picked up in Iraq.
The detainees break down roughly into two classes, the sources said.
About 30 are considered major terrorism suspects and have been held
under the highest level of secrecy at black sites financed by the CIA and
managed by agency personnel, including those in Eastern Europe and elsewhere,
according to current and former intelligence officers and two other U.S.
government officials. Two locations in this category -- in Thailand and
on the grounds of the military prison at Guantanamo Bay -- were closed
in 2003 and 2004, respectively.
A second tier -- which these sources believe includes more than 70 detainees
-- is a group considered less important, with less direct involvement in
terrorism and having limited intelligence value. These prisoners, some
of whom were originally taken to black sites, are delivered to intelligence
services in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Afghanistan and other countries, a
process sometimes known as "rendition." While the first-tier black sites
are run by CIA officers, the jails in these countries are operated by the
host nations, with CIA financial assistance and, sometimes, direction.
Morocco, Egypt and Jordan have said that they do not torture detainees,
although years of State Department human rights reports accuse all three
of chronic prisoner abuse.
The top 30 al Qaeda prisoners exist in complete isolation from the outside
world. Kept in dark, sometimes underground cells, they have no recognized
legal rights, and no one outside the CIA is allowed to talk with or even
see them, or to otherwise verify their well-being, said current and former
and U.S. and foreign government and intelligence officials.
Most of the facilities were built and are maintained with congressionally
appropriated funds, but the White House has refused to allow the CIA to
brief anyone except the House and Senate intelligence committees' chairmen
and vice chairmen on the program's generalities.
The Eastern European countries that the CIA has persuaded to hide al
Qaeda captives are democracies that have embraced the rule of law and individual
rights after decades of Soviet domination. Each has been trying to cleanse
its intelligence services of operatives who have worked on behalf of others
-- mainly Russia and organized crime.
Origins of the Black Sites
The idea of holding terrorists outside the U.S. legal system was not
under consideration before Sept. 11, 2001, not even for Osama bin Laden,
according to former government officials. The plan was to bring bin Laden
and his top associates into the U.S. justice system for trial or to send
them to foreign countries where they would be tried.
"The issue of detaining and interrogating people was never, ever discussed,"
said a former senior intelligence officer who worked in the CIA's Counterterrorist
Center, or CTC, during that period. "It was against the culture and they
believed information was best gleaned by other means."
On the day of the attacks, the CIA already had a list of what it called
High-Value Targets from the al Qaeda structure, and as the World Trade
Center and Pentagon attack plots were unraveled, more names were added
to the list. The question of what to do with these people surfaced quickly.
The CTC's chief of operations argued for creating hit teams of case
officers and CIA paramilitaries that would covertly infiltrate countries
in the Middle East, Africa and even Europe to assassinate people on the
list, one by one.
But many CIA officers believed that the al Qaeda leaders would be worth
keeping alive to interrogate about their network and other plots. Some
officers worried that the CIA would not be very adept at assassination.
"We'd probably shoot ourselves," another former senior CIA official
said.
The agency set up prisons under its covert action authority. Under U.S.
law, only the president can authorize a covert action, by signing a document
called a presidential finding. Findings must not break U.S. law and are
reviewed and approved by CIA, Justice Department and White House legal
advisers.
Six days after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush signed a sweeping
finding that gave the CIA broad authorization to disrupt terrorist activity,
including permission to kill, capture and detain members of al Qaeda anywhere
in the world.
It could not be determined whether Bush approved a separate finding
for the black-sites program, but the consensus among current and former
intelligence and other government officials interviewed for this article
is that he did not have to.
Rather, they believe that the CIA general counsel's office acted within
the parameters of the Sept. 17 finding. The black-site program was approved
by a small circle of White House and Justice Department lawyers and officials,
according to several former and current U.S. government and intelligence
officials.
Deals With 2 Countries
Among the first steps was to figure out where the CIA could secretly
hold the captives. One early idea was to keep them on ships in international
waters, but that was discarded for security and logistics reasons.
CIA officers also searched for a setting like Alcatraz Island. They
considered the virtually unvisited islands in Lake Kariba in Zambia, which
were edged with craggy cliffs and covered in woods. But poor sanitary conditions
could easily lead to fatal diseases, they decided, and besides, they wondered,
could the Zambians be trusted with such a secret?
Still without a long-term solution, the CIA began sending suspects it
captured in the first month or so after Sept. 11 to its longtime partners,
the intelligence services of Egypt and Jordan.
A month later, the CIA found itself with hundreds of prisoners who were
captured on battlefields in Afghanistan. A short-term solution was improvised.
The agency shoved its highest-value prisoners into metal shipping containers
set up on a corner of the Bagram Air Base, which was surrounded with a
triple perimeter of concertina-wire fencing. Most prisoners were left in
the hands of the Northern Alliance, U.S.-supported opposition forces who
were fighting the Taliban.
"I remember asking: What are we going to do with these people?" said
a senior CIA officer. "I kept saying, where's the help? We've got to bring
in some help. We can't be jailers -- our job is to find Osama."
Then came grisly reports, in the winter of 2001, that prisoners kept
by allied Afghan generals in cargo containers had died of asphyxiation.
The CIA asked Congress for, and was quickly granted, tens of millions of
dollars to establish a larger, long-term system in Afghanistan, parts of
which would be used for CIA prisoners.
The largest CIA prison in Afghanistan was code-named the Salt Pit. It
was also the CIA's substation and was first housed in an old brick factory
outside Kabul. In November 2002, an inexperienced CIA case officer allegedly
ordered guards to strip naked an uncooperative young detainee, chain him
to the concrete floor and leave him there overnight without blankets. He
froze to death, according to four U.S. government officials. The CIA officer
has not been charged in the death.
The Salt Pit was protected by surveillance cameras and tough Afghan
guards, but the road leading to it was not safe to travel and the jail
was eventually moved inside Bagram Air Base. It has since been relocated
off the base.
By mid-2002, the CIA had worked out secret black-site deals with two
countries, including Thailand and one Eastern European nation, current
and former officials said. An estimated $100 million was tucked inside
the classified annex of the first supplemental Afghanistan appropriation.
Then the CIA captured its first big detainee, in March 28, 2002. Pakistani
forces took Abu Zubaida, al Qaeda's operations chief, into custody and
the CIA whisked him to the new black site in Thailand, which included underground
interrogation cells, said several former and current intelligence officials.
Six months later, Sept. 11 planner Ramzi Binalshibh was also captured in
Pakistan and flown to Thailand.
But after published reports revealed the existence of the site in June
2003, Thai officials insisted the CIA shut it down, and the two terrorists
were moved elsewhere, according to former government officials involved
in the matter. Work between the two countries on counterterrorism has been
lukewarm ever since.
In late 2002 or early 2003, the CIA brokered deals with other countries
to establish black-site prisons. One of these sites -- which sources said
they believed to be the CIA's biggest facility now -- became particularly
important when the agency realized it would have a growing number of prisoners
and a shrinking number of prisons.
Thailand was closed, and sometime in 2004 the CIA decided it had to
give up its small site at Guantanamo Bay. The CIA had planned to convert
that into a state-of-the-art facility, operated independently of the military.
The CIA pulled out when U.S. courts began to exercise greater control over
the military detainees, and agency officials feared judges would soon extend
the same type of supervision over their detainees.
In hindsight, say some former and current intelligence officials, the
CIA's problems were exacerbated by another decision made within the Counterterrorist
Center at Langley.
The CIA program's original scope was to hide and interrogate the two
dozen or so al Qaeda leaders believed to be directly responsible for the
Sept. 11 attacks, or who posed an imminent threat, or had knowledge of
the larger al Qaeda network. But as the volume of leads pouring into the
CTC from abroad increased, and the capacity of its paramilitary group to
seize suspects grew, the CIA began apprehending more people whose intelligence
value and links to terrorism were less certain, according to four current
and former officials.
The original standard for consigning suspects to the invisible universe
was lowered or ignored, they said. "They've got many, many more who don't
reach any threshold," one intelligence official said.
Several former and current intelligence officials, as well as several
other U.S. government officials with knowledge of the program, express
frustration that the White House and the leaders of the intelligence community
have not made it a priority to decide whether the secret internment program
should continue in its current form, or be replaced by some other approach.
Meanwhile, the debate over the wisdom of the program continues among
CIA officers, some of whom also argue that the secrecy surrounding the
program is not sustainable. "It's just a horrible burden," said the intelligence
official.
Researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.
November 9, 2005
Report Warned C.I.A. on Tactics In Interrogation
WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 - A classified report issued last
year by the Central Intelligence Agency's inspector general warned that
interrogation procedures approved by the C.I.A. after the Sept. 11 attacks
might violate some provisions of the international Convention Against Torture,
current and former intelligence officials say.
The previously undisclosed findings from the report, which was completed
in the spring of 2004, reflected deep unease within the C.I.A. about the
interrogation procedures, the officials said. A list of 10 techniques authorized
early in 2002 for use against terror suspects included one known as waterboarding,
and went well beyond those authorized by the military for use on prisoners
of war.
The convention, which was drafted by the United Nations, bans torture,
which is defined as the infliction of "severe" physical or mental pain
or suffering, and prohibits lesser abuses that fall short of torture if
they are "cruel, inhuman or degrading." The United States is a signatory,
but with some reservations set when it was ratified by the Senate in 1994.
The report, by John L. Helgerson, the C.I.A.'s inspector general, did
not conclude that the techniques constituted torture, which is also prohibited
under American law, the officials said. But Mr. Helgerson did find, the
officials said, that the techniques appeared to constitute cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment under the convention.
The agency said in a written statement in March that "all approved interrogation
techniques, both past and present, are lawful and do not constitute torture."
It reaffirmed that statement on Tuesday, but would not comment on any classified
report issued by Mr. Helgerson. The statement in March did not specifically
address techniques that could be labeled cruel, inhuman or degrading, and
which are not explicitly prohibited in American law.
The officials who described the report said it discussed particular
techniques used by the C.I.A. against particular prisoners, including about
three dozen terror suspects being held by the agency in secret locations
around the world. They said it referred in particular to the treatment
of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is said to have organized the Sept. 11 attacks
and who has been detained in a secret location by the C.I.A. since he was
captured in March 2003. Mr. Mohammed is among those believed to have been
subjected to waterboarding, in which a prisoner is strapped to a board
and made to believe that he is drowning.
In his report, Mr. Helgerson also raised concern about whether the use
of the techniques could expose agency officers to legal liability, the
officials said. They said the report expressed skepticism about the Bush
administration view that any ban on cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
under the treaty does not apply to C.I.A. interrogations because they take
place overseas on people who are not citizens of the United
States.
The current and former intelligence officials who described Mr. Helgerson's
report include supporters and critics of his findings. None would agree
to be identified by name, and none would describe his conclusions in specific
detail. They said the report had included 10 recommendations for changes
in the agency's handling of terror suspects, but they would not say what
those recommendations were.
Porter J. Goss, the C.I.A. director, testified this year that eight
of the report's recommendations had been accepted, but did not describe
them. The inspector general is an independent official whose auditing role
at the agency was established by Congress, but whose reports to the agency's
director are not binding.
Some former intelligence officials said the inspector general's findings
had been vigorously disputed by the agency's general counsel. To date,
the Justice Department has brought charges against only one C.I.A. employee
in connection with prisoner abuse, and prosecutors have signaled that they
are unlikely to bring charges against C.I.A. officers in several other
cases involving the mishandling of prisoners in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
But the current and former intelligence officials said Mr. Helgerson's
report had added to apprehensions within the agency about gray areas in
the rules surrounding interrogation procedures.
"The ambiguity in the law must cause nightmares for intelligence officers
who are engaged in aggressive interrogations of Al Qaeda suspects and other
terrorism suspects," said John Radsan, a former assistant general counsel
at the agency who left in 2004. Mr. Radsan, now an associate professor
at William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul, would not comment on Mr.
Helgerson's report.
Congressional officials said the report had emerged as an unstated backdrop
in the debate now under way on Capitol Hill over whether the C.I.A. should
be subjected to the same strict rules on interrogation that the military
is required to follow. In opposing an amendment sponsored by Senator John
McCain, Republican of Arizona,
Mr. Goss and Vice President Dick
Cheney have argued that the C.I.A. should be granted an exemption allowing
it extra latitude, subject to presidential authorization, in interrogating
high-level terrorists abroad who might have knowledge about future attacks.
The issue of the agency's treatment of detainees arose shortly after
the attacks of Sept. 11, after C.I.A. officers became involved in interrogating
prisoners caught in Afghanistan, and the agency sought legal guidance on
how far its employees and contractors could go in interrogating terror
suspects, current and former intelligence officials said.
The list of 10 techniques, including feigned drowning, was secretly
drawn up in early 2002 by a team that included senior C.I.A. officials
who solicited recommendations from foreign governments and from agency
psychologists, the officials said. They said officials from the Justice
Department and the National Security Council, which is part of the White
House, were involved in the process.
Among the few known documents that address interrogation procedures
and that have been made public is an August 2002 legal opinion by the Justice
Department, which said that interrogation methods just short of those that
might cause pain comparable to "organ failure, impairment of bodily function
or even death" could be allowable without being considered torture. The
administration disavowed that classified legal opinion in the summer of
2004 after it was publicly disclosed.
A new opinion made public in December 2004 and, signed by James B. Comey,
then the deputy attorney general, explicitly rejected torture and adopted
more restrictive standards to define it. But a cryptic footnote to the
new document about the "treatment of detainees" referred to what the officials
said were other still-classified opinions. Officials have said that the
footnote meant that coercive techniques approved by the Justice Department
under the looser interpretation of the torture statutes were still lawful
even under the new, more restrictive standards.
It remains unclear whether all 10 of the so-called enhanced procedures
approved in early 2002 remain authorized for use by the C.I.A. In an unclassified
report this summer, the Senate Intelligence Committee referred briefly
to Mr. Helgerson's report and said that the agency had fully put in effect
only 5 of his 10 recommendations. But in testimony before Congress in February
Mr. Goss said that eight had.
Some former intelligence officials have said the C.I.A. imposed tighter
safeguards on its interrogation procedures after the abuses at Abu Ghraib
prison came to light in May 2004. That was about the same time Mr. Helgerson
completed his report.
The agency issued its earlier statement on the legality of approved
interrogation techniques after Mr. Goss, in testimony before Congress on
March 17, said that all interrogation techniques used "at this time" were
legal but declined, when asked, to make the same broad assertion about
practices used over the past few years.
On March 18, Jennifer Millerwise Dyck, the agency's director of public
affairs, said that "C.I.A. policies on interrogation have always followed
legal guidance from the Department of Justice."
BS Report
28 November 2005
Could the CIA planes in Portugal and Europe be running
drugs?
Brenda Stardom
I know this sounds out there, but I can't shake the feeling they're
on a mission to saturate Europe with cocaine. One has to only remember
the war waged on Nicarauga and all the exposés which followed proving
the CIA was running drugs, not to mention supplying the gangs in South
Central Los Angeles with crack. Snakes!
When I first read about this, I felt my inner bs meter shoot up when
it was said they were making stopovers to transport terrorist suspects
to secret interrogation/torture centers in Eastern Europe and even Gitmo.
An airport in Porto? The hub is via Lisboa and south, Algarve, so Faro
would make sense. Those weren't the airports named. The base at Lajes has
been brought into it, The government in power is coughing and sputtering,
the left is demanding a major investigation.
Check any CIA factbook and a lot of other sources which all claim Portugal
is the gateway for drugs, especially coke from South America, Afghanistan
for heroin and Morocco for hashish. A big report came out recently which
revealed cocaine use is at an all time high in Spain and Britain, with
Portugal right in there. Portuguese publications have run articles about
the decline in heroin use and how the drug of choice now is cocaine and,
get this, the users in one article were 13 to 15 years old. This country
is awash in drugs and now there's a Columbian connection due to the cocaine.
Hey, the junkie rate declines, heroin isn't selling that well, but wow,
let's give 'em a taste of cocaine. It has to get here somehow and how better
to get it here from Colombia but by the CIA?
Back to those planes. I've been told by too many reputable people and
have also believed the CIA are the biggest drug lords on the planet. I
found an article from Columbia Tribune about how it was very unlikely the
secret prisons exist, which was mostly about the flights, but the part
I zeroed in on was at the end:
The Portuguese government said it was consulting with the U.S. government
after Diario de Noticias reported Friday that 34 planes that landed in
Portugal over the past three years were suspected of involvement in secret
CIA operations.
Secret? Hmmm. When this first broke it was 3 planes and the year has
changed from 2003 to 2005. Another suspicion-raiser were reports of a huge
drug bust, the first on the 22nd of November, the others on the 26th or
27th, depending on where it was read. From Xinhuanet:
LISBON, Nov. 22 (Xinhuanet) --Portugal's Judicial Police (PJ) announced
on Tuesday that they seized 6.1 tons of cocaine and arrested seven suspects
during a raid on Monday.
Though it's a bit different the players seem to be the same. The first
bust report stated,
The cocaine came from Colombia. A Colombian and six Frenchmen were
arrested in the raid.
. The later bust as reported by UPI;
LISBON, Portugal, Nov. 26 (UPI) -- Portuguese police have seized more
than 7 tons of cocaine and arrested six people, including a Frenchman under
investigation in Spain for money laundering.
Both included either 5 to 6 Frencmen and one Colombian. If there were
really a second record bust in 6 days, that news would have had the headlines
screaming 13 Tons and what do you get? News. This hasn't been news as there
was no two and two to put together. Why? It doesn't make sense, and I feel
more confused than when I first began writing. I can't see this having
anything to do with the CIA planes, unless that other report about the
Spanish finding 2 tons of coke destined for the Netherlands plays a part.
Link. Hmm. The last report of a CIA plane landing there was a week ago
according to the Columbian Tribune.
Stop the GD presses. It sure pays to search in many different ways.
After finding the plane that landed in the Netherlands was from a CIA front,
"Path Corp" I searched that with CIA. I found a blog, xer-files that has
me whistling even though I have a mouthful of crackers. Woootwooot. The
first entry was about the Path plane. The entry before is what roped and
pulled me in:
November 24, 2005 -- LATE NEWS -- The Frequency Monitoring Centre in
the Netherlands is now reporting on yet another CIA prisoner aircraft transiting
Schipol East Airport in Amsterdam. The plane departed Schipol on November
18, 2005 enroute to Reykjavik, Iceland. The plane, a DeHavilland Dash 8-315B
(registration N505LL) flew to Amsterdam from Sabiha Gökçen
Airport in Istanbul, Turkey on November 16, 2005. The plane is registered
to Path Corporation, a CIA front company. (Path owns three other aircraft:
N120JM (Fairchild.SA227-AT), N212CP (Cessna/208B), and N221SG (Gates Learjet
Corp 35A). N505LL was photographed at Chandler Airport in Phoenix on May
18, 2005 and has been seen in Afghanistan on CIA covert missions.
Turkey? Afghanistan? Whoa. Where do the drugs come from? Where are
they consumed? What is Amsterdam known for? I don't feel quite as ridiculous
as when I first began this wondering if the CIA were transporting drugs,
not terrorists. I'm going to stand by this hunch, like I would my man.
The feeling is that strong. In the meantime, Portugal plays a major role,
even if the players are usually another nationality. I don't understand
why the borders and the waters aren't more patrolled, unless...oh yes,
they're still doing for the CIA what they've done since the revolution
30-some years ago. Whatever is asked.
Just think about it. Iraq is costing more than the US can afford. All
wars have been paid for with drug money, so what makes things different
now? The CIA has always been the top dog. What makes that different? Not
a damn thing. It will always be business as usual and nothing anyone can
come up with to prove what I'm sensing is true, will mean a thing. These
agencies all play the same game -- there're no separate teams, in spite
of what the news, Hollywood or the White House want you to believe.
There you have it. I feel better having written out what's been stuck
inside for over a week now. I could be totally wrong or totally right,
but will never know. Hell, they could be transporting both -- terrorist
suspects and drugs, a most sick and slick operation that only the CIA can
get away with. Snakes.
DER SPIEGEL
48/2005 - November 28, 2005
CIA FLIGHTS IN EUROPE
The
Hunt for Hercules N8183J
By Georg Mascolo, Hans-Jürgen Schlamp and Holger Stark
A bitter debate over torture has erupted in Europe. Washington is believed
to have used EU countries as transit points for moving terrorism suspects
to clandestine locations where they may have been tortured. The Council
of Europe and other organizations are now demanding answers -- from the
US and European countries who looked the other way.
Dick Marty, a liberal-minded Swiss citizen with a gray beard, glasses
and a high forehead, knows what it's like to face a powerful opponent.
As a prosecutor, he once successfully prosecuted the Mafia. His current
adversary is just as intimidating and perhaps even more secretive than
the Mafia. It's the United States Central Intelligence Agency, which, in
an effort to back the White House, has responded to the Sept. 11, 2001
attacks by kidnapping terrorism suspects and presumably abusing them in
secret prisons. Now the Council of Europe has hired Marty to find out which
European countries may have helped the US agents achieve their objectives.
Last Friday, the Swiss prosecutor made it clear that he has no compunctions
about picking a fight with the world's sole remaining superpower. A self-confident
Marty filed a request with the European Union's satellite center in Torrejón,
Spain for satellite photographs from the past three years. He hopes to
use the images to determine whether the alleged secret prisons did in fact
exist, in countries like Poland and Romania. He also contacted the European
aviation authority, Eurocontrol, asking for data on the flight movements
of 31 aircraft suspected of having served as CIA shuttles for the transport
of prisoners or abducted terrorism suspects.
Marty's mission touches on a hot-button issue -- and it's the first
serious attempt to investigate and expose an arbitrary system Washington
has allegedly used as one of its most effective weapons in combating terrorism.
The US agents have used torture-like methods that many experts believe
violate international law to extract statements from suspected members
of al-Qaida. Until now, Washington's European allies have consistently
looked the other way when it came to this notorious aspect of the worldwide
counterterrorism effort.
A regular CIA gulag appears to have been created in recent years, with
many prisoners kept in Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and various central
Asian nations, places where the CIA was given access to the prisoners at
all times. Alvaro Gil-Robles, Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council
of Europe, also claims to have seen a suspicious-looking prison camp at
Camp Bondsteel, an American base in Kosovo.
But the highest-ranking al-Qaida members are apparently kept moving
with a small group of CIA interrogation experts, like an invisible caravan,
from one of the so-called black sites to another. Outrage over claims that
some of these secret prisons may be located at former military bases in
Eastern Europe triggered the Council of Europe's investigation.
Turning a blind eye to human rights violations?
In the past, the Europeans turned a blind eye to the Americans' human
rights violations. After all, Islamist terror was considered more dangerous
and, more importantly, was being committed by a common enemy. But now European
politicians have had enough.
Marty secretly hopes for trans-Atlantic cooperation, and he may well
get it. A heated debate has broken out in the United States over whether
the West's leading power can resort to torture when it believes its national
security is under threat. The Bush administration's draconian methods have
met with sharp resistance in the US Senate. US President George W. Bush,
for his part, has threatened to veto an amendment that would require the
CIA -- like any other US government agency -- to use only methods allowed
under international law to extract information from its prisoners. Vice
President Dick Cheney's vehement efforts to obstruct the amendment even
prompted former CIA Director Stansfield Turner to angrily label Cheney
a "vice president for torture."
Another amendment the US Congress recently approved would give the US
government 60 days to present a detailed report on the secret CIA prisons,
or black sites. Specifically, Congress wants information on both the locations
of these sites and all the interrogation methods allegedly used there.
In other words, it appears that the US Congress and Swiss prosecutor Marty
are both urgently seeking the same information.
The Council of Europe's investigator already submitted a discreet request
to the office of Democratic Senator John Kerry, who proposed the amendment,
asking for information on the outcome of the report. Meanwhile, however,
Marty can at least look forward to receiving informal help. In light of
the heated debate over torture in Washington, the prospects of keeping
the highly confidential report under wraps are slim.
The White House is increasingly coming under fire, especially in light
of the difficulties Bush is having in convincing his fellow Americans that
he is, in fact, winning the global war against terrorism. Indeed, every
attempt on the part of the administration to suppress the revolt in the
Senate against White House-sanctioned interrogation practices has so far
failed.
The US does not engage in torture, but rather "unique and innovative"
methods of prisoner interrogation, explains CIA Director Porter Goss. But
what these methods entail has since become public knowledge. Under the
policy, blows to the face and the abdomen are allowed, as is the apparently
routine practice of forcing prisoners to stand for 40-hour periods in ice-cold
cells while periodically spraying them with cold water. In an especially
repugnant practice known as waterboarding, the prisoner is made to believe
that he is drowning. "We must never simply fight evil with evil," says
Republican Senator John McCain, himself a torture victim during the Vietnam
War. "It will kill us."
European governments in the hot seat
The investigations in Europe are also acquiring a new sense of urgency,
prompted by an official investigation request filed by the Council of Europe,
which arrived in European capitals last Tuesday and has made officials
nervous in several member states, including Germany. In a questionnaire
accompanying the request, Terry Davis, the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe, asks for information on the "activities of foreign services"
on German soil and demands an investigation into the possible abduction
of suspected al-Qaida activists. The request also includes questions about
prisoner "transport by air."
The German government will have some explaining to do, especially when
it comes to charges that the German authorities turned a blind eye to the
Americans having used their military base in Frankfurt am Main, which was
just closed in October, Berlin's Schönefeld Airport and the US military
base in Ramstein essentially as European transfer stations for their secret
prisoner transports.
British journalist Stephen Grey, who claims to have a list of the flight
movements of CIA aircraft, says he has discovered 210 suspicious flights
in England alone. In January 2003, the Austrian air force even sent up
two fighter jets to check on a suspicious Hercules flying under registration
number N8183J. An investigation later revealed that the plane had taken
off from the Rhine-Main Airbase in Frankfurt and was operated by Tepper
Aviation, which is considered a CIA front company.
The German government has long been unofficially aware of such episodes.
But it too has no knowledge of what or who was actually being transported
on the aircraft. Nevertheless, Berlin has yet to follow the lead of the
Danish government, which insisted that the Pentagon discontinue flights
in Danish airspace that are "incompatible with international conventions."
The Council of Europe also wants to know how the German government intends
to ensure that such activities on the part of "foreign agencies" are monitored
in the future -- and "to what extent domestic law provides for a suitable
response to such violations of the law," especially when they relate to
the "curtailment of liberty by foreign agencies."
In short, the Council of Europe wants to know what European governments
intend to do about CIA agents being allowed to fly their prisoners across
Europe with impunity. The Germans won't be the only ones with some explaining
to do by Feb. 21, the deadline for all member states to return the questionnaire.
The truth is that hardly any US ally in Europe has sufficiently met its
obligation to comply with the requirements of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which prohibits any form of torture.
In Germany, there is at least one documented case of the CIA abducting
Khaled el-Masri, from the southern city of Neu-Ulm. The story of Masri,
who was abducted in Macedonia in late 2003 and flown to Afghanistan in
January 2004, is one of the first cases to expose the secret CIA program.
Masri, who has had a German passport for the past decade, was interrogated
for months in a prison in Afghanistan, where he was likely tortured and,
after no evidence was found to incriminate him, was secretly flown back
to Europe in late May 2004. The case has drawn the attention of both the
German and the Spanish authorities, because the aircraft used to transport
Masri, a Boeing 737 with registration number N313P, was owned by a company
with ties to the CIA and made a stop on the Spanish island of Mallorca.
The German government must have known about the allegations by no later
than June 2004, when Masri's attorney, Manfred Gnjidic wrote to then Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer and the Federal Chancellery. The authorities reacted
as they often do in embarrassing situations, using behind-the-scenes diplomacy
in an attempt to make the problem go away.
At first, agents with Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND),
sent a discreet inquiry to their US counterparts with whom they normally
enjoy a close working relationship. The reply was succinct: it was a mistake,
the kind that happens now and then.
Then, in Feb. 2005, then Interior Minister Otto Schily flew to Washington
and met with CIA Director Goss. Schily demanded an explanation and an assurance
that the abductions would cease. But this time Schily, otherwise known
for his good relationship with the Bush administration, came away more
or less empty-handed.
In a similar case, the Italian Justice Ministry has attempted to exert
pressure on its own judiciary. Justice Minister Roberto Castelli publicly
chastised a Milan public prosecutor who caused trouble for Castelli by
filing an extradition request for 22 CIA agents. Prosecutor Armando Spataro
said that in February 2003 the US agents kidnapped Imam Abu Omar in broad
daylight in Milan, placed him on a Lear jet operated by CIA airline Tepper
Aviation, and sent him to Egypt via the US airbase in Ramstein, Germany.
If Castelli sends the extradition request to Washington, the move will
anger the Bush administration. But if he refuses, he'll irritate many Italians.
To avert either outcome, Castelli first plans to meticulously examine the
prosecutor's petition for signs of "leftist anti-Americanism."
Two Eastern European countries are coming under even more pressure than
Germany or Italy: Poland and Romania, both countries that apparently served
as temporary destinations for the CIA's secret al-Qaida transports. Insiders
in Washington claim that the two countries also contained secret black
sites.
The issue is especially worrisome to the Romanians. If investigator
Marty, currently making inquiries in Bucharest, finds evidence of the existence
of a secret US prison, the country's planned accession to the EU in 2007
could be in jeopardy. But all other Europeans who, despite not having actively
supported the prisoner transports, looked the other way for too long will
hardly be able to avoid coming clean. "If it becomes apparent that flying
torture chambers are circling over Europe," threatens Martin Schulz, Social
Democratic group leader in the European Parliament, "there will be no getting
around an official inquiry."
Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
Correction Appended: A correction has been made to this text.
Through a translation error, SPIEGEL Online incorrectly stated that Khaled
el-Masri was abducted by the CIA in the German city of Neu-Ulm. In fact,
he was abducted in Macedonia.
05.5244
- Fragestunde. Frage
Geheime CIA-Flüge
Eingereicht von Teuscher
Franziska
Einreichungsdatum 05.12.2005
Eingereicht im Nationalrat
Stand der Beratung Erledigt
Eingereichter Text
1. Hat eine Schweizer Behörde, und wenn ja, welche, über
Landung von geheimen CIA-Flugzeugen in der Schweiz Bescheid gewusst?
2. Da die Flüge angeblich geheim sind, wie hat das EDA davon erfahren?
3. Was wird das EDA unternehmen, wenn die USA weiterhin die Auskunft
über die Flüge verweigern?
Amtliches
Bulletin - die Wortprotokolle
05.5282
- Fragestunde. Frage
Geheime CIA-Flüge. Sofortige Aufklärung
ist notwendig
Eingereicht von Teuscher
Franziska
Einreichungsdatum 12.12.2005
Eingereicht im Nationalrat
Stand der Beratung Erledigt
Eingereichter Text
1. Wofür hat die Schweiz Geheimdienste, wenn der Bundesrat nicht
durch diese, sondern über die Presse von den geheimen CIA-Flügen
erfährt?
2. Seit wann weiss der Geheimdienst DAP von diesen Flügen?
3. Zieht der Bundesrat Sanktionen gegen die USA in Betracht, wenn er
keine Antwort auf seine Anfrage zu den CIA-Flügen von den USA bekommt?
Amtliches
Bulletin - die Wortprotokolle
05.1182
- Anfrage
Mutmassliche Rechtsverletzungen durch die CIA.
Ermittlungen der Schweiz
Eingereicht von Banga
Boris
Einreichungsdatum 14.12.2005
Eingereicht im Nationalrat
Stand der Beratung Erledigt
Eingereichter Text
Im Anschluss an meine Anfrage 05.1093 ersuche ich den Bundesrat um
die Beantwortung folgender Fragen:
- Sind die drei CIA-Jets mit den Nummern N379 (später N8068V und
N44982), N313P (später N4476S) und N85VM (später N227SV) zwischen
dem 11. September 2001 bis Ende 2002 in der Schweiz gelandet oder haben
sie die Schweiz überflogen? Wenn ja, wann?
- Haben andere in der internationalen Presse als CIA-Flugzeuge enttarnte
Maschinen vom September 2001 bis heute Überflüge oder Landungen
in der Schweiz getätigt? (Die wichtigsten Registraturen könnten
nachgeliefert werden.)
- Hat er von den USA Passagier- und Crewlisten für jeden nachweislichen
Überflug und für jede nachweisliche Landung von CIA-Maschinen
in der Schweiz verlangt? Wenn nein, ist er bereit, dies zu tun?
- Hat er oder eine andere Behörde überprüft, ob sich
zu den Zeitpunkten, an denen die genannten CIA-Flugzeuge auf Schweizer
Flughäfen standen, von Italien international gesuchte oder andere
CIA-Agenten unter den Gästen von örtlichen Hotels befanden? Wenn
nein, ist er bereit, diese Überprüfung machen zu lassen?
- Hat er überprüft, warum sich der von Italien wegen Entführung
gesuchte CIA-Agent Robert Sheldon Lady sowie mindestens zwei weitere Kommandomitglieder
nach der Entführung des Imams Abu Omar zwei Mal in Zürich aufhielten?
Wenn ja, was ergaben diese Überprüfungen? Wenn nein, ist er bereit,
dies auf geeignetem Weg zu überprüfen?
- Hat er überprüft, ob eine der beiden Maschinen, mit denen
Abu Omar via Ramstein nach Kairo verschleppt wurde, den Schweizer Luftraum
benützte? Wenn ja, was ergab diese Überprüfung? Wenn nein,
ist er bereit, diese Überprüfung vorzunehmen?
Antwort des Bundesrates vom 10.03.2006
- Gemäss den Ermittlungen flog der Jet mit der Nummer N379P (später
N8068V und N44982) zwischen 2001 und 2002 zehnmal über die Schweiz.
Der Jet mit der Nummer N313P (später N4476S) durchquerte den Schweizer
Luftraum am 24. November 2002 und am 1. Dezember 2002. Der Jet mit der
Nummer N85VM (später N227SV) flog am 8. November 2002, am 12. November
2002 und am 22. November 2002 über die Schweiz.
- Neben den in der Interpellation erwähnten Jets haben auch andere
Flugzeuge das Schweizer Hoheitsgebiet in der Zeit von September 2001 bis
heute überflogen. Zwischen dem 24. Dezember 2003 und dem 25. Januar
2004 gab es vier Landungen in Genf Cointrin. Der Bundesrat verfügt
jedoch weder im Falle der obenerwähnten Jets, noch im Falle der übrigen
Flugzeuge über Beweise, dass es sich um CIA-Flüge handelte, die
für den illegalen Gefangenentransport benutzt worden wären.
- Artikel 3 Buchstabe c des Übereinkommens über die internationale
Zivilluftfahrt, dem die Schweiz beigetreten ist, besagt, dass "ein Staatsluftfahrzeug
eines Vertragsstaates das Hoheitsgebiet eines anderen Staates nur überfliegen
oder dort landen darf, wenn es eine Bewilligung durch besondere Vereinbarung
erhalten hat". Gemäss Artikel 5 des Übereinkommens haben alle
im Nichtlinienflugverkehr eingesetzten Luftfahrzeuge der Vertragsstaaten
das Recht, in das Hoheitsgebiet eines anderen Vertragsstaates einzufliegen,
es ohne Landung zu überfliegen und nichtgewerbliche Landungen durchzuführen,
ohne vorher eine Genehmigung einholen zu müssen. In allen oben erwähnten
Fällen handelte es sich um nichtgewerbliche Flüge. Gemäss
Völkerrecht muss die Identität der Passagiere bei solchen Flügen
nicht bekannt gegeben werden. In der Praxis wäre eine Überprüfung
ihrer Identität kaum möglich. Bis jetzt gibt es keine Beweise
für CIA-Operationen auf Schweizer Hoheitsgebiet oder im schweizerischen
Luftraum, bei denen die Grundsätze des Völkerrechtes oder des
Schweizer Rechtes verletzt worden wären. Trotzdem hat der Bundesrat
die amerikanischen Behörden um weitere Informationen zu diesen Landungen
in Genf Cointrin gebeten, sobald er davon erfahren hatte, d. h. im Juni
2005.
Die angeblichen Aufenthalte der von Italien wegen Entführung gesuchten
CIA-Agenten in Schweizer Hotels sind Gegenstand von Ermittlungen der Bundesanwaltschaft.
Den erfolgten Nachforschungen zufolge soll ein von Aviano gestartetes
Flugzeug auf dem Weg nach Ramstein am 17. Februar 2003 über die Schweiz
geflogen sein. Ob Abu Omar an Bord war, entzieht sich der Kenntnis des
Bundesrates. Die amerikanischen Behörden wurden um Erläuterungen
gebeten, und die Bundesanwaltschaft hat Ermittlungen eingeleitet.
05.3842
- Motion
Keine Sonderbehandlung für die USA
Eingereicht von Müller
Geri
Einreichungsdatum 15.12.2005
Eingereicht im Nationalrat
Stand der Beratung Im Plenum noch nicht behandelt
Eingereichter Text
Der Bundesrat wird aufgefordert, folgende Massnahmen zu beschliessen:
1. Die USA werden deutlich für ihr völkerrrechtswidriges
Verhalten gerügt.
2. Die Administration der USA muss sich vor dem Gerichtshof im Haag
verantworten.
3. Die Schweiz stellt per sofort sämtliche polizeiliche und militärische
Zusammenarbeit ein und untersagt jeglichen Waffenhandel.
4. Die Schweiz führt eine lückenlose Untersuchung über
amerikanische Souveränitätsverletzungen in der Schweiz durch.
5. Die Schweiz untersagt ab sofort jegliche Überflüge und
Landungen von Flugzeugen, welche sich nicht den internationalen Normen
unterstellen. Sie akzeptiert keine "unbekannten Frachten" mehr.
6. Die Schweiz macht eine USA-unabhängige Analyse über die
Sicherheit in der Schweiz und schlägt geeignete Präventionsmassnahmen
vor. Diese werden insbesondere mit ihren Nachbarländern abgestimmt.
7. Die Schweiz bemüht sich um Uno-Reformen, welche es ermöglichen,
ein Regulativ zu erstellen, das alle Länder möglichst gleichberechtigt
behandelt.
Begründung
Die USA geben vor, weltweit der Vorreiter für die Demokratie
und Menschenrechte zu sein. In Wirklichkeit mehren sich die Verletzungen
des Völkerrechtes und der Menschenrechte. Die Liste ist lang: offene
(Iran, Afghanistan) und verdeckte Kriegführung (Venezuela, Kuba) gegen
mehrere Länder ohne Uno-Legitimation; Verletzung international festgelegter
Menschenrechte (Folter in Guantanamo und anderen Ländern, Folter in
von den USA kontrollierten Gefängnissen), Verletzung der Aufsichtspflicht
als internationale Truppe z. B. in Kosovo (Vertreibung von Hunderttausenden
Roma) zusammen mit anderen vor Ort stationierten Truppen. Die bisherigen
Ermittlungen in der CIA-Affäre von Dick Marty untermauern zusätzlich,
mit welchen völker- und menschenrechtswidrigen Methoden die USA umgehen.
Jedes andere Land würde im vergleichbaren Fall mehrfach gerügt
und sanktioniert werden. Die USA kommen mit kritischen Bemerkungen davon
("man müsste Massnahmen prüfen").
Vor diesem Hintergrund muss nun die Schweiz ihre beiden Rollen überprüfen,
wie sie gegenüber den USA und der Weltöffentlichkeit auftritt.
Zum einen ist sie Depositärstaat der Menschenrechtskonventionen. Damit
soll sie nicht bloss Staaten mit Menschenrechtsverletzungen konfrontieren,
welche keine Gegenmassnahmen ergreifen können (Kuba z. B.), sondern
gemäss den genauen, internationalen Vereinbarungen über Menschenrechtsverletzungen
Mass nehmen und alle rügen, welche diese Rechte systematisch verletzen.
Zum anderen ist die Schweiz auch ein souveränes Land, welches die
Wahl hat, mit wem sie wie kooperieren will. Es steht ihr dabei sehr schlecht
an, wenn sie weiterhin mit einem Land Waffenkäufe und -verkäufe
betreibt, das gemäss eigenen Angaben Krieg führt. Es ziemt sich
nicht, mit einem solchen Land Freihandelsabkommen abzuschliessen.
Stellungnahme des Bundesrates vom 10.03.2006
1. Die Schweiz hat die USA wiederholt auf hoher politischer Ebene
auf ihre Verpflichtungen unter dem Völkerrecht und insbesondere unter
dem humanitären Völkerrecht hingewiesen. In einem Memorandum,
das Staatssekretär Michael Ambühl am 14. Juni 2005 dem US-State
Department sowie Bundesrätin Micheline Calmy-Rey am 27. Juni 2005
der US-Aussenministerin Condoleezza Rice übergeben haben, drückte
die Schweiz ihre Besorgnis aus über den Status der Häftlinge
in Guantanamo sowie die Praxis der sogenannten "Extraordinary renditions"
und erinnerte an die Einhaltung der erwähnten völkerrechtlichen
Normen. Im Zusammenhang mit den angeblichen CIA-Flügen verlangte das
EDA von den USA seit Ende Juli 2005 wiederholt Auskunft. Am 8. Dezember
2005 übermittelte die US-Botschaft im Auftrag des State Departments
die Erklärung von Staatssekretärin Condoleezza Rice, wonach "the
United States has not transported anyone, and will not transport anyone,
to a country when we believe he will be tortured". Am 30. Januar 2006 haben
die USA gegenüber der Schweiz erklärt, dass sie den schweizerischen
Luftraum oder schweizerische Flughäfen nicht für illegale Gefangenentransporte
benutzt haben und die Souveränität der Schweiz auch in Zukunft
respektieren werden.
Es liegen den Schweizer Behörden keine Beweise vor, dass der Schweizer
Luftraum oder Schweizer Flughäfen von der CIA für illegale Tätigkeiten
benutzt wurden (vgl. Punkt 4).
2. Der Internationale Strafgerichtshof in Den Haag ist für die
individuelle Strafverfolgung zuständig. Das bedeutet, dass nur Individuen,
nicht aber Staaten vorgeladen werden dürfen. Zudem sind die USA nicht
Mitglied des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes. Streitigkeiten zwischen
Uno-Mitgliedstaaten können vom Internationalen Gerichtshof geregelt
werden, dessen Sitz sich ebenfalls in Den Haag befindet. Ein Fall kann
aber nur mit Zustimmung der betroffenen Staaten vor den Gerichtshof gebracht
werden. Es ist deshalb unmöglich, vor einem der beiden Gerichtshöfe
in Den Haag ein Verfahren gegen die USA anzustrengen. Der Bundesrat erachtet
ein solches Vorgehen auch nicht als opportun.
3. Bei einer Einstellung der Ein- und Ausfuhr von Kriegsmaterial mit
den USA wären sicherheitspolitische Konsequenzen in Rechnung zu stellen.
Die USA sind für die Schweiz ein bedeutender Lieferant von Kriegsmaterial
und tragen damit wesentlich zu der in Artikel 1 des Kriegsmaterialgesetzes
postulierten schweizerischen Versorgungssicherheit bei. Die wirtschaftlichen
Nachteile einer Einstellung der Lieferungen von Kriegsmaterial an die USA
würden zudem weit über die Rüstungsindustrie hinausreichen.
4. Die Bundesanwaltschaft hat Ermittlungen wegen Verdachtes auf verbotene
Handlungen für einen fremden Staat (Art. 271 StGB) eröffnet.
5. Der Überflug über schweizerischem Territorium unterliegt
der Respektierung des internationalen Rechtes, der schweizerischen Souveränität
und der Rechtsordnung der Schweiz. Die Schweiz und die USA sind Vertragsstaaten
des Chicago-Übereinkommens über die internationale Zivilluftfahrt,
welches Privatflugzeuge berechtigt, in das Hoheitsgebiet des anderen Vertragsstaates
einzufliegen, es zu überfliegen und nichtgewerbliche Landungen durchzuführen,
ohne eine Genehmigung einholen zu müssen. Das Bazl beteiligt sich
seit dem Jahre 2000 am Safa-Programm (Safety Assessment of Foreign Aircraft)
der Europäischen Zivilluftfahrtkonferenz (ECAC), welches auch polizeiliche
und zollrechtliche Kontrollen von gelandeten Flugzeugen zulässt. Diese
können allerdings nur bei begründetem Verdacht erfolgen und liegen
in der polizeilichen Befugnis der Kantone des entsprechenden Flughafens.
Bei den zur Frage stehenden Landungen in der Schweiz lagen keine Verdachtsmomente
vor, die damals eine Kontrolle begründet hätten.
Ausländische Militär- und andere ausländische Staatsluftfahrzeuge
dürfen nur mit einer vom Bazl erteilten Bewilligung (diplomatic clearance)
auf schweizerischem Hoheitsgebiet landen bzw. dieses überfliegen.
Die Schweiz hält in den entsprechenden Jahresbewilligungen neu fest,
dass die Benutzung des schweizerischen Luftraumes für Flüge,
die im Widerspruch zu den Regeln des Völkerrechtes stehen, nicht gestattet
ist. Aufgrund der amerikanischen Zusicherungen vom 30. Januar 2006 (vgl.
Punkt 1) erneuerte die Schweiz am 31. Januar 2006 die Jahresbewilligung
zur Benützung des schweizerischen Luftraumes gemäss geltendem
Recht und in voller Einhaltung des Völkerrechtes.
6. Die Schweiz führt Sicherheitsanalysen und die daraus abgeleiteten
Präventionsmassnahmen bereits regelmässig durch und stimmt diese
im erforderlichen Ausmass international ab.
7. Die Uno beruht gemäss ihrer Charta "auf dem Grundsatz der souveränen
Gleichheit aller ihrer Mitglieder". Gleichzeitig überträgt sie
insbesondere den ständigen Mitgliedern des Sicherheitsrates besondere
Kompetenzen, Pflichten und Aufgaben. Der Bundesrat befürwortet im
Rahmen der Uno-Reformen eine Erweiterung des Sicherheitsrates, die eine
bessere Vertretung der Entwicklungsländer ermöglicht und nicht
nur zum einseitigen Vorteil der Grossstaaten und zum Nachteil der übrigen
Länder erfolgt. Zudem setzt sich die Schweiz aktiv für die Erhöhung
der Transparenz und die Weiterentwicklung der Arbeitsmethoden des Sicherheitsrates
ein, damit sich alle Uno-Mitgliedstaaten in diesem Gremium besser beteiligen
können.
Erklärung des Bundesrates vom 10.03.2006
Der Bundesrat beantragt die Ablehnung der Motion.
Mitunterzeichnende Frösch Therese - Garbani Valérie
- Graf Maya - Huguenin Marianne - John-Calame Francine - Lang Josef - Leuenberger
Ueli - Menétrey-Savary Anne-Catherine - Rechsteiner Rudolf - Recordon
Luc - Rossini Stéphane - Roth-Bernasconi Maria - Salvi Pierre -
Savary Géraldine - Vanek Pierre - Vischer Daniel - Zisyadis Josef
(17)
Le Matin
15 janvier 2006
«Nous restons persévérants
face aux Etats-Unis»
PRISONS DE LA CIA
Micheline Calmy-Rey rompt le silence du Conseil fédéral
après l’affaire du fax
MICHELINE
CALMY-REY Pour la cheffe du Département fédéral des
affaires étrangères, la Suisse n’a pas à avoir honte
face à la question des prisons secrètes de la CIA: «Elle
fait partie des pays les plus persévérants pour obtenir des
informations sur d’éventuels transferts extrajudiciaires de prisonniers.»
Daniel Rihs
Ludovic Rocchi
BERNE Les Américains torturent-ils jusque dans des prisons de la
CIA en Europe, et tout cela en se servant de l’espace aérien suisse?
La révélation d’un fax intercepté par les services
secrets suisses a mis le Conseil fédéral sous pression. La
ministre des Affaires étrangères se jette à l’eau
Interview: –
Très franchement, avez-vous eu entre les mains le fameux fax
égyptien intercepté par les services secrets suisses et dont
les informations sur l’existence de prisons secrètes de la CIA en
Europe de l’Est ont fait l’objet d’une fuite dans la presse?
– Non, j’ai découvert une transcription de ce fax dans la presse
dominicale. Mais je n’avais pas vu le fax ni le document classé
secret. Selon la procédure fixée dans une ordonnance du Conseil
fédéral, trois de mes services avaient reçu une note
résumant des informations de ce fax, sans que la source soit mentionnée.
Ces informations ne différaient guère de celles contenues
dans un article du Washington Post et dans un rapport de l’organisation
Human Rights Watch.
– Le fax ne vous a-t-il donc rien appris?
– La note transmise à mes services n’a rien apporté de
fondamentalement neuf, et l’indiscrétion n’a rien changé
à notre politique étrangère dans ce domaine: les transferts
extrajudiciaires sont contraires au droit international public, les personnes
accusées doivent bénéficier d’une protection juridique,
et les interrogatoires sous torture sont strictement interdits.
– Vous sortez pourtant d’une semaine où le Conseil fédéral
n’a cessé d’être critiqué pour son silence voire sa
«servilité» à l’égard des Etats-Unis,
les prisons secrètes de la CIA et les soupçons de torture...
– Ces critiques m’étonnent, car la Suisse est intervenue très
tôt déjà. Elle fait partie des pays les plus persévérants
pour obtenir des informations sur d’éventuels transferts extrajudiciaires
de prisonniers. Dès fin juin 2005, j’avais transmis un mémorandum
à mon homologue américaine, Mme Condoleezza Rice, exprimant
notre position et nos préoccupations à cet égard.
–Quelles réponses avez-vous obtenues jusqu’ici?
– Nous n’avons été traités ni mieux ni moins bien
que les autres pays européens. Le 8 décembre dernier,Mme
Rice, lors de son passage en Europe, nous a fait transmettre copie de ses
déclarations – en substance, les Etats-Unis n’ont pas transporté
et ne transporteront quiconque vers un pays pratiquant la torture.
– Allez-vous en rester là, sachant que la présence de
prisons secrètes en Europe, la pratique de la torture et le survol
de la Suisse d’avions de la CIA avec des prisonniers privés de tout
droit se précisent de jour en jour?
– Nous restons persévérants face aux Etats-Unis et nous
continuons de leur demander des éclaircissements. Je précise
que nos démarches concernent 74 survols de la Suisse et 4 atterrissages
d’avions américains dont nous voulons savoir s’ils ont servi à
des transferts illégaux de prisonniers. Nous n’avons, en revanche,
pas à demander formellement de comptes aux Etats-Unis sur ce qui
se serait passé dans les autres pays européens.
– Ces autres pays, dont la Roumanie, sont mentionnés dans le
fameux fax. Se sont-ils plaints?
– De manière générale, les pays concernés
par ces informations ont réagi avec une certaine amertume. Ils ne
sont pas heureux d’être ainsi montrés du doigt. Et maintenant
ils nous demandent des preuves. A l’heure actuelle, nous n’en avons pas.
Mais nous sommes d’accord de partager les informations en notre possession.
– Et, avec les Etats-Unis, où en sont nos relations: Joseph
Deiss a fait savoir cette semaine que les pourparlers en vue d’un accord
commercial de libre-échange ne sont nullement perturbés alors
que vous avez laissé entendre le contraire?
– La fuite n’améliore pas l’atmosphère, mais il ne faut
pas surévaluer son effet. Surtout, le problème posé
par d’éventuels transferts extrajudiciaires et l’accord de libre-échange
sont deux dossiers distincts.
– Faut-il comprendre que vous ne sacrifierez pas la défense
des droits humains sur l’autel de nos intérêts commerciaux?
– La défense des droits humains est un des piliers de notre
politique étrangère et participe aussi de la défense
de nos intérêts. Nous avons clairement des divergences d’interprétation
avec les Etats-Unis sur le fait qu’il ne peut y avoir de trou juridique
dans la défense des droits humains en cas de guerre ou dans un autre
contexte. Mais ces divergences clairement exprimées n’empêchent
pas d’entretenir des relations bilatérales constructives dans les
domaines politiques, économiques ou autres.
– Le conseiller aux Etats Dick Marty, qui enquête sur les prisons
de la CIA pour le Conseil de l’Europe, se plaint dumanque de collaboration
de la Suisse. Allez-vous l’aider?
– Si nos informations intéressent M.Marty, nous lui répondrons
bien sûr dans toute la mesure du possible. Nous avons, par ailleurs,
reçu une demande d’information du secrétaire général
du Conseil de l’Europe, à laquelle nous aurons répondu d’ici
à la fin de janvier.
Les services secrets suisses ont tout faux
Maurice Botbol dirige depuis 1980 Intelligence Online, le site le plus
pointu sur les services de renseignements. Il ne raconte pas d’exploits
à la James Bond; sa spécialité est de donner avant
tout le monde le nom du nouveau patron du General Intelligence Department
jordanien ou de révéler l’existence de Sprint, un nouveau
logiciel d’analyse de renseignements. «A ma connaissance, c’est la
première fois qu’un service secret est contraint de reconnaître
qu’il est à l’écoute des pays étrangers.
C’est assez invraisemblable, car les espions ne respectent rien,sauf
leurs sources», constate Maurice Botbol. En d’autres termes, si les
services secrets ont l’habitude d’organiser des fuites, ils s’arrangent
pour que la presse ignore tout de la façon dont le document a été
obtenu. Il aurait été beaucoup plus judicieux de fournir
à SonntagsBlick une copie du fax égyptien original rédigé
en arabe. Autre faute impardonnable: les fax diplomatiques sont normalement
cryptés.
La Suisse montre qu’elle est capable de casser les codes utilisés
par Le Caire. «Or, dans ce métier, il ne faut surtout pas
montrer ses muscles. Au contraire, il faut faire croire aux pays étrangers
que leurs systèmes de sécurité sont sans faille pour
pouvoir les écouter facilement», s’amuse le directeur d’Intelligence
Online.
Un membre d’un service secret étranger en poste à Berne
se souvient qu’un ministre de la Défense s’était autrefois
vanté que son pays pouvait écouter les Iraniens. «Résultat:
Téhéran a changé tous ses systèmes de cryptage.
L’Iran a utilisé du matériel beaucoup plus sophistiqué,
et nous avons mis six ans avant de pouvoir de nouveau déchiffrer
leurs messages», raconte l’espion européen. Les services secrets
du monde entier seraient donc en train de maudire la Suisse.
Enfin, les spécialistes des services s’étonnent que l’on
ait choisi parmi des milliers d’interceptions un fax égyptien.
«Le Caire n’a guère la réputation d’être
pointue en matière d’espionnage. Sa principale préoccupation
se limite au «flicage» de ses opposants à Londres»,
ironise un membre des services secrets. Un fax sur les prisons de la CIA
émanant du Ministère des affaires étrangères
allemand, français ou britannique aurait été autrement
plus crédible. Bref, Berne a tout faux dans ce dossier.
Ian Hamel
www.intelligenceonline.fr
31. Januar 2006
ERKLÄRUNG DER GESCHÄFTSPRÜFUNGSDELEGATION
Die Schweiz und ihr Luftraum:
Benutzung für aussergerichtliche Gefangenentransporte
-
Veröffentlichung eines geheim klassifizierten
Dokuments
A. Gegenstand der Kontrolltätigkeit der Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation
Im Verlaufe des Jahres 2005 haben schweizerische
und ausländische Medien sowie Menschenrechtsorganisationen verschiedentlich
Behauptungen über mutmassliche Aktivitäten zur Terrorismusbekämpfung
der amerikanischen Nachrichtendienste in Europa aufgestellt. Gemäss
diesen Quellen hätten mehrere CIA-Flugzeuge das europäische Territorium
und/oder den europäischen Luftraum für illegale Gefangenentransporte
benutzt. In gewissen europäischen Ländern hätten sich geheime
Gefängnisse der CIA befunden oder befänden sich sogar heute noch
dort.
Diese Behauptungen führten zu mehreren parlamentarischen
Vorstössen (Frage Banga 05.1093,
Frage Günter 05.5232
und Fragen Teuscher 05.5244
und 05.5282).
Der Bundesrat beantwortete sie am 23. September, am 5. Dezember und am
12. Dezember 2005. Die Beantwortung weiterer parlamentarischer Vorstösse
ist noch ausstehend (Motion Müller Geri 05.3842,
Motion Zisyadis 05.3819,
Interpellation Lang 05.3744,
Fragen Banga 05.1181und
05.1182).
...
(Volltext)
BBC News
7 June 2006, 13:10 GMT
Rendition and the rights of the individual
By Paul Reynolds, World Affairs Correspondent
The outrage evident in the Council of Europe report on the secret CIA
rendition programme emerges from a clash between the methods used by the
United States to break up al-Qaeda networks and the sensitivities of human
rights mechanisms introduced into post-war Europe and designed not to permit
the unhindered use of government power.
The report's author, Swiss Senator Dick Marty, following up his earlier
draft findings, identified what he felt was the difference between the
responses to terrorism by Europe and the US:
"While the states of the Old World have dealt with these threats primarily
by means of existing institutions and legal systems, the United States
appears to have made a fundamentally different choice: considering that
neither conventional judicial instruments nor those established under the
framework of the laws of war could effectively counter the new forms of
international terrorism, it decided to develop new legal concepts. "This
legal approach is utterly alien to the European tradition and sensibility,
and is clearly contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
It is important to stress here that the argument is not about the origins
of the human rights mechanisms, the inspiration for which came as much
from the US as from Europe. It is about their application today.
American attitudes
The American decision to engage in counterterrorism beyond the reach
of national or international law arose from a desire - a need as Washington
saw the matter - to avoid the restrictions of the US law and constitution,
which protect individual rights. It therefore built not only Guantanamo
Bay, but a series of "black sites", or secret prisons around the world.
In these black sites, senior al-Qaeda suspects were held and interrogated,
sometimes by so-called "enhanced" methods.
For the Bush administration, authority for this came from a congressional
resolution passed on 14 September 2001. Under this resolution "the President
is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001... in
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons."
Specific authority for the CIA to act as it saw best against al-Qaeda
was then given by President Bush in a "presidential finding" on 17 September
2001.
Clash
It was therefore perhaps inevitable that one day, there would be a clash
between the operational requirements of the CIA and the legal concerns
of European human rights organisations, led by the Council of Europe, which
administers the European Convention on Human Rights. This clash is but
one element of the wider legal struggle that has seen efforts to get rights
for the Guantanamo Bay prisoners and pressure on the US to abide by a strict
interpretation of the international convention against torture.
The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has stated that her country
does not engage in torture or hand over prisoners to those who do.
Poland and Romania
The most serious charge Mr Marty makes in his report is against Poland
and Romania, both of which he all but accuses of having allowed the CIA
to run black sites. These suspected secret prisons were in fact exposed
by the Washington Post in an article in November 2005.
Poland and Romania were not named in that article - the reference was to
"several democracies in Eastern Europe" - at the request of the White House,
but they were soon revealed. It is believed that the sites were rapidly
closed and the prisoners transferred, perhaps to somewhere in North Africa.
Mr Marty has now collated flight data from rendition flights and has
pointed a finger of suspicion at both countries, which continue to deny
they did anything wrong. In this, he goes beyond his earlier, preliminary
report.
Other intriguing circumstantial information has come from Muhammad Bashmila,
a former secret prisoner now free in Yemen. In a rare interview with the
BBC Newsnight programme, he spoke of being transferred from Afghanistan
to a secret prison where it was cold, where the food appeared European
and where evening prayers were held at the late hour of 2045. Somewhere
in Eastern Europe is suspected.
Balance of liberties
It is argued, by the British government among others, that the phenomenon
of Islamic terrorism is so grave that there has to be a reconsideration
of the balance of liberties. Previously, according to this view, the individual
had to be protected against governments. But now the individual ability
to wage war on societies is so great that individuals have to be restricted.
Mr Marty does not accept this. In his report, he states: "The compilation
of so-called "black lists" of individuals and companies suspected of maintaining
connections with organisations considered terrorist and the application
of the associated sanctions clearly breach every principle of the fundamental
right to a fair trial: no specific charges, no right to be heard, no right
of appeal, no established procedure for removing one's name from the list."
But he also quotes within his report a defence from Dan Fried, the US
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs: "We are attempting to
keep our people safe; we are attempting to fight dangerous terrorist groups
who are active and who mean what they say about destroying us. We are trying
to do so in a way consistent with our values and our international legal
obligations. "Doing all of those things in practice is not easy, partly
because - as we've discovered as we've gotten into it - the struggle we
are in does not fit neatly either into the criminal legal framework, or
neatly into the law of war framework."
September 5, 2006 [emphasis added]
National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism
[see also: CIA Program
of Secret Prisons Abroad Confirmed by U.S. President;
Links with "Rogue
States": US Treasury leans on Western banks, The Observer]
Today, The President Released His Updated National
Strategy For Combating Terrorism (NSCT), Which Outlines The
United States Government Strategy To Protect And Defend American Interests
At Home And Abroad From Terrorism. ...
Four Priorities
Over The Short Term
The Advance Of Freedom And
Human Dignity Through Democracy Is The Long-Term Solution To The Transnational
Terrorism Of Today. To create the space and time for that long-term solution
to take root, there are four steps we are taking in the short term. We
will:
Prevent
Attacks By Terrorist Networks. Working with partners across the globe,
we are using a range of tools at home and abroad to take the fight to the
terrorists, deny them entry to the United States, hinder their movement
across international boundaries, and establish protective measures to further
reduce our vulnerability to attack.
Deny
WMD To Rogue States And Terrorist Allies Who Seek To Use Them. Weapons
of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists is one of the gravest threats
we face. We have taken aggressive efforts to deny terrorists access to
WMD-related materials, equipment, and expertise, and we are enhancing these
activities through an integrated effort at all levels of government and
with the private sector and our foreign partners to stay ahead of this
dynamic and evolving threat.
Deny
Terrorists The Support And Sanctuary Of Rogue States. We
make no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who
support and harbor terrorists. We are working to disrupt the flow of resources
from states to terrorists while simultaneously end state sponsorship of
terrorism.
Deny
Terrorists Control Of Any Area They Would Use As A Base And Launching Pad
For Terror. We are working to prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned
and under-governed areas as physical safehavens. These
efforts also extend to non-physical or virtual safehavens, such as those
existing within legal, cyber, and financial systems.
Financial
safehavens. Financial systems are used by terrorist organizations
as a fiscal sanctuary in which to store and transfer the funds that support
their survival and operations. Terrorist organizations use a variety of
financial systems, including formal banking, wire transfers, debit and
other stored value cards, online value storage and value transfer systems,
the informal hawala system, and cash couriers. Terrorist organizations
may be able to take advantage of such financial systems either as the result
of willful complicity by financial institutions or as the result of poor
oversight and monitoring practices. Domestically, we have hardened our
financial systems against terrorist abuse by promulgating effective regulations,
requiring financial institutions to report suspicious transactions, and
building effective public/private partnerships. We
will continue to work with foreign partners to ensure they develop and
implement similar regulations, requirements, and partnerships with their
financial institutions. We also will continue to use the domestic and
international designation and targeted sanctions
regimes provided by, among other mechanisms, Executive Order
13224, USA PATRIOT Act Section 311, and United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1267 and subsequent resolutions.
These tools identify and isolate those actors who form part of terrorist
networks or facilitate their activities.
September 6, 2006 The East Room
CIA Program of Secret Prisons
Abroad Confirmed by U.S. President - fact
sheet
President
Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists
President's Remarks [emphasis added]
1:45 P.M. EDT
[see also National Strategy for Combating Terrorism]
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Thanks for the warm welcome. Welcome to the
White House. Mr. Vice President, Secretary Rice, Attorney General Gonzales,
Ambassador Negroponte, General Hayden, members of the United States Congress,
families who lost loved ones in the terrorist attacks on our nation, and
my fellow citizens: Thanks for coming.
On the morning of September the 11th, 2001, our nation awoke to
a nightmare attack. Nineteen men, armed with box cutters, took control
of airplanes and turned them into missiles. They used them to kill nearly
3,000 innocent people. We watched the Twin Towers collapse before our eyes
-- and it became instantly clear that we'd entered a new world, and a dangerous
new war.
The attacks of September the 11th horrified our nation. And amid the
grief came new fears and urgent questions: Who had attacked us? What did
they want? And what else were they planning? Americans saw the destruction
the terrorists had caused in New York, and Washington, and Pennsylvania,
and they wondered if there were other terrorist cells in our midst poised
to strike; they wondered if there was a second wave of attacks still to
come.
With the Twin Towers and the Pentagon still smoldering, our country
on edge, and a stream of intelligence coming in about potential new attacks,
my administration faced immediate challenges: We had to respond to the
attack on our country. We had to wage an unprecedented war against an enemy
unlike any we had fought before. We had to find the terrorists hiding in
America and across the world, before they were able to strike our country
again. So in the early days and weeks after 9/11, I directed our government's
senior national security officials to do everything in their power, within
our laws, to prevent another attack.
Nearly five years have passed since these -- those initial days of shock
and sadness -- and we are thankful that the terrorists have not succeeded
in launching another attack on our soil. This is not for the lack of desire
or determination on the part of the enemy. As the recently foiled plot
in London shows, the terrorists are still active, and they're still trying
to strike America, and they're still trying to kill our people. One reason
the terrorists have not succeeded is because of the hard work of thousands
of dedicated men and women in our government, who have toiled day and night,
along with our allies, to stop the enemy from carrying out their plans.
And we are grateful for these hardworking citizens of ours.
Another reason the terrorists have not succeeded is because our government
has changed its policies -- and given our military, intelligence, and law
enforcement personnel the tools they need to fight this enemy and protect
our people and preserve our freedoms.
The terrorists who declared war on America represent no nation,
they defend no territory, and they wear no uniform. They do not mass armies
on borders, or flotillas of warships on the high seas. They operate in
the shadows of society; they send small teams of operatives to infiltrate
free nations; they live quietly among their victims; they conspire in secret,
and then they strike without warning. In this new war, the most important
source of information on where the terrorists are hiding and what they
are planning is the terrorists, themselves. Captured terrorists have unique
knowledge about how terrorist networks operate. They have knowledge of
where their operatives are deployed, and knowledge about what plots are
underway. This intelligence -- this is intelligence that cannot be found
any other place. And our security depends on getting this kind of information.
To win the war on terror, we must be able to detain, question, and, when
appropriate, prosecute terrorists captured here in America, and on the
battlefields around the world.
After the 9/11 attacks, our coalition launched operations across the
world to remove terrorist safe havens, and capture or kill terrorist operatives
and leaders. Working with our allies, we've captured and detained thousands
of terrorists and enemy fighters in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and other fronts
of this war on terror. These enemy -- these are enemy
combatants, who were waging war on our nation. We have a right under the
laws of war, and we have an obligation to the American people, to detain
these enemies and stop them from rejoining the battle.
Most of the enemy combatants we capture are held in Afghanistan or in
Iraq, where they're questioned by our military personnel. Many are released
after questioning, or turned over to local authorities -- if we determine
that they do not pose a continuing threat and no longer have significant
intelligence value. Others remain in American custody near the battlefield,
to ensure that they don't return to the fight.
In some cases, we determine that individuals we have captured pose a
significant threat, or may have intelligence that we and our allies need
to have to prevent new attacks. Many are al Qaeda operatives or Taliban
fighters trying to conceal their identities, and they withhold information
that could save American lives. In these cases, it has been necessary to
move these individuals to an environment where they can be held secretly
[sic], questioned by experts, and -- when appropriate -- prosecuted for
terrorist acts.
Some of these individuals are taken to the United States Naval
Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It's important for Americans and others across
the world to understand the kind of people held at Guantanamo. These aren't
common criminals, or bystanders accidentally swept up on the battlefield
-- we have in place a rigorous process to ensure those held at Guantanamo
Bay belong at Guantanamo. Those held at Guantanamo include suspected bomb
makers, terrorist trainers, recruiters and facilitators, and potential
suicide bombers. They are in our custody so they cannot murder our people.
One detainee held at Guantanamo told a questioner questioning him -- he
said this: "I'll never forget your face. I will kill you, your brothers,
your mother, and sisters."
In addition to the terrorists held at Guantanamo,
a small number of suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured during
the war have been held and questioned outside the United States, in a separate
program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This group
includes individuals believed to be the key architects of the September
the 11th attacks, and attacks on the USS Cole, an operative involved in
the bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and individuals involved
in other attacks that have taken the lives of innocent civilians across
the world. These are dangerous men with unparalleled knowledge about terrorist
networks and their plans for new attacks. The security of our nation and
the lives of our citizens depend on our ability to learn what these terrorists
know.
Many specifics of this program, including where
these detainees have been held and the details of their confinement, cannot
be divulged. Doing so would provide our enemies with information
they could use to take retribution against our allies and harm our country.
I can say that questioning the detainees in this program has given us information
that has saved innocent lives by helping us stop new attacks -- here in
the United States and across the world. Today, I'm going to share with
you some of the examples provided by our intelligence community of how
this program has saved lives; why it remains vital to the security of the
United States, and our friends and allies; and why it deserves the support
of the United States Congress and the American people.
Within months of September the 11th, 2001, we captured a man known as
Abu Zubaydah. We believe that Zubaydah was a senior terrorist leader and
a trusted associate of Osama bin Laden. Our intelligence community believes
he had run a terrorist camp in Afghanistan where some of the 9/11 hijackers
trained, and that he helped smuggle al Qaeda leaders out of Afghanistan
after coalition forces arrived to liberate that country. Zubaydah was severely
wounded during the firefight that brought him into custody -- and he survived
only because of the medical care arranged by the CIA.
After he recovered, Zubaydah was defiant and evasive. He declared his
hatred of America. During questioning, he at first disclosed what he thought
was nominal information -- and then stopped all cooperation. Well, in fact,
the "nominal" information he gave us turned out to be quite important.
For example, Zubaydah disclosed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed -- or KSM -- was
the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, and used the alias "Muktar." This
was a vital piece of the puzzle that helped our intelligence community
pursue KSM. Abu Zubaydah also provided information that helped stop a terrorist
attack being planned for inside the United States -- an attack about which
we had no previous information. Zubaydah told us that al Qaeda operatives
were planning to launch an attack in the U.S., and provided physical descriptions
of the operatives and information on their general location. Based on the
information he provided, the operatives were detained -- one while traveling
to the United States.
We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent
lives, but he stopped talking. As his questioning proceeded, it became
clear that he had received training on how to resist interrogation. And
so the CIA used an alternative set of procedures. These procedures were
designed to be safe, to comply with our laws, our Constitution, and our
treaty obligations. The Department of Justice reviewed the authorized methods
extensively and determined them to be lawful. I cannot describe the specific
methods used -- I think you understand why -- if I did, it would help the
terrorists learn how to resist questioning, and to keep information from
us that we need to prevent new attacks on our country. But I can say the
procedures were tough, and they were safe, and lawful, and necessary.
Zubaydah was questioned using these procedures, and soon he began to
provide information on key al Qaeda operatives, including information that
helped us find and capture more of those responsible for the attacks on
September the 11th. For example, Zubaydah identified one of KSM's accomplices
in the 9/11 attacks -- a terrorist named Ramzi bin al Shibh. The information
Zubaydah provided helped lead to the capture of bin al Shibh. And together
these two terrorists provided information that helped in the planning and
execution of the operation that captured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
Once in our custody, KSM was questioned by the CIA using these procedures,
and he soon provided information that helped us stop another planned attack
on the United States. During questioning, KSM told us about another al
Qaeda operative he knew was in CIA custody -- a terrorist named Majid Khan.
KSM revealed that Khan had been told to deliver $50,000 to individuals
working for a suspected terrorist leader named Hambali, the leader of