re: Iranian NPT rights & obligations in perspective
On the backdrop of a current diplomatic headache Ė Iranís legitimate but for some less than helpful insistence on its duly acquired rights, under the NPT, to the full range of peaceful nuclear activities and, under certain conditions, even to «non-peaceful activities» involving nuclear material (Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, art.14) Ė Iím calling on your assistance for digging out a possibly helpful document from some dust-covered file. For it might serve as a reference, source of inspiration and a precedent for a generally satisfactory diplomatic way out of the current impasse. In as much as Iran might want to fully exploit its nuclear installations within the vast confines of the NPT. In as much as the existence, basic structure and content of the NPT is not to be put into question by the power that be without, in the event, proper preparation in the course of a possible follow-up to the 1968 Non-Nuclear Weapon States Conference. And in as much as Russia and/or other nuclear-weapon countries, might find it proper and indicated under the circumstances to strengthen the nonproliferation regime by having these Iranian installations operated with full Iranian participation under, e.g., Russian sovereignty, diplomatic immunity and effective control.
On the initiative by President Dwight D.Eisenhower, the U.S.-sponsored memorable «Atoms for Peace» conference was held in Geneva in August 1955. Held on the premises of the Palais des Nations, it featured Sapphire, i.e. a research nuclear reactor of the swimming pool type which was later turned over to Switzerland and, at Würenlingen, became the core of its R&D in nuclear matters. The reactorís temporary location was in front of the UNís main building at the south end of the park where there is now a depository for documents. Involving questions of security, liability, extra-territoriality, diplomatic immunity, etc., the reactorís temporary installation, operation and removal is understood to have been covered by corresponding formal agreements between the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the United Nations and the Swiss government.
Accordingly, I would appreciate your assistance in locating the documents thus described above, and in bringing them to the attention of those concerned with the subject matter. Meanwhile, I take this opportunity to extend to you my best wishes and remain, sincerely yours,
Anton Keller, Secretary
Good Offices Group of European Lawmakers, Geneva
cc: Iranian, Austrian, Chinese, French, German, Russian, UK, US missions
to the UN
extract from Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA
THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAN AND THE AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATIO OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (INFCIRC/214, 13 December 1974)
NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED IN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES
If the Government of Iran intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded under this Agreement in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under this Agreement, the following procedures shall apply:
(a) The Government of Iran shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:
(i) That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the Government of Iran may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and
(ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(b) The Government of Iran and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, only while the nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded material in Iran and of any export of such material; and
(c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. Such agreement shall be given as promptly as possible and shall relate only to such matters as, inter alia, temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.