19 Aug 08    Kurdish Control of Kirkuk Creates a Powder Keg in Iraq, NYT, RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.
4 Aug 08    A Major Political Test for Iraq, NYT, editorial
22 Jun 08   Iraq Petroleum Company successors show up in Baghdad, NYT, editorial
17 Jun 08   1930 all over? Another Bad Deal for Baghdad, NYT, KARL E. MEYER
5 Jun 08   History repeating itself: Secret plan to keep Iraq under US control, The Independent, Ali A. Allawi
31 May 08   The Mideast Won't Change from Within, Wall Street Journal, MOHAMMED FADHIL
1 Mar 08   Adopted Guidelines, Mosul Vilayet Council (Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish)
1 Feb 08   Kurds’ Power Wanes as Arab Anger Rises, NYT, Alissa J.Rubin
10 Jan 08   Benchmarks missed, the Goal is now 'Iraqi Solutions', WP, Thomas E. Ricks et al.
9 Dec 07   Kirkuk Pot Heating Up as Arabs, Turkmen & Kurds Vie for Kirkuk’s Oil, NYT, Stephen Farrell
9 Dec 07   No External Peace Without Internal Balance, NYT, Thomas L. Friedman
5 Dec 07   KRG Deputy PM Fattah meets US Vice President Cheney, KRG.org
2 Dec 07   Nonstop Theft and Bribery Are Staggering Iraq, NYT, Damien Cave
28 Nov 07   Baghdad must implement Kirkuk Article 140 of Iraq Constitution, KRG.org, Nechirvan Barzani
22 Nov 07   Shiites in S. Iraq Rebuke Tehran, WP, Amit R. Paley et al., comments
20 Nov 07   KRG responds to Baghdad’s threats to oil international companies, KRG.org
12 Nov 07   KRG signs five more petroleum contracts, KRG.org
9 Nov 07   Mosul Vilayet: a Pathway Out of Mideastern Gridlocks, Today's Zaman, Anton Keller
6 Nov 07   Clouds Over Northern Iraq, Wall Street Journal, Norman Stone
6 Nov 07   Ministry announces 7 new, reviews 5 existing contracts, KRG.org
5 Nov 07   Kurdistan's Hope for Talks, Washington Post, Nechirvan Barzani, comments
27. Okt 07   Die PKK fordert internationale Vermittlung, NZZ, iro
26 Oct 07   Bina Bawi - Northern Iraq, Petholding
24 Oct 07   Who's fooling whom: U.S. Officials Upbraid Kurds on PKK, NYT, RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr. et al.
24 Oct 07   Iran accuses US of backing Kurdish militants on its border, Sydney Morning Herald, Richard Oppel
24 Oct 07   AKP BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD, EDM, Gareth Jenkins
23 Oct 07   PKK Battlefield Tactic Changes Reflect Political Goals, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Gareth Jenkins
23 Oct 07   Olmert pressed to give up supporting Iraqi Kurds, Today's Zaman, Ercan Yavuz
23 Oct 07   Make Walls, Not War, NYT, PETER W. GALBRAITH
22 Oct 07   Kurdistan as a model for Iraq, CFR's Greg Bruno interviews Falah Mustafa Bakir
21 Oct 07   PKK threat: attack us and we blow up Iraqi oil pipeline and tanker trucks, al-Sharq al Awsat
19 Oct 07   Local Foes Commit [again] to Peace in Baghdad, WP, Joshua Partlow
19 Oct 07   Turkish Bid to Pursue Kurds Poses Quandary for Iraq, NYT, ALISSA J. RUBIN
16 Oct 07   Slipping away, KurdishMedia.com, Hussein Tahiri
16 Oct 07   Turkey Requests Authority to Attack, WP, Molly Moore
15 Oct 07   Iraqi Oil Spoils, NYT, editorial
15 Oct 07   The Kurdish example, Washington Times, Falah Mustafa Bakir
14 Oct 07   Cross-Border Strike Could Imperil Broader War in Iraq, WP, Molly Moore et al., comments
12 Oct 07   Observations on current Turkish-Iraqi border issues, Iconoclast
11 Oct 07   Worrisome Turkish-Kurdish Border Area, Washington Post, Joshua Partlow
11 Oct 07   Storm Warnings: Turkey-Iraq, newropeans-magazine, René Wadlow
11 Sep 07   KRG responds to Iraqi oil minister's recent statements, KRG.org
10 Sep 07   Northern Iraq has what’s missing in Baghdad, NYT, Thomas L. Friedman
10 Oct 07   Erbil to host conference on Iraq federalism, The Globe - Erbil
8 Oct 07   Shifting Targets - The Administration’s plan for Iran, The New Yorker, Seymour M. Hersh
8 Oct 07   Reconciliation Seen Unattainable Amid Struggle for Power, WP, Joshua Partlow, comments
7 Oct 07   Syria Is Said to Be Strengthening Ties to Iraqi Opponents, NYT, HUGH NAYLOR
6 Oct 07   Taking the lead on Iraqi oil, Wall Street Journal, Nechirvan Barzani
3 Oct 07   Federalism, Not Partition, WP, Joseph R. Biden Jr. & Leslie H. Gelb, comments
2 Oct 07 Kurdistan spearheads Iraq oil investment, KRG.org
1 Oct 07   In Iraq, Repeated Support for a Unified State, NYT, ALISSA J. RUBIN, correction
29 Sep 07   Iraq Kurdish region says new oil deals are legal, Reuters, Simon Webb
29 Sep 07   Security may trump ethnicity in Kirkuk, Los Angeles Times, Borzou Daragahi
28 Sep 07   Official Calls Kurd Oil Deal at Odds With Baghdad, NYT, ALISSA J. RUBIN et al.
26 Sep 07   US Senate adopts non-binding Iraq Federalism Resolution with 75 yeas to 23 nays
24 Sep 07   Ray Hunt's Iraq Oil Deal Gets Everybody's Attention, Washington Post, Michael A. Fletcher
15 Sep 07   The tribal ways of Iraq, IHT, Arthur Lieber, letter to the editor
14 Sept 07   A Surge, and Then a Stab, NYT, PAUL KRUGMAN
13 Sep 07   re: No longer tabu: League of Nations' role on Iraq, Anton Keller
13 Sep 07   The Ottoman Swede, NYT, ROGER COHEN
10 Sep 07   Dallas Oil Company Approved to Drill in Kurdistan, NYT, BLOOMBERG
8 Sep 07   KRG signs oil and gas contract with US-based Hunt Oil, KRG.org
7 Sep 07   The Partitioning of Iraq, Washington Post, Charles Krauthammer
6 Sep 07   Kurdistan Region Oil and Gas Law in Arabic and English, updated model contract, KRG.org
1 Sep 07   The Kurdish Secret, NYT, THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
31 Aug 07   Abandoned at the Border, NYT, JOSEPH P. HOAR, Op-Ed Contributor
31 Aug 07   Shiite’s Tale: How Gulf With Sunnis Widened, NYT, DAMIEN CAVE
20 Aug 07    Seeing is believing, NYT, Thomas L. Friedman
10 Aug 07   U.S. Seeks U.N. Help With Talks On Iraq, Washington Post, Colum Lynch and Robin Wright
10 Aug 07   Jordan Yields Poverty and Pain for the Well-Off Fleeing Iraq, NYT, SABRINA TAVERNISE
8 Aug 07   Pressed by U.S., a Wary U.N. Now Plans Larger Iraq Role, Washington Post, Colum Lynch
6 Aug 07   Kurdistan Oil & Gas Law approved by Kurdistan Parliament, KRG.org
4 Aug 07   In Iraq, a Perilous Alliance With Former Enemies, Washington Post, Sudarsan Raghavan
30 Jul 07   A War We Just Might Win, NYT, Michael E. O’Hanlon & Kenneth M. Pollack, Op-Ed Contributor
20 Jul 07   Why the United Nations Belongs in Iraq, NYT, ZALMAY KHALILZAD
17 Jul 07   Exit Strategies, WP, By Karen DeYoung and Thomas E. Ricks
15 Jul 07   UK Representation thanks KRG's British & international friends, KRG.org
Summer 07   "Iraqi Kurdistan's Downward Spiral", Middle East Quarterly, Kamal Said Qadir
27 Jun 07   Pointing to Stability, Kurds in Iraq Lure Investors, NYT, Kirk Semple
11 Jun 07   Tribal Coalition in Anbar Said to Be Crumbling, Washington Post, Joshua Partlow et al.
8 Jun 07   A New Danger in Iraq, NYT, editorial
5 Jun 07   Then there is Plan "MC.", Informed Comment,  Anonymous
3 Jun 07   Moktada al-Sadr: An Enemy We Can Work With, NYT, Bartle Breese Bull, Op-Ed Contributor
30 May 07   Strife in North Iraq as Sunni Arabs Drive Out Kurds, NYT, Edward Wong
28 May 07   Militants Widen Reach as Terror Seeps Out of Iraq, NYT, Michael Moss & Souad Mekhennet
7 May 07   In Iraq, the Play Was the Thing, NYT, HUSSAIN ABDUL-HUSSAIN
23 Apr 07   Kurds Cultivating Their Own Bonds With U.S., Washington Post, Rajiv Chandrasekaran
23 Dec 06   Shiites Remake Baghdad in Their Image, NYT, SABRINA TAVERNISE
21 Dec 06   Avoiding a Thirty Years War, Washington Times, Richard W. Rahn; a friend's comment
13 Dec 06   Kurdistan: America between the Turks and Kurds, The Economist
13 Dec 06   Turkish Kurds in Iraq: Lonesome rebels, The Economist
9 Dec 06   How about bringing back Saddam?, Washington Post blog, raiser; solami's comment
28 Nov 06   Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker, Washington Post, Dafna Linzer
24 Oct 06   Trying to Contain the Iraq Disaster, NYT, editorial
8 Oct 06   America ponders cutting Iraq in three, The Sunday Times, Sarah Baxter
17 Sep 06   The KDP and PUK: use it, loose it, or lose it, KurdishMedia.com, Hussein Tahiri
25 June 06   Solution: Break up Iraq; Reality: It's not so easy, NYT, Dexter Filkins
17 May 06   Iraq's Impending Fracture to Produce Political Earthquake in Turkey, PINR, J.P. Gundzik
16 June 06   The State of Iraq: An Update, NYT chart, Nina Kamp, Michael O'Hanlon & A.Unikewicz
10 May 06    Iraqi Federalism II - Answering Three Common Objections, volokh.com, Ilya Somin
9 May 06   Decentralized Federalism in Iraq, volokh.com, Ilya Somin
9 May 06   Three Iraqs Would Be One Big Problem, NYT, ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN
9 May 06   The Mother of All Mistakes, The Dignified Rant, Brian J. Dunn
9 May 06   The Prison of the Present, RealClearPolitics, Victor Davis Hanson
9 May 06    A decentralized Iraq is the necessary solution, National Review, J.R.Thomson & H.Hindawi
1 Mar 06   Red Lines Crisscross Iraq's Political Landscape, PINR, Michael A. Weinstein
9 Sep 05   New Orleans and Baghdad, NYT, THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
9 Sep 05   The State of Iraq: An Update, NYT, Nina Kamp, Michael O'Hanlon & Amy Unikewicz
05    Reducing Ethnic & Religious Conflict through Political Decentralization, Al Sabah, Ilya Somin
1996    Question du feu (pétrol): res in usu omnium en Droit Musulman et Arab, Sami Aldeeb

Ethnic and religious divisions are a serious challenge for many emerging democracies. If not carefully managed, such conflicts can lead to a reversion to authoritarianism or a bloody civil war. There is no perfect way to guarantee against such an outcome. But, in countries like Iraq, one essential mechanism for reducing the risk is decentralized federalism. Federalism cannot, by itself, solve all of Iraq’s problems. But it may not be possible to establish a stable democracy without it.  Yet federalism will not work unless it is accompanied by decentralization of control over government revenue and valuable resources such as oil.

Federalism, Democracy, and Group Conflict
In an ethnically or religiously divided society where power is concentrated in the hands of the central government, whichever group controls that government can completely dominate the entire country.  Therefore, no group can afford to let one of its rivals seize control of the national government. Democracy thereby becomes extremely difficult to maintain.  Minorities fear that whichever group is in the majority will gain power through the electoral process and then reduce the minorities to second-class citizens or worse. In such situations, minority groups often take up arms rather than accept the results of the democratic process, which they see as concentrating power in the hands of the more numerous group. Unfortunately, the usual result is either an ongoing conflict or a descent into dictatorship with one group seizing total control. This kind of process is part of the reason why Saddam Hussein was able to establish and maintain a highly centralized dictatorship in Iraq, playing one group against another. It also helps explain why Iraqis have had such enormous difficulties in establishing and maintaining democracy.

Fortunately, federalism can help break this pattern. Ethnic or religious groups that are minorities in the nation as a whole are often majorities in their particular regions. Under a federal system with decentralized authority, such minority groups can use the democratic process to control the areas where they live  - even if they do not have a majority in the nation as a whole.  Though the minority group cannot control the central government, federalism ensures that it is not completely at the mercy of whoever does. The danger of civil war is thereby reduced, because minority groups can accept democratic election of the central government. Even if they don’t win national elections, they can still protect their rights and interest by electing the government of their particular region.

Regional governments cannot be given 100% absolute authority over their territory. Regional governments in areas where one group is in the majority must still respect the basic human rights of members of other groups living in their jurisdiction. A delicate balance must be achieved, under which the national government has sufficient power to protect these local minorities, but not enough to undermine regional governments’ autonomy. Achieving such a balance is not easy, but it is far preferable to the alternatives of civil war, oppression of local minorities, and dictatorship.

Decentralized federalism has helped strengthen democracy and alleviate ethnic and religious conflict in a wide variety of nations, such as India, Canada, and Switzerland. In all these states, geographically concentrated minorities have reconciled themselves to democratic elections at the national level because federalism enables them to control the governments of their regions. Iraq too can benefit greatly from such an arrangement.

The Importance of Oil Revenue and Fiscal Independence
For federalism to be able to alleviate conflict, it is not enough to establish a system of regional autonomy that exists only on paper. Local and regional governments must have real power over important issues. Perhaps most important, they must have their own sources of funding that are not dependent on the central government. They need be “fiscally independent,” as economists call it. If the national government controls all or most of the available sources of revenue, it can force regional governments to do its bidding simply by threatening to withhold funds if they don’t.  In such a scenario, regional governments cannot provide any meaningful protection for minority groups, because they would have no recourse against the majority that dominates the national government and also controls the regional governments’ purse strings. In the long run, federalism cannot work if regional governments do not have at least some substantial degree of fiscal independence.

Obviously, the main source of government revenue in Iraq is oil. Centralized control of oil revenue was one of the main pillars of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. Most other oil-rich nations that allow their central government to monopolize control over this resource have also found it impossible to maintain democracy. If the national government continues to monopolize control of oil revenue under the new constitution, both federalism and democracy are likely to be undermined.

If regional governments are to have any real autonomy, they must have access to oil revenue that cannot be cut off by Baghdad. There are several possible ways to achieve this. Nobel Prize-winning economist Vernon Smith has proposed that the proceeds from Iraq’s oil reserves be transferred to a fund in which each individual Iraq citizen will have a share, just as stockholders can own shares of a corporation. Iraqis’ property rights in the shares would be guaranteed by law and each citizen would be able to buy or sell shares as they see fit.  Regional governments could tax the income derived from these shares by citizens living within their jurisdiction. By this means, individual Iraqis would acquire an important source of income and investment capital, while regional governments would have access to oil revenue that could not be eliminated by the central government.

Smith’s proposal is not the only possible way to decentralize control of Iraq’s oil resources. Other alternatives might include direct ownership of some oil fields by the regional governments themselves or ownership by private investors. It is important to recognize that Iraqis need not commit to a single ownership model that applies to all the oil in the country. It is perfectly possible for some oil to be controlled by the central government, some by regional governments, and some by  ordinary Iraqis holding shares in a Smith-style fund. What is essential, however, is that Iraq get beyond the Saddam Hussein model under which control of all the nation’s oil resources is concentrated in the hands of the central government.

Decentralized federalism can play a crucial role in helping to overcome Iraq’s religious and ethnic divisions, and setting the nation on the road to a stable democracy. But in order for this happy outcome to occur, Iraqis must ensure that control over the nation’s oil resources is no longer monopolized by the central government.

(*)    Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; B.A., Amherst College, 1995; J.D., Yale Law School, 2001; M.A. Harvard University Department of Government, 1997; Ph.D. expected.

With the bombing and destruction on February 22 of the al-Askari shrine -- one of the holiest sites of Shi'a Islam -- and the nearly immediate retaliatory attacks on Sunni mosques throughout Iraq, the military phase of the struggle over the country's political future overwhelmed and derailed its political dynamics, as the Sunni Arab bloc in Iraq's new parliament -- the National Accord Front (N.A.C.) -- broke off its participation in negotiations over the composition of a government to replace the outgoing transitional administration. Although a cycle of sectarian violence, marked by killings on both sides, had been building and intensifying for months, the al-Askari bombing precipitated the first open admission by Iraq's fragmented political class that the country was entering the condition of full-scale civil war.

As PINR has consistently projected for more than two years, the deep conflicts of interest among the three major ethnic-religious groups -- Shi'a Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds -- would reach a critical point when the time came for the country's political forces to negotiate a permanent settlement of their differences or to move toward separation. That moment arrived with the December 15, 2005 elections for a four-year parliament, which forced the political class to confront its stark divisions in the context of having to form a government. [See: "Iraq's Election Aftermath Reveals a Failed State"]

As negotiations for a government proceeded from late December into February, it became clear that an agreement on its composition would prove to be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Each player in the process was compelled to clarify its demands, revealing profound and -- according to the players -- irreconcilable conflicts. Rather than signifying an interruption of the political process, the al-Askari bombing and its aftermath vividly symbolize the failure of that process.

Behind the violence, which justifiably occupies the attention of the media and decision makers in the short term, are the persistent interests that surfaced in the negotiations as a series of non-negotiable demands by each side against the others. The phrase that dominated public discussion of the bargaining process in Iraq was "red line," meaning a limit beyond which a player would not go in making concessions to its adversaries. Rather than seeking compromise, the players engaged in drawing a crazy quilt of red lines, resulting in deadlock.

A sign as telling as the al-Askari bombing that the political process had broken down was the decision on February 20, 2006 by U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad to go public with a threat to cut off aid to Iraq's security forces if the Iraqi political class did not agree to form a "national unity government" in which each sectarian and ethnic bloc had a share in power and subsumed its militia under a national army and police force.

Asserting that the U.S. is "not going to invest the resources of the American people and build forces that are run by people who are sectarian," Khalilzad abandoned the behind-the-scenes diplomacy that had been his trademark in favor of blunt external pressure that had little credibility -- an admission of frustration. As the players proceeded on a collision course, Washington's influence over the negotiations steadily diminished to the point at which it has become a bystander reduced to issuing warnings from the sidelines.

Red Lines Proliferate
The stage was set for deadlock on February 11, when the Shi'a bloc -- the United Iraqi Alliance (U.I.A.) -- which has the largest number of seats in the new parliament voted 64-63 to name Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the transitional prime minister, as its choice for prime minister in the permanent government. The largest bloc in the new parliament, holding 130 of its 275 seats against the Sunni N.A.F.'s 55, the Kurdish Alliance's (K.A.) 53 and the secular Iraqi National List's (I.N.L.) 25, the U.I.A. has been beset by internal conflicts among its component factions that are reflected in al-Jaafari's razor-thin margin of victory.

Al-Jaafari, who represents the Dawa Party, achieved his win with the support of anti-occupation cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose faction controls 30 of the U.I.A.'s seats. Al-Sadr's backing of al-Jaafari was based on his opposition to Adil Abdul-Mahdi, the candidate of the U.I.A.'s largest faction, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (S.C.I.R.I.). Although the preponderance of the components of the U.I.A. are based in Shi'a clerical families, those families and their followers are divided by longstanding rivalries. The winning coalition of Dawa and the Sadrists came at the price of honoring S.C.I.R.I.'s red line that it be awarded control of the Interior Ministry, which is in charge of internal security and -- under the transitional government -- has been in S.C.I.R.I.'s hands and has been held responsible by Sunnis for sectarian attacks on their community.

In response to the prospect of continued S.C.I.R.I. control over the power ministries -- interior and defense -- N.A.F. leader Adnan al-Dulaimi drew his own red line, insisting that those portfolios be given to figures who are not identified with the Shi'a clerical establishment. Al-Dulaimi's demand was met by the leader of S.C.I.R.I.'s militia, the Badr Brigade, with the assertion that S.C.I.R.I. "will not relinquish the security portfolios."

Building on their deadlock over the power ministries, the U.I.A. and the N.A.F. drew red lines on an array of other issues. The U.I.A. insisted that the N.A.F. condemn "terrorism" and actively oppose the Sunni-led insurgency, to which the N.A.F. replied that the U.I.A. must distinguish between terrorism against civilians and legitimate resistance against what they consider the U.S.-led occupation. The N.A.F. demanded an end to the purge of ex-Ba'ath Party members from public life, which the U.I.A. rejected. Most importantly, the N.A.F. demanded that Iraq's current constitution be modified to restrict regional self-rule and the U.I.A. insisted that the Shi'a-dominated south, with its vast oil resources, move to regularize its substantial autonomy, leaving Sunni Arabs in fear that the resource-poor center and west of Iraq, where they are concentrated, will be impoverished.

Reinforcing the Sunni-Shi'a deadlock at the level of the political class is Sunni public opinion. A survey conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes and reported in the Washington Times on February 1 found that only five percent of Sunni Arabs approved of the December 15, 2005 elections, 92 percent thought that the new government was illegitimate, and 88 percent approved of attacks on U.S. forces. Sunni Arab participation in the political process, which Washington believed would integrate the Sunni community into a nation-building project, has not had the desired effect, but has only worked to reveal the latent political confrontation.

A little-noticed study conducted by Iraq's Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and released in late January shows some of the reasons for persisting Sunni Arab disaffection. The study reported that the poverty level in Iraq has increased by 30 percent since April 2003, reaching 20 percent of the population. Two million Iraqis are having difficulty finding sufficient food and shelter, and live with an income of less than US$2 per day. The report attributed rising poverty to the "shutdown of the public sector," lack of access to education, and violence, all of which differentially affect the Sunni Arab population.

Under the pressure of deteriorating living conditions and the resultant disaffection of public opinion from a Shi'a-Kurd dominated political process, the Sunni leadership is constrained to take a hard line, as its opponents mobilize to maintain their present advantages and accelerate their drive toward regional autonomy. As the Sunnis press their demands, the Shi'a and the Kurds dig in and resist making any concessions.

Although the seemingly intractable conflict between Sunni and Shi'a Arabs gained the greatest attention during the negotiations, the third player in the struggle over Iraq's future -- the Kurds -- began to assert their own demands more forcefully and drew their own red lines. Already running the oil-rich northern provinces as a mini-state, the Kurdish Alliance, composed of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (P.D.K.) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (P.U.K.), had allied with the U.I.A. forces in the transitional government, but had become dissatisfied with the treatment they had received and were ready to act more independently in furthering their interests.

The central interests of the Kurds are to maintain their effective independence and to gain control of Kirkuk and its surrounding region, which has large energy reserves and had been split off from the Kurdish provinces under Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime. The Kurds complain that the transitional government, in which the Shi'a had the preponderant influence, did not facilitate the resettlement of Kurds who had been displaced from Kirkuk under Ba'athist rule, and that it failed to put into effect provisions of the Iraqi constitution and its subsidiary Law of Administration that require a census in and a referendum on the status of Kirkuk. Already in late January 2006, Governor of Kirkuk Abd al-Rahman Mustafa had threatened to suspend oil exports to the rest of Iraq if the central government did not allocate funds for taking the census and holding the referendum.

The status of Kirkuk became an explicit "red line issue" when President of the "Kurdistan Region" Masoud Barzani declared in mid-February that the situation would have to be resolved constitutionally by the end of 2007. Accession of Kirkuk to the Kurdish mini-state is as threatening to the Sunnis economically as the normalization of a Shi'a autonomous region would be, and has the added problem that the city is multi-ethnic, with Arab, Turkomen and Christian minorities that are resistant to Kurdish hegemony.

Barzani also drew a red line, as would be expected, around preservation of constitutional provisions guaranteeing regional autonomy. In a break with the Kurdish-Shi'a alliance, Barzani reported that in his negotiations with the U.I.A. he had insisted that the secular bloc led by former provisional Prime Minister Ayad Allawi be included in a national unity government along with the U.I.A., the N.A.F. and the K.A., which was a deal breaker for the U.I.A. due to al-Sadr's rejection of any collaboration with Allawi, who ordered the suppression of al-Sadr's rebellion against the occupation in 2004.

Finally, Barzani demanded that the arrangement in the transitional government whereby a Kurd receives the presidency be maintained and insisted that the constitution be changed to grant the president greater powers at the expense of the prime minister. In his most revealing comment in a February 10 interview with al-Arabiya television, Barzani said that Kurdistan would secede from Iraq if a Sunni-Shi'a civil war broke out and forthrightly declared that the Kurds had a right to their own independent state, although "we are aware of the international and internal circumstances" standing in the way of one.

It was in the face of the collapsing Iraqi political process that Khalilzad delivered his threat of an aid cut-off. He had preceded his public announcement by publishing an opinion column -- "Blueprint for a National Government" -- in which he laid out Washington's own red line -- a national unity government. Recognizing that marginalization and isolation of the Sunni Arabs is at the core of the deadlock, Khalilzad made a scarcely veiled demand that the Kurds and the Shi'a concede to Sunni demands.

Using hard rhetoric, Khalilzad wrote that Iraqi leaders "must" give "political minorities confidence that the majority will share power and take their legitimate concerns into account." Specifically, Khalilzad went on, the government "must" disband factional militias and the Defense and Interior Ministries have to be staffed "on the basis of competence, not ethnic or sectarian background." He warned that the Sunni-led insurgency would only be curbed if regional powers are not "allowed to dominate Iraq" and de-Ba'athification is limited to "high-ranking officials, integrating all those who did not commit crimes into mainstream society." On the root issue of regional autonomy, Khalilzad was direct: "Iraqi leaders must strike agreements that will win greater Sunni Arab support and create a near-consensus in favor of the constitution."

Having incorporated the entire Sunni position into his list of demands, Khalilzad's blueprint met with a predictable rejectionist response from the Shi'a and Kurds who accused him of violating Iraqi sovereignty and going back on U.S. policy by attempting to dictate a resolution of the conflict. In a telling and scathing paragraph-by-paragraph critique of Khalilzad's essay, Kurdish analyst Dr. Rebwar Fatah concluded: "Khalilzad's blueprint for Iraqi national unity will be as successful as the British Iraq. The difference is that in the early 20th century, imposing superficial nation-states over ethnic and religious groups was possible by bloodshed, but in the 21st century, the mission of Iraqi national unity shall remain a myth."

Conclusion
The moment of reckoning has arrived in post-Ba'athist Iraq and none of the major players shows a trace of the will to compromise that would be necessary to construct a genuine nation-state, in which diverse social groups have an overriding commitment to live together.

Even if civil war is averted in the short term and a government is formed, that government will not be a genuine national-unity administration, but an arena of conflict between contending power groups. In one of the most astute observations on the situation by an Iraqi politician, Abdul-Mahdi -- the S.C.I.R.I.-backed candidate in the U.I.A.'s election for the prospective prime minister -- shrugged off his loss, saying that any new government would not be popular and would not be likely to serve out a four-year term.

A weak central government, which seems to be inevitable, will be starved for funds and will have trouble enforcing security given the preponderant slide toward confederal regionalism. Ministerial portfolios will be allocated according to ethnic-religious groups, and ministries will tend to coalesce into self-enclosed fiefdoms -- as they already have in the transitional government -- that effectively resist coordinated direction from high political officials. With each major bloc demanding positions with real power, there will not be enough to go around and dissatisfaction will build among those who feel they have been slighted.

Most importantly, the red lines that the contending players have drawn are not preliminary negotiating positions, but reflect deeply embedded perceptions of vital interests that are resistant to reconciliation.

Washington has neither the trust nor the credibility nor the resources to impose its blueprint and will have to watch its efforts unravel. Fatah, the Kurdish analyst, perceptively observed that "the frustration that Khalilzad demonstrates in his article could be interpreted as some degree of a resignation." Increasingly resigned to the collapse of all its plans for Iraq, Washington has been placed in a no-win situation. It has no prospect of a graceful exit and seems fated to preside helplessly over Iraq's disintegration.

Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein (+1 765 49-44173)

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR; http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=449) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.

Senator Joseph Biden and Leslie Gelb recently published an article in the New York Times titled “Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq.” It’s a good idea, and one that we have been advocating for the past couple of years, both here on NRO and elsewhere. There remains little indication that the Bush administration is considering any significant alteration to its long held call for a centralized government; however, even the most stubborn observer must agree that long term prospects for such a formulation are slight indeed. In any event, it is encouraging that, after more than two years’ gestation, the idea is getting attention and being discussed more broadly.

There are of course challenges aplenty in the fulfillment of any governance formula for Iraq. The Arab world’s authoritarian tradition extends to Baghdad, requiring resolution and clear codification in law of any form of government. Fortunately, at the leadership level, good judgment increasingly seems to prevail. The agreement on a prime minister and cabinet, albeit after months of politicking, means politicians on all sides are at last being realistic, causing us to infer that they have a clear understanding of the virtual impossibility of creating an effective, strong central government.

Simply stated, Shia and Kurd leaders overwhelmingly favor a decentralized government, with the Sunnis nominally opposed, fearing they will be dealt out of Iraq’s oil wealth.

What is required is equitable distribution of oil ownership and its attendant financial benefits, a challenge that provides an outstanding free market opportunity which we summarize below. Following is what we have been recommending for the past two years, with respect to both governance and petroleum.

GOVERNANCE
A cantonal system similar to the Swiss model is the most viable option for the restive, fearful Iraqi communities—Shia, Kurd, Sunni, Christian, and Turkmen. From countless talks with Iraqi leaders of the various communities, it appears eminently possible to maintain an Iraqi national fabric while allowing for semi-autonomous governance in different sectors of the country. Such a formula has peacefully united very different communities, the very challenge facing Iraq, in one nation for 800 years: Switzerland.

A system of five cantonal districts can be established. Three would be Kurd, Shia and Sunni dominated, based in the northern, central, and southern areas of the country respectively. Two other cantons would have special administrative status: the one, based in Baghdad (a melting pot of Shia, Kurds, Sunnis, Turkmen, and Christians, among others), would be recognized by all Iraqis as the country's capital canton; the other, embracing oil-rich Kirkuk plus Diali-Khanaqin, would also have special status owing to the area’s equally diverse ethnicity.

A Kurdish canton should contain three main districts—Erbil, Dahuk and Suleimaniya. Concentrated in the north, the Kurds are a dynamic, non-Arab minority comprising upwards of 20 percent of Iraq’s population. They have shown themselves remarkably capable of governing themselves effectively for a decade, have agreed not to seek independence, and should be allowed to retain their status.

The Sunni minority, similar in size to the Kurds, is reviled by the Shia because of decades of oppression by Saddam Hussein’s regime, and has understandable concerns of a strong central government dominated by Shia politicians—fears heightened by credible reports of Interior Ministry support for attacks on the Sunni community during the past year. The Sunni should have their own semi-autonomous canton in their heartland, the notorious “Sunni triangle” north and west of Baghdad.

The numerically dominant Shia would not only control their own development and destiny in the south and central areas where they predominate, but would also be a pivotal force in the national government based in the Baghdad special administrative canton, as well as in the other mixed canton of Kirkuk and Diali-Khanaqin.

The Shia community strongly favors running its own affairs, provided there is agreement on the composition and residual responsibilities of a Baghdad national government.

The remaining sizeable community to be specially considered is the Turkmen, a group which has felt inadequately considered since Iraq’s liberation and is fearful for its rights. Most live in the two proposed mixed cantons, as do the much smaller Christian communities (including Chaldeans, Assyrians, Armenians, Orthodox, and Protestants), and the Sabean, Mandaean, Yazidi, and Jewish communities. Clearly, every effort should be made to guarantee the rights of all such minorities in the ultimate cantonal and national constitutions.

What about the national government? It can and should provide for Iraq’s foreign relations, defense, and monetary requirements, and oversee the development, management, and equitable operation of the country’s massive petroleum reserves.

PETROLEUM
We have encountered no substantial or meaningful case favoring a nationalized, government-owned petroleum industry, just as we have heard no persuasive argument for a centralized Iraqi government, either from Baghdad or from Washington. Indeed, there could be no stronger proof-positive of Iraq’s newly attained free market status than for its greatest natural resource not to be socialized.

Iraq's vast petroleum wealth is an asset of inestimable potential, and must be developed to the benefit of all the country's citizens. There can be no question about oil in the north being solely for the benefit of Kurds, or oil in the south for the Shia; petroleum is an asset which should benefit all Iraqis equally.

The nation's enormous oil patch clearly requires professional local oversight. Local management, reporting to a board of directors (one-half of whom could be designated by the national parliament and the other half by shareholders) would see to the effective and honest operation of the industry, utilizing international companies to prospect and develop the oilfields and market the production.

Actual ownership should be Iraqi, adopting a modified Norwegian model that provides direct participation in the financial benefits of its oil industry to those to whom the resources belong—the citizenry. A key difference from the Norwegian model, however, should be that the Iraqi petroleum industry is actually owned by the citizens, whereas the Norwegian industry is state-owned, with profits earmarked to a host of services benefiting citizens.

The keys to a successful citizen-owned, locally managed, and internationally developed petroleum sector are threefold:
1. An equal number of shares distributed to every citizen age 18 or older.
2. Shares held by the original recipient for a minimum of five years, except in the event of death, when they would be deeded to the designated next of kin. In any event, shares could only be held by Iraqi citizens.
3. All petroleum related operations overseen by an independent Board of Directors.

A citizen-owned oil industry would send a resounding message to Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and every other oil producing state in the region that petroleum is a resource of the people of each country. In so doing, state-owned companies would no longer have the option, as currently, to creak with inefficiency and reek of corruption.

MOVING FORWARD
Implementation of the above programs and policies would lead to:
• Development of trusted leadership cadres in the three major population groups;
• Reduction in potentially disastrous inter-communal rivalries;
• No need to deal with the foul regime in Tehran, simultaneously encouraging the already strong Iranian opposition;
• Iraq as a genuine beacon of free market democracy in the Middle East.

This is, in short, decidedly not the time to cut and run. America's Iraqi experience since the end of its brilliant military campaign has been an object lesson in what not to do. However, it is not too late to reverse the downward spiral and to implement with clarity and conviction what can and should be done to bring peace and stability to the country and, thence, the region.

It is a self-defeating myth that Americans have lost the respect and support of Iraqis. The overwhelming majority of Iraqi leaders and men in the street are grateful and hopeful that America will stay the course by providing security and guidance, until Iraqi forces and governmental structures are in place.

There are, however, three constituencies the coalition will never win over: Iraqi Ba'athist and assorted Muslim fanatics; al-Qaeda and other foreign inspired terrorist groups; and neighboring nations' governments, including most significantly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Iran.

A critical step for improving relations with Iraq's Shia is for the United States to open direct discussions between Grand Ayatollah Ali-Muhammad Sistani and a senior U.S. representative. Having made the egregious mistake of treating Sistani like a 19th-century Japanese emperor, a way can and must be found to create the basis for mutually face-saving and profitable talks with the country's single most influential Shia leader. Undeniably important, Sistani is primus inter pares of Iraq's Shia clergy. The perception of further American kowtowing can only result in jealousy among his senior colleagues.

Another doubly important way to improve U.S.-Iraq relations is for Washington to cease discussions with Iran's leadership, whom Sistani and many other Shia clergy in Iraq despise. President Bush correctly identified Iran as a charter member of the Axis of Evil, and Tehran’s reigning mullahs wish America no luck whatever.

The recommended approaches to governance as well as petroleum sector organization and ownership have the great benefit of being broadly accepted by all Iraqis. They would avoid much of the predictable dispute that the coalition's current centralized approach for government and a nationalized petroleum sector have produced. Indeed, they would be as refreshing to good governance and nascent capitalism as the widely popular 15-percent flat tax for individuals and corporations that is already in place.

What remains is Republican concurrence with this thoroughly nonpartisan solution to Iraq’s two most pressing issues, followed by the U.S. mission and its British partners providing guidance and encouragement to the country’s new cabinet in the fulfillment of these realistic goals.

—John R. Thomson has worked as businessman, diplomat, and journalist in the Middle East for four decades, having lived in Beirut, Cairo, and Riyadh. Hussain Hindawi founded and edited for eight years UPI’s Arabic service, and most recently served as Chairman of the Independent Iraqi Electoral Commission.

SOME pundits and politicians have been floating the idea that America consider dividing Iraq into three ethno-religious entities, saying this would not only stem the insurgency but also allow our troops an earlier exit. They are wrong: fracturing the country would not serve either Iraqi or United States interests, and would make life for average Iraqis even worse.

The first problem is that Iraq does not have a neat set of ethnic dividing lines. There has never been a meaningful census of Iraq showing exactly how its Arab Sunnis, Arab Shiites, Kurds and other factions are divided or where they live. The two elections held since the toppling of Saddam Hussein have made it clear, however, that Iraq's cities and 18 governorates all have significant minorities.

Thus any effort to divide the country along sectarian and ethnic lines would require widespread "relocations." This would probably be violent and impoverish those forced to move, leave a legacy of fear and hatred, and further delay Iraq's political and economic recovery.

Moreover, Iraq is heavily urbanized, with nearly 40 percent of the population in the multiethnic greater Baghdad and Mosul areas. We have seen in Northern Ireland and the Balkans how difficult it is to split cities, and with Iraq's centralized and failing services and impoverished economy, violence and economics cannot be separated. Deciding where Kirkuk, a key oil city, belonged would pit the Kurds against all the rest of Iraq's factions. Basra, the nation's port, is already under the sway of Shiite Islamist militias and could lose all of its secular character if the nation divided. In addition, the nation could not be partitioned without dividing the army, the security forces and the police. The regular military is largely Shiite with a significant number of Kurds. The Ministry of Interior forces are largely Shiite, and the police are hopelessly mixed with militias and local security forces that split according to local tribal, sectarian and ethnic ties. Dividing the country essentially means dividing the army and security forces and strengthening the militias — all of which would lead to more violence.

And of course, there is no way to divide Iraqi that will not set off fights over control of oil. More than 90 percent of Iraq's government revenues come from oil exports. The Sunni Arab west has no developed oil fields and thus would have no oil revenues. The Kurds want the northern oil fields, but have no legitimate claim to them and no real way to export the oil they produce (their neighbors Iran, Syria and Turkey have restive Kurdish populations of their own and thus no interest in helping Iraq's Kurds achieve self-sustaining freedom). Control of Basra would also be an issue, with various Shiite groups looking to separate and take control of the oil in the south.

Dividing Iraq would also harm regional stability and the war on terrorists. Sunni Islamist extremist groups with ties to Al Qaeda already dominate the Sunni insurgents, and division would only increase their hold over average Iraqis. And with Iraqi Sunnis cut out of oil money, Arab Sunni states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be forced to support them, if only to avoid having the Islamist extremists take over this part of Iraq.

Iran, of course, would compete for the Iraqi Shiites. The Kurds have no friends: Turkey, Iran and Syria would seek to destabilize the north and exploit the divisions between the two main Kurdish political unions. In the end, these divisions could spill over into the rest of the Middle East and the Arab world, creating a risk of local conflicts and the kind of religious tension that feeds Islamist extremism.

Washington has made serious mistakes in Iraq, and they may lead to civil war. Dividing Iraq, however, is virtually certain to make things worse. It would convey the message that America has been defeated and abandoned a nation and a people. Even if one could overlook the fact the United States effectively broke Iraq and has a responsibility to its 28 million people, it is impossible to deny that leaving behind a power vacuum in an already dangerous region is hardly a viable strategy.

Anthony H. Cordesman, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is the author of "The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons." [adapted version of "Dividing Iraq: Think Long and Hard First", CSIC, undated]

Dividing Iraq now into three parts is both impractical and foolish:

Washington has made serious mistakes in Iraq, and they may lead to civil war. Dividing Iraq, however, is virtually certain to make things worse. It would convey the message that America has been defeated and abandoned a nation and a people. Even if one could overlook the fact the United States effectively broke Iraq and has a responsibility to its 28 million people, it is impossible to deny that leaving behind a power vacuum in an already dangerous region is hardly a viable strategy.

I guess when we are winning and you can't stand that fact, the only thing to do is advocate the creation of somebody to whom you can surrender.

The enemy in Iraq can't cobble together a company-sized force to launch an attack or call any territory their own, so forcing Iraq into the Vietnam template is rather difficult. Even aside from the whole 'sand' thing.

But by urging the creation of a country in the Sunni portion of Iraq that the Baathists would control, voila! An entity that can accept our surrender and snatch an American defeat from the jaws of victory is created! Ah, the fruits of big-brained, nuanced thinking!

We cannot allow the Iraqi Baathists to run their own thug state. Even a shrunken Sunni Triangle-based state. Period. That's why we invaded Iraq, remember? Otherwise this is just a replay of Desert Storm where our only goal was to reduce the territory that Saddam controlled.

As the saying might go: When you start to take Baghdad--take Baghdad. And when you take it--keep it.

Listen to the present televised hysteria. Too few troops! No, too many still there! The CIA is out of control! No, it is weak and irrelevant! The Iraq mess only empowered Iran! No, its democratic experiment is the best way to undermine that neighboring theocracy.

Such frenzy of the 24-hour news cycle is now everywhere, as we are lectured that our victories over the Taliban and Saddam Hussein have caused as many problems as they solved.

But in war aren't choices usually between the bad and the far worse? So often victory leads not to utopia, but only something better.

Take our past ambiguous successes. Recall that the outcome of America's horrific, but successful, Civil War that ended slavery led not to racial harmony. Instead followed over a decade of failed Reconstruction and another century of Jim Crow apartheid in the South.

We saved a reeling Britain and France in World War I. But an isolationist United States did not occupy a defeated Germany. So we fought a resurgent Hitler little more than twenty years later, who talked of the 'stab in the back,' while he bragged that imperial Germany had withdrawn unbeaten from foreign soil.

The outcome of World War II (note the sudden need for the Roman numerals) was not perpetual peace or even the freedom of Eastern Europe, but rather its enslavement and a Cold War of a half-century.

The United States prevailed in saving South Korea. Yet it still bequeathed a lunatic nuclear communist state to our grandchildren.

Gulf War I was a smashing success. But it was followed by the slaughter of tens of thousands of Shiites and Kurds, twelve years of no-fly zones, and yet another war against Saddam.

Almost every controversy in this present war also proves to be a rehash of the past. Poorly armored Humvees? Thousands, not hundreds, of Americans perished, in thin-skinned Sherman tanks ("Ronson lighters") that never were up-armored even at the end of World War II.

Too few troops? In late July 1944 as Gen. George Patton raced eastward through France, the topic never came up. But by autumn as several under-strength American armies suddenly stalled on the distant Rhine, national recrimination replaced the earlier euphoria. What fool planner had advocated a broad-front advance into Germany with far too few soldiers?

Did removing Saddam empower Iran? No more so than ending Nazism gave more opportunity for our "ally" Stalin to enslave Eastern Europe.

Why was our Iraqi intelligence so poor in assessing the potential for postwar insurgency? The same was asked how some surprised American divisions near the end of World War II were nearly annihilated by Germans in the Bulge and by the Japanese on Okinawa?

Won't Iraq require years of occupation? We hope not. But years after our victories, American troops are still residing in Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, and the Balkans.

The point of these historical comparisons is not to excuse our present mistakes by citing worse ones from the past--or to suggest that all wars are always the same. Much less should history's examples be used to stifle necessary contemporary criticism that alone leads to remedy.

Rather knowledge of the capricious nature of wars of the past can restore a little humility to our national psyche.

We need it. Ours is the first generation of Americans that thinks it can demand perfection in war. Our present leisure, wealth, and high technology fool us into thinking that we are demi-gods always be able to trump both human and natural disasters. Accordingly, we become frustrated that we cannot master every wartime obstacle, as we seem otherwise to be able to do with computers or cosmetic surgery. Then, without any benchmarks of comparison from the past, we despair that our actions are failed because they are not perfect.

But why did a poorer, less educated, and more illiberal United States in far bloodier and more error-ridden wars of the past still have greater confidence in itself? Was it that our ancestors, who died younger and far more tragically, did not expect their homeland to be without flaws, only to be considerably better than the enemy's?

Perhaps we have forgotten such modesty because we have ignored the study of history that alone offers us guidance from our forbearers. It now competes as an orphan discipline with social science, -ologies and -isms that entice us into thinking that the more money and education of the present can at last perfect the human condition and thus consign our flawed past to irrelevance.

The result is that while sensitive young Americans seem to know what correct words and ideas they must embrace, they derive neither direction nor solace from past events. After all, very few could identify Vicksburg or Verdun, much less have any idea where or what Iwo Jima was. In such a lonely prison of the present what are historically ignorant Americans to make of a Fallujah or an Iranian madman's threat of annihilation other than such things can't or shouldn't or must not happen to us?

So, of this present war, I think our war-torn forefathers would say to us that both messy Afghanistan and Iraq are better places without their dictators even if they never will resemble Carmel or Austin.

They would add that it is not unusual to be confronted with new crises even after such apparently easy victories. And they would shrug that however scary Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Iran now appears, it poses nothing new or insurmountable to a confident and strong United States that has dealt with far more serious enemies in the past with its accustomed wisdom and resolve.

Victor Davis Hanson is a classicist and historian at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and author, most recently, of "A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War." You can reach him by e-mailing author@victorhanson.com.

I published a piece making a similar argument in a supplement to the Iraqi paper Al Sabah last year. The English language version is available here.

UPDATE: Many people, both in the US and in Iraq, confuse decentralized federalism with partition of the country into three separate states (Sunni, Shiite, Kurdish). In reality, federalism is an ALTERNATIVE to partition, not a synonym for it. Like partition, it has the advantage of enabling each of the three groups to avoid total domination by any of the others. Unlike partition, it avoids breaking up Iraq into three relatively weak nations that would be easy pickings for Iraq's rapacious neighbors. The other alternatives to partition are probably dictatorship or civil war. Despite the very serious attendant risks, I don't think that partition should be categorically ruled out for all time. But, at the very least, we and the Iraqis should try federalism first.

I. Distribution of oil revenues.
The vast majority of Iraqi economic production and government revenue consists of oil. Nearly all the oil is found in the Kurdish north and the Shia-majority south. Thus, majority-Sunni central Iraq might be left out in the cold. Fortunately, all three of the federalism proposals cited in my earlier post propose ways around this problem. The possible solutions are guaranteeing the Sunnis a share of the government's oil revenue (Biden), a privatization model that would give all Iraqis individual ownership rights over oil (National Review), or a combination of the two (my approach).

If any of these policies are put into effect, there will initially be problems of credible commitment. The Sunnis might fear that the Shiites and Kurds will renege on the commitment to give them their share of oil money. However, once the payments get off the ground, these concerns can be eased. The US, if it wants to, can give the Shia-led government strong incentives to make the payments happen. The Iraqi government is likely to remain dependent on US assistance for some time, and we could condition that assistance on compliance with the terms of the federalism deal. Moreover, once payments begin, the government will have a self-interest in continuing them because the alternative would be a civil war that is much more costly. Finally, under my approach and National Review's (privatized shares of oil stock given to each member of the population, regardless of religion and ethnicity), any attempt by the government to confiscate the shares of the Sunni population would be likely to undercut the market value of ALL shares, including those held by Kurds and Shia. Kurdish and Shia shareholders would thus have a common interest with the Sunnis.

II. Mixed areas.
Most parts of Iraq do not have homogenous populations. There are Shia living in Sunni areas, Sunnis living in majority-Kurdish areas, and so on. In a federal system, the rights of local minorities may well be threatened by the local majority. Of course this problem does not disappear under a highly centralized government. Ultimately, the parties will have to bargain out the exact boundaries between them, addressing disputed areas such as Kirkuk. Whatever the details of the final settlement, there will obviously still be local minorities. There are two ways to protect their rights: 1) judicial review under a central constitution that guarantees basic individual rights, and 2) mutual deterrence.

Both approaches should be tried, but I set more stock by the second, because the Iraqi judicial system is in its infancy and is likely to improve only very slowly. The Sunni authorities should be able to agree to protect Shiite and Kurd minorities in their midst in exchange for the latter protecting the Sunnis in their areas. Such an "exchange of hostages" model is not very inspiring, but it does give regional governments an incentive to respect the rights of local minorities. Here too, the US and its Coalition partners can play a role in enforcing the bargain by denying or reducing aid to regional governments that violate minority rights. Will it work perfectly? Of course not. But it is better than the alternatives of civil war or centralization. Under the latter, the dominant group in the central government would be able to oppress its rivals all over the country, not just in a few regions.

III. Federalism and partition.
Critics of decentralized federalism often claim that it will lead to partition. Some, like Cordesman in his NY Times piece, do not even seem to distinguish between the two. It is in fact the fear of a dominant central government dominated by one's enemies that leads to pressure for partition. Implementation of a strong form of federalism would dampen these fears, though probably not completely eliminate them. Realistically, the Kurds will not accept a highly centralized government of any kind (and I don't blame them). The Sunnis will not accept one dominated by the Shia, as is likely to be case if the government continues to be democratically elected (the Shiites are 60% of the population). By removing the threat of nation-wide domination by one group, decentralized federalism will reduce pressures for partition rather than increase it. This is especially likely in light of the fact that partition would leave all three major Iraqi groups vulnerable to the depradations of Iraq's unscrupulous and rapacious neighbors. Federalism is a way to capture the main benefits of partition, while mitigating its dangers.

Decentralized federalism is not a panacea for Iraq's many problems, but it does have important advantages over the alternatives of centralization, partition, and civil war.

Unusual political stability in Turkey faces upheaval from Iraq's impending fracture along sectarian lines. The birth of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq will end Turkey's E.U. accession hopes. The collapse of the accession process will strongly undermine the legitimacy of the ruling Justice and Development Party (A.K.P.), making it increasingly vulnerable to political attacks from Turkey's secular establishment. These attacks could prompt the disintegration of the Erdogan government as soon as the end of 2006.

Sectarianism Governs Iraq
Far from providing the long-awaited impetus for political and social stability, the results of Iraq's December 2005 parliamentary election were another step toward the division of the country along sectarian lines. Secular candidates supported by the Bush administration were trounced in the election, while the broad victory of the Iran-backed Shi'a political parties undermined Washington's influence in Iraq. [See: "Red Lines Crisscross Iraq's Political Landscape"]

Thus far, it has been impossible for either Ibrahim al-Jaafari or his successor as prime minister, Nouri Maliki, to form a government. At the heart of Iraq's political impasse is the country's new U.S.-drafted constitution, which incomprehensibly calls for the division of political powers along sectarian lines.

The constitutionally-mandated division of political power in Iraq was meant to ensure that Shi'a, Kurds and Sunnis would participate equally in a government of "national unity." In practice, however, it has proved impossible for these disparate ethnic groups to reach a consensus for sharing cabinet positions.

Bush administration officials blame the escalation of sectarian violence in Iraq on the inability of the country's political parties to form a government. More likely, it is the other way around. Iraq's descent into civil war, which began with the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra, has made it impossible for Shi'a and Sunni political parties to work together. Meanwhile, sectarian violence has raged out of control. At least 3,000 Iraqis have died in sectarian-related violence since February 2006.

Although Prime Minister Nouri Maliki is expected to fill his cabinet positions soon, Iraq's escalating civil war will continue to obstruct governance making it impossible for the country's new government to function. This, combined with the planned withdrawal in 2006 by most of Washington's coalition partners from Iraq, will pressure the Bush administration to begin withdrawing U.S. troops. A U.S. troop drawdown may be accelerated by electoral politics as the U.S. mid-term elections approach. The withdrawal of U.S.-led forces will fuel Iraq's civil war, speeding the country's fracture along sectarian lines.

As with Iraq's government, Washington played a strong role in the creation of the country's military, police and paramilitary organizations. As a result, these security organizations are also steeped in sectarianism, hence their role in enflaming Iraq's civil war. As foreign forces are withdrawn, Iraq's security organizations will devolve back into the Shi'a and Kurdish militias from which they were derived. These militias will be used to protect Shi'a and Kurdish territories, respectively. Compared to the Shi'a, the Kurdish militia, or peshmerga, is much better organized and more well-armed thanks to many years of U.S. support.

More than 90 percent of the Iraqi National Army troops stationed in northern Iraq, or Iraqi Kurdistan, hail from the Kurdish peshmerga. Rather than showing allegiance to a central military authority, these troops are loyal to peshmerga leaders. The Kurds have also maintained their peshmerga militia in northern Iraq. Combining these troops gives the Kurds a formidable army with which to defend its territory. Inevitably, Iraqi Kurds, who just anointed their own prime minister and parliament creating the Kurdistan Regional Government, will likely declare their independence from Iraq.

No E.U., No Erdogan
In the past six months, the Turkish military has amassed nearly 250,000 troops in southeastern Turkey and along the border between Turkey and Iraq. This buildup has two aims: thwarting Turkey's own Kurdish separatists operating in the region and protecting the interests of the Turcoman population in Iraqi Kurdistan. The birth of an independent Kurdistan could agitate Turkey's Kurdish population, which has suffered decades of repression at the hands of the Turkish military. It could also undermine the rights of the Turcoman living in Kurdistan.

The militarization of southeastern Turkey in response to Iraq's fracturing and moves toward Kurdish independence has already prompted new repression designed to foil any separatist designs by Turkey's Kurds. This repression, combined with probable Turkish military action against the new Kurdistan, will probably end Turkey's hopes of eventual E.U. accession. Without E.U. accession as an anchor, the Erdogan government will quickly lose its legitimacy.

In Turkey's November 2002 elections, the A.K.P. won a stunning 363 out of 550 parliamentary seats, allowing Prime Minister Erdogan to form the country's first single party government in more than ten years. Turkey has a unique electoral system, which allows political parties to gain parliamentary representation only after surpassing a ten percent threshold in popular votes.

Heavy political fragmentation combined with growing disdain for traditional political parties allowed the A.K.P. to control 66 percent of the seats in Turkey's parliament despite gaining only 34 percent of the popular vote. That a government with Islamist roots came to power with such a weak popular mandate initially raised serious legitimacy questions within Turkey's secular establishment, which includes the business community, the judiciary and the military.

The Erdogan government strengthened its legitimacy by immediately and aggressively pursuing E.U. accession, an issue dear to Turkey's secularists. These Herculean efforts seemingly paid off in December 2004, when Brussels formally accepted Turkey's E.U. accession application. Accession negotiations subsequently commenced in October 2005. Nearly simultaneously, Kurdish nationalists, based in Iraq, began to launch increasingly bold attacks in Turkey, including military ambushes and civilian bombings.

Turkey's military leaders have been almost powerless to pursue Kurdish nationalists of Turkish origin in Iraq due to Washington's restraining hand. The Bush administration does not want to undermine its Kurdish partners in Iraq by allowing Turkish military operations in Iraqi Kurdistan. This is most likely because many in the Pentagon believe that Iraq's fracture along sectarian lines is unavoidable.

With no leverage over Iraq's Shi'a or Sunnis, Washington's only hope for maintaining military basing rights in Iraq is by cementing its relations with the Kurds. In addition, Turkey's military leadership, headed by General Hilmi Ozkok, has taken a pragmatic approach toward developments in Iraq and the broader implications of these developments for Turkey's E.U. membership. Nonetheless, a red line undoubtedly still exists for the Turkish military in Iraq. This red line is Kurdish independence.

In August 2006, General Ozkok will retire in favor of Turkish Ground Forces Commander General Yasar Buyukanit. General Buyukanit appears to have much more hawkish views toward the birth of an independent Kurdistan and Turkey's Kurds than does General Ozkok. Buyukanit raised many eyebrows at home and abroad after stating that he would personally lead the Turkish military into northern Iraq should Iraqi Kurds establish an independent state.

In order to launch a military action against Iraq's Kurds and to contain the threat of secessionist activity by Turkish Kurds, the Turkish military has already begun to militarize southeastern Turkey. With Europeans focusing heavily on Turkey's ability to improve its human rights record, military action against Kurds in Iraq, military action against an independent Kurdistan and renewed oppression of Turkey's own Kurds will bring Istanbul's E.U. accession process to a screeching halt.

Conclusion
The collapse of Turkey's E.U. accession bid can be expected to raise significantly the political heat on the Erdogan government from Turkey's secular establishment. This heat will be amplified as the May 2007 presidential succession approaches. Turkey current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer has acted as a secular bulwark against the Erdogan government, using his power to veto A.K.P.-sponsored legislation and to reject many government appointments made by Erdogan.

Since Turkey's president is appointed by the country's parliament, the political party controlling parliament will decide who replaces Sezer. Barring early elections, this party will be the A.K.P. Turkey's secular establishment is unlikely to accept an A.K.P.-appointed Islamist as the country's next president. The Turkish military may find it quite convenient to intervene politically to prevent this. Intervention could provoke the collapse of the Erdogan government by late 2006 or early 2007.

Report Drafted By:
Jephraim P. Gundzik (760.937.7152)

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR; http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=490&language_id=1) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.

Let it break up. It seems a simple enough solution. Iraq's three main groups - the Shiite Arabs, the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds - are killing each other with greater ferocity than ever, and the Americans are playing referee. A number of American officials and experts, weary from the bloodletting, are giving renewed attention to proposals to let the regions of Iraq break into their own parts.

In the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, argues for a variation of sectarian division - a loose federation of three largely autonomous regions that might help stop Iraq's slide into civil war while avoiding a complete breakup of the country. As attractive as the idea of dividing Iraq into sectarian regions sounds, it has one big problem: Especially in Iraq's urban areas, it could be a bloody affair. (Mr. Gelb acknowledges this, but says the risk of violence is no greater than under other solutions proposed for Iraq.)

From afar, it might seem that drawing new borders between Iraq's main groups could be accomplished fairly easily. Each group predominates in a different part of the country: Sunnis in the west, Kurds in the north, Shiites in the south. In the north, the Kurds, with their own language, army and regional government, have already gone their own way. But in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul, there are no clear geographical lines separating the main groups. A breakup into ethnic regions or states would almost certainly increase the pressure on families to flee the mixed neighborhoods to be closer to members of their own group. Shiites to Shiites, Sunnis to Sunnis. Ethnic cleansing is already happening in Iraq, but still at a relatively slow pace.

Iraq's main groups - and even smaller ones, like Christians and Turkomans - now live together in many places. While the Tigris River acts as a broad ethnic boundary in both Baghdad and Mosul - Sunnis on the west and Shiites on the east in Baghdad, and Sunnis on the west and Kurds on the east in Mosul - there are large pockets of each group on both sides of the river. Trying to divide those cities could result in the expulsion of tens of thousands of people from their homes, maybe more. That is not a pretty process: the neighborhoods around the edges of Baghdad have already experienced a lot of ethnic cleansing - mainly Shiites being forced from their homes. Many of these families have fled to refugee camps in central Baghdad. The individual stories told by these families are heartbreaking. Not everyone survives.

Kirkuk is the most complicated Iraqi city of all. It is divided into three main communities: Arab, Turkoman and Kurd. Within those there are many subgroups - Sunni and Shiite Arab, Sunni and Shiite Turkoman. As in both Baghdad and Mosul, there are pockets of Christians scattered throughout. In Kirkuk, the main issue is how to rectify the expulsion of tens of thousands of Kurds by Saddam Hussein in the 1980's. The houses emptied by the fleeing Kurds were filled by Arab families lured north by Mr. Hussein's regime. Since the fall of Mr. Hussein, tens of thousands of Kurds have been streaming back, mostly living in squalid camps on the city's eastern side. Splitting this city - and its oil reserves - would probably come down to power. In all likelihood, that wouldn't be pretty, either.

On 30 April 2006, I had the opportunity to visit South Kurdistan and travel through the region for a month. I have been observing Kurdish politics for years and it was a good opportunity to see the situation, and talk to people at close range.

To my sorrow, at the end of a month living among the people in South Kurdistan I departed from there very disappointed. After 15 years of self-rule there has not been any significant development, despite claims to the contrary. In some respects, compared to my previous visit in 1997, the situation has worsened. Having said that there have been some positive developments in certain areas. The following are my observations of the situation in South Kurdistan. I will start by focusing on the positive developments.

Kurdish self-rule

For the first time in their history, the Kurds in South Kurdistan have been ruling over some parts of their traditional lands. Arab rule has not been directly enforced in South Kurdistan, and security for the region has been tacitly entrusted to the Kurdish population. This has helped the security of Kurdistan. While there have been daily explosions and terrorist activities elsewhere in Iraq the situation is relatively safe and stable in Kurdistan. This has helped the development of the regional economy. Compared to a decade ago the financial situation of the population in Kurdistan has improved significantly. There have been many construction projects such as buildings and roads completed or currently underway.

During my visit to the region, I also noticed that different Kurdish dialects are becoming closer. I saw many Soranis attempting to speak in Bahdini dialect and vice versa. In some cases, individuals could converse in their own dialects yet understand the dialect spoken by the other. Kurdish radio programs and television channels have greatly helped this. This has facilitated communication among the Kurds which has helped the development of pan-Kurdish sentiments.

More importantly, these developments in Kurdistan have had a flow-on effect to other parts of Kurdistan. The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran has changed its slogan from autonomy to federalism. There are some political parties in North Kurdistan that are now also demanding federalism. The Kurds in Western Kurdistan have been more assertive in their demands for greater cultural, social and political rights. South Kurdistan has become a refuge for the Kurds in other parts when they flee persecution. Yet, despite these positive developments there are many problems as well.

What has gone wrong?

My last visit to South Kurdistan occurred in 1997. I was very hopeful upon returning to the region again that there would be ever greater positive developments. Back in 1997, basic services such as water and electricity were inadequate for the needs of the population. Water would often be available only for a couple of hours every two to three days, and electricity was sporadic at best. When I returned in April 2006, the region had access to a couple of hours water every five days and the electricity situation had not changed. After fifteen years of Kurdish self-rule basic services are almost non-existent.

After decades of suppression and destruction Kurdistan has remained underdeveloped. The Kurds are in urgent need of community development. During my month long visit, I did not see or even hear about any substantial community development activities. The minimal activities that are in place are operated by Kurdish intellectuals under the auspice of political parties, mainly the KDP and PUK. However, these activities are very limited in scope, and they are carried out to serve specific political purposes. Kurdistan requires human resources for political, social, economic and cultural developments. Without major community development projects Kurdistan will remain underdeveloped.

Another major problem I observed was economic dependency. Kurdistan is abundant in water resources. However, drinking water is being imported from Turkey and Iran. Agricultural produce is being imported, despite the fertile land lying fallow and empty where flourishing crops could be harvested. Such Economic dependency could lead to the destruction of Kurdistan. If Kurdistan is ever to declare independence, neighbouring states would not need to invade Kurdistan militarily; they would need only to impose economic sanctions to achieve their goal. Kurdistan’s economy is so dependent on external produce that it cannot survive such a sanction.

Kurdistan needs economic infrastructure. I did not observe any economic infrastructure being built, except for some few buildings and roads which had often taken years to complete. For instance, I was told that the Hewler-Suleimaniyeh road construction had started three years ago. When I travelled along this road, after three years, construction had progressed only to the stage of levelling the soil. Economic infrastructure is essential for economic independency and the survival of Kurdistan. Without such a development Kurdistan cannot be independent.

Agriculture is another pilar of economic independency and a vital industry for a flourishing society. Yet, systems within Kurdistan discourage agricultural development. There is inadequate support services and infrastructure for rural areas. Furthermore, a culture of militarisation within Kurdistan does not help the development of agriculture. There is no incentive for local people to cultivate land or learn agricultural skills. One of the legacies of Saddam’s rule has been that many Kurds have learnt to take up arms in order to achieve a monthly salary. This was an easier and quicker way to earn money than working in the fields or industrial sectors. Even now, many Kurds do not see any need to learn vocational skills or to work in an agricultural sector. Many join the ranks of Kurdish political parties, mainly the KDP and PUK, as peshmargas only to get a monthly salary. Conditions are seen as good - they are often required to go to work for only half their time – working for fifteen days, then returning home for the next fifteen. This is an easy way to earn a living. Why bother to learn occupational skills when easy money can be obtained simply by taking up arms? This trend has put economic development within Kurdistan at risk. The Kurds, especially young people, should be encouraged to learn skills. While the security of Kurdistan is very important and essential for economic development it needs to be in proportion. Kurdistan cannot only be defended by military force. The future of Kurdistan depends upon all aspects of economic development.

In any militarised society democracy and freedom is usually the victim. History has shown that those governments with military focus have created dictatorships. I am not saying that there is a dictatorship in Kurdistan. However, my fear is that the current society is heading in this direction. Kurdish independent media is being persecuted for criticising party officials or covering the news that the government does not like to be covered. The suppression of the people of Halabja a few months ago and the suppression of Kurdish demonstrators more recently indicates that the Kurdish administration is becoming more intolerant of opposition or criticism. The development of civil society is very slow, if existing at all. Without an independent media and civil society democracy cannot exist.

The Kurdish South is proud of its democratic organisations, such as the Kurdistan Parliament, especially when the two existing Kurdish administrations united in May 2006. While unification of Kurdistan was welcomed by the majority of the Kurds in South and other parts of Kurdistan, it underlined a deep division that has existed between the two main Kurdish political parties, KDP and PUK. Having 42 ministers out of a total parliament number of 111 members is not a good sign. It underlines the depth of problems (which was acknowledge by the Prime Minister of Kurdistan) between these two parties. The sensitive posts of the peshmarga, judiciary and finance ministers could not be united at this stage as there is lack of trust between the KDP and PUK.

Furthermore, power needs to be transferred to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and individual Kurdish political parties are still reluctant to do so. One would expect that the members of politburos of the KDP and PUK and other influential figures within these parties would join the Kurdistan Parliament as ministers and members. However, this has not happened. They have been controlling Kurdish administration behind the scenes. Therefore, there are ministers who hold official portfolios but who have no real power to enact any initiatives without approval from outside sources. This is one of the reasons that the KRG does not have the power and authority it should have.

The KRG is being financed by the KDP and PUK. I am not aware of any such system that exists elsewhere in the world. Kurdistan needs an independent parliament with due powers and responsibilities. Of course, in democratic countries political parties with majority votes rule, however, they rule through the government not separated from it. If they should lose the next election the government is still there to be ruled by another political party. Revenues and other incomes go to a government not political parties.

This is where the problem of corruption exists. I did not hear from any Kurd in South Kurdistan who did not complain about corruption and mismanagement. Many times I was told that if a corrupt official was ‘outed’ publicly he would simply be transferred to another, somethimes higher position instead of being punished. Even if we assume that the majority of these claims are inaccurate or overstated, the fact remains that such a perception exists, and in politics perceptions matter. The Kurdish leadership and administration are responsible for public assets and Kurdistan’s wealth. Responsibilities and accountability are the main criteria for a society’s development and wellbeing. If the current situation continues it is more than probable that Kurdistan will develop as a corrupt society, with corrupt administration and leadership. If a corrupt system is consolidated and becomes a part of the administrative culture even a revolution would be unable to eradicate it. This is a very serious issue the effect of which will be deeply felt in future Kurdistan. Now that a Kurdish entity is being formed it is the responsibility of the Kurdish leadership to build a system that will benefit Kurdish people and which is different from the corrupt governments in neighbouring countries.

Unfortunately, Kurdish leaders have always taken as their guide the leaderships in neighbouring countries. The new role model has become the government of the post-Saddam regime Iraq. At this point in time it is unclear whether the major political powers emerging in the power vacuum in Iraq would be inclusive or even accepting of Kurdish identity and self-determination. Yet, since the invasion of Iraq by the US led coalition the Kurdish leadership has been attempting to lead the Kurds back under Iraqi rule. This is not helpful to Kurdish identity, confidence and future of Kurdistan.

To conclude, Kurdistan is at the cross-roads of history, both internationally and nationally. The region could go in many different directions. Internationally, Kurdistan could be developed into a united and independent state. Alternatively, it could be incorporated under the rule of other states who have a history of oppressing the Kurds for decades. Nationally, it could be developed into a democratic parliamentary entity through which the values of equality, prosperity and the rule of law were promoted. Or it could be developed into a dictatorship whose fundamental characteristics are essentially identical to those of its neighbours. The Kurdish leadership could determine to take the Kurds in any of these directions.

If the Kurdish leadership wants to develop a democratic and independent Kurdistan with a bright future they need to build economic, social, political and cultural infrastructure that would develop Kurdistan into a self-sufficient and self-reliant entity. With the framework of its current developments Kurdistan is doomed to fail and the responsibility for this will be laid at the door of the Kurdish leadership. The KDP and PUK can use their opportunities to utilise the current regional and international development schemes to move Kurdistan towards independence. They can loose their grip over power in order to build a democratic and pluralistic Kurdistan. Otherwise, they may well lose their power altogether. Pertinent lessons in the power plays of HAMAS in Palestine, the unrest in East Timor and the comparison to the recent unrest in Kurdish towns should be a reminder to the KDP and PUK leadership. Therefore, it should be emphasised again: use it, loose it or lose it.

Dr. Hussein Tahiri is an Honourary Research Associate with the School of Social and Political Enquiries, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia.

AN independent commission set up by Congress with the approval of President George W Bush may recommend carving up Iraq into three highly autonomous regions, according to well informed sources.

The Iraq Study Group, co-chaired by James Baker, the former US secretary of state, is preparing to report after next month’s congressional elections amid signs that sectarian violence and attacks on coalition forces are spiralling out of control. The conflict is claiming the lives of 100 civilians a day and bombings have reached record levels.

The Baker commission has grown increasingly interested in the idea of splitting the Shi’ite, Sunni and Kurdish regions of Iraq as the only alternative to what Baker calls “cutting and running” or “staying the course”.

“The Kurds already effectively have their own area,” said a source close to the group. “The federalisation of Iraq is going to take place one way or another. The challenge for the Iraqis is how to work that through.”

The commission is considered to represent a last chance for fresh thinking on Iraq, where mass kidnappings are increasing and even the police are suspected of being responsible for a growing number of atrocities.

Baker, 76, an old Bush family friend who was secretary of state during the first Gulf war in 1991, said last week that he met the president frequently to discuss “policy and personnel”.

His group will not advise “partition”, but is believed to favour a division of the country that will devolve power and security to the regions, leaving a skeletal national government in Baghdad in charge of foreign affairs, border protection and the distribution of oil revenue.

The Iraqi government will be encouraged to hold a constitutional conference paving the way for greater devolution. Iran and Syria will be urged to back a regional settlement that could be brokered at an international conference.

Baker, a leading exponent of shuttle diplomacy, has already met representatives of the Syrian government and is planning to see the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations in New York. “My view is you don’t just talk to your friends,” he said last week. “You need to talk to your enemies in order to move forward diplomatically towards peace.”

His group has yet to reach a final conclusion, but there is a growing consensus that America can neither pour more soldiers into Iraq nor suffer mounting casualties without any sign of progress. It is thought to support embedding more high-quality American military advisers in the Iraqi security forces rather than maintaining high troop levels in the country indefinitely.

Frustrated by the failure of a recent so-called “battle of Baghdad” to stem violence in the capital, Zalmay Khalilzad, the US ambassador to Iraq, said last week that the unity government of Nouri al-Maliki, the prime minister, had only two months left to get a grip. Rumours abound that the much-admired ambassador could depart by Christmas.

Khalilzad’s warning was reinforced by John Warner, Republican chairman of the Senate armed services committee, on his return from a visit to Baghdad. “In two to three months’ time, if this thing hasn’t come to fruition and this government (is not) able to function, I think it’s a responsibility of our government internally to determine: is there a change of course we should take?” Warner said.

Bush and Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state, have resisted the break-up of Iraq on the grounds that it could lead to more violence, but are thought to be reconsidering. “They have finally noticed that the country is being partitioned by civil war and ethnic cleansing is already a daily event,” said Leslie Gelb, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Gelb is the co-author with Senator Joseph Biden, a leading Democrat, of a plan to divide Iraq. “There was almost no support for our idea until very recently, when all the other ideas being advocated failed,” Gelb said.

In Baghdad last week Rice indicated that time was running out for the Iraqi government to resolve the division of oil wealth and changes to the constitution.

Many Kurds are already hoping for their own national state, while the Shi’ite Islamist leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim is pressing for regional autonomy. The Sunnis are opposed to a carve-up of Iraq, which would further deprive them of the national power they enjoyed under Saddam Hussein and could leave them with a barren tranche of the country bereft of oil revenue.

Many Middle East experts are horrified by the difficulty of dividing the nation. “Fifty-three per cent of the population of Iraq live in four cities and three of them are mixed,” said Anthony Cordesman of the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, who fears a bloody outcome.

Baghdad is a particular jumble, although ethnic cleansing is already dividing the population along the Tigris River, with Shi’ites to the east and Sunnis to the west of the city.

America may have passed the point where it can determine Iraq’s future, according to Cordesman: “The internal politics of Iraq have taken on a momentum of their own.”

Gelb is under no illusions about the prospects of success. “Everything is a long shot at this point,” he said.

No matter what President Bush says, the question is not whether America can win in Iraq. The only question is whether the United States can extricate itself without leaving behind an unending civil war that will spread more chaos and suffering throughout the Middle East, while spawning terrorism across the globe.

The prospect of what happens after an American pullout haunts the debate on Iraq. The administration, for all its hints about new strategies and timetables, is obviously hoping to slog along for two more years and dump the problem on Mr. Bush’s successor. This fall’s election debates have educated very few voters because neither side is prepared to be honest about the terrible consequences of military withdrawal and the very long odds against success if American troops remain.

This page opposed a needlessly hurried and unilateral invasion, even before it became apparent that the Bush administration was unprepared to do the job properly. But after it happened, we believed that America should stay and try to clean up the mess it had made — as long as there was any conceivable road to success.

That road is vanishing. Today we want to describe a strategy for containing the disaster as much as humanly possible. It is hardly a recipe for triumph. Americans can only look back in wonder on the days when the Bush administration believed that success would turn Iraq into a stable, wealthy democracy — a model to strike fear into the region’s autocrats while inspiring a new generation of democrats. Even last fall, the White House was dividing its strategy into a series of victorious outcomes, with the short-term goal of an Iraq “making steady progress in fighting terrorists.” The medium term had Iraq taking the lead in “providing its own security” and “on its way to achieving its economic potential,” with the ultimate outcome being a “peaceful, united, stable and secure” nation.

If an American military occupation could ever have achieved those goals, that opportunity is gone. It is very clear that even with the best American effort, Iraq will remain at war with itself for years to come, its government weak and deeply divided, and its economy battered and still dependent on outside aid. The most the United States can do now is to try to build up Iraq’s security forces so they can contain the fighting — so it neither devours Iraqi society nor spills over to Iraq’s neighbors — and give Iraq’s leaders a start toward the political framework they would need if they chose to try to keep their country whole.

The tragedy is that even this marginal sort of outcome seems nearly unachievable now. But if America is to make one last push, there are steps that might lessen the chance of all-out chaos after the troops withdraw:

Start at Home
For all the talk of timetables for Iraq, there has been little discussion of the timetable that must be handed to George W. Bush. The president cannot leave office with American troops still dying in an Iraq that staggers along just short of civil war, on behalf of no concrete objective other than “get the job done,” which is now Mr. Bush’s rhetorical substitute for “stay the course.” The administration’s current vague talk about behind-the-scenes agreements with Iraqi politicians is next to meaningless. Americans, Iraqis and the rest of the world need clear, public signs of progress.

Mr. Bush can make the first one by firing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. There is no chance of switching strategy as long as he is in control of the Pentagon. The administration’s plans have gone woefully wrong, and while the president is unlikely to admit that, he can send a message by removing Mr. Rumsfeld. It would also be a signal to the military commanders in the field that the administration now wants to hear the truth about what they need, what can be salvaged out of this mess, and what cannot.

The president should also make it clear, once and for all, that the United States will not keep permanent bases in Iraq. The people in Iraq and across the Middle East need a strong sign that the troops are not there to further any American imperial agenda.

Demand Reconciliation Talks
Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, has indefinitely postponed reconciliation talks among the nation’s top politicians. He must receive an immediate deadline to start the process. Tomorrow would not be too soon; the end of the year would be too late.

Whatever decisions Iraqi leaders reached over the past few years were achieved by pushing aside all the critical questions that were hardest to address. The Bush administration must demand not only that new talks start, but that they continue until some agreement is reached on protecting minority rights, dividing up Iraq’s oil revenues, the role of religion in the state, providing an amnesty for insurgents willing to put down their weapons, and demobilizing and disarming the militias.

More outside aid could increase their incentive to talk. Even then, the threat of an American withdrawal may be the only way to extract real concessions. In parallel with the reconciliation talks, the United States should begin its own negotiations with the Iraqi leadership about a timetable for withdrawing American troops — making clear that America’s willingness to stay longer will depend on the Iraqis’ willingness to make real compromises. Iraqi politicians have to know that they have even more to lose if their country plunges into complete civil war.

We are skeptical of calls to divide the country into three ethnically controlled regions, using the model that finally ended the Bosnian war. Most Iraqis, except for the Kurds, show little enthusiasm for the idea. Clear ethnic boundaries could not be drawn without driving many people from their homes — though an intolerable level of ethnic cleansing is already pushing things in that direction. Any effort at reconciliation will almost certainly require a transfer of power and resources to provincial and local governments. But it must be up to the Iraqis to decide the ultimate shape of their country.

Stabilize Baghdad
Most Iraqis have forgotten what security is — or if they remember, it is an idealized vision of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. Since neither the government nor the American occupation is able to provide basic services or safety, it is little wonder that Iraqis have turned to the militias for protection. In such a world, retribution will always take precedence over the uncertainties of political compromise.

American commanders have launched a series of supposedly make-or-break campaigns to take back the streets of Baghdad. The problem is not one of military strategy; their idea of “clearing” out insurgents, “holding” neighborhoods and quickly rebuilding infrastructure is probably the only thing that could work. The problem is that commanders in Baghdad have been given only a fraction of the troops — American and Iraqi — they need.

There have never been enough troops, the result of Mr. Rumsfeld’s negligent decision to use Iraq as a proving ground for his pet military theories, rather than listen to his generals. And since the Army and Marines are already strained to the breaking point, the only hope of restoring even limited sanity to Baghdad would require the transfer of thousands of American troops to the capital from elsewhere in the country. That likely means moving personnel out of the Sunni-dominated west, and more mayhem in a place like Anbar.

But Iraqis need a clear demonstration that security and rebuilding is possible. So long as Baghdad is in chaos they will have no reason to believe in anything but sectarian militias and vigilante justice. Once Washington is making a credible effort to stabilize Baghdad, Iraqi politicians will have more of an incentive to show up for reconciliation talks. No one wants to be a rejectionist if it looks like the tide might be turning.

Convene the Neighbors
America’s closest allies in the region are furious about America’s gross mismanagement of the war. But even Iran and Syria, which are eager to see America bloodied, have a great deal to lose if all-out civil war erupts in Iraq, driving refugees toward their borders. That self-interest could be the start of a discussion about how Iraq’s neighbors might help pressure their clients inside Iraq to step back from the brink. Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich neighbors — whose own stability could be threatened by an Iraqi collapse — need to be pressed into providing major financing to underwrite jobs programs and reconstruction.

Enlightened self-interest is a rarity in the Middle East. The Bush administration will most likely have to go further to elicit real help, showing a serious willingness to expand its dialogue with Damascus and Tehran beyond the issue of Iraq and to be a genuine broker for Middle East peace. That should be the easiest part of the strategy — only this White House regards the willingness to talk to another country as a major concession.

Acknowledge Reality
While the strategy described above seems the best bet to us, the odds are still very much against it working. At this point, all plans to avoid disaster involve the equivalent of a Hail Mary pass. In America, almost no one — even the administration’s harshest critics — wants to tell people the bitter truth about how few options remain on the table, and about the mayhem that will almost certainly follow an American withdrawal unless more is done.

Truth will only take us so far, but it is the right way to begin. Americans will probably spend the next generation debating whether the Iraq invasion would have worked under a competent administration. Right now, the best place to express bitterness about what may become the worst foreign policy debacle in American history is at the polls. But anger at a president is not a plan for what happens next.

When it comes to Iraq the choices in the immediate future are scant and ugly. But there are still a few options to pursue, and the alternatives are so horrible that it is worth trying once again — as long as everyone understands that there is little time left and the odds are very long.