"1. In accordance with the Resolution of League of Nations on December 16th, 1925, the Mousil Vilayet - Southern Kurdistan - was illegally annexed to the newly established state of Iraq without due consideration to the will of its residents nor its ethnic composition. This was done illegally and in deference to the interests of external powers.
3. Successive Iraqi governments have failed to honor any of the obligations of the State of Iraq towards the Kurdish people; non of the obligations stipulations stipulated under international nor the specific obligations stipulated by the League of Nations as a precondition for Kurdistan annexation to the State of Iraq in 1925."
For its part, the Council of the League decided the Turkish/Iraqi border
issue 16 December 1925 provisionally in favor of the so-called "Brussels
line" which could become definitive if the British Government provided
for the proposed 25-year Mandate and for the League Commission of Inquiry's
recommendations on Kurdish autonomy (ibid. p.86ss) to be met:
Successive Iraqi governments are seen to have failed to honor many of
Iraq's constitutive "obligations of international concern". Iraq thus seems
to have forfaited whatever rights it was entrusted with in regard to the
Mosul Vilayet. At the same time, the International Community also has solemnly
undertaken obligations in that region. And it would be helpful, if it were
to honor and enforce those long-standing commitments and guarantees in
ways and with means effectively protecting the Mosul Vilayet inhabitants
against further genocidal practices and other human rights violations.
Successive Iraqi regimes have manifestly and grossly violated these
obligations as well as the specific 1926 attachment conditions concerning
the Mosul Vilayet. Iraq never had any other title to that area. We
fully understand the concern for the territorial integrity of any country,
and we thus fully respect that of Iraq - in its borders of 1925, that is.
Indeed, Iraq is seen to have irrecoverably forfeited whatever rights it
might have had with regard to the Mosul Vilayet. To a lesser extent,
that may also apply to the Marsh Arabs' ancestral lands in the Basra Vilayet
and to other disaster zones of Iraq's own making. At any rate, the
UN General Assembly has all the powers in its hands to effectively and
promptly resolve these humanitarian catastrophes without burdening the
taxpayers any further. For with some imagination and will it can
truly build on its authority to "take such measures and give such directions
as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances."
On 14 February 1994, the Iraqi Delegate to the Commission on Human Rights
sought to demonstrate how well successive Iraqi Governments, particularly
since 1954, have provided for the protection and non-discrimination of
their Assyrian, Kurdish and Turkoman minorities in particular with regard
to their cultural heritage, their racial, religious and linguistic specificity
and their human rights.
noting that, nevertheless, already in 1933 Iraq's Assyrian community
suffered "genocidal practices" at the hands of the Iraqi authorities and
that, until recently, successive Iraqi regimes continued to gravely violate
Iraq's international obligations also with regard to Assyrian minority
and property rights, thus - at least as far as Iraq's Assyrian minority
is concerned - rendering meaningless the potentially still useful system
of international minority and property rights guarantees:
Centralization in government has lost its appeal even within simple
and homogenous communities. It has especially lost its rationale for being
resorted to in communities that are of a pluralist nature made up of various
nationalities, religious groups and languages, such as the Iraqi community.
This high degree of centralization and the indifference of decision makers
to the presence of the special characteristics of the Kurdish people are
among the basic reasons for the Kurds being deprived of their legitimate
rights under the successive Iraqi governments, which came to power under
both the monarchy and the republic. This style of concentrating authority
in the centre and the unwillingness to share it with the Kurds on a practical
basis, even after the March 11, 1970 autonomy agreement, has been the hallmark
of the role of the Iraqi state.