Friend-in-need or traitor indeed? H.Walder's private legal assistance in BSI insider case, 26.10.81
Untersuchung von Insidergeschäften in USA: SEC vs Banca della Svizzera Italiana, NZZ 9.11.81
Telex to all U.S. Attorneys: Subpoenas to Obtain Records Located in Foreign Countries, 22.11.83
1982/4 - L'affaire Marc Rich: aide-mémoire, notes suisses, communication suisse, amicus curiae
Interpellation 03.3487Wirtschaftliche Kriegsführung der USA gegen die Schweiz? ¦ Economic warfare
FINMAG, Anti-Terror-Vertrag: "willfährige" Rechtshilfe, Unterbindung durch Beratende Kommission
 

A Swiss Mistake, Wall Street Journal 22.2.85
Swiss Questions, WSJ 8.3.85
Rechtshilfeabkommen: Zunehmende USA-Übergriffe in die schweizerische Wirtschaft, BAZ 15.3.85
Lex Americana?, WSJ 26.3.85
Schweizer Banken zu nachgiebig?, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Blick durch die Wirtschaft, 19.4.85
Switzerland's Baby, WSJ 24.5.85
TREATY NEGOTIATIONS are urged in the U.S. to end foreign-bank secrecy, WSJ 11.10.85
Suckering the Swiss, WSJ 4.3.86
AEROSPATIALE case, Swiss AMICUS CURIAE to US Supreme Court, 22.8.86
AEROSPATIALE case, Syllabus, 15.6.87
U.S. Justices Rule on Access To Foreign Data, WSJ 16.6.87
No Justice in Swiss Insider Stance, WSJ 3.11.87
Schweizer Antworten auf amerikanische Ideen, Neue Zürcher Zeitung 7./8.11.87
Switzerland's Last Month, WSJ 9.3.88
Spooking Switzerland? Is Swiss secrecy under a new threat from Bern?, WSJ 25-26.3.88
Schweizerische Interessen, NZZ (Trumpf Buur-Inserat) 26.3.88
A Trojan Horse in Switzerland, WSJ 12.4.88
Kuhhandel: Ex-Bundesanwalt Walder arbeitete für die USA, Basler Zeitung 19.1.89
Der CIA treu ergeben, FACTS 6.7.06

LEGAL OPINION BY PROF. DR. HANS WALDER, UNIVERSITY OF BERNE, INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL LAW.
RE: SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, etc. al.  81 Civil 1836 (MP) (S.D.N.Y.)     [emphasis added]

1.  I STUDIED THE LEGAL OPINION OF MR. AUBERT DATED 13TH JULY 1981 IN THE ABOVE MENTIONED CASE.  ALL THAT MR. AUBERT SAYS IN RELATION TO ARTICLES 273 AND 162 OF THE SWISS PENAL CODE AND ARTICLE 47 OF THE SWISS BANKING ACT IS AS A GENERAL APPROACH CORRECT AND VALID.

2.  MR. AUBERT, HOWEVER, DOES NOT PROPERLY DEAL WITH THE QUESTION: WHAT IF THE FOREIGN (NON-SWISS) AUTHORITY, FOR INSTANCE A U.S. JUDGE, DOES NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION SWISS LEGISLATION?  WHAT IF THE FOREIGN AUTHORITY DOES NOT KNOW SWISS LAW OR IS NOT WILLING TO TAKE IT INTO CONSIDERATION, WHATEVER THE REASONS MIGHT BE?  IN SUCH A CASE, THE PERSON WHO SHOULD GIVE THE INFORMATION REQUESTED IS A VICTIM OF TWO CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS: (1) HE SHOULD GIVE INFORMATION, FOR INSTANCE AS A WITNESS, TO THE FOREIGN AUTHORITY, AND IF HE DOES NOT HE WILL BE PUNISHED (FINE, IMPRISONMENT, LOSS OF LICENSE FOR HIS ENTERPRISE AND SO ON); (2) IF HE GIVES THE INFORMATION TO THE FOREIGN AUTHORITY, HE COULD BE PUNISHED "AT HOME" (SWITZERLAND) ACCORDING TO ARTICLES 273 AND 162 OF THE SWISS PENAL CODE, AS WELL AS ARTICLE 47 OF THE SWISS BANKING ACT (IF HE IS A BANKER), BECAUSE HE GAVE AWAY SECRETS PROTECTED BY SWISS LAW.

3.  IT IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THIS PROBLEM HAS OCCURRED, AND THERE ARE A FEW SWISS COURT DECISIONS DEALING WITH THIS CONFLICT.  IN THESE DECISIONS THE JUDGES EXAMINED THE CASES UNDER ARTICLE 34 OF THE SWISS PENAL CODE, CALLED "STATE OF NECESSITY", WHICH SAYS (IN FREE TRANSLATION): "THE (CRIMINAL) ACT SOMEBODY COMMITS TO PROTECT HIS  OWN GOOD ("GOOD" I.E. INTEREST), ESPECIALLY LIFE, BODY, FREEDOM, HONOR AND FORTUNE, FROM AN IMMEDIATE DANGER THAT CANNOT OTHERWISE BE AVOIDED, WILL NOT BE PUNISHABLE IF HE IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DANGER AND IF ONE CANNOT EXPECT HIM TO GIVE UP HIS (MORE VALUABLE) GOOD."

4.  PRACTICALLY THE SAME HOLDS IF SOMEBODY HELPS ANOTHER PERSON (OR ENTERPRISE) AVOID DAMAGE BY DESTROYING ANOTHER LESS VALUABLE GOOD.

5.  TO BE QUITE CLEAR, IN ORDER TO ACCEPT A STATE OF NECESSITY THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS MUST BE FULFILLED:
A)  THERE IS A DANGER TO A GOOD, FOR INSTANCE TO SOMEBODY'S FORTUNE;
B)  THIS DANGER IS IMMEDIATE AND CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN A MILDER WAY THAN BY COMMITTING A CRIMINAL ACT;
C)  THE PERSON ACTING IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONFLICT HE GOT INTO;
D)  WE CANNOT EXPECT THE PERSON IN QUESTION TO GIVE UP HIS GOOD (OR THE GOOD OF ANOTHER PERSON) BECAUSE THE ENDANGERED GOOD IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE GOOD HE IS DESTROYING (TO SAVE THE FIRST).  THIS COMPARISON OF GOODS INVOLVED IS IMPORTANT.

6.  IF ALL THESE CONDITIONS ARE FULFILLED, THE PERSON COMMITTING THE CRIMINAL ACT WILL NOT BE PUNISHABLE UNDER SWISS LAW.  THE COURT OR THE INVESTIGATING MAGISTRATE WILL FIND HIS ACTION JUSTIFIED OR EXCUSED.

7.  I DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE SANCTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE IF BANCA DELLA SVIZZERA ITALIANA OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES REFUSE TO GIVE THE INFORMATION REQUIRED BY THE SEC OR BY A U.S. JUDGE.  IF IT WERE ONLY A RELATIVELY SMALL FINE, A SWISS JUDGE APPLYING ARTICLES 273 AND 162 OF THE SWISS PENAL CODE AND ARTICLE 47 OF THE SWISS BANKERS' ACT COULD HARDLY CONSIDER AS A STATE OF NECESSITY THE SITUATION OF THE PERSON GIVING AWAY SECRETS.  HOWEVER, IF THE SANCTIONS (IN CONSEQUENCE OF NOT GIVING THE REQUIRED INFORMATION) WERE, FOR EXAMPLE, A VERY HIGH FINE, IMPRISONMENT OR LOSS OF LICENSE TO CARRY OUT BANKING TRANSACTIONS IN THE U.S., IT WOULD BE DIFFERENT: I THINK THE SWISS JUDGE WOULD QUALIFY THE SITUATION AS NECESSITY, WITH THE CONSEQUENCE THAT HE COULD NOT PUNISH THE PERSON INVOLVED.  BUT I AM NOT A SWISS JUDGE, AND I CANNOT SAY FOR SURE HOW A SWISS JUDGE WOULD DECIDE.

8.  THERE IS, HOWEVER, A DECISION OF THE ZÜRICH HIGH COURT IN THIS RESPECT, THE "ACKERMANN CASE" (NOT PUBLISHED AS FAR AS I KNOW):  MRS ACKERMANN, SWISS CITIZEN, INHERITED FROM HER HUSBAND A SMALL ENTERPRISE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA (CSSR) DIRECTED BY A CZECHOSLOVAK CITIZEN.  THE SALARY OF THIS MAN WAS PARTLY PAID IN THE CSSR, PARTLY IN SWITZERLAND.  NOT INFORMING THE CSSR AUTHORITIES OF THE SWISS SALARY HE RECEIVED WAS A VIOLATION OF CSSR LAW. WHEN MRS. ACKERMANN ENTERED THE CSSR AFTER RECEIVING THE INHERITANCE, SHE WAS INTERROGATED BY THE CSSR AUTHORITIES AND WAS TOLD SHE COULD LOSE HER ENTERPRISE IN THE CSSR IF SHE DID NOT GIVE INFORMATION ABOUT THE CSSR DIRECTOR'S SALARY IN SWITZERLAND.  SHE THUS MADE SOME STATEMENTS VIOLATING IN PRINCIPLE ARTICLE 273 OF THE SWISS PENAL CODE.  RETURNING TO SWITZERLAND SHE SENT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO THE CSSR AUTHORITIES, WHICH HAD NOT BEEN REQUIRED BY THEM.  A CRIMINAL CASE WAS OPENED AGAINST HER IN SWITZERLAND.  SHE WAS NOT PUNISHED FOR GIVING AWAY SECRETS ABOUT THE DIRECTOR'S SALARY WHILE INTERROGATED IN THE CSSR, BECAUSE THE SWISS COURT FOUND SHE HAD ACTED WHEN IN A STATE OF NECESSITY.  ON THE OTHER HAND, SHE WAS CONVICTED FOR GIVING AWAY ADDITIONAL SECRETS AFTER HAVING RETURNED TO SWITZERLAND, THAT HAD NOT BEEN REQUIRED BY THE CSSR AUTHORITIES.
 9.  THERE ARE OTHER COURT DECISIONS IN RELATION TO ARTICLES 273 AND 34 (STATE OF NECESSITY).
10.  IF YOU NEED A MORE EXTENSIVE LEGAL OPINION OF THE  PROBLEM AND MORE COURT DECISIONS, PLEASE LET ME KNOW.

PROF. DR. HANS WALDER,  BERNE    FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SWITZERLAND
BERNE, OCT. 26, 1981

ROBERT B. BLACKBURN, ESQ.  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
26 FEDERAL PLAZA - ROOM 1100       NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10007

Cls. New York, 8. November     Die amerikanische Wertschriftenbehörde (SEC) scheint entschlossen, hart gegen Schweizer Banken vorzugehen, die sich auf Grund des Bankgeheimnisses weigern, hier Namen ihrer Kunden preiszugeben. Im Zuge verschiedener Untersuchungen über angebliche Insider-Transaktionen an amerikanischen Börsen hat die SEC u. a. von einer Reihe schweizerischer Institute Informationen angefordert, welche diese Banken jedoch nicht herauszugeben bereit bzw. in der Lage sind. Die SEC hat in einigen Fällen Guthaben der Institute sicherstellen lassen. Im Falle der Banca della Svizzera Italiana, die angeblich in New York dubiose Optionengeschäfte für unbekannte Dritte getätigt haben soll, konnte die SEC jetzt das Bundesdistriktgericht in Manhattan dazu bewegen, einen Gerichtsbefehl zu erlassen und für dessen Missachtung drastische Strafen zu verhängen.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
4B1320            11-17-83
MICHAEL E. ABBELL         phone 724-7600

TO: All United States Attorneys

re: Subpoenas to Obtain Records Located in Foreign Countries for Use in Criminal Cases

    It has been noted that federal prosecutors are with increasing frequency obtaining the issuance of grand juiy and trial subpoenas duces tecum for the production of banking, financial, and commercial records which are stored within a foreign country. Typically, such subpoenas are served on a Uniled States based entity, such as a bank or businrss enterprise, which maintains an office in the foreign country where the subpoenaed records arc located. Typically, too, the subpoenaed records are "protected" by the bank and/or commercial secrecy laws of the foreign country.
    Two recent court dccisions upholding the use of such subpoenas. In Re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982). cert.den., 103 S.Ct. 3086 (1983) and In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Directed to Marc Rich & Company, A.G.,  707 F.2d 663 (2 Cir. 1983), cert. den. _ U.S. _ (I983), have dramatically improved the potetial for law enforcement access to the records of foreign bank accounts and business transactions used by narcotics traffickers, organiced crime figures, and white collar criminals to launder the proceeds of illegal activities or to engage in tax evasion or tax fraud schemes. Another important aspect of these cases is the willingness of the courts to impose substantial daily fines - $25,000 in Bank of Nova Scotia and $50.000 in Marc Rich - to compel compliance with their orders to produce records located in foreign countries.
    The Bank of Nova Scotia and Marc Rich decisions clearly demonstrate that use of a subpoena to obtain foreign records is a powerful weapon which the department will vigorously support in appropriate cases. It should be borne in mind, however, that it is not the only method - or indeed in most cases the most effective, economical or timely one - for obtaining such records. Moreover, since this method involves assertion by the United States of jurisdiction which may be in conflict with the bank or commercial secrecy laws of a foreign country, its uncoordinated use raises various questions of infringement of foreign sovereignty which can seriously damage United States foreign relations and adversely affect other cases under investigation. In this regard, several foreign countries have recently lodged strong protests with both the state and justice departments against the use of such subpoenas. We have rejected these protests and do not intend to relinquish the hard fought gains we have won in this battle, but we do want to seize upon this opportunity to convert these protests into offers of assistance by the countries concrrned. It is with this in mind that the following has been promulgated.
    In order lo assess the magnitude of the potential effect of such subpoenas on our foreign relations, it is essential that the office of international affairs of the criminal division be advised of the status of all such outstanding subpoenas. Accordingly, each United States attorney is requested to provide the criminal division by immediate return telex the following data as to each such subpoena:

1.  Caption of case or grand jury prpceeding.
2.  Type of offense involved.
3.  Name of person or entity subpoenaed.
4.  Type of records subpoenaed.
5.  Name of foreign country where records are located.
6.  Date of issuance of subpoena.
7.  Rerurn date.
8.  Whether subpoenaed person or entity is cooperating or is opposing production.
9.  Status of current or proposcd enforcement proceedings.

1. The availabilily of alternative methods of obtaining the records in a timely rnanner, such as use of mutual assistance treaties, tax treaties or letters rogatory.
2. The indispensability of the records to the success of the investigation or prosecution.
3. The need to protect against thw destruction of records located abroad and to protect the ability lo prosecute for contempt or obstruction of justice for such destruction.

Indépendance et souveraineté territoriale: compétence exclusive de l'Etat territorial en matière législative, de recherche de preuves et d'actes de contrainte (articles 271 et 273 du Code pénal suisse); application extraterritoriale du droit national; obligation de l'Etat de ne pas laisser utiliser son territoire aux fins d'actes contraires aux droits d'autres Etats; entraide judiciaire internationale. Droit international et droit interne: incorporation.

«Celui qui aura cherché à découvrir un secret de fabrication ou d'affaires pour le rendre accessible à un organisme officiel ou privé étranger, ou à une entreprise privée étrangère, ou à leurs agents, celui qui aura rendu accessible un secret de fabrication ou d'affaires à un organisme officiel ou privé étranger, ou à une entreprise privée étrangère, ou à leurs agents, sera puni de l'emprisonnement ou, dans les cas graves, de la réclusion. Le juge pourra en outre prononcer l'amende.»

[Traduction:]
...     L'article 273 poursuit plusieurs buts. Il vise d'abord à préserver la Suisse des atteintes portées à sa souveraineté, d'une part par la recherche directe de renseignements ou par des dénonciations adressées à des personnes à l'étranger et, d'autre part, par la divulgation de renseignements à des autorités étrangères sur l'ordre de celles-ci. L'article 273 a ensuite pour but de protéger l'économie suisse, affectée en tant que telle dès que des individus ou sociétés visés par cette disposition font l'objet de recherches de ce genre. Le Tribunal fédéral suisse a souligné à plusieurs reprises que toute violation ou menace de violation de secrets d'affaires porte préjudice aux intérêts de l'économie suisse dans son ensemble. Il s'ensuit que, indirectement, la protection des intérêts économiques des sociétés visées constitue également un des buts fondamentaux de la disposition pénale en cause. Lorsque des organes judiciaires ou administratifs étrangers cherchent à obtenir des renseignements sur une vaste échelle, sans rester dans le cadre tracé par les traités internationaux et les dispositions du droit suisse relatives à l'entraide judiciaire, leur activité peut entrer en conflit avec les buts poursuivis par l'article 273.
...     L'article 273 figure dans le chapitre que le Code pénal consacre aux crimes ou délits contre l'Etat et la défense nationale. Les infractions qu'il réprime sont poursuivies d'office, ce qui signifie que le ministère public agit même en l'absence de plainte de la victime; vu le caractère politique de ces infractions, il appartient au Conseil fédéral de décider s'il y a lieu de poursuivre leurs auteurs. L'article 273 s'applique notamment aux organismes à l'étranger ou aux personnes privées qui cherchent à obtenir des informations confidentielles.
    L'expression «secret d'affaires» inclut tous les faits de la vie des affaires: 1 ) qui ne sont ni généralement connus ni librement accessibles; 2) que les intéressés veulent tenir secrets; 3) à condition qu'il y ait un intérêt objectif au maintien du secret.
    Se fondant sur la jurisprudence constante du Tribunal fédéral, le Ministère public de la Confédération a élaboré les directives suivantes en matière de divulgation de secrets de fabrication ou d'affaires:
    1 ) Si le divulgateur seul a un intérêt au maintien du secret, il peut librement décider de le révéler.
    2) L'article 273 interdit et réprime la communication de renseignements économiques à des autorités ou organisations étrangères, etc.:
        a) si la Suisse, en tant qu'entité politique ou économique, a un intérêt (direct) à préserver le secret; ou
        b) si des tiers qui ont un intérêt digne de protection au maintien du secret n'ont pas donné leur consentement préalable à sa divulgation.
    Le Ministère public de la Confédération et les tribunaux suisses considèrent comme étant contraires au droit suisse les actes visés aux points 2 a) et 2 b) également dans les cas où un organe judiciaire ou administratif étranger a sommé leurs auteurs de divulguer le renseignement. La responsabilité pour la divulgation de secrets d'affaires incombe exclusivement à la personne à qui le renseignement a été demandé. Il ressort du point 2b) des directives précitées que cette personne, avant de divulguer un secret à une entité étrangère, doit obtenir le consentement des tiers qui ont un intérêt digne de protection à préserver le secret. Une sommation émanant d'un tribunal étranger ne saurait changer quoi que ce soit à cette exigence posée par le droit suisse. L'article 273 ne prévoit nulle part une déclaration officielle que pourrait faire une autorité suisse et qui pourrait être interprétée comme équivalant à une autorisation - explicite ou implicite - de procéder à la divulgation. De plus, le droit pénal suisse ne prévoit aucune immunité de poursuite dans une pareille situation.
    Il est toutefois nécessaire, dans toutes les situations visées à l'article 273, que le renseignement dont il s'agit ait un lien avec la Suisse. L'existence d'un tel lien est donnée lorsque le renseignement porte sur un compte en banque ou sur tout autre secret d'affaires localisé en Suisse. Le rattachement en question fait défaut, en revanche, si le secret a un caractère entièrement et exclusivement étranger, son seul lien avec la Suisse étant le fait qu'il est partagé par une personne relevant de la juridiction suisse; dans une pareille situation, l'article 273 ne s'applique pas.
    Les buts poursuivis par cet article sont des corollaires de la souveraineté suisse et, partant, sont conformes au droit international. En conséquence, toute tentative d'un organe administratif ou judiciaire étranger de contraindre des individus ou des sociétés relevant de la juridiction suisse à enfreindre l'article 273, entreprise au moyen d'ordonnances assorties de sommations ou de la menace d'autres sanctions juridiques, doit être qualifiée d'atteinte indue à la souveraineté de la Suisse. La seule voie légitime ouverte aux autorités étrangères pour obtenir des renseignements qui sont protégés par l'article 273 et qui ne peuvent être librement divulgués par l'intéressé est celle de l'entraide judiciaire prévue par les traités internationaux pertinents et par la législation suisse; encore faut-il rester dans le cadre tracé par ces textes.
    Vu l'évolution récente de la pratique américaine, une autre disposition du Code pénal suisse, soit son article 34 (état de nécessité), pourrait être invoquée pour démontrer que la personne sommée de communiquer des renseignements ne rencontre pas les difficultés visées au paragraphe 40 du «Restatement of thé Law (2d), Foreign Relations Law of thé United States» 104). On a en effet prétendu que la création artificielle, aux Etats-Unis, d'un état de nécessité en menaçant de sanctions très rigoureuses les personnes sommées de violer la législation suisse relative à la confidentialité des renseignements amènerait le juge suisse à renoncer à punir ces personnes. Le Conseil fédéral suisse a récemment eu l'occasion de se prononcer à ce sujet en répondant à une question posée par un membre du Parlement. Dans sa réponse, le Conseil fédéral s'est dit préoccupé par cette argumentation qui, si elle était retenue, aboutirait à porter indûment atteinte à la souveraineté de la Suisse, ce pour plusieurs raisons.
    En premier lieu, la création artificielle d'un tel «état de nécessité» empêcherait les tribunaux suisses d'appliquer l'article 273 de manière effective et, partant, contreviendrait à l'obligation qui incombe à tout Etat de ne pas laisser utiliser son territoire aux fins d'actes contraires aux droits d'autres Etats.
    En deuxième lieu, la création d'un «état de nécessité» par des organes judiciaires ou administratifs des Etats-Unis contraindrait des personnes et sociétés sous juridiction suisse à violer la législation suisse relative à la confidentialité des renseignements. Une telle contrainte irait à l'encontre du principe du droit international qui veut qu'aucune personne résidant à l'étranger ne doit être forcée, directement ou indirectement, par un acte de contrainte de portée extraterritoriale, à enfreindre la législation de son lieu de résidence.
    En dernier lieu, il faut rappeler que l'article 34 a pour objectif fondamental de concilier les intérêts contradictoires issus de situations où une personne ne peut préserver un droit essentiel (tel que le droit à la vie) qu'en contrevenant à une règle du droit pénal. Il va de soi que le législateur suisse, en promulgant l'article 34, n'avait nullement l'intention d'offrir aux organes judiciaires ou administratifs d'un Etat étranger un moyen pour empêcher les tribunaux suisses compétents d'appliquer effectivement le droit suisse.
    L'Ambassade prie le Département de bien vouloir porter le présent aide-mémoire à la connaissance des autorités américaines compétentes qui sont appelées à trancher des questions touchant à l'application de l'article 273 du Code pénal suisse. Il est entendu que la présente déclaration ne préjuge en rien l'effet des autres règles du droit international qui conditionnent l'application extraterritoriale du droit national et qui définissent l'étendue de la compétence des organes judiciaires ou administratifs dans des affaires comportant un élément étranger.

5.3 II. Le deuxième document ici retenu est la note remise au Département d'Etat le 22 juillet 1983, soit quelques jours après la décision de la Cour de district de New-York (Sud) enjoignant à Marc Rich S.A. de payer l'amende fixée. Dans cette note, le Gouvernement suisse précisa que son intervention visait à prévenir une atteinte à la souveraineté suisse et les frictions internationales qui pouvaient en résulter, et non pas à protéger les intérêts de la société concernée. A l'appui de son action, le Département fédéral des affaires étrangères avança trois arguments principaux.
[Traduction:]

...     En premier lieu, la demande faite par le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis à un tribunal fédéral américain de sommer une société en Suisse de lui remettre des papiers d'affaires détenus par elle en Suisse provoquera un conflit entre les droits publics américain et suisse. Le Gouvernement suisse est très préoccupé par toute situation qui menace l'intégrité de son droit public et estime que ce genre de conflit devrait être évité.
    En deuxième lieu, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis pourrait agir de manière conforme au droit suisse en cherchant à obtenir les renseignements désirés par des voies intergouvernementales. Le recours à ces voies peut permettre au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'atteindre ses objectifs et de préserver ses intérêts légitimes sans pour autant porter atteinte à l'intégrité de l'ordre juridique suisse.
    En troisième lieu, il est douteux que la demande du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, consistant à exiger d'une société suisse qu'elle accomplisse certains actes en Suisse, soit compatible avec les principes du droit international. Le Gouvernement américain a invoqué des principes relatifs à la compétence pénale internationale; en l'espèce, il s'agit toutefois de prétendues infractions fiscales qui ne sont pas traditionnellement qualifiées de «pénales» par la communauté internationale. De plus, une sommation de produire des pièces assortie de la menace d'amendes exorbitantes relève de l'exercice de la juridiction en matière d'exécution forcée; or cette juridiction est strictement territoriale, voir le paragraphe 20 du «Restatement of the Law (2d), Foreign Relations Law of the United States», FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobin-Pont-à-Mousson, 636 F. 2d 1300,1316-1317 (D.C. Circ., 1980). Etant donné que les pièces recherchées peuvent être obtenues par la voie de la coopération telle qu'elle est tracée par le droit suisse, il semble particulièrement inapproprié que les Etats-Unis utilisent des moyens unilatéraux dont la légalité est douteuse sous l'angle du droit international. ...

5.4 III. Le troisième texte retenu est une communication adressée par l'Ambassadeur de Suisse à Washington à M. SAND, juge de district, le 19 septembre 1983, soit quelques jours après les entretiens de Berne. Il ressort de ce texte, qui résume les entretiens, que la délégation des Etats-Unis avait proposé: 1) que le Ministère public de la Confédération accélère l'examen des documents saisis par lui afin d'identifier ceux dont la communication enfreindrait l'article 273 du Code pénal suisse; et 2) que ces documents puissent être étudiés «officieusement» par la délégation des Etats-Unis. Les membres de la délégation suisse avaient répliqué que ni la durée de l'examen conduit par le Ministère public de la Confédération ni les conclusions auxquelles celui-ci pouvait parvenir n'allaient avoir une incidence quelconque sur une décision éventuelle de transmettre les pièces demandées aux Etats-Unis. En effet, la Loi fédérale du 20 mars 1981 sur l'entraide internationale en matière pénale (RS 351.1) l'emporte sur d'autres dispositions du droit suisse en matière de renseignements confidentiels, telle que l'article 273 du Code pénal suisse; de plus, en l'absence de demande formelle d'entraide conformément à la loi de 1981, aucune pièce ne saurait être rendue accessible aux autorités américaines. Malgré ces divergences, les deux délégations convinrent qu'une demande d'entraide judiciaire était possible en vertu de l'article 3, chiffre 3, de cette loi.
    Parmi les questions débattues au cours des entretiens se trouvait le point de savoir si Marc Rich S.A. pourrait ou devrait remettre aux autorités américaines les documents qui lui seraient restitués par le Ministère public de la Confédération parce que non visés par l'interdiction stipulée à l'article 273 du Code pénal suisse.

[Traduction:]
...     La délégation suisse a souligné que, même si l'article 273 n'empêchait plus la société de remettre les pièces en cause, les autorités fédérales, sur la base de principes généralement reconnus du droit international, ne sauraient tolérer qu'une entité ayant son siège en Suisse et créée conformément au droit suisse soit assujettie à la juridiction d'un Etat étranger et qu'elle soit soumise par celle-ci à une contrainte exercée par des moyens autres que l'entraide judiciaire internationale. ...

5.5 IV. Le quatrième document partiellement reproduit ici est la note du 21 septembre 1983 par laquelle l'Ambassade de Suisse à Washington informa le Département d'Etat que le Conseil fédéral avait interdit à Marc Rich S.A. d'obtempérer à la sommation que lui avait adressée le Département de l'énergie. Cette notification était accompagnée d'une protestation vigoureuse contre la sommation en question.

[Traduction:]
...     Conformément aux instructions qu'elle a reçues de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassade de Suisse proteste contre la sommation émise par le Département de l'énergie. Cet acte est contraire à des principes généralement reconnus du droit international. L'adoption, par une autorité étrangère, de mesures destinées à produire des effets sur territoire suisse porte atteinte à la souveraineté de la Suisse et, partant, est inacceptable. . . .
    Les autorités suisses demandent une fois encore que la sommation soit annulée et invitent les autorités américaines à utiliser la voie de l'entraide judiciaire internationale. Cette voie s'est avérée très efficace depuis l'entrée en vigueur, en 1977, du Traité sur l'entraide judiciaire en matière pénale conclu entre les Etats-Unis et la Suisse 106). ...

5.6 V. Les derniers passages reproduits sont extraits d'un mémoire soumis le 13 mars 1984 par le Gouvernement suisse en qualité d'amicus curiae à la Cour d'appel des Etats-Unis. Celle-ci, l'on se souviendra, avait été saisie par Marc Rich S.A. d'un appel contre la décision rendue le 27 janvier 1984 par la Cour de district de New-York (Sud). Le mémoire suisse, qui reprenait un bon nombre des éléments figurant dans les documents publiés ci-dessus, développa les trois arguments suivants: 1) le droit suisse interdit la remise de moyens de preuve dans l'intérêt d'une procédure étrangère par une voie autre que celle de l'entraide judiciaire internationale; 2) la décision de la Cour de district viole le droit international autant que le droit des Etats-Unis; 3) l'annulation de la décision rendue par la Cour de district n'affecterait pas la possibilité d'obtenir les pièces désirées.
    Les passages reproduits ci-après se rapportent aux deux premiers arguments. En ce qui concerne l'argument 1), le Gouvernement suisse exposa les idées générales sous-jacentes à la législation suisse et examina quelques-unes de ses dispositions, notamment l'article 271 du Code pénal. Cet article a la teneur suivante:

    «Celui qui, sans y être autorisé, aura procédé sur le territoire suisse pour un Etat étranger à des actes qui relèvent des pouvoirs publics, celui qui aura procédé à de tels actes pour un parti étranger ou une autre organisation à l'étranger, celui qui aura favorisé de tels actes, sera puni de l'emprisonnement et, dans les cas graves, de la réclusion.»

[Traduction:]
...     Dans le domaine de la recherche de preuves destinées à être utilisées dans des procédures qui se déroulent à l'étranger, la Suisse, comme bien d'autres pays appartenant au système du droit continental, exerce une surveillance plus stricte que les Etats-Unis. ... La Suisse, à l'instar de ces pays, estime que la recherche de preuves est une fonction réservée aux organes judiciaires nationaux; si cette recherche est effectuée sans la participation ni l'autorisation du pays où elle a lieu, la souveraineté de ce pays est réputée avoir été violée. . . .
Ces principes, observés par la Suisse et par d'autres pays, ont été reconnus par la présente Cour ....
    Les règles du droit suisse qui seront décrites ci-après reflètent l'attitude de la Suisse face aux efforts entrepris par des gouvernements étrangers pour mettre en œuvre en territoire suisse leurs procédures judiciaires sans s'assurer de la coopération du Gouvernement suisse.
    [Suit le texte de l'article 271 du Code pénal suisse.]
    Cette disposition interdit aux fonctionnaires et procureurs étrangers de réunir des preuves sur territoire suisse; elle prohibe également la notification directe de pièces par la voie postale ou par l'intermédiaire d'avocats suisses. Sont en outre proscrits, sur le territoire suisse, les actes destinés à donner effet à une sommation venant de l'étranger [21].
    [Suit une analyse de plusieurs autres dispositions, dont l'article 273 du Code pénal suisse.]
    Ces dispositions n'ont nullement pour but d'empêcher que les Etats-Unis mettent en œuvre leurs lois. Elles n'ont été ni adoptées ni appliquées à la requête ou avec la collaboration de Marc Rich S.A., ou dans le dessein de voler au secours de cette société. Au contraire, elles s'insèrent dans un ensemble de règles du droit public destinées à préserver la souveraineté de la Suisse et à protéger la sphère privée de ses ressortissants.

    Un principe établi du droit international, reconnu par les tribunaux des Etats-Unis [22], veut que la préférence soit accordée, en cas de conflit entre deux Etats adressant des injonctions contradictoires à une personne relevant de la juridiction de l'un et de l'autre, à l'Etat sur le territoire duquel l'injonction doit être exécutée. Dans l'affaire United States v. WatchmakersofSwitzerlandInformation Center, 1963 Trad. Cas. (CCH), § 70,600 (S.D.N.Y.), le Département de justice [des Etats-Unis] allégua - et la cour fit sien cet argument - que plusieurs fabricants de montres américains et suisses avaient contrevenu à la législation des Etats-Unis sur les cartels. La décision initiale fut modifiée suite à des négociations menées par l'intermédiaire du Gouvernement suisse et du Département d'Etat. La décision ainsi modifiée précise qu'elle ne limite en rien
    «le droit et les pouvoirs souverains du Gouvernement de la Confédération suisse ou d'un organe quelconque de celle-ci, ni, en particulier, le droit et les pouvoirs souverains du Gouvernement de la Confédération suisse ou d'un organe quelconque de celle-ci de réglementer le commerce intérieur ou extérieur de la Suisse, de conclure des contrats relatifs à ce commerce ou de promulguer et d'appliquer des règlements portant sur tout ou partie de l'industrie horlogère suisse.» 1965 Trad. Cas. (CCH), § 71, 352, au § 80, 491 (S.D.N.Y.).
    Les décisions d'autres tribunaux comportent des restrictions semblables.   . . .
    La présente Cour a appliqué le principe en cause à des cas touchant à la production de documents et de renseignements. . . .
    Le contenu minimum de ce principe consiste à enjoindre aux tribunaux de faire tout effort raisonnable pour éviter que des conflits s'élèvent entre des ordres juridiques nationaux dont les exigences sont contradictoires. . . [23]

    De l'avis du Gouvernement suisse, il n'est pas nécessaire de procéder à une appréciation des intérêts en présence. ... le droit international, de même qu'une partie importante du droit des Etats-Unis, prescrivent que la voie de l'entraide judiciaire internationale doit avoir été épuisée avant qu'une confrontation touchant à la souveraineté d'un Etat étranger puisse être provoquée. -Toutefois, le Gouvernement suisse n'ignore pas que les tribunaux américains ont parfois procédé à une appréciation des intérêts en présence dans des situations comparables. Sans vouloir se rallier à cette méthode, il constate avec regret que la Cour de district a omis de tenir compte de tous les facteurs pertinents.
    Se référant au paragraphe 40 du «Restatement of the Law (2d), Foreign Relations Law of the United States», le Gouvernement suisse nota que la Cour de district s'était bornée à relever que les intérêts des Etats-Unis étaient plus importants que ceux de la Suisse, puis il formula les conclusions suivantes:
    La méthode qui consiste à comparer les intérêts en présence, prévue par le «Restatement» et appliquée par la présente Cour, exigeait que la Cour de district prît en considération des éléments autres que l'intérêt que les Etats-Unis portent à la mise en œuvre de leur législation. La Cour de district aurait dû tenir compte des éléments que voici:
Premièrement, les intérêts de la Suisse et des Etats-Unis à faire respecter leurs législations sont d'une valeur égale.
Deuxièmement, la violation de lois suisses et d'injonctions du Gouvernement suisse par Marc Rich S.A. entraînerait des sanctions pénales pour cette société.
Troisièmement, l'exécution de l'injonction de la Cour de district aurait lieu sur territoire suisse.
Quatrièmement, le fait de rechercher l'exécution de l'injonction au moyen d'une amende n'est pas de nature à amener son destinataire à s'y conformer [24]. ...

NOTES
103)     Voir note 57).
104)     Ce paragraphe dispose ce qui suit: «Lorsque deux Etats ont la compétence d'adopter et de mettre à exécution des règles de droit et lorsque les règles ainsi adoptées sont contradictoires, le droit international demande à chacun d'eux d'examiner de bonne foi s'il est en mesure de réduire l'exercice de sa compétence en matière d'exécution en tenant compte de facteurs tels que: a) les intérêts vitaux de chaque Etat; b) l'étendue et la nature des difficultés occasionnées à leur destinataire par des actes d'exécution contradictoires; c) la mesure dans laquelle le comportement prescrit doit avoir lieu sur le territoire de l'autre Etat; d) la nationalité de la personne concernée; et e) le point de savoir si l'on peut s'attendre à ce que les mesures prises par l'un ou l'autre Etat assurent effectivement la mise en œuvre de la législation de cet Etat.»
105)     Document communiqué par la Direction du droit international public du Département fédéral des affaires étrangères.
106)     Traité du 25 mai 1973 (RS 0.351.933.6).
107)     Document communiqué par la Direction du droit international public du Département fédéral des affaires étrangères.

NOTES SECONDAIRES
[21]     La disposition en cause est applicable même si l'Etat étranger allègue que la personne qui détient des preuves recherchées en Suisse tombe sous sa juridiction.
[22]     Les règles fondamentales du droit des gens font partie intégrante du droit fédéral non écrit des Etats-Unis. Voir The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) («Le droit international fait partie de notre droit. C'est aux tribunaux compétents qu'il appartient de constater et de faire appliquer ses règles chaque fois que des questions juridiques y relatives leur sont soumises.»).
[23]     Ce concept rappelle le principe qui veut que les tribunaux évitent, autant que possible, de se prononcer sur des problèmes de droit constitutionnel, de même que la règle de l'épuisement des recours en droit administratif. Cependant, une décision d'une cour fédérale américaine qui irait à l'encontre des règles posées par une nation étrangère serait particulièrement préoccupante car elle affecterait les relations entre les Etats-Unis et la nation en cause ainsi que l'idée que se font nombre d'Etats étrangers quant à la manière dont les Etats-Unis respectent le droit international. Il s'ensuit que s'il faut éviter de rendre des décisions en matière constitutionnelle ou administrative, une telle attitude est encore plus désirable dans le domaine des relations internationales dans la mesure où la coopération intergouvernementale demeure possible.
[24]     Lorsqu'ils envisagent l'imposition de sanctions dans des cas où une sommation de produire des documents localisés à l'étranger est demeurée infructueuse, les tribunaux ont souvent choisi comme critère la bonne foi du destinataire de la sommation. ... Le Gouvernement suisse ne se prononce pas sur la bonne foi de Marc Rich S.A. pendant la durée de la procédure. Il estime en revanche que la Cour de district n'était pas appelée à examiner cette question dans le cas d'espèce puisque, pour commencer, elle n'avait pas à induire Marc Rich S.A. à violer le droit pénal suisse et les injonctions du Gouvernement suisse.
 
 

NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG
7./8. November 1987

NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG
(Trumpf Buur-Inserat) 26.März 1988

    Die andauernde Selbstanschwärzung - namentlich von den Kanzeln herab gepredigt, in den Kreisen der professionellen Entwicklungshelfer und mit starken Ausläufern bis weit in die Medienwelt hinein eifrig nachgebetet - sie hat langsam ihre Auswirkungen. Steter Tropfen höhlt den Stein, und der Schweizer beginnt sich angesichts seiner angeblichen Untaten in Sack und Asche zu hüllen. Denn er soll ja schuld sein an der hohen internationalen Wirtschaftskriminalität ...
    So lächerlich solche Pauschalverurteilungen auch sind, indirekte Auswirkungen haben sie eben doch. Es ist nachgerade unüblich, ja in weiten Kreisen unanständig geworden, vom «schweizerischen Interesse» zu sprechen. Alles und jedes soll immer übergeordneten, oft illusionären oder unscharf definierten «höheren» Anliegen dienen. Nur unsere eigenen Interessen dürfen offenbar nicht zählen! - Damit sei ja nichts gegen die Nächstenliebe und den Solidaritätsgedanken gesagt. Sich nicht für dumm verkaufen lassen dagegen ist noch lange kein Egoismus.
    Auf der internationalen Traktandenliste der Schweiz stehen da nämlich einige Punkte, bei denen es recht viel zu verlieren gäbe. So geht es im Verhältnis zu den Vereinigten Staaten auch weiterhin darum, unsere Rechtsauffassung erfolgreich gegen Übergriffe der amerikanischen Gerichte zu schützen. Es entspräche zum Beispiel einer unentschuldbaren Blauäugigkeit zu glauben, dass die «insider»-Regelung nicht in erster Linie zur Verteidigung knallharter amerikanischer Interessen uns aufgezwungen worden ist. Weiterreichende Forderungen sind bereits angemeldet. Erfolgreich können unsere Exponenten allerdings nur verhandeln, wenn sie zum einen nicht selbst in helvetischem Reuedenken stecken und wenn sie nicht zum andern Rückenschüsse aus dem eigenen Lager erhalten.
    Ein anderes Beispiel: Mit Sicherheit - wird man angesichts der immer enger werdenden europäischen Integration und der steigenden Bedeutung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft zu einem neuen Arrangement mit der EG gelangen müssen. Wenn wir nicht alle möglichen Trümpfe so geschickt wie möglich ausspielen, wird das ohne unangenehme (auch finanziell wirksame!) Auswirkungen nicht gehen. Wir sollten in Sachen Aussenpolitik deshalb zu einer Art nationaler Einigkeit finden.
    Wir haben, bei aller Bescheidenheit, auch gute Gründe, das Büsserhemd abzustreifen und mit ein wenig mehr Selbstbewusstsein anzutreten. Denn der Beitrag der Schweiz als Insel der Vertrauenswürdigkeit, der Stabilität und der Sicherheit, die Rolle der Schweiz als Vermittlerin guter Dienste zwischen verfeindeten Parteien, die vielfach bewiesene und untermauerte Funktion der Schweiz als Hüterin der Alpenpässe und des Herzens Europas - das alles sind Elemente, die ins Gewicht fallen. Wir dürften darauf sogar ein wenig stolz sein, meint der Trumpf Buur.

BASLER ZEITUNG
19.Januar 1989

Der Berner Strafrechtsprofessor und Ex-Bundesanwalt Hans Walder hat den USA verraten, wie sie das Schweizer Bankgeheimnis erfolgreich knacken können, um Insideroperationen aufzudecken. Den in den USA tätigen Schweizer Banken kam dieser« Kuhhandel» vielleicht nicht einmal ungelegen.

BASLER ZEITUNG
15.März 1985

     Die Schweiz wird in letzter Zeit wieder mit zunehmenden Übergriffen der USA in ihrer Justizhoheit konfrontiert. Die Genfer Security Bank Pacific wurde für zwei Jahre vom amerikanischen Terminmarkt ausgeschlossen und mit einer Busse von 100000$ belegt, weil sie nicht sofort den Namen eines ihrer Kunden bekanntgab. Die Genfer Anwälte Delissy und Hornung wurden mit Gefängnisandrohung für sich und ihre Klienten in den USA daran gehindert, die Rechte von zwei Amerikanern in der Schweiz zu verleidigen.
    In einem Telegramm an alle amerikanischen Staatsanwälte kündigte das US-Justizdepartement an, dass die Übergriffe von amerikanischen Gerichten, Untersuchungsrichtern und Slaatsanwälten in die ausländische Justizhoheit trotz der Proteste mehrerer Länder diplomatisch und aussenpolitisch abgesichert werden. Damit wird der übliche, völkerrechtlich festgelegte Rechtsweg zwischen den USA und der Schweiz umgangen.

 Zerstörung
   Zu beobachten ist die langsame, aber sichere Zerstörung des schweizerischen Rechtssystems: Auf der einen Seite durch seinen Missbrauch durch Verbrecher und andererseits durch den Missbrauch, den ein demokratischer Rechtsstaat, nämlich die Vereinigten Staaten mit diesem System treiben.
   Immer mehr erscheinen die USA im Zusammenhang mit Wirtschaftskn-minalität in den Schlagzeilen. Die amerikanische Unterwelt schwappt in alle befreundeten Länder über. Die I)e-kämpfttng dieser Inlernationalisierung ist letzten Endes auch im Interesse der Drittländer wie der Schweiz. Deswegen kann man ohne weiteres Solidarität walten lassen.
   Die Amerikaner würden in der Schweiz ohne jeden Zweifel auf sehr sehr viele offene Ohren stossen, wenn sie um noch mehr Hilfe ersuchen würden. Die Gewaltmethoden, mit denen die Amerikaner jedoch ins schweizerische Rechtssystem einbrechen und die Leichtigkeit, mit denen diese Methoden offiziell geduldet, ja gefördert werden, sind hingegen äusserst kontraproduktiv.
   Auch Benutzer des schweizerischen Finanzplatzes, die sich keine Vorwürfe irgendwelcher Art machen müssten, fühlen sich nun verunsichert. Wenn Verbrecher die Schweiz als zu heiss empfinden, soll das zwar nur recht sein. Aber ehrliche Leute muss man ja nicht gleich auch noch verjagen. Der Trennungsstrich zwischen der Behandlung der einen und der anderen muss noch deutlicher, noch radikaler und noch nachdrücklicher gezogen werden.     Erich Reyhl

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
19.April 1985

Die schweizerischen Großbanken klagen zu nehmend über eine mögliche Gefährdung ihrer Wettbewerbsfähigkeit gegenüber dem Ausland. Gewünscht wird der Abbau geschäftshemmender Steuern und blockierender Vorschriften, die die Teilnahme Schweizer Banken an modernen Finanzinnovationen vom Boden der Eidgenossenschaft aus erschweren oder verhindern. Nicht überall in der Schweiz wird die Meinung der Großbanken geteilt. Insbesondere wird im poiltischen Raum auf die gegenwärtige exzellente Gewinnlage der schweizerischen Großbanken hingewiesen. Aber auch aus dem Kreis schweizerischer Bankkunden werden kritische Stimmen laut, die Banken mögen zunächst einiges selber tun, um das Vertrauen zum Finanzplatz Schweiz nicht zu gefährden. Wir veröffentlichen nachstehend einen Beitrag des Sekretärs der Schweizer Investoren-Schutz-Vereinigung (ASDI) Genf, H. Anton Keller, in dem eine Attacke gegen die Großbanken wegen ihres Verhaltens gegenüber amerikanischen Forderungen zur Durchlöcherung des Bankgeheimnisses und der nationalen Souveränität geritten wird. Die Meinung der Schutz-Vereinigung dürfte auch aus der Sicht deutscher Kunden interessant sein.  Die Redaktion

WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
22 February 1985

    Switzerland's officials are insisting no harm was done by their decision to break bank secrecy and hand over documents to American prosecutors trying to nail those suspected of violating American law by trading on inside information in the Santa Fe International case. The spokesman for the Swiss Justice Department is boasting that legal assistance "does function" between the two coimtries. The new Justice Minister herself, Elizabeth Kopp, now says that clearing up so-called misunderstandings with the Amencans is one of her priorities. And the country's supreme executive authority, the Federal Council, claims the action won't harm the national interest.
    Well, the market is going to make its own decision on that, and it wouldn't be surprising to see it go against the Swiss economy in the coming years. For when you clear away all the legal gobbledygook what the Swiss have done for short-term gain here is to jettison protections that clients of Swiss banks have long cherished. The short-term gain is that some pressure might be taken off some Swiss banks wanting to expand in the U.S. market. But the longterm risk - a serious one - is that the Swiss are opening their highly successful and exceptionally private economy to regulation according to the American culture.
    America' s regulators don't see it that way, of course. They have been pursumg the Santa Fe International case for more than three years, ever since they noticed a surge in the trading of Santa Fe International stock and options during the weeks before an announcement was made of a merger agreement between Santa Fe and Kuwait Petroleum Corp. Trading in Santa Fe shares was haited on Oct. 2. 1981, when the stock was selling at $24.625 a share. The merger was announced Oct. 5. When trading resumed, the stock crossed at $42 a share. On Oct. 25, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filed an enforcement action against "certain unknown purchasers" (and one known foreigner) who, the SEC contends, had made illegal gains.
    But the SEC ran into Swiss bank secrecy when it tried to find out who the alleged insiders were, for the suspect transactions had been made through Swiss banks operating for clients. So it launched its long struggle to gain the names of the clients for whom the banks were acting, along with related documents. One problem it ran into was that insider trading, per se, isn't a crime in Switzerland. The Americans argue their mandate is to protect the American market, even when insider trading is initiated in it from offshore. The Swiss sent the names of the alleged insiders in May 1984, and have now delivered documents that presumably could enable the SEC to pursue the case further.
    Swiss bankers found themselves caught in the middle of all this (several Swiss banks were named nominal defendants in the Santa Fe case, because they made the trades from their ominibus trading accounts). So the banks weren't exactily unhappy when the Swiss govemment started cooperating with the Americans. The director of the Swiss Bankers Association, Jean-Paul Chapuis, says: "We have to protect the rights of individuals, but do away with what is unnecessary." Indeed, the Swiss Bankers Association appears to be supporting a proposal to outlaw insider trading in Switzeriand, which would broaden access by American prosecutors in these kinds of cases.
    This, however, has quite a few Swiss worried and promises to be a hot issue in the future. The Swiss Investors Protection Association, most assiduously, has been arguing that the government in Bern will jeopardize a business climate that has served the country well - even spectacularly - for generations. It's easy to understand its worries. Let the American regulators get a foot in the door on insider trading and they'll jump in with both feet on antitrust cases. Soon there'll be a stampede on tax cases, and before you know it, there won't be all that much difference between Switzerland and America. The theorists will call that a "level playing field." But the market may start to wonder why it needs to do business in Switzerland at all.
 
 

WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
18 March 1985

    Switzerland's new minister of justice, Elizabeth Kopp, is going to be asked some tough questions today about the government's handling of the Santa Fe International case. In a series of moves during the past year, the Swiss government decided to break its bank secrecy to help American prosecutors trying to find individuals suspected of trading on inside Information in Santa Fe's stock. Now a member of Parliament wants to know the broader consequences of those decisions - and asks whether the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has been abusing the Swiss-American treaty under which cooperation was given in the case.
    The questions - some of which were submitted in advance - are being raised by Valentin Oehen, one of the members of Parliament who has been concerned with the protection of Swiss banking secrecy and economic freedom in the face of increasing raids from foreign regulators. Mr. Oehen's detractors call him a right-wing fanatic. They tend to sneer at the two-year-old Swiss Investors Protection Association, which is representing some of the same views. Yet the really fundamental questions usually get asked by those outside the establishment, and Mr. Oehen's questions deserve attention.
    Two actions in the Santa Fe case have left free market forces in Switzerland particularly bitter. One was the dispatch to U.S. authorities in May 1984 of the names of Swiss bank clients being sought by the SEC's enforcement division. The SEC alleges the individuals possessed inside information when they asked their Swiss banks to buy on U.S. share markets shares of Santa Fe International shortly before a merger announcement sent those shares soaring. The second action, in February 1985, was to dispatch to Washington various bank documents that could help the SEC prosecute the clients of the Swiss banks.
    Part of Mr. Oehen's ire is directed at the Americans. He suggests that the Santa Fe case was one of the "personal pet schemes" of John Fedders, who was chief of the SEC's enforcement division until he resigned recently because of publicity over a difficult divorce trial. He suggests Mr. Fedders's personal problems might have fueled his zeal in his professional conduct. But he appears even angrier at Swiss authorities who, as he phrases it, have "aided and abetted" the SEC's campaign to crack down on insider trading, which in Switzerland is "perfectly legal." Mr. Oehen. and others contend that the Swiss-American legal assistance treaty of 1973, under which Mr. Fedders pursued the alleged Santa Fe insiders, was designed to combat organized crime and covers exclusively serious crimes. He considers its use in pursuit of lesser crimes - and an act such as insider trading - to be "a clear abuse."
    Prosecutors at the SEC disagree. They aren't so concerned whether insider trading is illegal in Switzerland, since they don't assert that the offenses were committed in Switzerland. These offenses took place when the shares were traded on American markets, over which the SEC has thorough jurisdiction. They insist they have the right to seek - and the courts to compel - evidence from anywhere in the world. American courts have tended to agree with the approach, taking tough stands in - for example - the tax evasion case against Marc Rich and the Laker antitrust case against British Airways. Moreover, the Swiss Supreme Court ruled that the Fedders request was covered by the treaty.
    Mr. Oehen is concerned with Swiss, not American, national interests. Switzerland's highest executive body, the Federal Council, ruled that complying with the SEC's request in the Santa Fe case wouldn't prejudice Swiss national interests. But Mr. Oehen isn't convinced. Do American judges have the right to freeze accounts in Swiss banks without going through the relevant treaties, as Mr. Oehen asserts happened in the Santa Fe case? And just what responsibility does the Swiss government have to enforce American law?
    These concerns are particularly relevant because a Swiss team is preparing to go to America at the end of the month, to pursue the question of cooperation with American authorities. It's always possible, now that Mr. Fedders has resigned, that the SEC will back off from its hot pursuit of insiders operating in the American market from offshore. But we strongly doubt the SEC's campaign is simply a "personal pet scheme" of Mr. Fedders's. The problem is a bigger, institutional one - a policy of the SEC itself. It's also unlikely that other enforcement agencies will halt their campaigns. The probability is that American regulators will continue to try to extend their reach as far as possible. This means reaching deeper into the Swiss banking system than they've already gone. So the Swiss parliament is undoubtedly wise to insist on pressing Mr. Oehen's questions.
 

WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
26 March 1985

    A delegation of Swiss officials will be in Washington this week, meeting with their American counterparts on the question of judicial cooperation. The meeting is part of an effort to ease the tension that has been created by clashes between, on the one hand, American prosecutors and courts and, on the other, Switzerland's banking and business secrecy laws and its culture of laissez-faire capitalism.
    The issues in this clash have been thrown into sharp relief in two seminal cases pursued by American authorithies. One is against the Swiss-based commodities trader Marc Rich for allegedly evading American taxes; another is against various alleged insiders who traded in shares of Santa Fe International Corp. In both instances we have in recent weeks cautioned the Swiss against abandoning a business culture that has served their country well and the Americans against seeking to impose their own regulatory regime and sense of values on other sovereign states.
    We haven't been alone in our concern, we've discovered as we've spoken with businessmen and lawyers, including a fair number of Americans, working overseas. Indeed, the problems that have been cropping up between Switzerland and America appear likely to grow as jet travel and high speed electronics continue to shrink the business world. They will affect not only Switzerland, but other countries whose laws, culture and interests diverge from America's.
    The danger that needs to be borne in mind isn't the danger of bringing criminals to justice. This isn't a danger at all, of course. Neither is there any reason that, say, the Swiss might want to allow operators to use their country as a base from which to scheme in American markets m violation of American laws. The danger is that in order to avoid the kind of problems that have been cropping up, pressures will build to make independent countries conform to the American way of doing things, even when this mightn't necessarily be wise.
    Take, for example, the Santa Fe case. The American Securities and Exchange Commission lit out after alleged insiders in the Santa Fe case in 1981, seeking names and documents of individuals who had used Swiss banks to make their transactions in the American market. It wasn't until May 1981 and February 1985 that they were able to break Swiss bank secrecy and get the evidence they wanted. One problem they ran into was that insider trading wasn't - and still isn't - illegal in Switzerland.
    As the problem came into focus, an agreement - called Agreement 16 - was struck among the Swiss banks that they would warn their customers that secrecy wouldn't prevail when the banks were asked to make such share transactions in the U.S. That was a temporary measure until the Swiss could pass their own insider trading law that would allow faster cooperation between the two countries. That law will probably be proposed shortly, and before the Swiss know it they'll have an American-style insider trading law because U.S. prosecutors have had a hard time getting evidence out of Switzerland.
    Do the Swiss really want that kind of law, without which they have prospered quite handsomely? The Swiss justice minister, Elizabeth Kopp, has found it necessary to declare at a recent press conference that the insider trading law under consideration isn't "lex Americana." Do the Swiss want to take on all sorts of other American laws? The rumblings in the Swiss parliament suggest not. One petition [Motion Früh, 84.400] gathering steam in the parliament calls for the suspension of all negotiations on changes in Swiss-American treaties so long as the American authorities continue, in the view of the petition's signers, to treat lightly existing agreements in their zeal to break Swiss secrecy.
    The cooperation that has been gained between the Swiss and Americans in recent years has been provided under a legal assistance pact designed to aid in the attack on serious crimes of the sort that are perpetrated by drug dealers and organized criminals. Quite a number of Swiss resent the use of the mutual assistance provision in lesser offenses like insider trading, and when the Swiss and American delegates sit down this week to talk about judicial cooperation they might want to ask some basic questions about just what they're talking about.
 

WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
24 May 1985

    Sooner than even we had feared, European governments are going to come under harassment by a new arm of the United States' Securities and Exchange Commission. The new office, within the SEC's enforcement division, is now being organized to coordinate efforts to extract from foreign governments evidence these governments have heretofore felt it inadvisable (or illegal) to turn over to American officials. When foreigners mail off their complaints to Washington, they might drop a copy to the Swiss Minister of Justice, Elizabeth Kopp, in Bern.
    For the SEC's latest gambit is partly Switzerland's baby. It was Switzerland's idea that one might be able to appease America's prosecutors, by cooperating now and again. So the brains in Bern broke Swiss bank secrecy and handed over the names of Swiss bank clients suspected of trading in the U.S. share markets on inside information about Santa Fe International Corp. Then the Swiss caved in to American pressure and proposed outlawing insider trading in Switzerland itself. This would make it even easier for American prosecutors and judges to forage in foreign vaults.
    We've been trying to alert the Swiss to the American regulatory bureaucracy's penchant for growing real problems if given fertile ground. The latest doings at the SEC - we hear they could be announced next week - look like a classic example. The new operation in the SEC is apparently going to be called the Office of Foreign Legal Assistance. This is a euphemism for coordinating the kind of threats and legal blackmail that were used in the Santa Fe case both to bring the Swiss Justice Ministry to the table and to make lap dogs of a number of Swiss banks.
    It doesn't take a reporter long to sense the delight within the SEC over the thoroughness of the Swiss collapse and the possibilities it has opened up. We wouldn't be surprised to see the director of the new office - most likely an SEC aide, Michael Mann, who was lead counsel on the Santa Fe case - try now to broaden the discussion away from questions of national sovereignty, over which the U.S. and Switzerland fought so hard.
    Presumably, we'll start to hear less talk about individual cases and more about the need to apply U.S. regulations wholesale. The SEC will start to target other countries besides Switzerland - France, say, Japan or England and the European country that might have the strictest bank secrecy, Austria. And the SEC will try to leap barriers other than bank secrecy and blocking laws. It will start looking at other crimes besides insider trading - such as, for example, disclosure violations, market manipulation, accounting fraud. Like other embryos of Washington bureaucracy, the new Office of Foreign Legal Assistance will soon be adding to its staff. At the rate things have been going, it wouldn't be an illogical sinecure for Switzerland's minister of justice herseif.
 

WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
11 October 1985

    And if the banking-haven countries used by criminals aren't interested in negotiating, the U.S. should consider sanctions, says the U.S. Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Among possible moves: requiring that loans from haven banks be reportable äs U.S. income; prohibiting tax Issses on transactions with haven banks; curbing airline flights between the U.S. and haven countries. The subcommittee lists 29 tax-haven areas (exampies: the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Panama, Switzerland).
    Exactly how much money the havens are draining from the U.S. Treasury each year isn't known, but the figure is believed to be in the billions of dollars and growing. Besides professional criminals, the users of the havens are thought to include growing numbers of tax-avoiders who are otherwise law-abiding. Haven secrecy enables assets and investment income to stay hidden.
 

WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
4 March 1986

    America's market regulators are trying to make the settlement of the Santa Fe International insider trading case look like a famous victory. Certainly there is drama in the government's success in muscling eight individuals to disgorge $7.8 million in profits the U.S. government claims were made illegally. This will be put into a fund to be split among those who can prove they lost out by selling securities while insiders were operating on knowledge that Kuwait Petroleum Corp, was about to acquire Santa Fe. But when all the self-congratulatory blather blows by, the Swiss might want to do an accounting of what they got out of the deal.
    It was Switzerland, after all, that was asked to break its treasured bank secrecy to hand over to American regulators the names of those suspected of trading in Santa Fe shares on the basis of inside information. After a lengthy court battle, the government in Bern finally caved in and did so. It did so under a treaty that the two countries set up in 1977 to help in the prosecution of serious criminal offenses. But once the Americans broke Swiss bank secrecy and got the names, they promptly settled the matter in a civil proceeding, without going into criminal court to prove their charges and with no one admitting any guilt.
    Now it is true that the U.S. Justice Department does have a criminal case outstanding against one of the central figures in the affair, Darius Keaton. He is a former Santa Fe director charged with trading on inside information through a bank in Switzerland, where he allegedly held an account under an Arabic-sounding name. It's also true that Mr. Keaton was one of the names the Swiss handed over to the U.S. government. But the thing to note is that Mr. Keaton had already stepped forward and identified himself to U.S. authorities, well before the Swiss turned over his name. It's conceivable he did so because he feared Swiss bank secrecy wouldn't hold. But it's also conceivable that the enormous contest with Switzerland over getting his name just wasn't necessary.
    Meanwhile, there's the question of what happens if Mr. Keaton is tried and acquitted. In an unrelated case last year, a jury found one businessman, Thomas C. Reed, innocent of trading on inside information in his dealings in stock options of Amax Corp. But the government still hasn't returned to Mr. Reed the allegedly illegal profits it had earlier forced Mr. Reed to disgorge in civil proceedings.
    Under American law, the burden of proof is less in civil proceedings, so some will argue the settlement of the civil case should still stand. To us there are serious doubts whether the government ought to be allowed to use in civil cases evidence gathered froin secret bank accounts in Switzeriand under treaty provisions designed to be used for serious crimes.
    The way it looks so far is that in return for shattering one of the most treasured principles in the Swiss economy - the concept known as the Banking Secret - the Swiss have gained nothing. In blunter language, one could say they have been played for suckers. They have been bamboozled by American prosecutors who, having breached bank secrecy to win a measly consent decree in a civil proceeding, are now going to be heaping one subpoena after another against Swiss banking privacy. Soon Swiss banking secrecy is going to be riddled with more holes than their cheese. The Swiss are going to be stuck with their own, unneeded insider trading law, designed to make it easier for the Americans to break Swiss bank secrecy in the future.
    As we've said before, we favor international cooperation in the prosecution of real crimes, crimes agreed upon by the cooperating governments. These are generally crimes like murder, drug running, spying for the communists, terrorism. But that is not what we're talking about with insider trading. We don't wish to suggest that it's impossible to abuse insider information. But the degree to which the practice has been criminalized in America goes far beyond anything that makes sense from the point of view of market theory. What capital markets are for is to reflect correct values and thus better allocate resources, and - with only a few exceptions - its hard to justify outlawing trades that accomplish this.
    Switzerland would end up with the more efficient markets were its parliament to turn down the proposed insider trading law that has been introduced and to resist American pressure to get involved in these prosecutions. The issue here is not criminal conduct but a conflict of business cultures. The way to settle it is not to put Switzerland and Europe under the obsessive regulation of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of Justice. The better strategy is deregulating American markets so that capital can flow freely and productively to the economies that can put it to the most profitable use.
 

WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
3 November 1987

    Re: "Switzerland's Justice Minister States Her Case" (editorial page, Oct. 29). On the eve of Elisabeth Kopp's trip to Washington, I wish to comment on a few Statements she made in this interview:
• "[W]e have this strange situation now in Switzerland that the tippee may be punished, while the real insiders may not be."
    Present Swiss law - as conceived and written by parliamentary Swiss lawmakers - does not provide for either a tippee, or an insider crime. It was only with its highly questionable and widely criticized Santa Fe rulings of Jan. 26, 1983, and May 16,1984, that the Swiss Supreme Court bent over backward and stretched the misdemeanor article 162 of the Swiss penal code, turned a blind eye to the unmistakable limits of the Swiss-American legal assistance treaty of May 25,1973, and opened the Pandora's box of Swiss banks, authorities and laws being exposed to further foreign pressures. The Swiss government, of course, is free to repeat, as Mrs. Kopp says, that "This bill is based on our own needs. Neither its aims nor contents nor forms were dictated by the U.S." Only who does it want to fool with such statements?
• "[With] our new insider trading bill we want to ensure fair trade on our stock exchanges and to give equal chances to all groups of Investors."
    Maybe some of our American friends can explain to Mrs. Kopp why, in a free market, at least half of all insider trades, namely non-trades due to insider information, would escape any and every insider law, why then there is no such thing as equal investment chances.
• "[W]e feel that it's a real crime, insider trading is a crime against other people . . . [T]he younger generation definitely is of the opinion that insider trading isa crime."
    The penal code is patently the wrong instrument to change ethical values, and it is indeed for every market player to square them with his other interests and obligations, including responsible risk taking on the basis of the best available information. Does that make us criminals? Moreover, the Swiss people, on every opportunity they were given, consistently and massively voted for the strict maintenance of individual liberties, banking secrecy and fiscal non-cooperation. Every Swiss banker and parliamentarian I talked to in the last few years expressed dismay at what most see as a naive and apologetic Swiss government position in defending Swiss commercial interests abroad. Almost every one was thus more or less strongly against the insider Lex Americana, particularly after the American Supreme Court, last June 15, decided in its alarming Aerospatiale ruling that American courts and authorities need not always respect binding international treaties if the application of national means of coercion, such as the subpoena weapon, promises quicker and less expensive results from abroad.
    Marc Rich, Santa Fe, Marcos and Aerospatiale have thus combined into a Situation where Swiss lawmakers seriously contemplate retorsion measures, such as blocking pending legislation and suspending all Swiss-American legal assistance not vital to Swiss interests. Some even wrote to American Attorney General Edwin Meese - and have been waiting for the courtesy of a reply for 15 months. Not surprisingly, then, the admittedly "accelerated" Swiss Lex Americana was taken off the agenda in the June and September sessions of the Swiss parliament. While it was formally adopted in both chambers, it may now await final passage until after the American Supreme Court will have decided the R. Fester Winans insider case. For even if Swiss government ministers may not mind becoming the laughing stock of the market-place, the Swiss parliament may not want to appear holier than the pope.

WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
9 March 1988

    Switzerland's free market partisans have a month left in which to gain a referendum that would give the Swiss public a chance to block the parliament's insider trading law. Whether this will happen depends largely on whether the gadfly organization that has led the so far unsuccessful fight against the bill, the Swiss Investors Protection Association, is able to gather 50,000 signatures or get some cantons to help. Gaining so many signatures, all certified, is not only time-consuming, but also expensive, requiring the kind of money that is usually forthcoming from the big lobbying organizations. In this case, however, the biggest relevant lobbying organization, the Swiss Bankers Association, has been supporting the insider law.
    All the rnore reason then to take note of The Dingell Flap. This involves the trip to Switzerland last month of four staffers of a U.S. House of Representatives committee chaired by John Dingell, the liberal Michigau Democrat. Ostensibly seeking general background information on the working of Swiss banking secrecy and insider trading, they interviewed officers of Bank Pictet & Cie. in Geneva and asked, among other things, about the Dennis Levine case. A Dingell staffer who was at the meeting, Peter Stockton, says his group's interest was in learning how Bank Pictet had detected something fishy in Levine's operations before the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission woke up to alleged insider trading.
    The Swiss Bankers Association, which spoke with Bank Pictet execu-tives before and after the ineeting with the Dingell staffers, feit the questions were too specific and amounted to a Potential violation of Swiss criminal law forbidding unauthorized investiga-tions by foreign agencies on Swiss soil. So the SBA's first secretary, Andreas Hubschrnid, telephoned the Associa-tion's lawyer in Washington, Rober Royer, and asked him to express the SBA's concern to the relevant authorities. The Swiss foreign ministry voiced its own concern. Within 24 hours or so, the staffers were on their way home, complaining that they'd been "set up."
    Received wisdom is that The Dingell Flap is being blown out of proportion. It may be true that Mr. Dingell's aides lacked criminal intent; they were luckier than other foreign government investigators who have gone poking in Switzerland without appropriate clearance (several years ago French officials on an unauthorized investigation were held in jail). But the real issue here is something else. The Swiss Bankers Association and the Swiss government seem to believe it can appease regulatory forces in the U.S. by passing an insider trading law and setting up procedures for breaking the bank secret in agreed upon instances. "We're in favor of co-operation," says SBA's Mr. Hubschmid "within well-established procedures."
    Such reasonableness, unfortunately, isn't going to tame the regulatory zealots in Washington - neither in such agencies as the SEC nor in the higher-ranking committees of the American Congress, such as Mr. Dingell's Energy and Commerce Committee, that have oversight. The Dingell Flap is just a whiff of what Switzerland will be facing. Left wingers in the Congress are convinced that the Swiss banking secret is shielding a colossal nest of criminals. They are bent on its destruction, and they don't care whether they damage Switzerland's economy in the process. Mr. Hubschmid was eminently prudent in raising the alann over the Dingell caper. The Swiss would be equally prudent in requiring - even at the last minute - a referendum on the insider trading law so that the Swiss people could decide for themselves where to draw the line.
 

WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
16 June 1987

    The U.S. Supreme Court, in an important decision for international business disputes, ruled that federal courts have latitude in deciding whether to require that foreign companies produce records and other evidence in U.S. lawsuits.
    The high court ruled that an evidence treaty, signed by the U.S. in 1972 and in effect in 16 other countries, isn't the exclusive or even primary method of obtaining evidence in international disputes. The court said federal judges may use their own judgment about when to follow federal court rules, rather than the treaty, for pretrial proceedings.
    The dispute over The Hague Evidence Convention, as the treaty is called, is highly technical. But it has considerable practical significance in antitrust, securities and product-liability disputes. It drew friend-of-the-court briefs in the Supreme Court from the governments of West Germany, France, Britain and Switzerland.

WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
 25-26 March, 1988

    As the deadline approaches at which Switzerland's insider trading law will take effect a new question is being raised. Is Switzerland going to start massive tapping of its international telephone lines to keep a record of what bankers and their international clients are saying to one another - this for the purpose of helping the U.S. enforce its own insider trading laws? If so what are the implications for Switzerland's economy - and for its tradition of personal privacy in financial and political matters? The questions are germaine for those who carry on business with Switzerland on the assumption that their affairs are secure from snooping.
    The questions were raised under a procedure in Switzerland that enables members of parliament to put their concerns to the Federal Council that runs the government. The questions were prompted by reports that the government is purchasing telephone monitoring equipment that would extend Swiss surveillance capabilities so that it could tape record 20,000 telephone conversations sirnultaneously. The questiorier - Peter Hefti, of the Radical Party, which is a member of the governing coalition - wants to know whether such reports are true and, if so, whether the purchase of the equipment was prompted by the passage of the insider trading legislation.
    More broadly, Mr. Hefti - who is a moderate and one of the more pro-American members of the Swiss parliament - wants a clarification of government policy on the use of technical capabilities to tap phone, telefax and data transmissions between Swiss banks and lawyers and their foreign clients. His questions are not connected with the campaign agairist the insider trading law being pressed by free market zealots in Switzerland. But one gadfly organization that opposes the insider law, the Swiss Investors Protection Association, has also been asking about the telephone tapping issue. The Swiss Investors Protection Association wants to get eight cantons to request a national referendum on the insider trading law.
    Some will dismiss the telephone tapping questions as a scare tactic. But they look like good questions to us. They raise precisely the kind of issue Switzerland is going to have to think about if it wants to get into American-style regulation of securities markets. Maybe the Federal Council will reply that it's not going to start or condone tapping telephones on the scale about which Mr. Hefti inquires. Then, however, it would be logical to ask, why not? A massive, Orwellian monitoring and investigatory apparatus is the logical, even inevitable, requirement of the kind of law Switzerland has passed. It would change profoundly the view of the privacy of Swiss banking. It is surprising that lawyers, bankers - and the cantonal governments - are not showing greater concern.
 

WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
12 April 1988

    Your recent editorial "Spooking Switzerland?" (March 25-26) on the impending Swiss insider law stated: "A massive, Orweilian monitoring and investigatory apparatus is the logical, even inevitable, requirement of the Hex Americanal kind of law Switzerland has passed." That, of course, holds also true for other countries willing to apply American standards and laws on their own soil.
    So far, only West German bankers have successfully resisted the bureaucratic plain-leveling pressures emanating from Washington, Brussels and even from the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Relying on voluntary self-regulation measures, they thus spare themselves and their clients the risks entailed in the ill-considered criminalization of yet another blown-up and ill-defined market abuse.
    In this wider context of self-inflicted market wounds and a looming insider quagmire, something even more surprising was disclosed by the Basler Zeitung on March 31: it's not only the governments who increasingiy keep a watchful ear on their residents' telecommunications. The comprehensive surveillance and information needs created and facilitated by the SEC-inspired insider laws can easily be covered by privately held high-capacity telephone monitoring systems. In the case of Switzerland, these systems will even be run by the big Swiss banks themselves under cover of PTT licenses used for answering machines. What's more, these systems are already mostly in place and operational, according to the Basler Zeitung.
    Of course, the orally-run foreign exchange market, involving transactions of up to $300 billion a day [on a global basis], has given rise to a comprehensive recording of all related telephone communications. According to a spokesman of the Union Bank of Switzerland, its Geneva offices at present have some 400 telephone lines permanently on tapes for this security purpose. All banks directly participating in the foreign exchange market are said to maintain such professional recording systems of which more than 300 reportedly are installed in Swiss banks, covering more than 10,000 telephone lines. The resultant tapes are usually stored, which entails the risk of their detrimental use and - apparently overlooked, so far - of such tapes being subpoenaed in legal proceedings.
    Until now, this massive recording seems to have caused no major technical or legal problem. With new high-performance equipment just entering the market and with digital telephone centrals with comprehensive, even remotely-controlled capabilities already being tested, the recording and storing of telepnone conversations seems to have become a routine, escaping most people's attention and concern. The Volkswagen foreign exchange debacle may now become the first case where the data thus stored will serve to enlighten criminal investigators from abroad. With the insider law eventually in place, the SEC will be in a position to "convince" Swiss bankers to deliver on the promises contained in the Swiss-American Memorandum of Understanding of November 10, 1987, by availing their monitoring equipment and archives for accelerated insider investigations. Judging from past cases of myopic Swiss readiness to yield to U.S. pressures, the Swiss government will be glad to routinely facilitate the data flow the Swiss lawmakers unwittingly provided for but never intended.
    As to the legality of this intrusion of privacy of unsuspecting bank clients, the official telephone directory published by the Swiss PTT discloses under the heading "Pick-up sign": "This sign signifies that ... your communication may also be recorded on magnetic tape even if your call is being answered by a person." A few pages later the telephone book carries the notice: "Whoever listens in on or records telephone conversations with corresponding equipment without being authorized to do so by the PTT is punishable under art. I79bis and 179ter of the Swiss Penal Code. The authorization for recording telephone conversations is presumed granted if the subscriber arranged for the pick-up sign (Q) to be registered in the telephone book. The corresponding application identifying the kind and brand of equipment involved is to be submitted to the regional PTT directorate."
    According to the PTT directorate general, the 18 official telephone directories list some 150,000 Swiss telephone subscribers with a Q entry, including most lawyers - and all big Swiss banks. It remains to be seen whether this is what the Swiss lawmakers really had in mind.
    One of them, Dr. Peter Hefti of the governing coalition, has publicly expressed the view that any massive recording and storing of telecommunication data would be "incompatible with the libertarian principles underlying Swiss society." In his parliamentary question of March 18, Dr. Hefti also asked the government about the extent to which the technical possibilities for systematic surveillance and analysis of telecommunications are presently "exploited from within Switzerland and from abroad with regard to messages exchanged between Swiss banks and lawyers and their foreign clients?" Those concerned about individual liberties and truly reliable and discreet Swiss services were not exactly reassured by the facts disclosed by the Basler Zeitung. Yet in the interest of the numerous Swiss bank clients everywhere, we are confident that both the Swiss bankers and the Swiss government will not fail to provide in time fully satisfactory answers.
    In any case, clients of Swiss banks, for reasons of principle, too, may not accept the risk, however remote, that their telephone conversations with their bankers could one day be used against themselves or third persons. And they may not content themselves with any assurances which are not promptly backed up by corresponding deeds. Clearly, criminalizing remaining liberties and helping to pierce Swiss banking secrecy ever more readily and rapidly on ever less real grounds will only feed the bureaucracy. Swiss bankers still have a chance to convince their clients that they really mean to protect their clients' privacy - by using their economic and political clout for getting the insider law before the Swiss voters. Failing that the technical and legal infrastructure playing into the hands of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and other foreign snoops will grow into a Trojan Horse in the Swiss bankers' own backyard.

U.S. SUPREME COURT (85-1695, Swiss amicus curiae, Aerospatiale case)
No. 85-1695        OCTOBER TERM, 1985

    Pursuant to Rule 36 of the Rules of this Court, the Government of Switzerland respectfully submits this brief as amicus curiae to urge reversal of the judgment below. Both petitioners and respondent have consented to the submission of this brief, and the written consents have been filed with the Clerk of the Court.

A.     The Convention, Like Other Judicial Assistance Mechanisms, Serves an Important Role in Facililating International Commerce

B.     An Attempt by a U.S. Court lo Compel Unilalerally the Taking of Evidence in Switzerland. Similar lo the Demand for Evidence from France Made in This Case, Would Violate Swiss Sovereignty

C.     The Convention Applies to the Production of Evidence by Parties Subject to U.S. Jurisdiclion

"The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restrictions upon it, deriving validity from an  external source, would imply a diminuation of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restrictions. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself."
The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).

"In the execution of a Letter of Request the person concerned may refuse to give evidence in so far as he has a privilege or duty to refuse to give the evidence—
"(a) under the law of the State of execution; or "(b) under the law of the State of origin . . . ."

D.     The United States Should Not Disregard Its Obligations Under International Law

                            Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT E. HERZSTEIN         STEPHAN E. BECKER    ARNOLD & PORTER
Counsel of Record                     Counsel for Government of Switzerland

    The United States, France, and 15 other countries have acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention, which prescribes procedures by which a judicial authority in one Contracting State may request evidence located in another. Plaintiffs brought suit in Federal District Court for personal injuries resulting from the crash of an aircraf t built and sold by petitioners, two corporations owned by France. Petitioners answered the complaint without questioning the court's jurisdiction, and engaged in initial discovery without objection. However, when plaintiffs served subsequent discovery requests under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners filed a motion for a protective order, alleging that the Convention dictated the exclusive procedures that must be followed since petitioners are French and the discovery sought could only be had in France. A Magistrate denied the motion. and the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' mandamus petition, holding, inter alia, that when a district court has jurisdiction over a foreign litigant, the Convention does not apply even though the information sought may be physically located within the territory of a foreign signatory to the Convention.
Held:
    1. The Convention does not provide exclusive or mandatory procedures for obtaining documents and information located in a foreign signatory's territory. The Convention's plain language, as well as the history of its proposal and ratification by the United States, unambiguously supports the conclusion that it was intended to establish optional procedures for obtaining evidence abroad. Its preamble speaks in nonmandatory terms, specifying its purpose to "facilitate" discovery and to "improve mutual judicial co-operation." Similarly, its text uses permissive language, and does not expressly modify the law of Contractine States or require them to use the specified procedures or change their own procedures. The Convention does not deprive the District Court of its jurisdiction to order, under the Federal Rules, a foreign national party to produce evidence physically located within a signatory nation. Pp. 6-16.
    2. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the Convention "does not apply" to discovery sought from a foreign litigant that is subject to an American court's jurisdiction. Although they are not mandatory, the Convention's procedures are available whenever they will facilitate the gathering of evidence, and "apply" in the sense that they are one method of seeking evidence that a court may elect lo employ. Pp. 17-18.
    3. International comity does not require in all instances that American litigants first resort to Convention procedures before initiating discovery under the FederaJ Rules. In many situations, Convention procedures would be unduly time-consuming and expensive, and less likely to produce needed evidence than direct use of the Federal Rules. The concept of comity requires in this context a more particularized analysis of the respective interests of the foreign and requesting nations than a blanket "first resort" rule would generate. Thus, the determination whether to resort to the Convention requires prior scrutiny in each case of the particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that such resort will prove effective. Pp. 18-23.
782 F. 2d 120, vacated and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST. C. J., and WHITE, POWELL, and SCALIA, JJ.. joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and O'CONNOR, JJ.. joined.
(Slip Opinion)
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321. 337.

Die katholischen Spione
    Ziel der US-Spionage in der Schweiz wa-ren nicht nur die Bundesräte, sondern auch katholische Würdenträger. Hier Hessen die Zuträger Antiquar und Zur Sonne. Die als «zuverlässig» bezeichnete Quelle Antiquar berichtete brühwarm von vertraulichen Gesprächen, die er mit Philippe Bernardini, dem päpstlichen Nuntius in Bern, geführt hatte. Im Vatikan, klagte Bernardini im Herbst 1945, hätten Provinzler das Sagen: «Viele Kardinale und andere Würdenträger haben sehr wenig Ahnung von der Welt ausserhalb Italiens.» Antiquar kritisierte in vertrauter Runde auch den Papst: Obwohl sich dieser als grosser Deutschlandkenner ausgebe, sei sein Wissen über das Land klein und veraltet - «er missachtet den Rat von Kirchenmännern, die besser Bescheid wissen.»
    Nicht nur Spitzenbeamte und Kirchenleute spionierten für den US-Geheimdienst, auch Politiker und Journalisten gehörten zu den heimlichen Zuträgern. Toast zum Beispiel, eine Quelle, hinter der laut einem geheimen Memorandum des Zürcher US-Konsulats eine «führende Schweizer Polit-Persönlichkeit mit extrem guten Beziehungen ins linke Lager» steckt. Bei den Amerikanern schwärzte Toast im Mai 1945 die Anti-Nazi-Bewegung Freies Deutschland an. Die Bewegung solle nicht gefördert werden, «da sie eher kommunistisch wie nationalistisch ist».

Atomforscher Paul Scherrer rapportierte fleissig den Amerikanern.
    In die höchste Geheimhaltungsklasse wurden Informationen zur Atomtechnologie eingestuft. Ein nicht genannter Journalist lieferte im Mai 1946 die Informationen zu einem «topsecret» klassifizierten Rapport über die Atomforschung in der Schweiz. «Wissenschaftler aus Deutschland und Österreich haben den Schweizern interessante Dokumente überlassen», wusste die Medienquelle zu berichten. Unter dem Decknamen Flute rapportierte der bekannte Schweizer Atomforscher Paul Scherrer regelmässig den Amerikanern, vor allem über die deutsche Atomforschung. Der US-Geheimdienst plante während des Kriegs, den in Deutschland führenden Atomforscher Werner Heisenberg zu kidnappen. Ende 1944 gab es sogar einen Mordplan. Morris Berg, ein amerikanischer Undercover-Agent, sollte nach einem Referat in Zürich Heisenberg erschiessen, falls offenkundig würde, dass dieser das Wissen für den Atombombenbau hat. Heisenbergs Glück war, dass er mit keinem Wort auf eine Atombombe der Nazis einging.
    Bestens verankert ist der amerikanische Auslandgeheimdienst CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) und seine Vorgängerorganisation, das Office of Strategie Services (OSS), in der Welt der Schweizer Geschäftsanwälte und Banken. Nach dem Krieg suchte der Dienst intensiv nach deutschem Vermögen in der Schweiz. Wöchentlich gingen bei der Berner OSS-Aussenstelle Hinweise ein: Im März 1946 ist es eine Liste mit 62 Anwälten aus der Stadt Zürich, die in der Schweiz angeblich deutsche Vermögenswerte versteckten. «Die Liste wurde von einer zuverlässigen Quelle erstellt, die ähnliche Listen für jede Schweizer Stadt erstellen würde», heisst es im Begleitschreiben. Ein anderer Informant meldet, dass viele deutsche Konten in der Schweiz über Holland verwaltet würden: «In vielen Fällen wurden die holländischen Aufzeichnungen verbrannt oder vergraben.»
    Im Nachkriegsjahr erfahren die ameri-anischen Geheimdienstler in der Schweiz von Van Loo, einer Quelle «nahe einer prominenten Schweizer Bank», dass über ein klandestines Netz von Geschäftsagenten Kapital von französischen Industriellen in die Schweiz fliesst.
    Minuziös führten die Berner US-Agenten Buch über Schweizer Politiker, Spitzenbeamte und Wirtschaftsführer. Das geht aus den vom amerikanischen Nationalarchiv freigegebenen Dokumenten hervor. Im Dezember 1945 erstellte der US-Geheimdienst einen geheimen Informationsbericht über die ...-Familie. Ein Insider hatte Familien- und Firmeninterna verraten, unter anderem, dass ... während des Kriegs «ausgezeichnete Beziehungen zur Wehrmacht und zur SS» unterhalten habe. Bis zum Schluss habe der Industrielle an den Endsieg Deutschlands geglaubt und deutsche Verträge unterzeichnet.
    Reports, die ab November 1969 per Telex nach Washington übermittelt wurden, hielten fest, wer Freund und wer Feind der Amerikaner ist. Dem SRG-Generaldirektor Marcel Bezengon wurde nicht nur mangelhaftes Englisch attestiert. «Er steht im Ruf, antiamerikanisch zu sein», notierten die Profiler. Den Basler Finanzvorsteher Lukas Burckhardt, eine «attraktive und junge Politfigur», nannte ein vertrauliches Papier den «Kennedy der Schweiz». Auch der spätere Bundesrat Kurt Furgler kam in die Schublade «Pro | U.S.»: «Er ist sich der amerikanischen Lasten und Pflichten bewusst und versteht sie.» Den damaligen Schweizer Rüstungschef Heiner Schulthess bezeichneten die Geheimdienst-Biografen euphorisch als «All American Boy»: «Er ist nicht nur ein überzeugter Pro-Amerikaner, er hat auch ein typisch amerikanisches, offenes und easy-going Auftreten.»
    Die einflussreichen Freunde der CIA sind hier zu Lande so zahlreich, dass der Geheimdienst die Schweiz immer wieder als Plattform für heikle Operationen benutzt. So in den Achtzigerjahren, als im Rahmen der Iran-Contra-Aktion über Konten in Genf Waffengeschäfte abgewickelt wurden. 2000 wurde bekannt, dass Schweizer Armeeoffiziere die CIA illegal mit Informationen versorgten. Die Schweizer Militärs übergaben der CIA Pläne von Bunkern im Irak, die von Schweizer Unternehmen gebaut worden waren. Informationen, die den US-Militärs im ersten Golfkrieg nützlich waren.
    Obwohl illegal, bleiben solche Spionageaktivitäten zu Gunsten der CIA meistens ohne Folgen. Aktuelles Beispiel sind die Ermittlungen der Bundesanwaltschaft gegen den Schweizer Ingenieur Urs Tinner. Dieser soll mitgeholfen haben, Libyen mit Atomwaffen-Technologie zu versorgen. Obwohl Tinner die CIA über Moamar al-Kathafis Atomwaffenpläne auf dem Laufenden hielt, wird gegen ihn nicht wegen verbotenem Nachrichtendienst ermittelt. Es war Bundesrat Christoph Blocher, der seine schützende Hand über die CIA hielt: Im Vorfeld der Ermittlungen machte er deutlich, dass er mit Spionageermittlungen nicht einverstanden wäre. Nachdem FACTS den Vorgang publik gemacht hatte (51/2005), befragte der parlamentarische Geheimdienstausschuss Blocher.
    Was dabei herauskam, darf die Öffentlichkeit nicht wissen. Es bleibt - wie könnte es anders sein - ein Geheimnis.

SPIONAGE-STATISTIK
CIA und MI6 werden geschont
Die Schweizer Spionageabwehr zielte von 1948 bis 1994 vorab auf Ostspione. Gegen 31 Schweizer wurde wegen Spionage für die UdSSR und Russland ermittelt. 18 Schweizer wurden wegen Spitzelns für Frankreich aktenkundig, 7 wegen Spionage für die USA und 4 für den britischen Dienst MI6